

**NAME**

asn1parse – ASN.1 parsing tool

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl asn1parse [-inform PEM|DER] [-in filename] [-out filename] [-noout] [-offset number]
                  [-length number] [-i] [-oid filename] [-strparse offset]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **asn1parse** command is a diagnostic utility that can parse ASN.1 structures. It can also be used to extract data from ASN.1 formatted data.

**OPTIONS****-inform DER|PEM**

the input format. **DER** is binary format and **PEM** (the default) is base64 encoded.

**-in filename**

the input file, default is standard input

**-out filename**

output file to place the DER encoded data into. If this option is not present then no data will be output. This is most useful when combined with the **-strparse** option.

**-noout**

don't output the parsed version of the input file.

**-offset number**

starting offset to begin parsing, default is start of file.

**-length number**

number of bytes to parse, default is until end of file.

**-i** indents the output according to the “depth” of the structures.**-oid filename**

a file containing additional OBJECT IDENTIFIERS (OIDs). The format of this file is described in the NOTES section below.

**-strparse offset**

parse the contents octets of the ASN.1 object starting at **offset**. This option can be used multiple times to “drill down” into a nested structure.

**OUTPUT**

The output will typically contain lines like this:

```
0:d=0  hl=4 l= 681 cons: SEQUENCE
.....
229:d=3  hl=3 l= 141 prim: BIT STRING
373:d=2  hl=3 l= 162 cons: cont [ 3 ]
376:d=3  hl=3 l= 159 cons: SEQUENCE
379:d=4  hl=2 l=  29 cons: SEQUENCE
381:d=5  hl=2 l=   3 prim: OBJECT                :X509v3 Subject Key Identifier
386:d=5  hl=2 l=  22 prim: OCTET STRING
410:d=4  hl=2 l= 112 cons: SEQUENCE
412:d=5  hl=2 l=   3 prim: OBJECT                :X509v3 Authority Key Identifier
417:d=5  hl=2 l= 105 prim: OCTET STRING
524:d=4  hl=2 l=  12 cons: SEQUENCE
.....
```

This example is part of a self signed certificate. Each line starts with the offset in decimal. **d=XX** specifies the current depth. The depth is increased within the scope of any SET or SEQUENCE. **hl=XX** gives the header length (tag and length octets) of the current type. **l=XX** gives the length of the contents octets.

The **-i** option can be used to make the output more readable.

Some knowledge of the ASN.1 structure is needed to interpret the output.

In this example the BIT STRING at offset 229 is the certificate public key. The contents octets of this will contain the public key information. This can be examined using the option **-strparse 229** to yield:

```

    0:d=0  hl=3  l= 137  cons: SEQUENCE
      3:d=1  hl=3  l= 129  prim: INTEGER           :E5D21E1F5C8D208EA7A2166C7FAF9F6BD
    135:d=1  hl=2  l=   3  prim: INTEGER           :010001

```

## NOTES

If an OID is not part of OpenSSL's internal table it will be represented in numerical form (for example 1.2.3.4). The file passed to the **-oid** option allows additional OIDs to be included. Each line consists of three columns, the first column is the OID in numerical format and should be followed by white space. The second column is the "short name" which is a single word followed by white space. The final column is the rest of the line and is the "long name". **asn1parse** displays the long name. Example:

```
1.2.3.4      shortName    A long name
```

## BUGS

There should be options to change the format of input lines. The output of some ASN.1 types is not well handled (if at all).

**NAME**

ca – sample minimal CA application

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl ca [-verbose] [-config filename] [-name section] [-gencrl] [-revoke file] [-crl_reason
reason] [-crl_hold instruction] [-crl_compromise time] [-crl_CA_compromise time] [-subj arg]
[-crl days days] [-crl hours hours] [-crl_exts section] [-startdate date] [-enddate date] [-days arg]
[-md arg] [-policy arg] [-keyfile arg] [-key arg] [-passin arg] [-cert file] [-in file] [-out file]
[-notext] [-outdir dir] [-infile] [-spkac file] [-ss_cert file] [-preserveDN] [-noemailDN]
[-batch] [-msie_hack] [-extensions section] [-extfile section] [-engine id]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **ca** command is a minimal CA application. It can be used to sign certificate requests in a variety of forms and generate CRLs it also maintains a text database of issued certificates and their status.

The options descriptions will be divided into each purpose.

**CA OPTIONS****-config filename**

specifies the configuration file to use.

**-name section**

specifies the configuration file section to use (overrides **default\_ca** in the **ca** section).

**-in filename**

an input filename containing a single certificate request to be signed by the CA.

**-ss\_cert filename**

a single self signed certificate to be signed by the CA.

**-spkac filename**

a file containing a single Netscape signed public key and challenge and additional field values to be signed by the CA. See the **SPKAC FORMAT** section for information on the required format.

**-infile**

if present this should be the last option, all subsequent arguments are assumed to be the names of files containing certificate requests.

**-out filename**

the output file to output certificates to. The default is standard output. The certificate details will also be printed out to this file.

**-outdir directory**

the directory to output certificates to. The certificate will be written to a filename consisting of the serial number in hex with “.pem” appended.

**-cert**

the CA certificate file.

**-keyfile filename**

the private key to sign requests with.

**-key password**

the password used to encrypt the private key. Since on some systems the command line arguments are visible (e.g. Unix with the ‘ps’ utility) this option should be used with caution.

**-passin arg**

the key password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

**-verbose**

this prints extra details about the operations being performed.

**-notext**

don’t output the text form of a certificate to the output file.

**–startdate date**

this allows the start date to be explicitly set. The format of the date is YYMMDDHHMMSSZ (the same as an ASN1 UTCTime structure).

**–enddate date**

this allows the expiry date to be explicitly set. The format of the date is YYMMDDHHMMSSZ (the same as an ASN1 UTCTime structure).

**–days arg**

the number of days to certify the certificate for.

**–md alg**

the message digest to use. Possible values include md5, sha1 and mdc2. This option also applies to CRLs.

**–policy arg**

this option defines the CA “policy” to use. This is a section in the configuration file which decides which fields should be mandatory or match the CA certificate. Check out the **POLICY FORMAT** section for more information.

**–msie\_hack**

this is a legacy option to make **ca** work with very old versions of the IE certificate enrollment control “certenr3”. It used UniversalStrings for almost everything. Since the old control has various security bugs its use is strongly discouraged. The newer control “Xenroll” does not need this option.

**–preserveDN**

Normally the DN order of a certificate is the same as the order of the fields in the relevant policy section. When this option is set the order is the same as the request. This is largely for compatibility with the older IE enrollment control which would only accept certificates if their DN's match the order of the request. This is not needed for Xenroll.

**–noemailDN**

The DN of a certificate can contain the EMAIL field if present in the request DN, however it is good policy just having the e-mail set into the altName extension of the certificate. When this option is set the EMAIL field is removed from the certificate's subject and set only in the, eventually present, extensions. The **email\_in\_dn** keyword can be used in the configuration file to enable this behaviour.

**–batch**

this sets the batch mode. In this mode no questions will be asked and all certificates will be certified automatically.

**–extensions section**

the section of the configuration file containing certificate extensions to be added when a certificate is issued (defaults to **x509\_extensions** unless the **–extfile** option is used). If no extension section is present then, a V1 certificate is created. If the extension section is present (even if it is empty), then a V3 certificate is created.

**–extfile file**

an additional configuration file to read certificate extensions from (using the default section unless the **–extensions** option is also used).

**–engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

**CRL OPTIONS****–gencrl**

this option generates a CRL based on information in the index file.

**–crl days num**

the number of days before the next CRL is due. That is the days from now to place in the CRL nextUpdate field.

**-crlhours num**

the number of hours before the next CRL is due.

**-revoke filename**

a filename containing a certificate to revoke.

**-crl\_reason reason**

revocation reason, where **reason** is one of: **unspecified**, **keyCompromise**, **CACompromise**, **affiliationChanged**, **superseded**, **cessationOfOperation**, **certificateHold** or **removeFromCRL**. The matching of **reason** is case insensitive. Setting any revocation reason will make the CRL v2.

In practice **removeFromCRL** is not particularly useful because it is only used in delta CRLs which are not currently implemented.

**-crl\_hold instruction**

This sets the CRL revocation reason code to **certificateHold** and the hold instruction to **instruction** which must be an OID. Although any OID can be used only **holdInstructionNone** (the use of which is discouraged by RFC2459) **holdInstructionCallIssuer** or **holdInstructionReject** will normally be used.

**-crl\_compromise time**

This sets the revocation reason to **keyCompromise** and the compromise time to **time**. **time** should be in GeneralizedTime format that is YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ.

**-crl\_CA\_compromise time**

This is the same as **crl\_compromise** except the revocation reason is set to **CACompromise**.

**-subj arg**

supersedes subject name given in the request. The arg must be formatted as */type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...*, characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped.

**-crlxsts section**

the section of the configuration file containing CRL extensions to include. If no CRL extension section is present then a V1 CRL is created, if the CRL extension section is present (even if it is empty) then a V2 CRL is created. The CRL extensions specified are CRL extensions and **not** CRL entry extensions. It should be noted that some software (for example Netscape) can't handle V2 CRLs.

## CONFIGURATION FILE OPTIONS

The section of the configuration file containing options for **ca** is found as follows: If the **-name** command line option is used, then it names the section to be used. Otherwise the section to be used must be named in the **default\_ca** option of the **ca** section of the configuration file (or in the default section of the configuration file). Besides **default\_ca**, the following options are read directly from the **ca** section:

**RANDFILE**

**preserve**

**msie\_hack** With the exception of **RANDFILE**, this is probably a bug and may change in future releases.

Many of the configuration file options are identical to command line options. Where the option is present in the configuration file and the command line the command line value is used. Where an option is described as mandatory then it must be present in the configuration file or the command line equivalent (if any) used.

**oid\_file**

This specifies a file containing additional **OBJECT IDENTIFIERS**. Each line of the file should consist of the numerical form of the object identifier followed by white space then the short name followed by white space and finally the long name.

**oid\_section**

This specifies a section in the configuration file containing extra object identifiers. Each line should consist of the short name of the object identifier followed by = and the numerical form. The short and long names are the same when this option is used.

**new\_certs\_dir**

the same as the **-outdir** command line option. It specifies the directory where new certificates will be placed. Mandatory.

**certificate**

the same as **-cert**. It gives the file containing the CA certificate. Mandatory.

**private\_key**

same as the **-keyfile** option. The file containing the CA private key. Mandatory.

**RANDFILE**

a file used to read and write random number seed information, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd(3)*).

**default\_days**

the same as the **-days** option. The number of days to certify a certificate for.

**default\_startdate**

the same as the **-startdate** option. The start date to certify a certificate for. If not set the current time is used.

**default\_enddate**

the same as the **-enddate** option. Either this option or **default\_days** (or the command line equivalents) must be present.

**default\_crl\_hours default\_crl\_days**

the same as the **-crlhours** and the **-crldays** options. These will only be used if neither command line option is present. At least one of these must be present to generate a CRL.

**default\_md**

the same as the **-md** option. The message digest to use. Mandatory.

**database**

the text database file to use. Mandatory. This file must be present though initially it will be empty.

**serial**

a text file containing the next serial number to use in hex. Mandatory. This file must be present and contain a valid serial number.

**x509\_extensions**

the same as **-extensions**.

**crl\_extensions**

the same as **-crlxts**.

**preserve**

the same as **-preserveDN**

**email\_in\_dn**

the same as **-noemailDN**. If you want the EMAIL field to be removed from the DN of the certificate simply set this to 'no'. If not present the default is to allow for the EMAIL field in the certificate's DN.

**msie\_hack**

the same as **-msie\_hack**

**policy**

the same as **-policy**. Mandatory. See the **POLICY FORMAT** section for more information.

**nameopt, certopt**

these options allow the format used to display the certificate details when asking the user to confirm signing. All the options supported by the **x509** utilities **-nameopt** and **-certopt** switches can be used here, except the **no\_signame** and **no\_sigdump** are permanently set and cannot be disabled (this is because the certificate signature cannot be displayed because the certificate has not been signed at this point).

For convenience the values **ca\_default** are accepted by both to produce a reasonable output.

If neither option is present the format used in earlier versions of OpenSSL is used. Use of the old format is **strongly** discouraged because it only displays fields mentioned in the **policy** section,

mishandles multicharacter string types and does not display extensions.

### **copy\_extensions**

determines how extensions in certificate requests should be handled. If set to **none** or this option is not present then extensions are ignored and not copied to the certificate. If set to **copy** then any extensions present in the request that are not already present are copied to the certificate. If set to **copyall** then all extensions in the request are copied to the certificate: if the extension is already present in the certificate it is deleted first. See the **WARNINGS** section before using this option.

The main use of this option is to allow a certificate request to supply values for certain extensions such as subjectAltName.

## **POLICY FORMAT**

The policy section consists of a set of variables corresponding to certificate DN fields. If the value is “match” then the field value must match the same field in the CA certificate. If the value is “supplied” then it must be present. If the value is “optional” then it may be present. Any fields not mentioned in the policy section are silently deleted, unless the **–preserveDN** option is set but this can be regarded more of a quirk than intended behaviour.

## **SPKAC FORMAT**

The input to the **–spkac** command line option is a Netscape signed public key and challenge. This will usually come from the **KEYGEN** tag in an HTML form to create a new private key. It is however possible to create SPKACs using the **spkac** utility.

The file should contain the variable SPKAC set to the value of the SPKAC and also the required DN components as name value pairs. If you need to include the same component twice then it can be preceded by a number and a ‘.’.

## **EXAMPLES**

Note: these examples assume that the **ca** directory structure is already set up and the relevant files already exist. This usually involves creating a CA certificate and private key with **req**, a serial number file and an empty index file and placing them in the relevant directories.

To use the sample configuration file below the directories demoCA, demoCA/private and demoCA/newcerts would be created. The CA certificate would be copied to demoCA/cacert.pem and its private key to demoCA/private/cakey.pem. A file demoCA/serial would be created containing for example “01” and the empty index file demoCA/index.txt.

Sign a certificate request:

```
openssl ca -in req.pem -out newcert.pem
```

Sign a certificate request, using CA extensions:

```
openssl ca -in req.pem -extensions v3_ca -out newcert.pem
```

Generate a CRL

```
openssl ca -gencrl -out crl.pem
```

Sign several requests:

```
openssl ca -infiles req1.pem req2.pem req3.pem
```

Certify a Netscape SPKAC:

```
openssl ca -spkac spkac.txt
```

A sample SPKAC file (the SPKAC line has been truncated for clarity):

```
SPKAC=MIG0MGAwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEA7PDhCeV/xIxUg8V70YRxBK2A5
CN=Steve Test
emailAddress=steve@openssl.org
0.OU=OpenSSL Group
1.OU=Another Group
```

A sample configuration file with the relevant sections for **ca**:

```
[ ca ]
default_ca      = CA_default          # The default ca section
```

```

[ CA_default ]

dir               = ./demoCA                # top dir
database          = $dir/index.txt          # index file.
new_certs_dir     = $dir/newcerts           # new certs dir

certificate       = $dir/cacert.pem         # The CA cert
serial            = $dir/serial             # serial no file
private_key       = $dir/private/cakey.pem  # CA private key
RANDFILE          = $dir/private/.rand      # random number file

default_days      = 365                    # how long to certify for
default_crl_days  = 30                    # how long before next CRL
default_md        = md5                   # md to use

policy            = policy_any             # default policy
email_in_dn       = no                    # Don't add the email into cert DN

nameopt           = ca_default             # Subject name display option
certopt           = ca_default             # Certificate display option
copy_extensions   = none                  # Don't copy extensions from request

[ policy_any ]
countryName       = supplied
stateOrProvinceName = optional
organizationName  = optional
organizationalUnitName = optional
commonName        = supplied
emailAddress      = optional

```

## FILES

Note: the location of all files can change either by compile time options, configuration file entries, environment variables or command line options. The values below reflect the default values.

```

/usr/local/ssl/lib/openssl.cnf - master configuration file
./demoCA                      - main CA directory
./demoCA/cacert.pem           - CA certificate
./demoCA/private/cakey.pem    - CA private key
./demoCA/serial               - CA serial number file
./demoCA/serial.old           - CA serial number backup file
./demoCA/index.txt            - CA text database file
./demoCA/index.txt.old        - CA text database backup file
./demoCA/certs                - certificate output file
./demoCA/.rnd                 - CA random seed information

```

## ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES

**OPENSSL\_CONF** reflects the location of master configuration file it can be overridden by the **-config** command line option.

## RESTRICTIONS

The text database index file is a critical part of the process and if corrupted it can be difficult to fix. It is theoretically possible to rebuild the index file from all the issued certificates and a current CRL: however there is no option to do this.

V2 CRL features like delta CRL support and CRL numbers are not currently supported.

Although several requests can be input and handled at once it is only possible to include one SPKAC or self signed certificate.

## BUGS

The use of an in memory text database can cause problems when large numbers of certificates are present because, as the name implies the database has to be kept in memory.

It is not possible to certify two certificates with the same DN: this is a side effect of how the text database is indexed and it cannot easily be fixed without introducing other problems. Some S/MIME clients can use two certificates with the same DN for separate signing and encryption keys.

The **ca** command really needs rewriting or the required functionality exposed at either a command or



interface level so a more friendly utility (perl script or GUI) can handle things properly. The scripts **CA.sh** and **CA.pl** help a little but not very much.

Any fields in a request that are not present in a policy are silently deleted. This does not happen if the **-preserveDN** option is used. To enforce the absence of the EMAIL field within the DN, as suggested by RFCs, regardless the contents of the request' subject the **-noemailDN** option can be used. The behaviour should be more friendly and configurable.

Cancelling some commands by refusing to certify a certificate can create an empty file.

## WARNINGS

The **ca** command is quirky and at times downright unfriendly.

The **ca** utility was originally meant as an example of how to do things in a CA. It was not supposed to be used as a full blown CA itself: nevertheless some people are using it for this purpose.

The **ca** command is effectively a single user command: no locking is done on the various files and attempts to run more than one **ca** command on the same database can have unpredictable results.

The **copy\_extensions** option should be used with caution. If care is not taken then it can be a security risk. For example if a certificate request contains a basicConstraints extension with CA:TRUE and the **copy\_extensions** value is set to **copyall** and the user does not spot this when the certificate is displayed then this will hand the requestor a valid CA certificate.

This situation can be avoided by setting **copy\_extensions** to **copy** and including basicConstraints with CA:FALSE in the configuration file. Then if the request contains a basicConstraints extension it will be ignored.

It is advisable to also include values for other extensions such as **keyUsage** to prevent a request supplying its own values.

Additional restrictions can be placed on the CA certificate itself. For example if the CA certificate has:

```
basicConstraints = CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
```

then even if a certificate is issued with CA:TRUE it will not be valid.

## SEE ALSO

*req* (1), *spkac* (1), *x509* (1), *CA.pl* (1), *config* (5)

**NAME**

CA.pl – friendlier interface for OpenSSL certificate programs

**SYNOPSIS**

**CA.pl** [-?] [-h] [-help] [-newcert] [-newreq] [-newreq-nodes] [-newca] [-xsign] [-sign] [-signreq] [-signcert] [-verify] [files]

**DESCRIPTION**

The **CA.pl** script is a perl script that supplies the relevant command line arguments to the **openssl** command for some common certificate operations. It is intended to simplify the process of certificate creation and management by the use of some simple options.

**COMMAND OPTIONS**

**?, -h, -help**

prints a usage message.

**-newcert**

creates a new self signed certificate. The private key and certificate are written to the file “newreq.pem”.

**-newreq**

creates a new certificate request. The private key and request are written to the file “newreq.pem”.

**-newreq-nodes**

is like **-newreq** except that the private key will not be encrypted.

**-newca**

creates a new CA hierarchy for use with the **ca** program (or the **-signcert** and **-xsign** options). The user is prompted to enter the filename of the CA certificates (which should also contain the private key) or by hitting ENTER details of the CA will be prompted for. The relevant files and directories are created in a directory called “demoCA” in the current directory.

**-pkcs12**

create a PKCS#12 file containing the user certificate, private key and CA certificate. It expects the user certificate and private key to be in the file “newcert.pem” and the CA certificate to be in the file demoCA/cacert.pem, it creates a file “newcert.p12”. This command can thus be called after the **-sign** option. The PKCS#12 file can be imported directly into a browser. If there is an additional argument on the command line it will be used as the “friendly name” for the certificate (which is typically displayed in the browser list box), otherwise the name “My Certificate” is used.

**-sign, -signreq, -xsign**

calls the **ca** program to sign a certificate request. It expects the request to be in the file “newreq.pem”. The new certificate is written to the file “newcert.pem” except in the case of the **-xsign** option when it is written to standard output.

**-signCA**

this option is the same as the **-signreq** option except it uses the configuration file section **v3\_ca** and so makes the signed request a valid CA certificate. This is useful when creating intermediate CA from a root CA.

**-signcert**

this option is the same as **-sign** except it expects a self signed certificate to be present in the file “newreq.pem”.

**-verify**

verifies certificates against the CA certificate for “demoCA”. If no certificates are specified on the command line it tries to verify the file “newcert.pem”.

**files**

one or more optional certificate file names for use with the **-verify** command.

**EXAMPLES**

Create a CA hierarchy:

```
CA.pl -newca
```

Complete certificate creation example: create a CA, create a request, sign the request and finally create a PKCS#12 file containing it.

```
CA.pl -newca
CA.pl -newreq
CA.pl -signreq
CA.pl -pkcs12 "My Test Certificate"
```

## DSA CERTIFICATES

Although the **CA.pl** creates RSA CAs and requests it is still possible to use it with DSA certificates and requests using the *req*(1) command directly. The following example shows the steps that would typically be taken.

Create some DSA parameters:

```
openssl dsaparam -out dsap.pem 1024
```

Create a DSA CA certificate and private key:

```
openssl req -x509 -newkey dsa:dsap.pem -keyout cacert.pem -out cacert.pem
```

Create the CA directories and files:

```
CA.pl -newca
```

enter cacert.pem when prompted for the CA file name.

Create a DSA certificate request and private key (a different set of parameters can optionally be created first):

```
openssl req -out newreq.pem -newkey dsa:dsap.pem
```

Sign the request:

```
CA.pl -signreq
```

## NOTES

Most of the filenames mentioned can be modified by editing the **CA.pl** script.

If the demoCA directory already exists then the **-newca** command will not overwrite it and will do nothing. This can happen if a previous call using the **-newca** option terminated abnormally. To get the correct behaviour delete the demoCA directory if it already exists.

Under some environments it may not be possible to run the **CA.pl** script directly (for example Win32) and the default configuration file location may be wrong. In this case the command:

```
perl -S CA.pl
```

can be used and the **OPENSSL\_CONF** environment variable changed to point to the correct path of the configuration file "openssl.cnf".

The script is intended as a simple front end for the **openssl** program for use by a beginner. Its behaviour isn't always what is wanted. For more control over the behaviour of the certificate commands call the **openssl** command directly.

## ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES

The variable **OPENSSL\_CONF** if defined allows an alternative configuration file location to be specified, it should contain the full path to the configuration file, not just its directory.

## SEE ALSO

*x509*(1), *ca*(1), *req*(1), *pkcs12*(1), *config*(5)

**NAME**

ciphers – SSL cipher display and cipher list tool.

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl ciphers** [-v] [-ssl2] [-ssl3] [-tls1] [**cipherlist**]

**DESCRIPTION**

The **cipherlist** command converts OpenSSL cipher lists into ordered SSL cipher preference lists. It can be used as a test tool to determine the appropriate cipherlist.

**COMMAND OPTIONS**

**-v** verbose option. List ciphers with a complete description of protocol version (SSLv2 or SSLv3; the latter includes TLS), key exchange, authentication, encryption and mac algorithms used along with any key size restrictions and whether the algorithm is classed as an “export” cipher. Note that without the **-v** option, ciphers may seem to appear twice in a cipher list; this is when similar ciphers are available for SSL v2 and for SSL v3/TLS v1.

**-ssl3**  
only include SSL v3 ciphers.

**-ssl2**  
only include SSL v2 ciphers.

**-tls1**  
only include TLS v1 ciphers.

**-h, -?**  
print a brief usage message.

**cipherlist**  
a cipher list to convert to a cipher preference list. If it is not included then the default cipher list will be used. The format is described below.

**CIPHER LIST FORMAT**

The cipher list consists of one or more *cipher strings* separated by colons. Commas or spaces are also acceptable separators but colons are normally used.

The actual cipher string can take several different forms.

It can consist of a single cipher suite such as **RC4-SHA**.

It can represent a list of cipher suites containing a certain algorithm, or cipher suites of a certain type. For example **SHA1** represents all ciphers suites using the digest algorithm SHA1 and **SSLv3** represents all SSL v3 algorithms.

Lists of cipher suites can be combined in a single cipher string using the + character. This is used as a logical **and** operation. For example **SHA1+DES** represents all cipher suites containing the SHA1 **and** the DES algorithms.

Each cipher string can be optionally preceded by the characters **!**, **-** or **+**.

If **!** is used then the ciphers are permanently deleted from the list. The ciphers deleted can never reappear in the list even if they are explicitly stated.

If **-** is used then the ciphers are deleted from the list, but some or all of the ciphers can be added again by later options.

If **+** is used then the ciphers are moved to the end of the list. This option doesn't add any new ciphers it just moves matching existing ones.

If none of these characters is present then the string is just interpreted as a list of ciphers to be appended to the current preference list. If the list includes any ciphers already present they will be ignored: that is they will not be moved to the end of the list.

Additionally the cipher string **@STRENGTH** can be used at any point to sort the current cipher list in order of encryption algorithm key length.

## CIPHER STRINGS

The following is a list of all permitted cipher strings and their meanings.

### DEFAULT

the default cipher list. This is determined at compile time and is normally **ALL:!ADH:RC4+RSA:+SSLv2:@STRENGTH**. This must be the first cipher string specified.

### COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT

the ciphers included in **ALL**, but not enabled by default. Currently this is **ADH**. Note that this rule does not cover **eNULL**, which is not included by **ALL** (use **COMPLEMENTOFALL** if necessary).

### ALL

all ciphers suites except the **eNULL** ciphers which must be explicitly enabled.

### COMPLEMENTOFALL

the cipher suites not enabled by **ALL**, currently being **eNULL**.

### HIGH

“high” encryption cipher suites. This currently means those with key lengths larger than 128 bits.

### MEDIUM

“medium” encryption cipher suites, currently those using 128 bit encryption.

### LOW

“low” encryption cipher suites, currently those using 64 or 56 bit encryption algorithms but excluding export cipher suites.

### EXP, EXPORT

export encryption algorithms. Including 40 and 56 bits algorithms.

### EXPORT40

40 bit export encryption algorithms

### EXPORT56

56 bit export encryption algorithms.

### eNULL, NULL

the “NULL” ciphers that is those offering no encryption. Because these offer no encryption at all and are a security risk they are disabled unless explicitly included.

### aNULL

the cipher suites offering no authentication. This is currently the anonymous DH algorithms. These cipher suites are vulnerable to a “man in the middle” attack and so their use is normally discouraged.

### kRSA, RSA

cipher suites using RSA key exchange.

### kEDH

cipher suites using ephemeral DH key agreement.

### kDhR, kDhD

cipher suites using DH key agreement and DH certificates signed by CAs with RSA and DSS keys respectively. Not implemented.

### aRSA

cipher suites using RSA authentication, i.e. the certificates carry RSA keys.

### aDSS, DSS

cipher suites using DSS authentication, i.e. the certificates carry DSS keys.

### aDH

cipher suites effectively using DH authentication, i.e. the certificates carry DH keys. Not implemented.

### kFZA, aFZA, eFZA, FZA

cipher suites using FORTEZZA key exchange, authentication, encryption or all FORTEZZA algorithms. Not implemented.

**TLSv1, SSLv3, SSLv2**

TLS v1.0, SSL v3.0 or SSL v2.0 cipher suites respectively.

**DH** cipher suites using DH, including anonymous DH.

**ADH**

anonymous DH cipher suites.

**AES**

cipher suites using AES.

**3DES**

cipher suites using triple DES.

**DES**

cipher suites using DES (not triple DES).

**RC4**

cipher suites using RC4.

**RC2**

cipher suites using RC2.

**IDEA**

cipher suites using IDEA.

**MD5**

cipher suites using MD5.

**SHA1, SHA**

cipher suites using SHA1.

**CIPHER SUITE NAMES**

The following lists give the SSL or TLS cipher suites names from the relevant specification and their OpenSSL equivalents. It should be noted, that several cipher suite names do not include the authentication used, e.g. DES-CBC3-SHA. In these cases, RSA authentication is used.

**SSL v3.0 cipher suites.**

SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5	NULL-MD5
SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA	NULL-SHA
SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5	EXP-RC4-MD5
SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5	RC4-MD5
SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA	RC4-SHA
SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5	EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA	IDEA-CBC-SHA
SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	EXP-DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	DES-CBC3-SHA
SSL_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
SSL_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
SSL_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
SSL_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
SSL_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	EDH-DSS-CBC-SHA
SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
SSL_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA

SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5	EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5
SSL_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5	ADH-RC4-MD5
SSL_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA
SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_NULL_SHA	Not implemented.
SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_FORTEZZA_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
SSL_FORTEZZA_KEA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA	Not implemented.

**TLS v1.0 cipher suites.**

TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5	NULL-MD5
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA	NULL-SHA
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5	EXP-RC4-MD5
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5	RC4-MD5
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA	RC4-SHA
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5	EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5
TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA	IDEA-CBC-SHA
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	EXP-DES-CBC-SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	DES-CBC-SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	DES-CBC3-SHA
TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	Not implemented.
TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	EDH-DSS-CBC-SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5	EXP-ADH-RC4-MD5
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5	ADH-RC4-MD5
TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA	EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	ADH-DES-CBC-SHA
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA

**AES ciphersuites from RFC3268, extending TLS v1.0**

TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	AES128-SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	AES256-SHA
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DH-DSS-AES128-SHA
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DH-DSS-AES256-SHA
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DH-RSA-AES128-SHA
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DH-RSA-AES256-SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	ADH-AES128-SHA
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	ADH-AES256-SHA

### Additional Export 1024 and other cipher suites

Note: these ciphers can also be used in SSL v3.

TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA
TLS_RSA_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA	EXP1024-RC4-SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA	EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA	DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA

### SSL v2.0 cipher suites.

SSL_CK_RC4_128_WITH_MD5	RC4-MD5
SSL_CK_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5	EXP-RC4-MD5
SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5	RC2-MD5
SSL_CK_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5	EXP-RC2-MD5
SSL_CK_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5	IDEA-CBC-MD5
SSL_CK_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5	DES-CBC-MD5
SSL_CK_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5	DES-CBC3-MD5

## NOTES

The non-ephemeral DH modes are currently unimplemented in OpenSSL because there is no support for DH certificates.

Some compiled versions of OpenSSL may not include all the ciphers listed here because some ciphers were excluded at compile time.

## EXAMPLES

Verbose listing of all OpenSSL ciphers including NULL ciphers:

```
openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:eNULL'
```

Include all ciphers except NULL and anonymous DH then sort by strength:

```
openssl ciphers -v 'ALL:!ADH:@STRENGTH'
```

Include only 3DES ciphers and then place RSA ciphers last:

```
openssl ciphers -v '3DES:+RSA'
```

Include all RC4 ciphers but leave out those without authentication:

```
openssl ciphers -v 'RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT'
```

Include all ciphers with RSA authentication but leave out ciphers without encryption.

```
openssl ciphers -v 'RSA:!COMPLEMENTOFALL'
```

## SEE ALSO

*s\_client*(1), *s\_server*(1), *ssl*(3)

## HISTORY

The **COMPLEMENTOFALL** and **COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT** selection options were added in version 0.9.7.



**NAME**

crl – CRL utility

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl crl [-inform PEM|DER] [-outform PEM|DER] [-text] [-in filename] [-out filename]
[-noout] [-hash] [-issuer] [-lastupdate] [-nextupdate] [-CAfile file] [-CApath dir]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **crl** command processes CRL files in DER or PEM format.

**COMMAND OPTIONS****-inform DER|PEM**

This specifies the input format. **DER** format is DER encoded CRL structure. **PEM** (the default) is a base64 encoded version of the DER form with header and footer lines.

**-outform DER|PEM**

This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the **-inform** option.

**-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read from or standard input if this option is not specified.

**-out filename**

specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by default.

**-text**

print out the CRL in text form.

**-noout**

don't output the encoded version of the CRL.

**-hash**

output a hash of the issuer name. This can be use to lookup CRLs in a directory by issuer name.

**-issuer**

output the issuer name.

**-lastupdate**

output the lastUpdate field.

**-nextupdate**

output the nextUpdate field.

**-CAfile file**

verify the signature on a CRL by looking up the issuing certificate in **file**

**-CApath dir**

verify the signature on a CRL by looking up the issuing certificate in **dir**. This directory must be a standard certificate directory: that is a hash of each subject name (using **x509 -hash**) should be linked to each certificate.

**NOTES**

The PEM CRL format uses the header and footer lines:

```
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
-----END X509 CRL-----
```

**EXAMPLES**

Convert a CRL file from PEM to DER:

```
openssl crl -in crl.pem -outform DER -out crl.der
```

Output the text form of a DER encoded certificate:

```
openssl crl -in crl.der -text -noout
```

**BUGS**

Ideally it should be possible to create a CRL using appropriate options and files too.

**SEE ALSO***crl2pkcs7(1)*, *ca(1)*, *x509(1)*

**NAME**

crl2pkcs7 – Create a PKCS#7 structure from a CRL and certificates.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl crl2pkcs7 [-inform PEM|DER] [-outform PEM|DER] [-in filename] [-out filename]
[-certfile filename] [-nocrl]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **crl2pkcs7** command takes an optional CRL and one or more certificates and converts them into a PKCS#7 degenerate “certificates only” structure.

**COMMAND OPTIONS****-inform DER|PEM**

This specifies the CRL input format. **DER** format is DER encoded CRL structure. **PEM** (the default) is a base64 encoded version of the DER form with header and footer lines.

**-outform DER|PEM**

This specifies the PKCS#7 structure output format. **DER** format is DER encoded PKCS#7 structure. **PEM** (the default) is a base64 encoded version of the DER form with header and footer lines.

**-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read a CRL from or standard input if this option is not specified.

**-out filename**

specifies the output filename to write the PKCS#7 structure to or standard output by default.

**-certfile filename**

specifies a filename containing one or more certificates in **PEM** format. All certificates in the file will be added to the PKCS#7 structure. This option can be used more than once to read certificates from multiple files.

**-nocrl**

normally a CRL is included in the output file. With this option no CRL is included in the output file and a CRL is not read from the input file.

**EXAMPLES**

Create a PKCS#7 structure from a certificate and CRL:

```
openssl crl2pkcs7 -in crl.pem -certfile cert.pem -out p7.pem
```

Creates a PKCS#7 structure in DER format with no CRL from several different certificates:

```
openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile newcert.pem
-certfile demoCA/cacert.pem -outform DER -out p7.der
```

**NOTES**

The output file is a PKCS#7 signed data structure containing no signers and just certificates and an optional CRL.

This utility can be used to send certificates and CAs to Netscape as part of the certificate enrollment process. This involves sending the DER encoded output as MIME type application/x-x509-user-cert.

The **PEM** encoded form with the header and footer lines removed can be used to install user certificates and CAs in MSIE using the Xenroll control.

**SEE ALSO**

*pkcs7(1)*

**NAME**

dgst, md5, md4, md2, sha1, sha, mdc2, ripemd160 – message digests

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl dgst [-md5|-md4|-md2|-sha1|-sha|-mdc2|-ripemd160|-dss1] [-c] [-d] [-hex]
[-binary] [-out filename] [-sign filename] [-verify filename] [-prverify filename] [-signature
filename] [file...]

[md5|md4|md2|sha1|sha|mdc2|ripemd160] [-c] [-d] [file...]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The digest functions output the message digest of a supplied file or files in hexadecimal form. They can also be used for digital signing and verification.

**OPTIONS**

- c** print out the digest in two digit groups separated by colons, only relevant if **hex** format output is used.
- d** print out BIO debugging information.
- hex**  
digest is to be output as a hex dump. This is the default case for a “normal” digest as opposed to a digital signature.
- binary**  
output the digest or signature in binary form.
- out filename**  
filename to output to, or standard output by default.
- sign filename**  
digitally sign the digest using the private key in “filename”.
- verify filename**  
verify the signature using the the public key in “filename”. The output is either “Verification OK” or “Verification Failure”.
- prverify filename**  
verify the signature using the the private key in “filename”.
- signature filename**  
the actual signature to verify.
- rand file(s)**  
a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd(3)*). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is ; for MS-Windows, , for OpenVMS, and : for all others.
- file...**  
file or files to digest. If no files are specified then standard input is used.

**NOTES**

The digest of choice for all new applications is SHA1. Other digests are however still widely used. If you wish to sign or verify data using the DSA algorithm then the dss1 digest must be used. A source of random numbers is required for certain signing algorithms, in particular DSA. The signing and verify options should only be used if a single file is being signed or verified.

**NAME**

dhparam – DH parameter manipulation and generation

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl dhparam [-inform DER|PEM] [-outform DER|PEM] [-in filename] [-out filename]
[-dsaparam] [-noout] [-text] [-C] [-2] [-5] [-rand file(s)] [-engine id] [numbits]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

This command is used to manipulate DH parameter files.

**OPTIONS****-inform DER|PEM**

This specifies the input format. The **DER** option uses an ASN1 DER encoded form compatible with the PKCS#3 DHparameter structure. The PEM form is the default format: it consists of the **DER** format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines.

**-outform DER|PEM**

This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the **-inform** option.

**-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read parameters from or standard input if this option is not specified.

**-out filename**

This specifies the output filename parameters to. Standard output is used if this option is not present. The output filename should **not** be the same as the input filename.

**-dsaparam**

If this option is used, DSA rather than DH parameters are read or created; they are converted to DH format. Otherwise, “strong” primes (such that  $(p-1)/2$  is also prime) will be used for DH parameter generation.

DH parameter generation with the **-dsaparam** option is much faster, and the recommended exponent length is shorter, which makes DH key exchange more efficient. Beware that with such DSA-style DH parameters, a fresh DH key should be created for each use to avoid small-subgroup attacks that may be possible otherwise.

**-2, -5**

The generator to use, either 2 or 5. 2 is the default. If present then the input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead.

**-rand file(s)**

a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd(3)*). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is `;` for MS-Windows, `,` for OpenVMS, and `:` for all others.

**numbits**

this option specifies that a parameter set should be generated of size *numbits*. It must be the last option. If not present then a value of 512 is used. If this option is present then the input file is ignored and parameters are generated instead.

**-noout**

this option inhibits the output of the encoded version of the parameters.

**-text**

this option prints out the DH parameters in human readable form.

**-C** this option converts the parameters into C code. The parameters can then be loaded by calling the `get_dhnumbits()` function.

**-engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

## WARNINGS

The program **dhparam** combines the functionality of the programs **dh** and **gendh** in previous versions of OpenSSL and SSLeay. The **dh** and **gendh** programs are retained for now but may have different purposes in future versions of OpenSSL.

## NOTES

PEM format DH parameters use the header and footer lines:

```
-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----  
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
```

OpenSSL currently only supports the older PKCS#3 DH, not the newer X9.42 DH.

This program manipulates DH parameters not keys.

## BUGS

There should be a way to generate and manipulate DH keys.

## SEE ALSO

*dsaparam*(1)

## HISTORY

The **dhparam** command was added in OpenSSL 0.9.5. The **-dsaparam** option was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6.

**NAME**

dsa – DSA key processing

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl dsa [-inform PEM|DER] [-outform PEM|DER] [-in filename] [-passin arg] [-out filename] [-passout arg] [-des] [-des3] [-idea] [-text] [-noout] [-modulus] [-pubin] [-pubout] [-engine id]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **dsa** command processes DSA keys. They can be converted between various forms and their components printed out. **Note** This command uses the traditional SSLeay compatible format for private key encryption: newer applications should use the more secure PKCS#8 format using the **pkcs8**

**COMMAND OPTIONS****-inform DER|PEM**

This specifies the input format. The **DER** option with a private key uses an ASN1 DER encoded form of an ASN.1 SEQUENCE consisting of the values of version (currently zero), p, q, g, the public and private key components respectively as ASN.1 INTEGERS. When used with a public key it uses a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure: it is an error if the key is not DSA.

The **PEM** form is the default format: it consists of the **DER** format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines. In the case of a private key PKCS#8 format is also accepted.

**-outform DER|PEM**

This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the **-inform** option.

**-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be prompted for.

**-passin arg**

the input file password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl* (1).

**-out filename**

This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output by is not specified. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase will be prompted for. The output filename should **not** be the same as the input filename.

**-passout arg**

the output file password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl* (1).

**-des|-des3|-idea**

These options encrypt the private key with the DES, triple DES, or the IDEA ciphers respectively before outputting it. A pass phrase is prompted for. If none of these options is specified the key is written in plain text. This means that using the **dsa** utility to read in an encrypted key with no encryption option can be used to remove the pass phrase from a key, or by setting the encryption options it can be used to add or change the pass phrase. These options can only be used with PEM format output files.

**-text**

prints out the public, private key components and parameters.

**-noout**

this option prevents output of the encoded version of the key.

**-modulus**

this option prints out the value of the public key component of the key.

**-pubin**

by default a private key is read from the input file: with this option a public key is read instead.

**-pubout**

by default a private key is output. With this option a public key will be output instead. This option is automatically set if the input is a public key.

**-engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

**NOTES**

The PEM private key format uses the header and footer lines:

```
-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----  
-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
```

The PEM public key format uses the header and footer lines:

```
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----  
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
```

**EXAMPLES**

To remove the pass phrase on a DSA private key:

```
openssl dsa -in key.pem -out keyout.pem
```

To encrypt a private key using triple DES:

```
openssl dsa -in key.pem -des3 -out keyout.pem
```

To convert a private key from PEM to DER format:

```
openssl dsa -in key.pem -outform DER -out keyout.der
```

To print out the components of a private key to standard output:

```
openssl dsa -in key.pem -text -noout
```

To just output the public part of a private key:

```
openssl dsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
```

**SEE ALSO**

*dsaparam* (1), *gendsa* (1), *rsa* (1), *genrsa* (1)



**NAME**

dsaparam – DSA parameter manipulation and generation

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl dsaparam [-inform DER|PEM] [-outform DER|PEM] [-in filename] [-out filename]
[-noout] [-text] [-C] [-rand file(s)] [-genkey] [-engine id] [numbits]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

This command is used to manipulate or generate DSA parameter files.

**OPTIONS****-inform DER|PEM**

This specifies the input format. The **DER** option uses an ASN1 DER encoded form compatible with RFC2459 (PKIX) DSS-Parms that is a SEQUENCE consisting of p, q and g respectively. The PEM form is the default format: it consists of the **DER** format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines.

**-outform DER|PEM**

This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the **-inform** option.

**-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read parameters from or standard input if this option is not specified. If the **numbits** parameter is included then this option will be ignored.

**-out filename**

This specifies the output filename parameters to. Standard output is used if this option is not present. The output filename should **not** be the same as the input filename.

**-noout**

this option inhibits the output of the encoded version of the parameters.

**-text**

this option prints out the DSA parameters in human readable form.

**-C** this option converts the parameters into C code. The parameters can then be loaded by calling the *get\_dsaXXX()* function.

**-genkey**

this option will generate a DSA either using the specified or generated parameters.

**-rand file(s)**

a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd(3)*). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is ; for MS-Windows, , for OpenVMS, and : for all others.

**numbits**

this option specifies that a parameter set should be generated of size **numbits**. It must be the last option. If this option is included then the input file (if any) is ignored.

**-engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

**NOTES**

PEM format DSA parameters use the header and footer lines:

```
-----BEGIN DSA PARAMETERS-----
-----END DSA PARAMETERS-----
```

DSA parameter generation is a slow process and as a result the same set of DSA parameters is often used to generate several distinct keys.

**SEE ALSO**

*gendsa(1)*, *dsa(1)*, *genrsa(1)*, *rsa(1)*

**NAME**

enc – symmetric cipher routines

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl enc** **–ciphername** [**–in filename**] [**–out filename**] [**–pass arg**] [**–e**] [**–d**] [**–a**] [**–A**] [**–k password**] [**–kfile filename**] [**–K key**] [**–iv IV**] [**–p**] [**–P**] [**–bufsize number**] [**–nopad**] [**–debug**]

**DESCRIPTION**

The symmetric cipher commands allow data to be encrypted or decrypted using various block and stream ciphers using keys based on passwords or explicitly provided. Base64 encoding or decoding can also be performed either by itself or in addition to the encryption or decryption.

**OPTIONS****–in filename**

the input filename, standard input by default.

**–out filename**

the output filename, standard output by default.

**–pass arg**

the password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

**–salt**

use a salt in the key derivation routines. This option should **ALWAYS** be used unless compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL or SSLeay is required. This option is only present on OpenSSL versions 0.9.5 or above.

**–nosalt**

don't use a salt in the key derivation routines. This is the default for compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL and SSLeay.

**–e** encrypt the input data: this is the default.**–d** decrypt the input data.**–a** base64 process the data. This means that if encryption is taking place the data is base64 encoded after encryption. If decryption is set then the input data is base64 decoded before being decrypted.**–A** if the **–a** option is set then base64 process the data on one line.**–k password**

the password to derive the key from. This is for compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL. Superseded by the **–pass** argument.

**–kfile filename**

read the password to derive the key from the first line of **filename**. This is for compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL. Superseded by the **–pass** argument.

**–S salt**

the actual salt to use: this must be represented as a string comprised only of hex digits.

**–K key**

the actual key to use: this must be represented as a string comprised only of hex digits. If only the key is specified, the IV must additionally specified using the **–iv** option. When both a key and a password are specified, the key given with the **–K** option will be used and the IV generated from the password will be taken. It probably does not make much sense to specify both key and password.

**–iv IV**

the actual IV to use: this must be represented as a string comprised only of hex digits. When only the key is specified using the **–K** option, the IV must explicitly be defined. When a password is being specified using one of the other options, the IV is generated from this password.

**–p** print out the key and IV used.**–P** print out the key and IV used then immediately exit: don't do any encryption or decryption.

- bufsize number**  
set the buffer size for I/O
- nopad**  
disable standard block padding
- debug**  
debug the BIOs used for I/O.

## NOTES

The program can be called either as **openssl ciphername** or **openssl enc -ciphername**.

A password will be prompted for to derive the key and IV if necessary.

The **-salt** option should **ALWAYS** be used if the key is being derived from a password unless you want compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL and SSLeay.

Without the **-salt** option it is possible to perform efficient dictionary attacks on the password and to attack stream cipher encrypted data. The reason for this is that without the salt the same password always generates the same encryption key. When the salt is being used the first eight bytes of the encrypted data are reserved for the salt: it is generated at random when encrypting a file and read from the encrypted file when it is decrypted.

Some of the ciphers do not have large keys and others have security implications if not used correctly. A beginner is advised to just use a strong block cipher in CBC mode such as bf or des3.

All the block ciphers normally use PKCS#5 padding also known as standard block padding: this allows a rudimentary integrity or password check to be performed. However since the chance of random data passing the test is better than 1 in 256 it isn't a very good test.

If padding is disabled then the input data must be a multiple of the cipher block length.

All RC2 ciphers have the same key and effective key length.

Blowfish and RC5 algorithms use a 128 bit key.

## SUPPORTED CIPHERS

base64	Base 64
bf-cbc	Blowfish in CBC mode
bf	Alias for bf-cbc
bf-cfb	Blowfish in CFB mode
bf-ecb	Blowfish in ECB mode
bf-ofb	Blowfish in OFB mode
cast-cbc	CAST in CBC mode
cast	Alias for cast-cbc
cast5-cbc	CAST5 in CBC mode
cast5-cfb	CAST5 in CFB mode
cast5-ecb	CAST5 in ECB mode
cast5-ofb	CAST5 in OFB mode
des-cbc	DES in CBC mode
des	Alias for des-cbc
des-cfb	DES in CBC mode
des-ofb	DES in OFB mode
des-ecb	DES in ECB mode
des-ede-cbc	Two key triple DES EDE in CBC mode
des-ede	Alias for des-ede
des-ede-cfb	Two key triple DES EDE in CFB mode
des-ede-ofb	Two key triple DES EDE in OFB mode
des-ede3-cbc	Three key triple DES EDE in CBC mode
des-ede3	Alias for des-ede3-cbc
des3	Alias for des-ede3-cbc
des-ede3-cfb	Three key triple DES EDE CFB mode
des-ede3-ofb	Three key triple DES EDE in OFB mode

desx	DESX algorithm.
idea-cbc	IDEA algorithm in CBC mode
idea	same as idea-cbc
idea-cfb	IDEA in CFB mode
idea-ecb	IDEA in ECB mode
idea-ofb	IDEA in OFB mode
rc2-cbc	128 bit RC2 in CBC mode
rc2	Alias for rc2-cbc
rc2-cfb	128 bit RC2 in CBC mode
rc2-ecb	128 bit RC2 in CBC mode
rc2-ofb	128 bit RC2 in CBC mode
rc2-64-cbc	64 bit RC2 in CBC mode
rc2-40-cbc	40 bit RC2 in CBC mode
rc4	128 bit RC4
rc4-64	64 bit RC4
rc4-40	40 bit RC4
rc5-cbc	RC5 cipher in CBC mode
rc5	Alias for rc5-cbc
rc5-cfb	RC5 cipher in CBC mode
rc5-ecb	RC5 cipher in CBC mode
rc5-ofb	RC5 cipher in CBC mode

## EXAMPLES

Just base64 encode a binary file:

```
openssl base64 -in file.bin -out file.b64
```

Decode the same file

```
openssl base64 -d -in file.b64 -out file.bin
```

Encrypt a file using triple DES in CBC mode using a prompted password:

```
openssl des3 -salt -in file.txt -out file.des3
```

Decrypt a file using a supplied password:

```
openssl des3 -d -salt -in file.des3 -out file.txt -k mypassword
```

Encrypt a file then base64 encode it (so it can be sent via mail for example) using Blowfish in CBC mode:

```
openssl bf -a -salt -in file.txt -out file.bf
```

Base64 decode a file then decrypt it:

```
openssl bf -d -salt -a -in file.bf -out file.txt
```

Decrypt some data using a supplied 40 bit RC4 key:

```
openssl rc4-40 -in file.rc4 -out file.txt -K 0102030405
```

## BUGS

The **-A** option when used with large files doesn't work properly.

There should be an option to allow an iteration count to be included.

The **enc** program only supports a fixed number of algorithms with certain parameters. So if, for example, you want to use RC2 with a 76 bit key or RC4 with an 84 bit key you can't use this program.

**NAME**

gensda – generate a DSA private key from a set of parameters

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl gensda** [**-out filename**] [**-des**] [**-des3**] [**-idea**] [**-rand file(s)**] [**-engine id**] [**paramfile**]

**DESCRIPTION**

The **gensda** command generates a DSA private key from a DSA parameter file (which will be typically generated by the **openssl dsaparam** command).

**OPTIONS**

**-des** | **-des3** | **-idea**

These options encrypt the private key with the DES, triple DES, or the IDEA ciphers respectively before outputting it. A pass phrase is prompted for. If none of these options is specified no encryption is used.

**-rand file(s)**

a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd(3)*). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is ; for MS-Windows, , for OpenVMS, and : for all others.

**-engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

**paramfile**

This option specifies the DSA parameter file to use. The parameters in this file determine the size of the private key. DSA parameters can be generated and examined using the **openssl dsaparam** command.

**NOTES**

DSA key generation is little more than random number generation so it is much quicker than RSA key generation for example.

**SEE ALSO**

*dsaparam(1)*, *dsa(1)*, *genrsa(1)*, *rsa(1)*

**NAME**

genrsa – generate an RSA private key

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl genrsa** [**–out filename**] [**–passout arg**] [**–des**] [**–des3**] [**–idea**] [**–f4**] [**–3**] [**–rand file(s)**]  
[**–engine id**] [**numbits**]

**DESCRIPTION**

The **genrsa** command generates an RSA private key.

**OPTIONS****–out filename**

the output filename. If this argument is not specified then standard output is used.

**–passout arg**

the output file password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

**–des** | **–des3** | **–idea**

These options encrypt the private key with the DES, triple DES, or the IDEA ciphers respectively before outputting it. If none of these options is specified no encryption is used. If encryption is used a pass phrase is prompted for if it is not supplied via the **–passout** argument.

**–F4** | **–3**

the public exponent to use, either 65537 or 3. The default is 65537.

**–rand file(s)**

a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd*(3)). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is ; for MS–Windows, , for OpenVMS, and : for all others.

**–engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

**numbits**

the size of the private key to generate in bits. This must be the last option specified. The default is 512.

**NOTES**

RSA private key generation essentially involves the generation of two prime numbers. When generating a private key various symbols will be output to indicate the progress of the generation. A . represents each number which has passed an initial sieve test, + means a number has passed a single round of the Miller-Rabin primality test. A newline means that the number has passed all the prime tests (the actual number depends on the key size).

Because key generation is a random process the time taken to generate a key may vary somewhat.

**BUGS**

A quirk of the prime generation algorithm is that it cannot generate small primes. Therefore the number of bits should not be less than 64. For typical private keys this will not matter because for security reasons they will be much larger (typically 1024 bits).

**SEE ALSO**

*genssa*(1)

**NAME**

nseq – create or examine a netscape certificate sequence

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl nseq** [**-in filename**] [**-out filename**] [**-toseq**]

**DESCRIPTION**

The **nseq** command takes a file containing a Netscape certificate sequence and prints out the certificates contained in it or takes a file of certificates and converts it into a Netscape certificate sequence.

**COMMAND OPTIONS****-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read or standard input if this option is not specified.

**-out filename**

specifies the output filename or standard output by default.

**-toseq**

normally a Netscape certificate sequence will be input and the output is the certificates contained in it. With the **-toseq** option the situation is reversed: a Netscape certificate sequence is created from a file of certificates.

**EXAMPLES**

Output the certificates in a Netscape certificate sequence

```
openssl nseq -in nseq.pem -out certs.pem
```

Create a Netscape certificate sequence

```
openssl nseq -in certs.pem -toseq -out nseq.pem
```

**NOTES**

The **PEM** encoded form uses the same headers and footers as a certificate:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----  
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

A Netscape certificate sequence is a Netscape specific form that can be sent to browsers as an alternative to the standard PKCS#7 format when several certificates are sent to the browser: for example during certificate enrollment. It is used by Netscape certificate server for example.

**BUGS**

This program needs a few more options: like allowing DER or PEM input and output files and allowing multiple certificate files to be used.

**NAME**

ocsp – Online Certificate Status Protocol utility

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl ocsp [-out file] [-issuer file] [-cert file] [-serial n] [-signer file] [-signkey file]
[-sign_other file] [-no_certs] [-req_text] [-resp_text] [-text] [-reqout file] [-respout file] [-reqin
file] [-respin file] [-nonce] [-no_nonce] [-url URL] [-host host:n] [-path] [-CApath dir]
[-CAfile file] [-VAfile file] [-validity_period n] [-status_age n] [-noverify] [-verify_other file]
[-trust_other] [-no_intern] [-no_signature_verify] [-no_cert_verify] [-no_chain]
[-no_cert_checks] [-port num] [-index file] [-CA file] [-rsigner file] [-rkey file] [-rother file]
[-resp_no_certs] [-nmin n] [-ndays n] [-resp_key_id] [-nrequest n]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) enables applications to determine the (revocation) state of an identified certificate (RFC 2560).

The **ocsp** command performs many common OCSP tasks. It can be used to print out requests and responses, create requests and send queries to an OCSP responder and behave like a mini OCSP server itself.

**OCSP CLIENT OPTIONS****-out filename**

specify output filename, default is standard output.

**-issuer filename**

This specifies the current issuer certificate. This option can be used multiple times. The certificate specified in **filename** must be in PEM format.

**-cert filename**

Add the certificate **filename** to the request. The issuer certificate is taken from the previous **issuer** option, or an error occurs if no issuer certificate is specified.

**-serial num**

Same as the **cert** option except the certificate with serial number **num** is added to the request. The serial number is interpreted as a decimal integer unless preceded by **0x**. Negative integers can also be specified by preceding the value by a **-** sign.

**-signer filename, -signkey filename**

Sign the OCSP request using the certificate specified in the **signer** option and the private key specified by the **signkey** option. If the **signkey** option is not present then the private key is read from the same file as the certificate. If neither option is specified then the OCSP request is not signed.

**-sign\_other filename**

Additional certificates to include in the signed request.

**-nonce, -no\_nonce**

Add an OCSP nonce extension to a request or disable OCSP nonce addition. Normally if an OCSP request is input using the **respin** option no nonce is added; using the **nonce** option will force addition of a nonce. If an OCSP request is being created (using **cert** and **serial** options) a nonce is automatically added specifying **no\_nonce** overrides this.

**-req\_text, -resp\_text, -text**

print out the text form of the OCSP request, response or both respectively.

**-reqout file, -respout file**

write out the DER encoded certificate request or response to **file**.

**-reqin file, -respin file**

read OCSP request or response file from **file**. These option are ignored if OCSP request or response creation is implied by other options (for example with **serial**, **cert** and **host** options).

**-url responder\_url**

specify the responder URL. Both HTTP and HTTPS (SSL/TLS) URLs can be specified.



**-host hostname:port, -path pathname**

if the **host** option is present then the OCSP request is sent to the host **hostname** on port **port**. **path** specifies the HTTP path name to use or “/” by default.

**-CAfile file, -CApath pathname**

file or pathname containing trusted CA certificates. These are used to verify the signature on the OCSP response.

**-verify\_other file**

file containing additional certificates to search when attempting to locate the OCSP response signing certificate. Some responders omit the actual signer’s certificate from the response: this option can be used to supply the necessary certificate in such cases.

**-trust\_other**

the certificates specified by the **-verify\_certs** option should be explicitly trusted and no additional checks will be performed on them. This is useful when the complete responder certificate chain is not available or trusting a root CA is not appropriate.

**-Vfile file**

file containing explicitly trusted responder certificates. Equivalent to the **-verify\_certs** and **-trust\_other** options.

**-noverify**

don’t attempt to verify the OCSP response signature or the nonce values. This option will normally only be used for debugging since it disables all verification of the responders certificate.

**-no\_intern**

ignore certificates contained in the OCSP response when searching for the signers certificate. With this option the signers certificate must be specified with either the **-verify\_certs** or **-Vfile** options.

**-no\_signature\_verify**

don’t check the signature on the OCSP response. Since this option tolerates invalid signatures on OCSP responses it will normally only be used for testing purposes.

**-no\_cert\_verify**

don’t verify the OCSP response signers certificate at all. Since this option allows the OCSP response to be signed by any certificate it should only be used for testing purposes.

**-no\_chain**

do not use certificates in the response as additional untrusted CA certificates.

**-no\_cert\_checks**

don’t perform any additional checks on the OCSP response signers certificate. That is do not make any checks to see if the signers certificate is authorised to provide the necessary status information: as a result this option should only be used for testing purposes.

**-validity\_period nsec, -status\_age age**

these options specify the range of times, in seconds, which will be tolerated in an OCSP response. Each certificate status response includes a **notBefore** time and an optional **notAfter** time. The current time should fall between these two values, but the interval between the two times may be only a few seconds. In practice the OCSP responder and clients clocks may not be precisely synchronised and so such a check may fail. To avoid this the **-validity\_period** option can be used to specify an acceptable error range in seconds, the default value is 5 minutes.

If the **notAfter** time is omitted from a response then this means that new status information is immediately available. In this case the age of the **notBefore** field is checked to see it is not older than **age** seconds old. By default this additional check is not performed.

**OCSP SERVER OPTIONS****-index indexfile**

**indexfile** is a text index file in **ca** format containing certificate revocation information.

If the **index** option is specified the **ocsp** utility is in responder mode, otherwise it is in client mode. The request(s) the responder processes can be either specified on the command line (using **issuer** and **serial** options), supplied in a file (using the **respin** option) or via external OCSP clients (if **port** or **url** is specified).

If the **index** option is present then the **CA** and **rsigner** options must also be present.

**-CA file**

CA certificate corresponding to the revocation information in **indexfile**.

**-rsigner file**

The certificate to sign OCSP responses with.

**-rother file**

Additional certificates to include in the OCSP response.

**-resp\_no\_certs**

Don't include any certificates in the OCSP response.

**-resp\_key\_id**

Identify the signer certificate using the key ID, default is to use the subject name.

**-rkey file**

The private key to sign OCSP responses with: if not present the file specified in the **rsigner** option is used.

**-port portnum**

Port to listen for OCSP requests on. The port may also be specified using the **url** option.

**-nrequest number**

The OCSP server will exit after receiving **number** requests, default unlimited.

**-nmin minutes, -ndays days**

Number of minutes or days when fresh revocation information is available: used in the **nextUpdate** field. If neither option is present then the **nextUpdate** field is omitted meaning fresh revocation information is immediately available.

## OCSP Response verification.

OCSP Response follows the rules specified in RFC2560.

Initially the OCSP responder certificate is located and the signature on the OCSP request checked using the responder certificate's public key.

Then a normal certificate verify is performed on the OCSP responder certificate building up a certificate chain in the process. The locations of the trusted certificates used to build the chain can be specified by the **CAfile** and **CApath** options or they will be looked for in the standard OpenSSL certificates directory.

If the initial verify fails then the OCSP verify process halts with an error.

Otherwise the issuing CA certificate in the request is compared to the OCSP responder certificate: if there is a match then the OCSP verify succeeds.

Otherwise the OCSP responder certificate's CA is checked against the issuing CA certificate in the request. If there is a match and the OCSPSigning extended key usage is present in the OCSP responder certificate then the OCSP verify succeeds.

Otherwise the root CA of the OCSP responders CA is checked to see if it is trusted for OCSP signing. If it is the OCSP verify succeeds.

If none of these checks is successful then the OCSP verify fails.

What this effectively means is that if the OCSP responder certificate is authorised directly by the CA it is issuing revocation information about (and it is correctly configured) then verification will succeed.

If the OCSP responder is a "global responder" which can give details about multiple CAs and has its own separate certificate chain then its root CA can be trusted for OCSP signing. For example:

```
openssl x509 -in ocsPCA.pem -addtrust OCSPSigning -out trustedCA.pem
```

Alternatively the responder certificate itself can be explicitly trusted with the **-VAfile** option.

## NOTES

As noted, most of the verify options are for testing or debugging purposes. Normally only the **-CApath**, **-CAfile** and (if the responder is a 'global VA') **-VAfile** options need to be used.

The OCSP server is only useful for test and demonstration purposes: it is not really usable as a full

OCSP responder. It contains only a very simple HTTP request handling and can only handle the POST form of OCSP queries. It also handles requests serially meaning it cannot respond to new requests until it has processed the current one. The text index file format of revocation is also inefficient for large quantities of revocation data.

It is possible to run the **ocsp** application in responder mode via a CGI script using the **respin** and **respout** options.

## EXAMPLES

Create an OCSP request and write it to a file:

```
openssl ocsp -issuer issuer.pem -cert c1.pem -cert c2.pem -reqout req.der
```

Send a query to an OCSP responder with URL `http://ocsp.myhost.com/` save the response to a file and print it out in text form

```
openssl ocsp -issuer issuer.pem -cert c1.pem -cert c2.pem \  
-url http://ocsp.myhost.com/ -resp_text -respout resp.der
```

Read in an OCSP response and print out text form:

```
openssl ocsp -respin resp.der -text
```

OCSP server on port 8888 using a standard **ca** configuration, and a separate responder certificate. All requests and responses are printed to a file.

```
openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -port 8888 -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/ca  
-text -out log.txt
```

As above but exit after processing one request:

```
openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -port 8888 -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/ca  
-nrequest 1
```

Query status information using internally generated request:

```
openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem  
-issuer demoCA/cacert.pem -serial 1
```

Query status information using request read from a file, write response to a second file.

```
openssl ocsp -index demoCA/index.txt -rsigner rcert.pem -CA demoCA/cacert.pem  
-reqin req.der -respout resp.der
```

**NAME**

openssl – OpenSSL command line tool

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl** *command* [ *command\_opts* ] [ *command\_args* ]

**openssl** [ **list-standard-commands** | **list-message-digest-commands** | **list-cipher-commands** ]

**openssl no-XXX** [ *arbitrary options* ]

**DESCRIPTION**

OpenSSL is a cryptography toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) network protocols and related cryptography standards required by them.

The **openssl** program is a command line tool for using the various cryptography functions of OpenSSL's **crypto** library from the shell. It can be used for

- o Creation of RSA, DH and DSA key parameters
- o Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs
- o Calculation of Message Digests
- o Encryption and Decryption with Ciphers
- o SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests
- o Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail

**COMMAND SUMMARY**

The **openssl** program provides a rich variety of commands (*command* in the SYNOPSIS above), each of which often has a wealth of options and arguments (*command\_opts* and *command\_args* in the SYNOPSIS).

The pseudo-commands **list-standard-commands**, **list-message-digest-commands**, and **list-cipher-commands** output a list (one entry per line) of the names of all standard commands, message digest commands, or cipher commands, respectively, that are available in the present **openssl** utility.

The pseudo-command **no-XXX** tests whether a command of the specified name is available. If no command named *XXX* exists, it returns 0 (success) and prints **no-XXX**; otherwise it returns 1 and prints *XXX*. In both cases, the output goes to **stdout** and nothing is printed to **stderr**. Additional command line arguments are always ignored. Since for each cipher there is a command of the same name, this provides an easy way for shell scripts to test for the availability of ciphers in the **openssl** program. (**no-XXX** is not able to detect pseudo-commands such as **quit**, **list-...-commands**, or **no-XXX** itself.)

**STANDARD COMMANDS**

**asn1parse** Parse an ASN.1 sequence.

**ca** Certificate Authority (CA) Management.

**ciphers** Cipher Suite Description Determination.

**crl** Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Management.

**crl2pkcs7** CRL to PKCS#7 Conversion.

**dgst** Message Digest Calculation.

**dh** Diffie-Hellman Parameter Management. Obsoleted by **dhparam**.

**dsa** DSA Data Management.

**dsaparam** DSA Parameter Generation.

**enc** Encoding with Ciphers.

**errstr** Error Number to Error String Conversion.

**dhparam** Generation and Management of Diffie-Hellman Parameters.

**gendh** Generation of Diffie-Hellman Parameters. Obsoleted by **dhparam**.

**gendsa** Generation of DSA Parameters.

<b>genrsa</b>	Generation of RSA Parameters.
<b>ocsp</b>	Online Certificate Status Protocol utility.
<b>passwd</b>	Generation of hashed passwords.
<b>pkcs12</b>	PKCS#12 Data Management.
<b>pkcs7</b>	PKCS#7 Data Management.
<b>rand</b>	Generate pseudo-random bytes.
<b>req</b>	X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Management.
<b>rsa</b>	RSA Data Management.
<b>rsautl</b>	RSA utility for signing, verification, encryption, and decryption.
<b>s_client</b>	This implements a generic SSL/TLS client which can establish a transparent connection to a remote server speaking SSL/TLS. It's intended for testing purposes only and provides only rudimentary interface functionality but internally uses mostly all functionality of the OpenSSL <b>ssl</b> library.
<b>s_server</b>	This implements a generic SSL/TLS server which accepts connections from remote clients speaking SSL/TLS. It's intended for testing purposes only and provides only rudimentary interface functionality but internally uses mostly all functionality of the OpenSSL <b>ssl</b> library. It provides both an own command line oriented protocol for testing SSL functions and a simple HTTP response facility to emulate an SSL/TLS-aware webserver.
<b>s_time</b>	SSL Connection Timer.
<b>sess_id</b>	SSL Session Data Management.
<b>smime</b>	S/MIME mail processing.
<b>speed</b>	Algorithm Speed Measurement.
<b>verify</b>	X.509 Certificate Verification.
<b>version</b>	OpenSSL Version Information.
<b>x509</b>	X.509 Certificate Data Management.

#### MESSAGE DIGEST COMMANDS

<b>md2</b>	MD2 Digest
<b>md5</b>	MD5 Digest
<b>mdc2</b>	MDC2 Digest
<b>rmd160</b>	RMD-160 Digest
<b>sha</b>	SHA Digest
<b>sha1</b>	SHA-1 Digest

#### ENCODING AND CIPHER COMMANDS

<b>base64</b>	Base64 Encoding
<b>bf bf-cbc bf-cfb bf-ecb bf-ofb</b>	Blowfish Cipher
<b>cast cast-cbc</b>	CAST Cipher
<b>cast5-cbc cast5-cfb cast5-ecb cast5-ofb</b>	CAST5 Cipher
<b>des des-cbc des-cfb des-ecb des-ede des-ede-cbc des-ede-cfb des-ede-ofb des-ofb</b>	DES Cipher

**des3 desx des-ede3 des-ede3-cbc des-ede3-cfb des-ede3-ofb**

Triple-DES Cipher

**idea idea-cbc idea-cfb idea-ecb idea-ofb**

IDEA Cipher

**rc2 rc2-cbc rc2-cfb rc2-ecb rc2-ofb**

RC2 Cipher

**rc4** RC4 Cipher

**rc5 rc5-cbc rc5-cfb rc5-ecb rc5-ofb**

RC5 Cipher

## PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS

Several commands accept password arguments, typically using **-passin** and **-passout** for input and output passwords respectively. These allow the password to be obtained from a variety of sources. Both of these options take a single argument whose format is described below. If no password argument is given and a password is required then the user is prompted to enter one: this will typically be read from the current terminal with echoing turned off.

### **pass:password**

the actual password is **password**. Since the password is visible to utilities (like 'ps' under Unix) this form should only be used where security is not important.

**env:var** obtain the password from the environment variable **var**. Since the environment of other processes is visible on certain platforms (e.g. ps under certain Unix OSes) this option should be used with caution.

### **file:pathname**

the first line of **pathname** is the password. If the same **pathname** argument is supplied to **-passin** and **-passout** arguments then the first line will be used for the input password and the next line for the output password. **pathname** need not refer to a regular file: it could for example refer to a device or named pipe.

### **fd:number**

read the password from the file descriptor **number**. This can be used to send the data via a pipe for example.

**stdin** read the password from standard input.

## SEE ALSO

*asn1parse*(1), *ca*(1), *config*(5), *crl*(1), *crl2pkcs7*(1), *dgst*(1), *dhparam*(1), *dsa*(1), *dsaparam*(1), *enc*(1), *genssa*(1), *genrsa*(1), *nseq*(1), *openssl*(1), *passwd*(1), *pkcs12*(1), *pkcs7*(1), *pkcs8*(1), *rand*(1), *req*(1), *rsa*(1), *rsautl*(1), *s\_client*(1), *s\_server*(1), *smime*(1), *spkac*(1), *verify*(1), *version*(1), *x509*(1), *crypto*(3), *ssl*(3)

## HISTORY

The *openssl*(1) document appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.2. The **list-XXX-commands** pseudo-commands were added in OpenSSL 0.9.3; the **no-XXX** pseudo-commands were added in OpenSSL 0.9.5a. For notes on the availability of other commands, see their individual manual pages.

**NAME**

passwd – compute password hashes

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl passwd [-crypt] [-1] [-apr1] [-salt string] [-in file] [-stdin] [-noverify] [-quiet] [-table]
{password}
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **passwd** command computes the hash of a password typed at run-time or the hash of each password in a list. The password list is taken from the named file for option **-in file**, from stdin for option **-stdin**, or from the command line, or from the terminal otherwise. The Unix standard algorithm **crypt** and the MD5-based BSD password algorithm **1** and its Apache variant **apr1** are available.

**OPTIONS****-crypt**

Use the **crypt** algorithm (default).

**-1** Use the MD5 based BSD password algorithm **1**.

**-apr1**

Use the **apr1** algorithm (Apache variant of the BSD algorithm).

**-salt *string***

Use the specified salt. When reading a password from the terminal, this implies **-noverify**.

**-in *file***

Read passwords from *file*.

**-stdin**

Read passwords from **stdin**.

**-noverify**

Don't verify when reading a password from the terminal.

**-quiet**

Don't output warnings when passwords given at the command line are truncated.

**-table**

In the output list, prepend the cleartext password and a TAB character to each password hash.

**EXAMPLES**

```
openssl passwd -crypt -salt xx password prints xxj31ZMTZzkVA.
```

```
openssl passwd -1 -salt xxxxxxxx password prints $1$xxxxxxx$UYCIxa628.9qXjpQCjM4a..
```

```
openssl passwd -apr1 -salt xxxxxxxx password prints $apr1$xxxxxxx$dxHfLAsjHk-DRmG83UXe8K0.
```

**NAME**

pkcs12 – PKCS#12 file utility

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl pkcs12 [-export] [-chain] [-inkey filename] [-certfile filename] [-name name] [-caname
name] [-in filename] [-out filename] [-noout] [-nomacver] [-nocerts] [-clcerts] [-cacerts]
[-nokeys] [-info] [-des] [-des3] [-idea] [-nodes] [-noiter] [-maciter] [-twopass] [-descert]
[-certpbe] [-keypbe] [-keyex] [-keysig] [-password arg] [-passin arg] [-passout arg] [-rand
file(s)]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **pkcs12** command allows PKCS#12 files (sometimes referred to as PFX files) to be created and parsed. PKCS#12 files are used by several programs including Netscape, MSIE and MS Outlook.

**COMMAND OPTIONS**

There are a lot of options the meaning of some depends of whether a PKCS#12 file is being created or parsed. By default a PKCS#12 file is parsed a PKCS#12 file can be created by using the **-export** option (see below).

**PARSING OPTIONS****-in filename**

This specifies filename of the PKCS#12 file to be parsed. Standard input is used by default.

**-out filename**

The filename to write certificates and private keys to, standard output by default. They are all written in PEM format.

**-pass arg, -passin arg**

the PKCS#12 file (i.e. input file) password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl(1)*.

**-passout arg**

pass phrase source to encrypt any outputted private keys with. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl(1)*.

**-noout**

this option inhibits output of the keys and certificates to the output file version of the PKCS#12 file.

**-clcerts**

only output client certificates (not CA certificates).

**-cacerts**

only output CA certificates (not client certificates).

**-nocerts**

no certificates at all will be output.

**-nokeys**

no private keys will be output.

**-info**

output additional information about the PKCS#12 file structure, algorithms used and iteration counts.

**-des**

use DES to encrypt private keys before outputting.

**-des3**

use triple DES to encrypt private keys before outputting, this is the default.

**-idea**

use IDEA to encrypt private keys before outputting.

**-nodes**

don't encrypt the private keys at all.



**-nomacver**

don't attempt to verify the integrity MAC before reading the file.

**-twopass**

prompt for separate integrity and encryption passwords: most software always assumes these are the same so this option will render such PKCS#12 files unreadable.

**FILE CREATION OPTIONS****-export**

This option specifies that a PKCS#12 file will be created rather than parsed.

**-out filename**

This specifies filename to write the PKCS#12 file to. Standard output is used by default.

**-in filename**

The filename to read certificates and private keys from, standard input by default. They must all be in PEM format. The order doesn't matter but one private key and its corresponding certificate should be present. If additional certificates are present they will also be included in the PKCS#12 file.

**-inkey filename**

file to read private key from. If not present then a private key must be present in the input file.

**-name friendlyname**

This specifies the "friendly name" for the certificate and private key. This name is typically displayed in list boxes by software importing the file.

**-certfile filename**

A filename to read additional certificates from.

**-caname friendlyname**

This specifies the "friendly name" for other certificates. This option may be used multiple times to specify names for all certificates in the order they appear. Netscape ignores friendly names on other certificates whereas MSIE displays them.

**-pass arg, -passout arg**

the PKCS#12 file (i.e. output file) password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

**-passin password**

pass phrase source to decrypt any input private keys with. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

**-chain**

if this option is present then an attempt is made to include the entire certificate chain of the user certificate. The standard CA store is used for this search. If the search fails it is considered a fatal error.

**-descert**

encrypt the certificate using triple DES, this may render the PKCS#12 file unreadable by some "export grade" software. By default the private key is encrypted using triple DES and the certificate using 40 bit RC2.

**-keypbe alg, -certpbe alg**

these options allow the algorithm used to encrypt the private key and certificates to be selected. Although any PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 algorithms can be selected it is advisable only to use PKCS#12 algorithms. See the list in the **NOTES** section for more information.

**-keyex|-keysig**

specifies that the private key is to be used for key exchange or just signing. This option is only interpreted by MSIE and similar MS software. Normally "export grade" software will only allow 512 bit RSA keys to be used for encryption purposes but arbitrary length keys for signing. The **-keysig** option marks the key for signing only. Signing only keys can be used for S/MIME signing, authenticode (ActiveX control signing) and SSL client authentication, however due to a bug only MSIE 5.0 and later support the use of signing only keys for SSL client authentication.

**-nomaciter, -noiter**

these options affect the iteration counts on the MAC and key algorithms. Unless you wish to produce files compatible with MSIE 4.0 you should leave these options alone.

To discourage attacks by using large dictionaries of common passwords the algorithm that derives keys from passwords can have an iteration count applied to it: this causes a certain part of the algorithm to be repeated and slows it down. The MAC is used to check the file integrity but since it will normally have the same password as the keys and certificates it could also be attacked. By default both MAC and encryption iteration counts are set to 2048, using these options the MAC and encryption iteration counts can be set to 1, since this reduces the file security you should not use these options unless you really have to. Most software supports both MAC and key iteration counts. MSIE 4.0 doesn't support MAC iteration counts so it needs the **-nomaciter** option.

**-maciter**

This option is included for compatibility with previous versions, it used to be needed to use MAC iterations counts but they are now used by default.

**-rand file(s)**

a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd(3)*). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is ; for MS-Windows, , for OpenVMS, and : for all others.

**NOTES**

Although there are a large number of options most of them are very rarely used. For PKCS#12 file parsing only **-in** and **-out** need to be used for PKCS#12 file creation **-export** and **-name** are also used.

If none of the **-clcerts**, **-cacerts** or **-nocerts** options are present then all certificates will be output in the order they appear in the input PKCS#12 files. There is no guarantee that the first certificate present is the one corresponding to the private key. Certain software which requires a private key and certificate and assumes the first certificate in the file is the one corresponding to the private key: this may not always be the case. Using the **-clcerts** option will solve this problem by only outputting the certificate corresponding to the private key. If the CA certificates are required then they can be output to a separate file using the **-nokeys -cacerts** options to just output CA certificates.

The **-keypbe** and **-certpbe** algorithms allow the precise encryption algorithms for private keys and certificates to be specified. Normally the defaults are fine but occasionally software can't handle triple DES encrypted private keys, then the option **-keypbe PBE-SHA1-RC2-40** can be used to reduce the private key encryption to 40 bit RC2. A complete description of all algorithms is contained in the **pkcs8** manual page.

**EXAMPLES**

Parse a PKCS#12 file and output it to a file:

```
openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -out file.pem
```

Output only client certificates to a file:

```
openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -clcerts -out file.pem
```

Don't encrypt the private key:

```
openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -out file.pem -nodes
```

Print some info about a PKCS#12 file:

```
openssl pkcs12 -in file.p12 -info -noout
```

Create a PKCS#12 file:

```
openssl pkcs12 -export -in file.pem -out file.p12 -name "My Certificate"
```

Include some extra certificates:

```
openssl pkcs12 -export -in file.pem -out file.p12 -name "My Certificate" \
-certfile othercerts.pem
```

**BUGS**

Some would argue that the PKCS#12 standard is one big bug :-)

Versions of OpenSSL before 0.9.6a had a bug in the PKCS#12 key generation routines. Under rare

circumstances this could produce a PKCS#12 file encrypted with an invalid key. As a result some PKCS#12 files which triggered this bug from other implementations (MSIE or Netscape) could not be decrypted by OpenSSL and similarly OpenSSL could produce PKCS#12 files which could not be decrypted by other implementations. The chances of producing such a file are relatively small: less than 1 in 256.

A side effect of fixing this bug is that any old invalidly encrypted PKCS#12 files cannot no longer be parsed by the fixed version. Under such circumstances the **pkcs12** utility will report that the MAC is OK but fail with a decryption error when extracting private keys.

This problem can be resolved by extracting the private keys and certificates from the PKCS#12 file using an older version of OpenSSL and recreating the PKCS#12 file from the keys and certificates using a newer version of OpenSSL. For example:

```
old-openssl -in bad.p12 -out keycerts.pem
openssl -in keycerts.pem -export -name "My PKCS#12 file" -out fixed.p12
```

## SEE ALSO

*pkcs8*(1)

**NAME**

pkcs7 – PKCS#7 utility

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl pkcs7 [-inform PEM|DER] [-outform PEM|DER] [-in filename] [-out filename]
[-print_certs] [-text] [-noout] [-engine id]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **pkcs7** command processes PKCS#7 files in DER or PEM format.

**COMMAND OPTIONS****-inform DER|PEM**

This specifies the input format. **DER** format is DER encoded PKCS#7 v1.5 structure. **PEM** (the default) is a base64 encoded version of the DER form with header and footer lines.

**-outform DER|PEM**

This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the **-inform** option.

**-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read from or standard input if this option is not specified.

**-out filename**

specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by default.

**-print\_certs**

prints out any certificates or CRLs contained in the file. They are preceded by their subject and issuer names in one line format.

**-text**

prints out certificates details in full rather than just subject and issuer names.

**-noout**

don't output the encoded version of the PKCS#7 structure (or certificates is **-print\_certs** is set).

**-engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

**EXAMPLES**

Convert a PKCS#7 file from PEM to DER:

```
openssl pkcs7 -in file.pem -outform DER -out file.der
```

Output all certificates in a file:

```
openssl pkcs7 -in file.pem -print_certs -out certs.pem
```

**NOTES**

The PEM PKCS#7 format uses the header and footer lines:

```
-----BEGIN PKCS7-----
-----END PKCS7-----
```

For compatibility with some CAs it will also accept:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

**RESTRICTIONS**

There is no option to print out all the fields of a PKCS#7 file.

This PKCS#7 routines only understand PKCS#7 v 1.5 as specified in RFC2315 they cannot currently parse, for example, the new CMS as described in RFC2630.

**SEE ALSO**

*crl2pkcs7(1)*

## NAME

pkcs8 – PKCS#8 format private key conversion tool

## SYNOPSIS

```
openssl pkcs8 [-topk8] [-inform PEM|DER] [-outform PEM|DER] [-in filename] [-passin arg]
[-out filename] [-passout arg] [-noiter] [-nocrypt] [-nooct] [-embed] [-nsdb] [-v2 alg] [-v1 alg]
[-engine id]
```

## DESCRIPTION

The **pkcs8** command processes private keys in PKCS#8 format. It can handle both unencrypted PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo format and EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo format with a variety of PKCS#5 (v1.5 and v2.0) and PKCS#12 algorithms.

## COMMAND OPTIONS

### **-topk8**

Normally a PKCS#8 private key is expected on input and a traditional format private key will be written. With the **-topk8** option the situation is reversed: it reads a traditional format private key and writes a PKCS#8 format key.

### **-inform DER|PEM**

This specifies the input format. If a PKCS#8 format key is expected on input then either a **DER** or **PEM** encoded version of a PKCS#8 key will be expected. Otherwise the **DER** or **PEM** format of the traditional format private key is used.

### **-outform DER|PEM**

This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the **-inform** option.

### **-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be prompted for.

### **-passin arg**

the input file password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

### **-out filename**

This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output by default. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase will be prompted for. The output filename should **not** be the same as the input filename.

### **-passout arg**

the output file password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

### **-nocrypt**

PKCS#8 keys generated or input are normally PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo structures using an appropriate password based encryption algorithm. With this option an unencrypted PrivateKeyInfo structure is expected or output. This option does not encrypt private keys at all and should only be used when absolutely necessary. Certain software such as some versions of Java code signing software used unencrypted private keys.

### **-nooct**

This option generates RSA private keys in a broken format that some software uses. Specifically the private key should be enclosed in a OCTET STRING but some software just includes the structure itself without the surrounding OCTET STRING.

### **-embed**

This option generates DSA keys in a broken format. The DSA parameters are embedded inside the PrivateKey structure. In this form the OCTET STRING contains an ASN1 SEQUENCE consisting of two structures: a SEQUENCE containing the parameters and an ASN1 INTEGER containing the private key.

### **-nsdb**

This option generates DSA keys in a broken format compatible with Netscape private key databases. The PrivateKey contains a SEQUENCE consisting of the public and private keys

respectively.

#### **-v2 alg**

This option enables the use of PKCS#5 v2.0 algorithms. Normally PKCS#8 private keys are encrypted with the password based encryption algorithm called **pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC** this uses 56 bit DES encryption but it was the strongest encryption algorithm supported in PKCS#5 v1.5. Using the **-v2** option PKCS#5 v2.0 algorithms are used which can use any encryption algorithm such as 168 bit triple DES or 128 bit RC2 however not many implementations support PKCS#5 v2.0 yet. If you are just using private keys with OpenSSL then this doesn't matter.

The **alg** argument is the encryption algorithm to use, valid values include **des**, **des3** and **rc2**. It is recommended that **des3** is used.

#### **-v1 alg**

This option specifies a PKCS#5 v1.5 or PKCS#12 algorithm to use. A complete list of possible algorithms is included below.

#### **-engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

## NOTES

The encrypted form of a PEM encode PKCS#8 files uses the following headers and footers:

```
-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----
-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----
```

The unencrypted form uses:

```
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
```

Private keys encrypted using PKCS#5 v2.0 algorithms and high iteration counts are more secure than those encrypted using the traditional SSLeay compatible formats. So if additional security is considered important the keys should be converted.

The default encryption is only 56 bits because this is the encryption that most current implementations of PKCS#8 will support.

Some software may use PKCS#12 password based encryption algorithms with PKCS#8 format private keys: these are handled automatically but there is no option to produce them.

It is possible to write out DER encoded encrypted private keys in PKCS#8 format because the encryption details are included at an ASN1 level whereas the traditional format includes them at a PEM level.

## PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 algorithms.

Various algorithms can be used with the **-v1** command line option, including PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12. These are described in more detail below.

### **PBE-MD2-DES PBE-MD5-DES**

These algorithms were included in the original PKCS#5 v1.5 specification. They only offer 56 bits of protection since they both use DES.

### **PBE-SHA1-RC2-64 PBE-MD2-RC2-64 PBE-MD5-RC2-64 PBE-SHA1-DES**

These algorithms are not mentioned in the original PKCS#5 v1.5 specification but they use the same key derivation algorithm and are supported by some software. They are mentioned in PKCS#5 v2.0. They use either 64 bit RC2 or 56 bit DES.

### **PBE-SHA1-RC4-128 PBE-SHA1-RC4-40 PBE-SHA1-3DES PBE-SHA1-2DES PBE-SHA1-RC2-128 PBE-SHA1-RC2-40**

These algorithms use the PKCS#12 password based encryption algorithm and allow strong encryption algorithms like triple DES or 128 bit RC2 to be used.

## EXAMPLES

Convert a private from traditional to PKCS#5 v2.0 format using triple DES:

```
openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -v2 des3 -out enckey.pem
```

Convert a private key to PKCS#8 using a PKCS#5 1.5 compatible algorithm (DES):

```
openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -out enckey.pem
```

Convert a private key to PKCS#8 using a PKCS#12 compatible algorithm (3DES):

```
openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -out enckey.pem -v1 PBE-SHA1-3DES
```

Read a DER unencrypted PKCS#8 format private key:

```
openssl pkcs8 -inform DER -nocrypt -in key.der -out key.pem
```

Convert a private key from any PKCS#8 format to traditional format:

```
openssl pkcs8 -in pk8.pem -out key.pem
```

## STANDARDS

Test vectors from this PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation were posted to the pkcs-tng mailing list using triple DES, DES and RC2 with high iteration counts, several people confirmed that they could decrypt the private keys produced and Therefore it can be assumed that the PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation is reasonably accurate at least as far as these algorithms are concerned.

The format of PKCS#8 DSA (and other) private keys is not well documented: it is hidden away in PKCS#11 v2.01, section 11.9. OpenSSL's default DSA PKCS#8 private key format complies with this standard.

## BUGS

There should be an option that prints out the encryption algorithm in use and other details such as the iteration count.

PKCS#8 using triple DES and PKCS#5 v2.0 should be the default private key format for OpenSSL: for compatibility several of the utilities use the old format at present.

## SEE ALSO

*dsa*(1), *rsa*(1), *genrsa*(1), *genssa*(1)

**NAME**

**rand** – generate pseudo-random bytes

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl rand** [**-out** *file*] [**-rand** *file(s)*] [**-base64**] *num*

**DESCRIPTION**

The **rand** command outputs *num* pseudo-random bytes after seeding the random number generator once. As in other **openssl** command line tools, PRNG seeding uses the file *\$HOME/.rnd* or *.rnd* in addition to the files given in the **-rand** option. A new *\$HOME/.rnd* or *.rnd* file will be written back if enough seeding was obtained from these sources.

**OPTIONS**

**-out** *file*

Write to *file* instead of standard output.

**-rand** *file(s)*

Use specified file or files or EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd(3)*) for seeding the random number generator. Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is ; for MS-Windows, , for OpenVMS, and : for all others.

**-base64**

Perform base64 encoding on the output.

**SEE ALSO**

*RAND\_bytes(3)*



**NAME**

req – PKCS#10 certificate request and certificate generating utility.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl req [-inform PEM|DER] [-outform PEM|DER] [-in filename] [-passin arg] [-out filename]
[-passout arg] [-text] [-pubkey] [-noout] [-verify] [-modulus] [-new] [-rand file(s)]
[-newkey rsa:bits] [-newkey dsa:file] [-nodes] [-key filename] [-keyform PEM|DER] [-keyout filename]
[-[md5|sha1|md2|mdc2]] [-config filename] [-subj arg] [-x509] [-days n] [-set_serial n]
[-asn1-kludge] [-newhdr] [-extensions section] [-reqexts section] [-utf8] [-nameopt]
[-batch] [-verbose] [-engine id]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **req** command primarily creates and processes certificate requests in PKCS#10 format. It can additionally create self signed certificates for use as root CAs for example.

**COMMAND OPTIONS****–inform DER|PEM**

This specifies the input format. The **DER** option uses an ASN1 DER encoded form compatible with the PKCS#10. The **PEM** form is the default format: it consists of the **DER** format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines.

**–outform DER|PEM**

This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the **–inform** option.

**–in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read a request from or standard input if this option is not specified. A request is only read if the creation options (**–new** and **–newkey**) are not specified.

**–passin arg**

the input file password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

**–out filename**

This specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by default.

**–passout arg**

the output file password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

**–text**

prints out the certificate request in text form.

**–pubkey**

outputs the public key.

**–noout**

this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.

**–modulus**

this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key contained in the request.

**–verify**

verifies the signature on the request.

**–new**

this option generates a new certificate request. It will prompt the user for the relevant field values. The actual fields prompted for and their maximum and minimum sizes are specified in the configuration file and any requested extensions.

If the **–key** option is not used it will generate a new RSA private key using information specified in the configuration file.

**–rand file(s)**

a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd*(3)). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is ; for MS-Windows, , for OpenVMS, and : for all others.

**–newkey arg**

this option creates a new certificate request and a new private key. The argument takes one of two forms. **rsa:nbits**, where **nbits** is the number of bits, generates an RSA key **nbits** in size. **dsa:filename** generates a DSA key using the parameters in the file **filename**.

**–key filename**

This specifies the file to read the private key from. It also accepts PKCS#8 format private keys for PEM format files.

**–keyform PEM|DER**

the format of the private key file specified in the **–key** argument. PEM is the default.

**–keyout filename**

this gives the filename to write the newly created private key to. If this option is not specified then the filename present in the configuration file is used.

**–nodes**

if this option is specified then if a private key is created it will not be encrypted.

**–[md5|sha1|md2|mdc2]**

this specifies the message digest to sign the request with. This overrides the digest algorithm specified in the configuration file. This option is ignored for DSA requests: they always use SHA1.

**–config filename**

this allows an alternative configuration file to be specified, this overrides the compile time filename or any specified in the **OPENSSL\_CONF** environment variable.

**–subj arg**

sets subject name for new request or supersedes the subject name when processing a request. The arg must be formatted as */type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...*, characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped.

**–x509**

this option outputs a self signed certificate instead of a certificate request. This is typically used to generate a test certificate or a self signed root CA. The extensions added to the certificate (if any) are specified in the configuration file. Unless specified using the **set\_serial** option **0** will be used for the serial number.

**–days n**

when the **–x509** option is being used this specifies the number of days to certify the certificate for. The default is 30 days.

**–set\_serial n**

serial number to use when outputting a self signed certificate. This may be specified as a decimal value or a hex value if preceded by **0x**. It is possible to use negative serial numbers but this is not recommended.

**–extensions section****–reqexts section**

these options specify alternative sections to include certificate extensions (if the **–x509** option is present) or certificate request extensions. This allows several different sections to be used in the same configuration file to specify requests for a variety of purposes.

**–utf8**

this option causes field values to be interpreted as UTF8 strings, by default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that the field values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings.

**–nameopt option**

option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The **option** argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by commas. Alternatively the **–nameopt** switch may be used more than once to set multiple options. See the *x509(1)* manual page for details.

**–asn1-kludge**

by default the **req** command outputs certificate requests containing no attributes in the correct PKCS#10 format. However certain CAs will only accept requests containing no attributes in an invalid form: this option produces this invalid format.

More precisely the **Attributes** in a PKCS#10 certificate request are defined as a **SET OF Attribute**. They are **not OPTIONAL** so if no attributes are present then they should be encoded as an empty **SET OF**. The invalid form does not include the empty **SET OF** whereas the correct form does.

It should be noted that very few CAs still require the use of this option.

**-newhdr**

Adds the word **NEW** to the PEM file header and footer lines on the outputted request. Some software (Netscape certificate server) and some CAs need this.

**-batch**

non-interactive mode.

**-verbose**

print extra details about the operations being performed.

**-engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

## CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT

The configuration options are specified in the **req** section of the configuration file. As with all configuration files if no value is specified in the specific section (i.e. **req**) then the initial unnamed or **default** section is searched too.

The options available are described in detail below.

**input\_password output\_password**

The passwords for the input private key file (if present) and the output private key file (if one will be created). The command line options **passin** and **passout** override the configuration file values.

**default\_bits**

This specifies the default key size in bits. If not specified then 512 is used. It is used if the **-new** option is used. It can be overridden by using the **-newkey** option.

**default\_keyfile**

This is the default filename to write a private key to. If not specified the key is written to standard output. This can be overridden by the **-keyout** option.

**oid\_file**

This specifies a file containing additional **OBJECT IDENTIFIERS**. Each line of the file should consist of the numerical form of the object identifier followed by white space then the short name followed by white space and finally the long name.

**oid\_section**

This specifies a section in the configuration file containing extra object identifiers. Each line should consist of the short name of the object identifier followed by = and the numerical form. The short and long names are the same when this option is used.

**RANDFILE**

This specifies a filename in which random number seed information is placed and read from, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd(3)*). It is used for private key generation.

**encrypt\_key**

If this is set to **no** then if a private key is generated it is **not** encrypted. This is equivalent to the **-nodes** command line option. For compatibility **encrypt\_rsa\_key** is an equivalent option.

**default\_md**

This option specifies the digest algorithm to use. Possible values include **md5 sha1 mdc2**. If not present then MD5 is used. This option can be overridden on the command line.

**string\_mask**

This option masks out the use of certain string types in certain fields. Most users will not need to change this option.

It can be set to several values **default** which is also the default option uses PrintableStrings, T61Strings and BMPStrings if the **pkix** value is used then only PrintableStrings and BMPStrings

will be used. This follows the PKIX recommendation in RFC2459. If the **utf8only** option is used then only UTF8Strings will be used: this is the PKIX recommendation in RFC2459 after 2003. Finally the **nombstr** option just uses PrintableStrings and T61Strings: certain software has problems with BMPStrings and UTF8Strings: in particular Netscape.

#### **req\_extensions**

this specifies the configuration file section containing a list of extensions to add to the certificate request. It can be overridden by the **-reqexts** command line switch.

#### **x509\_extensions**

this specifies the configuration file section containing a list of extensions to add to certificate generated when the **-x509** switch is used. It can be overridden by the **-extensions** command line switch.

#### **prompt**

if set to the value **no** this disables prompting of certificate fields and just takes values from the config file directly. It also changes the expected format of the **distinguished\_name** and **attributes** sections.

#### **utf8**

if set to the value **yes** then field values to be interpreted as UTF8 strings, by default they are interpreted as ASCII. This means that the field values, whether prompted from a terminal or obtained from a configuration file, must be valid UTF8 strings.

#### **attributes**

this specifies the section containing any request attributes: its format is the same as **distinguished\_name**. Typically these may contain the challengePassword or unstructuredName types. They are currently ignored by OpenSSL's request signing utilities but some CAs might want them.

#### **distinguished\_name**

This specifies the section containing the distinguished name fields to prompt for when generating a certificate or certificate request. The format is described in the next section.

### **DISTINGUISHED NAME AND ATTRIBUTE SECTION FORMAT**

There are two separate formats for the distinguished name and attribute sections. If the **prompt** option is set to **no** then these sections just consist of field names and values: for example,

```
CN=My Name
OU=My Organization
emailAddress=someone@somewhere.org
```

This allows external programs (e.g. GUI based) to generate a template file with all the field names and values and just pass it to **req**. An example of this kind of configuration file is contained in the **EXAMPLES** section.

Alternatively if the **prompt** option is absent or not set to **no** then the file contains field prompting information. It consists of lines of the form:

```
fieldName="prompt"
fieldName_default="default field value"
fieldName_min= 2
fieldName_max= 4
```

“fieldName” is the field name being used, for example commonName (or CN). The “prompt” string is used to ask the user to enter the relevant details. If the user enters nothing then the default value is used if no default value is present then the field is omitted. A field can still be omitted if a default value is present if the user just enters the ‘.’ character.

The number of characters entered must be between the fieldName\_min and fieldName\_max limits: there may be additional restrictions based on the field being used (for example countryName can only ever be two characters long and must fit in a PrintableString).

Some fields (such as organizationName) can be used more than once in a DN. This presents a problem because configuration files will not recognize the same name occurring twice. To avoid this problem if the fieldName contains some characters followed by a full stop they will be ignored. So for example a second organizationName can be input by calling it “1.organizationName”.

The actual permitted field names are any object identifier short or long names. These are compiled into

OpenSSL and include the usual values such as `commonName`, `countryName`, `localityName`, `organizationName`, `organizationUnitName`, `stateOrProvinceName`. Additionally `emailAddress` is include as well as `name`, `surname`, `givenName` initials and `dnQualifier`.

Additional object identifiers can be defined with the **oid\_file** or **oid\_section** options in the configuration file. Any additional fields will be treated as though they were a `DirectoryString`.

## EXAMPLES

Examine and verify certificate request:

```
openssl req -in req.pem -text -verify -noout
```

Create a private key and then generate a certificate request from it:

```
openssl genrsa -out key.pem 1024
openssl req -new -key key.pem -out req.pem
```

The same but just using `req`:

```
openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
```

Generate a self signed root certificate:

```
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout key.pem -out req.pem
```

Example of a file pointed to by the **oid\_file** option:

```
1.2.3.4      shortName      A longer Name
1.2.3.6      otherName      Other longer Name
```

Example of a section pointed to by **oid\_section** making use of variable expansion:

```
testoid1=1.2.3.5
testoid2=${testoid1}.6
```

Sample configuration file prompting for field values:

```
[ req ]
default_bits          = 1024
default_keyfile       = privkey.pem
distinguished_name    = req_distinguished_name
attributes            = req_attributes
x509_extensions      = v3_ca

dirstring_type = nobmp

[ req_distinguished_name ]
countryName           = Country Name (2 letter code)
countryName_default   = AU
countryName_min       = 2
countryName_max       = 2

localityName          = Locality Name (eg, city)
organizationalUnitName = Organizational Unit Name (eg, section)
commonName            = Common Name (eg, YOUR name)
commonName_max        = 64

emailAddress          = Email Address
emailAddress_max      = 40

[ req_attributes ]
challengePassword     = A challenge password
challengePassword_min = 4
challengePassword_max = 20

[ v3_ca ]
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer:always
basicConstraints = CA:true
```

Sample configuration containing all field values:

```

RANDFILE                = $ENV::HOME/.rnd

[ req ]
default_bits             = 1024
default_keyfile          = keyfile.pem
distinguished_name      = req_distinguished_name
attributes              = req_attributes
prompt                  = no
output_password         = mypass

[ req_distinguished_name ]
C                       = GB
ST                      = Test State or Province
L                       = Test Locality
O                       = Organization Name
OU                      = Organizational Unit Name
CN                      = Common Name
emailAddress            = test@email.address

[ req_attributes ]
challengePassword       = A challenge password

```

## NOTES

The header and footer lines in the **PEM** format are normally:

```

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----

```

some software (some versions of Netscape certificate server) instead needs:

```

-----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
-----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----

```

which is produced with the **-newhdr** option but is otherwise compatible. Either form is accepted transparently on input.

The certificate requests generated by **Xenroll** with MSIE have extensions added. It includes the **keyUsage** extension which determines the type of key (signature only or general purpose) and any additional OIDs entered by the script in an extendedKeyUsage extension.

## DIAGNOSTICS

The following messages are frequently asked about:

```

Using configuration from /some/path/openssl.cnf
Unable to load config info

```

This is followed some time later by...

```

unable to find 'distinguished_name' in config
problems making Certificate Request

```

The first error message is the clue: it can't find the configuration file! Certain operations (like examining a certificate request) don't need a configuration file so its use isn't enforced. Generation of certificates or requests however does need a configuration file. This could be regarded as a bug.

Another puzzling message is this:

```

Attributes:
a0:00

```

this is displayed when no attributes are present and the request includes the correct empty **SET OF** structure (the DER encoding of which is 0xa0 0x00). If you just see:

```

Attributes:

```

then the **SET OF** is missing and the encoding is technically invalid (but it is tolerated). See the description of the command line option **-asn1-kludge** for more information.

## ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES

The variable **OPENSSL\_CONF** if defined allows an alternative configuration file location to be specified, it will be overridden by the **-config** command line switch if it is present. For compatibility reasons

the `SSLEAY_CONF` environment variable serves the same purpose but its use is discouraged.

## BUGS

OpenSSL's handling of T61Strings (aka TeletexStrings) is broken: it effectively treats them as ISO-8859-1 (Latin 1), Netscape and MSIE have similar behaviour. This can cause problems if you need characters that aren't available in PrintableStrings and you don't want to or can't use BMPStrings.

As a consequence of the T61String handling the only correct way to represent accented characters in OpenSSL is to use a BMPString: unfortunately Netscape currently chokes on these. If you have to use accented characters with Netscape and MSIE then you currently need to use the invalid T61String form.

The current prompting is not very friendly. It doesn't allow you to confirm what you've just entered. Other things like extensions in certificate requests are statically defined in the configuration file. Some of these: like an email address in `subjectAltName` should be input by the user.

## SEE ALSO

*x509(1)*, *ca(1)*, *genrsa(1)*, *gendsa(1)*, *config(5)*

**NAME**

rsa – RSA key processing tool

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl rsa [-inform PEM|NET|DER] [-outform PEM|NET|DER] [-in filename] [-passin arg]
[-out filename] [-passout arg] [-sgckey] [-des] [-des3] [-idea] [-text] [-noout] [-modulus]
[-check] [-pubin] [-pubout] [-engine id]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **rsa** command processes RSA keys. They can be converted between various forms and their components printed out. **Note** this command uses the traditional SSLeay compatible format for private key encryption: newer applications should use the more secure PKCS#8 format using the **pkcs8** utility.

**COMMAND OPTIONS****-inform DER|NET|PEM**

This specifies the input format. The **DER** option uses an ASN1 DER encoded form compatible with the PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey or SubjectPublicKeyInfo format. The **PEM** form is the default format: it consists of the **DER** format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines. On input PKCS#8 format private keys are also accepted. The **NET** form is a format is described in the **NOTES** section.

**-outform DER|NET|PEM**

This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the **-inform** option.

**-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read a key from or standard input if this option is not specified. If the key is encrypted a pass phrase will be prompted for.

**-passin arg**

the input file password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

**-out filename**

This specifies the output filename to write a key to or standard output if this option is not specified. If any encryption options are set then a pass phrase will be prompted for. The output filename should **not** be the same as the input filename.

**-passout password**

the output file password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

**-sgckey**

use the modified NET algorithm used with some versions of Microsoft IIS and SGC keys.

**-des|-des3|-idea**

These options encrypt the private key with the DES, triple DES, or the IDEA ciphers respectively before outputting it. A pass phrase is prompted for. If none of these options is specified the key is written in plain text. This means that using the **rsa** utility to read in an encrypted key with no encryption option can be used to remove the pass phrase from a key, or by setting the encryption options it can be used to add or change the pass phrase. These options can only be used with PEM format output files.

**-text**

prints out the various public or private key components in plain text in addition to the encoded version.

**-noout**

this option prevents output of the encoded version of the key.

**-modulus**

this option prints out the value of the modulus of the key.

**-check**

this option checks the consistency of an RSA private key.



**-pubin**

by default a private key is read from the input file: with this option a public key is read instead.

**-pubout**

by default a private key is output: with this option a public key will be output instead. This option is automatically set if the input is a public key.

**-engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

**NOTES**

The PEM private key format uses the header and footer lines:

```
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
```

The PEM public key format uses the header and footer lines:

```
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
```

The **NET** form is a format compatible with older Netscape servers and Microsoft IIS .key files, this uses unsalted RC4 for its encryption. It is not very secure and so should only be used when necessary.

Some newer version of IIS have additional data in the exported .key files. To use these with the utility, view the file with a binary editor and look for the string "private-key", then trace back to the byte sequence 0x30, 0x82 (this is an ASN1 SEQUENCE). Copy all the data from this point onwards to another file and use that as the input to the **rsa** utility with the **-inform NET** option. If you get an error after entering the password try the **-sgckey** option.

**EXAMPLES**

To remove the pass phrase on an RSA private key:

```
openssl rsa -in key.pem -out keyout.pem
```

To encrypt a private key using triple DES:

```
openssl rsa -in key.pem -des3 -out keyout.pem
```

To convert a private key from PEM to DER format:

```
openssl rsa -in key.pem -outform DER -out keyout.der
```

To print out the components of a private key to standard output:

```
openssl rsa -in key.pem -text -noout
```

To just output the public part of a private key:

```
openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem
```

**BUGS**

The command line password arguments don't currently work with **NET** format.

There should be an option that automatically handles .key files, without having to manually edit them.

**SEE ALSO**

*pkcs8(1)*, *dsa(1)*, *genrsa(1)*, *gendsa(1)*

**NAME**

rsautl – RSA utility

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl rsautl** [**-in file**] [**-out file**] [**-inkey file**] [**-pubin**] [**-certin**] [**-sign**] [**-verify**] [**-encrypt**]  
[**-decrypt**] [**-pkcs**] [**-ssl**] [**-raw**] [**-hexdump**] [**-asn1parse**]

**DESCRIPTION**

The **rsautl** command can be used to sign, verify, encrypt and decrypt data using the RSA algorithm.

**COMMAND OPTIONS****-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read data from or standard input if this option is not specified.

**-out filename**

specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by default.

**-inkey file**

the input key file, by default it should be an RSA private key.

**-pubin**

the input file is an RSA public key.

**-certin**

the input is a certificate containing an RSA public key.

**-sign**

sign the input data and output the signed result. This requires an RSA private key.

**-verify**

verify the input data and output the recovered data.

**-encrypt**

encrypt the input data using an RSA public key.

**-decrypt**

decrypt the input data using an RSA private key.

**-pkcs, -oaep, -ssl, -raw**

the padding to use: PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default), PKCS#1 OAEP, special padding used in SSL v2 backwards compatible handshakes, or no padding, respectively. For signatures, only **-pkcs** and **-raw** can be used.

**-hexdump**

hex dump the output data.

**-asn1parse**

asn1parse the output data, this is useful when combined with the **-verify** option.

**NOTES**

**rsautl** because it uses the RSA algorithm directly can only be used to sign or verify small pieces of data.

**EXAMPLES**

Sign some data using a private key:

```
openssl rsautl -sign -in file -inkey key.pem -out sig
```

Recover the signed data

```
openssl rsautl -verify -in sig -inkey key.pem
```

Examine the raw signed data:

```
openssl rsautl -verify -in file -inkey key.pem -raw -hexdump
```

```

0000 - 00 01 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff .....
0010 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff .....
0020 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff .....
0030 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff .....
0040 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff .....
0050 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff .....
0060 - ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff-ff ff ff ff ff ff ff .....
0070 - ff ff ff ff 00 68 65 6c-6c 6f 20 77 6f 72 6c 64 .....hello world

```

The PKCS#1 block formatting is evident from this. If this was done using encrypt and decrypt the block would have been of type 2 (the second byte) and random padding data visible instead of the 0xff bytes.

It is possible to analyse the signature of certificates using this utility in conjunction with **asn1parse**. Consider the self signed example in certs/pca-cert.pem . Running **asn1parse** as follows yields:

```

openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem
    0:d=0  hl=4 l= 742 cons: SEQUENCE
      4:d=1  hl=4 l= 591 cons: SEQUENCE
        8:d=2  hl=2 l=   3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
          10:d=3 hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :02
          13:d=2 hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :00
          16:d=2 hl=2 l=  13 cons: SEQUENCE
            18:d=3 hl=2 l=   9 prim: OBJECT           :md5WithRSAEncryption
            29:d=3 hl=2 l=   0 prim: NULL
            31:d=2 hl=2 l=  92 cons: SEQUENCE
              33:d=3 hl=2 l=  11 cons: SET
                35:d=4 hl=2 l=   9 cons: SEQUENCE
                  37:d=5 hl=2 l=   3 prim: OBJECT           :countryName
                  42:d=5 hl=2 l=   2 prim: PRINTABLESTRING :AU
        ....
      599:d=1  hl=2 l=  13 cons: SEQUENCE
        601:d=2 hl=2 l=   9 prim: OBJECT           :md5WithRSAEncryption
        612:d=2 hl=2 l=   0 prim: NULL
        614:d=1  hl=3 l= 129 prim: BIT STRING

```

The final BIT STRING contains the actual signature. It can be extracted with:

```
openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem -out sig -noout -strparse 614
```

The certificate public key can be extracted with:

```
openssl x509 -in test/testx509.pem -pubout -noout >pubkey.pem
```

The signature can be analysed with:

```

openssl rsautl -in sig -verify -asn1parse -inkey pubkey.pem -pubin
    0:d=0  hl=2 l=  32 cons: SEQUENCE
      2:d=1  hl=2 l=  12 cons: SEQUENCE
        4:d=2  hl=2 l=   8 prim: OBJECT           :md5
        14:d=2 hl=2 l=   0 prim: NULL
        16:d=1  hl=2 l=  16 prim: OCTET STRING
          0000 - f3 46 9e aa 1a 4a 73 c9-37 ea 93 00 48 25 08 b5 .F...Js.7...H%..

```

This is the parsed version of an ASN1 DigestInfo structure. It can be seen that the digest used was md5.

The actual part of the certificate that was signed can be extracted with:

```
openssl asn1parse -in pca-cert.pem -out tbs -noout -strparse 4
```

and its digest computed with:

```

openssl md5 -c tbs
MD5(tbs)= f3:46:9e:aa:1a:4a:73:c9:37:ea:93:00:48:25:08:b5

```

which it can be seen agrees with the recovered value above.

**SEE ALSO***dgst(1), rsa(1), genrsa(1)*

**NAME**

s\_client – SSL/TLS client program

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl s\_client** [-connect host:port>] [-verify depth] [-cert filename] [-key filename] [-CApath directory] [-CAfile filename] [-reconnect] [-pause] [-showcerts] [-debug] [-msg] [-nbio\_test] [-state] [-nbio] [-crlf] [-ign\_eof] [-quiet] [-ssl2] [-ssl3] [-tls1] [-no\_ssl2] [-no\_ssl3] [-no\_tls1] [-bugs] [-cipher cipherlist] [-starttls protocol] [-engine id] [-rand file(s)]

**DESCRIPTION**

The **s\_client** command implements a generic SSL/TLS client which connects to a remote host using SSL/TLS. It is a *very* useful diagnostic tool for SSL servers.

**OPTIONS****-connect host:port**

This specifies the host and optional port to connect to. If not specified then an attempt is made to connect to the local host on port 4433.

**-cert certname**

The certificate to use, if one is requested by the server. The default is not to use a certificate.

**-key keyfile**

The private key to use. If not specified then the certificate file will be used.

**-verify depth**

The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the server certificate chain and turns on server certificate verification. Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure.

**-CApath directory**

The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory must be in “hash format”, see **verify** for more information. These are also used when building the client certificate chain.

**-CAfile file**

A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.

**-reconnect**

reconnects to the same server 5 times using the same session ID, this can be used as a test that session caching is working.

**-pause**

pauses 1 second between each read and write call.

**-showcerts**

display the whole server certificate chain: normally only the server certificate itself is displayed.

**-prexit**

print session information when the program exits. This will always attempt to print out information even if the connection fails. Normally information will only be printed out once if the connection succeeds. This option is useful because the cipher in use may be renegotiated or the connection may fail because a client certificate is required or is requested only after an attempt is made to access a certain URL. Note: the output produced by this option is not always accurate because a connection might never have been established.

**-state**

prints out the SSL session states.

**-debug**

print extensive debugging information including a hex dump of all traffic.

**-msg**

show all protocol messages with hex dump.

- nbio\_test**  
tests non-blocking I/O
- nbio**  
turns on non-blocking I/O
- crlf**  
this option translated a line feed from the terminal into CR+LF as required by some servers.
- ign\_eof**  
inhibit shutting down the connection when end of file is reached in the input.
- quiet**  
inhibit printing of session and certificate information. This implicitly turns on **-ign\_eof** as well.
- ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -no\_ssl2, -no\_ssl3, -no\_tls1**  
these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate.  
  
Unfortunately there are a lot of ancient and broken servers in use which cannot handle this technique and will fail to connect. Some servers only work if TLS is turned off with the **-no\_tls** option others will only support SSL v2 and may need the **-ssl2** option.
- bugs**  
there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this option enables various workarounds.
- cipher cipherlist**  
this allows the cipher list sent by the client to be modified. Although the server determines which cipher suite is used it should take the first supported cipher in the list sent by the client. See the **ciphers** command for more information.
- starttls protocol**  
send the protocol-specific message(s) to switch to TLS for communication. **protocol** is a keyword for the intended protocol. Currently, the only supported keywords are “smtp” and “pop3”.
- engine id**  
specifying an engine (by it's unique **id** string) will cause **s\_client** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.
- rand file(s)**  
a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd(3)*). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is **;** for MS-Windows, **,** for OpenVMS, and **:** for all others.

## CONNECTED COMMANDS

If a connection is established with an SSL server then any data received from the server is displayed and any key presses will be sent to the server. When used interactively (which means neither **-quiet** nor **-ign\_eof** have been given), the session will be renegotiated if the line begins with an **R**, and if the line begins with a **Q** or if end of file is reached, the connection will be closed down.

## NOTES

**s\_client** can be used to debug SSL servers. To connect to an SSL HTTP server the command:

```
openssl s_client -connect servername:443
```

would typically be used (https uses port 443). If the connection succeeds then an HTTP command can be given such as “GET /” to retrieve a web page.

If the handshake fails then there are several possible causes, if it is nothing obvious like no client certificate then the **-bugs, -ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -no\_ssl2, -no\_ssl3, -no\_tls1** can be tried in case it is a buggy server. In particular you should play with these options **before** submitting a bug report to an OpenSSL mailing list.

A frequent problem when attempting to get client certificates working is that a web client complains it has no certificates or gives an empty list to choose from. This is normally because the server is not sending the clients certificate authority in its “acceptable CA list” when it requests a certificate. By

using **s\_client** the CA list can be viewed and checked. However some servers only request client authentication after a specific URL is requested. To obtain the list in this case it is necessary to use the **-prexit** command and send an HTTP request for an appropriate page.

If a certificate is specified on the command line using the **-cert** option it will not be used unless the server specifically requests a client certificate. Therefor merely including a client certificate on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works.

If there are problems verifying a server certificate then the **-showcerts** option can be used to show the whole chain.

## BUGS

Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of the techniques used are rather old, the C source of s\_client is rather hard to read and not a model of how things should be done. A typical SSL client program would be much simpler.

The **-verify** option should really exit if the server verification fails.

The **-prexit** option is a bit of a hack. We should really report information whenever a session is renegotiated.

## SEE ALSO

*sess\_id(1), s\_server(1), ciphers(1)*

**NAME**

s\_server – SSL/TLS server program

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl s_server [-accept port] [-context id] [-verify depth] [-Verify depth] [-cert filename]
[-key keyfile] [-dcert filename] [-dkey keyfile] [-dhparam filename] [-nbio] [-nbio_test] [-crlf]
[-debug] [-msg] [-state] [-CApath directory] [-CAfile filename] [-nocert] [-cipher cipherlist]
[-quiet] [-no_tmp_rsa] [-ssl2] [-ssl3] [-tls1] [-no_ssl2] [-no_ssl3] [-no_tls1] [-no_dhe] [-bugs]
[-hack] [-www] [-WWW] [-HTTP] [-engine id] [-id_prefix arg] [-rand file(s)]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **s\_server** command implements a generic SSL/TLS server which listens for connections on a given port using SSL/TLS.

**OPTIONS****–accept port**

the TCP port to listen on for connections. If not specified 4433 is used.

**–context id**

sets the SSL context id. It can be given any string value. If this option is not present a default value will be used.

**–cert certname**

The certificate to use, most servers cipher suites require the use of a certificate and some require a certificate with a certain public key type: for example the DSS cipher suites require a certificate containing a DSS (DSA) key. If not specified then the filename “server.pem” will be used.

**–key keyfile**

The private key to use. If not specified then the certificate file will be used.

**–dcert filename, –dkey keyname**

specify an additional certificate and private key, these behave in the same manner as the **–cert** and **–key** options except there is no default if they are not specified (no additional certificate and key is used). As noted above some cipher suites require a certificate containing a key of a certain type. Some cipher suites need a certificate carrying an RSA key and some a DSS (DSA) key. By using RSA and DSS certificates and keys a server can support clients which only support RSA or DSS cipher suites by using an appropriate certificate.

**–nocert**

if this option is set then no certificate is used. This restricts the cipher suites available to the anonymous ones (currently just anonymous DH).

**–dhparam filename**

the DH parameter file to use. The ephemeral DH cipher suites generate keys using a set of DH parameters. If not specified then an attempt is made to load the parameters from the server certificate file. If this fails then a static set of parameters hard coded into the s\_server program will be used.

**–no\_dhe**

if this option is set then no DH parameters will be loaded effectively disabling the ephemeral DH cipher suites.

**–no\_tmp\_rsa**

certain export cipher suites sometimes use a temporary RSA key, this option disables temporary RSA key generation.

**–verify depth, –Verify depth**

The verify depth to use. This specifies the maximum length of the client certificate chain and makes the server request a certificate from the client. With the **–verify** option a certificate is requested but the client does not have to send one, with the **–Verify** option the client must supply a certificate or an error occurs.

**–CApath directory**

The directory to use for client certificate verification. This directory must be in “hash format”, see **verify** for more information. These are also used when building the server certificate chain.



**-CAfile file**

A file containing trusted certificates to use during client authentication and to use when attempting to build the server certificate chain. The list is also used in the list of acceptable client CAs passed to the client when a certificate is requested.

**-state**

prints out the SSL session states.

**-debug**

print extensive debugging information including a hex dump of all traffic.

**-msg**

show all protocol messages with hex dump.

**-nbio\_test**

tests non blocking I/O

**-nbio**

turns on non blocking I/O

**-crlf**

this option translated a line feed from the terminal into CR+LF.

**-quiet**

inhibit printing of session and certificate information.

**-ssl2, -ssl3, -tls1, -no\_ssl2, -no\_ssl3, -no\_tls1**

these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate.

**-bugs**

there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this option enables various workarounds.

**-hack**

this option enables a further workaround for some some early Netscape SSL code (?).

**-cipher cipherlist**

this allows the cipher list used by the server to be modified. When the client sends a list of supported ciphers the first client cipher also included in the server list is used. Because the client specifies the preference order, the order of the server cipherlist irrelevant. See the **ciphers** command for more information.

**-www**

sends a status message back to the client when it connects. This includes lots of information about the ciphers used and various session parameters. The output is in HTML format so this option will normally be used with a web browser.

**-WWW**

emulates a simple web server. Pages will be resolved relative to the current directory, for example if the URL https://myhost/page.html is requested the file ./page.html will be loaded.

**-HTTP**

emulates a simple web server. Pages will be resolved relative to the current directory, for example if the URL https://myhost/page.html is requested the file ./page.html will be loaded. The files loaded are assumed to contain a complete and correct HTTP response (lines that are part of the HTTP response line and headers must end with CRLF).

**-engine id**

specifying an engine (by it's unique **id** string) will cause **s\_server** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

**-id\_prefix arg**

generate SSL/TLS session IDs prefixed by **arg**. This is mostly useful for testing any SSL/TLS code (eg. proxies) that wish to deal with multiple servers, when each of which might be generating a unique range of session IDs (eg. with a certain prefix).

**-rand file(s)**

a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd(3)*). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is `;` for MS-Windows, `,` for OpenVMS, and `:` for all others.

**CONNECTED COMMANDS**

If a connection request is established with an SSL client and neither the **-www** nor the **-WWW** option has been used then normally any data received from the client is displayed and any key presses will be sent to the client.

Certain single letter commands are also recognized which perform special operations: these are listed below.

- q** end the current SSL connection but still accept new connections.
- Q** end the current SSL connection and exit.
- r** renegotiate the SSL session.
- R** renegotiate the SSL session and request a client certificate.
- P** send some plain text down the underlying TCP connection: this should cause the client to disconnect due to a protocol violation.
- S** print out some session cache status information.

**NOTES**

**s\_server** can be used to debug SSL clients. To accept connections from a web browser the command:

```
openssl s_server -accept 443 -www
```

can be used for example.

Most web browsers (in particular Netscape and MSIE) only support RSA cipher suites, so they cannot connect to servers which don't use a certificate carrying an RSA key or a version of OpenSSL with RSA disabled.

Although specifying an empty list of CAs when requesting a client certificate is strictly speaking a protocol violation, some SSL clients interpret this to mean any CA is acceptable. This is useful for debugging purposes.

The session parameters can be printed out using the **sess\_id** program.

**BUGS**

Because this program has a lot of options and also because some of the techniques used are rather old, the C source of **s\_server** is rather hard to read and not a model of how things should be done. A typical SSL server program would be much simpler.

The output of common ciphers is wrong: it just gives the list of ciphers that OpenSSL recognizes and the client supports.

There should be a way for the **s\_server** program to print out details of any unknown cipher suites a client says it supports.

**SEE ALSO**

*sess\_id(1)*, *s\_client(1)*, *ciphers(1)*

**NAME**

`sess_id` – SSL/TLS session handling utility

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl sess_id [-inform PEM|DER] [-outform PEM|DER] [-in filename] [-out filename]
[-text] [-noout] [-context ID]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The `sess_id` process the encoded version of the SSL session structure and optionally prints out SSL session details (for example the SSL session master key) in human readable format. Since this is a diagnostic tool that needs some knowledge of the SSL protocol to use properly, most users will not need to use it.

**-inform DER|PEM**

This specifies the input format. The **DER** option uses an ASN1 DER encoded format containing session details. The precise format can vary from one version to the next. The **PEM** form is the default format: it consists of the **DER** format base64 encoded with additional header and footer lines.

**-outform DER|PEM**

This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the **-inform** option.

**-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read session information from or standard input by default.

**-out filename**

This specifies the output filename to write session information to or standard output if this option is not specified.

**-text**

prints out the various public or private key components in plain text in addition to the encoded version.

**-cert**

if a certificate is present in the session it will be output using this option, if the **-text** option is also present then it will be printed out in text form.

**-noout**

this option prevents output of the encoded version of the session.

**-context ID**

this option can set the session id so the output session information uses the supplied ID. The ID can be any string of characters. This option wont normally be used.

**OUTPUT**

Typical output:

```
SSL-Session:
  Protocol   : TLSv1
  Cipher     : 0016
  Session-ID: 871E62626C554CE95488823752CBD5F3673A3EF3DCE9C67BD916C809914B40ED
  Session-ID-ctx: 01000000
  Master-Key: A7CEFC571974BE02CAC305269DC59F76EA9F0B180CB6642697A68251F2D2BB57
  Key-Arg    : None
  Start Time : 948459261
  Timeout    : 300 (sec)
  Verify return code 0 (ok)
```

Theses are described below in more detail.

**Protocol**

this is the protocol in use TLSv1, SSLv3 or SSLv2.

**Cipher**

the cipher used this is the actual raw SSL or TLS cipher code, see the SSL or TLS specifications for more information.

**Session-ID**

the SSL session ID in hex format.

**Session-ID-ctx**

the session ID context in hex format.

**Master-Key**

this is the SSL session master key.

**Key-Arg**

the key argument, this is only used in SSL v2.

**Start Time**

this is the session start time represented as an integer in standard Unix format.

**Timeout**

the timeout in seconds.

**Verify return code**

this is the return code when an SSL client certificate is verified.

**NOTES**

The PEM encoded session format uses the header and footer lines:

```
-----BEGIN SSL SESSION PARAMETERS-----  
-----END SSL SESSION PARAMETERS-----
```

Since the SSL session output contains the master key it is possible to read the contents of an encrypted session using this information. Therefore appropriate security precautions should be taken if the information is being output by a “real” application. This is however strongly discouraged and should only be used for debugging purposes.

**BUGS**

The cipher and start time should be printed out in human readable form.

**SEE ALSO**

*ciphers* (1), *s\_server* (1)

**NAME**

smime – S/MIME utility

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl smime [-encrypt] [-decrypt] [-sign] [-verify] [-pk7out] [-des] [-des3] [-rc2-40]
[-rc2-64] [-rc2-128] [-in file] [-certfile file] [-signer file] [-recip file] [-inform
SMIME|PEM|DER] [-passin arg] [-inkey file] [-out file] [-outform SMIME|PEM|DER]
[-content file] [-to addr] [-from ad] [-subject s] [-text] [-rand file(s)] [cert.pem]...
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **smime** command handles S/MIME mail. It can encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify S/MIME messages.

**COMMAND OPTIONS**

There are five operation options that set the type of operation to be performed. The meaning of the other options varies according to the operation type.

**–encrypt**

encrypt mail for the given recipient certificates. Input file is the message to be encrypted. The output file is the encrypted mail in MIME format.

**–decrypt**

decrypt mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Expects an encrypted mail message in MIME format for the input file. The decrypted mail is written to the output file.

**–sign**

sign mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Input file is the message to be signed. The signed message in MIME format is written to the output file.

**–verify**

verify signed mail. Expects a signed mail message on input and outputs the signed data. Both clear text and opaque signing is supported.

**–pk7out**

takes an input message and writes out a PEM encoded PKCS#7 structure.

**–in filename**

the input message to be encrypted or signed or the MIME message to be decrypted or verified.

**–inform SMIME|PEM|DER**

this specifies the input format for the PKCS#7 structure. The default is **SMIME** which reads an S/MIME format message. **PEM** and **DER** format change this to expect PEM and DER format PKCS#7 structures instead. This currently only affects the input format of the PKCS#7 structure, if no PKCS#7 structure is being input (for example with **–encrypt** or **–sign**) this option has no effect.

**–out filename**

the message text that has been decrypted or verified or the output MIME format message that has been signed or verified.

**–outform SMIME|PEM|DER**

this specifies the output format for the PKCS#7 structure. The default is **SMIME** which write an S/MIME format message. **PEM** and **DER** format change this to write PEM and DER format PKCS#7 structures instead. This currently only affects the output format of the PKCS#7 structure, if no PKCS#7 structure is being output (for example with **–verify** or **–decrypt**) this option has no effect.

**–content filename**

This specifies a file containing the detached content, this is only useful with the **–verify** command. This is only usable if the PKCS#7 structure is using the detached signature form where the content is not included. This option will override any content if the input format is S/MIME and it uses the multipart/signed MIME content type.

**–text**

this option adds plain text (text/plain) MIME headers to the supplied message if encrypting or signing. If decrypting or verifying it strips off text headers: if the decrypted or verified message is not

of MIME type text/plain then an error occurs.

**-CAfile file**

a file containing trusted CA certificates, only used with **-verify**.

**-CAnpath dir**

a directory containing trusted CA certificates, only used with **-verify**. This directory must be a standard certificate directory: that is a hash of each subject name (using **x509 -hash**) should be linked to each certificate.

**-des -des3 -rc2-40 -rc2-64 -rc2-128**

the encryption algorithm to use. DES (56 bits), triple DES (168 bits) or 40, 64 or 128 bit RC2 respectively if not specified 40 bit RC2 is used. Only used with **-encrypt**.

**-nointern**

when verifying a message normally certificates (if any) included in the message are searched for the signing certificate. With this option only the certificates specified in the **-certfile** option are used. The supplied certificates can still be used as untrusted CAs however.

**-noverify**

do not verify the signers certificate of a signed message.

**-nochain**

do not do chain verification of signers certificates: that is don't use the certificates in the signed message as untrusted CAs.

**-nosigs**

don't try to verify the signatures on the message.

**-nocerts**

when signing a message the signer's certificate is normally included with this option it is excluded. This will reduce the size of the signed message but the verifier must have a copy of the signers certificate available locally (passed using the **-certfile** option for example).

**-noattr**

normally when a message is signed a set of attributes are included which include the signing time and supported symmetric algorithms. With this option they are not included.

**-binary**

normally the input message is converted to "canonical" format which is effectively using CR and LF as end of line: as required by the S/MIME specification. When this option is present no translation occurs. This is useful when handling binary data which may not be in MIME format.

**-nodetach**

when signing a message use opaque signing: this form is more resistant to translation by mail relays but it cannot be read by mail agents that do not support S/MIME. Without this option clear-text signing with the MIME type multipart/signed is used.

**-certfile file**

allows additional certificates to be specified. When signing these will be included with the message. When verifying these will be searched for the signers certificates. The certificates should be in PEM format.

**-signer file**

the signers certificate when signing a message. If a message is being verified then the signers certificates will be written to this file if the verification was successful.

**-recip file**

the recipients certificate when decrypting a message. This certificate must match one of the recipients of the message or an error occurs.

**-inkey file**

the private key to use when signing or decrypting. This must match the corresponding certificate. If this option is not specified then the private key must be included in the certificate file specified with the **-recip** or **-signer** file.

**-passin arg**

the private key password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl(1)*.

**-rand file(s)**

a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator, or an EGD socket (see *RAND\_egd(3)*). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is **;** for MS-Windows, **,** for OpenVMS, and **:** for all others.

**cert.pem...**

one or more certificates of message recipients: used when encrypting a message.

**-to, -from, -subject**

the relevant mail headers. These are included outside the signed portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email address matches that specified in the From: address.

**NOTES**

The MIME message must be sent without any blank lines between the headers and the output. Some mail programs will automatically add a blank line. Piping the mail directly to sendmail is one way to achieve the correct format.

The supplied message to be signed or encrypted must include the necessary MIME headers or many S/MIME clients wont display it properly (if at all). You can use the **-text** option to automatically add plain text headers.

A "signed and encrypted" message is one where a signed message is then encrypted. This can be produced by encrypting an already signed message: see the examples section.

This version of the program only allows one signer per message but it will verify multiple signers on received messages. Some S/MIME clients choke if a message contains multiple signers. It is possible to sign messages "in parallel" by signing an already signed message.

The options **-encrypt** and **-decrypt** reflect common usage in S/MIME clients. Strictly speaking these process PKCS#7 enveloped data: PKCS#7 encrypted data is used for other purposes.

**EXIT CODES**

- the operation was completely successfully.
- 1 an error occurred parsing the command options.
- 2 one of the input files could not be read.
- 3 an error occurred creating the PKCS#7 file or when reading the MIME message.
- 4 an error occurred decrypting or verifying the message.
- 5 the message was verified correctly but an error occurred writing out the signers certificates.

**EXAMPLES**

Create a cleartext signed message:

```
openssl smime -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \
    -signer mycert.pem
```

Create and opaque signed message

```
openssl smime -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg -nodetach \
    -signer mycert.pem
```

Create a signed message, include some additional certificates and read the private key from another file:

```
openssl smime -sign -in in.txt -text -out mail.msg \
    -signer mycert.pem -inkey mykey.pem -certfile mycerts.pem
```

Send a signed message under Unix directly to sendmail, including headers:

```
openssl smime -sign -in in.txt -text -signer mycert.pem \
    -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \
    -subject "Signed message" | sendmail someone@somewhere
```

Verify a message and extract the signer's certificate if successful:

```
openssl smime -verify -in mail.msg -signer user.pem -out signedtext.txt
```

Send encrypted mail using triple DES:

```
openssl smime -encrypt -in in.txt -from steve@openssl.org \
    -to someone@somewhere -subject "Encrypted message" \
    -des3 user.pem -out mail.msg
```

Sign and encrypt mail:

```
openssl smime -sign -in ml.txt -signer my.pem -text \
    | openssl smime -encrypt -out mail.msg \
    -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \
    -subject "Signed and Encrypted message" -des3 user.pem
```

Note: the encryption command does not include the **-text** option because the message being encrypted already has MIME headers.

Decrypt mail:

```
openssl smime -decrypt -in mail.msg -recip mycert.pem -inkey key.pem
```

The output from Netscape form signing is a PKCS#7 structure with the detached signature format. You can use this program to verify the signature by line wrapping the base64 encoded structure and surrounding it with:

```
-----BEGIN PKCS7-----
-----END PKCS7-----
```

and using the command,

```
openssl smime -verify -inform PEM -in signature.pem -content content.txt
```

alternatively you can base64 decode the signature and use

```
openssl smime -verify -inform DER -in signature.der -content content.txt
```

## BUGS

The MIME parser isn't very clever: it seems to handle most messages that I've thrown at it but it may choke on others.

The code currently will only write out the signer's certificate to a file: if the signer has a separate encryption certificate this must be manually extracted. There should be some heuristic that determines the correct encryption certificate.

Ideally a database should be maintained of a certificates for each email address.

The code doesn't currently take note of the permitted symmetric encryption algorithms as supplied in the SMIMECapabilities signed attribute. this means the user has to manually include the correct encryption algorithm. It should store the list of permitted ciphers in a database and only use those.

No revocation checking is done on the signer's certificate.

The current code can only handle S/MIME v2 messages, the more complex S/MIME v3 structures may cause parsing errors.



**NAME**

speed – test library performance

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl speed** [**–engine id**] [**md2**] [**mdc2**] [**md5**] [**hmac**] [**sha1**] [**rmd160**] [**idea-cbc**] [**rc2-cbc**] [**rc5-cbc**] [**bf-cbc**] [**des-cbc**] [**des-ede3**] [**rc4**] [**rsa512**] [**rsa1024**] [**rsa2048**] [**rsa4096**] [**dsa512**] [**dsa1024**] [**dsa2048**] [**idea**] [**rc2**] [**des**] [**rsa**] [**blowfish**]

**DESCRIPTION**

This command is used to test the performance of cryptographic algorithms.

**OPTIONS****–engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **speed** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

**[zero or more test algorithms]**

If any options are given, **speed** tests those algorithms, otherwise all of the above are tested.

**NAME**

`spkac` – SPKAC printing and generating utility

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl spkac [-in filename] [-out filename] [-key keyfile] [-passin arg] [-challenge string]
[-pubkey] [-spkac spkacname] [-spksect section] [-noout] [-verify] [-engine id]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **spkac** command processes Netscape signed public key and challenge (SPKAC) files. It can print out their contents, verify the signature and produce its own SPKACs from a supplied private key.

**COMMAND OPTIONS****-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read from or standard input if this option is not specified. Ignored if the **-key** option is used.

**-out filename**

specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by default.

**-key keyfile**

create an SPKAC file using the private key in **keyfile**. The **-in**, **-noout**, **-spksect** and **-verify** options are ignored if present.

**-passin password**

the input file password source. For more information about the format of **arg** see the **PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS** section in *openssl*(1).

**-challenge string**

specifies the challenge string if an SPKAC is being created.

**-spkac spkacname**

allows an alternative name form the variable containing the SPKAC. The default is “SPKAC”. This option affects both generated and input SPKAC files.

**-spksect section**

allows an alternative name form the section containing the SPKAC. The default is the default section.

**-noout**

don’t output the text version of the SPKAC (not used if an SPKAC is being created).

**-pubkey**

output the public key of an SPKAC (not used if an SPKAC is being created).

**-verify**

verifies the digital signature on the supplied SPKAC.

**-engine id**

specifying an engine (by it’s unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

**EXAMPLES**

Print out the contents of an SPKAC:

```
openssl spkac -in spkac.cnf
```

Verify the signature of an SPKAC:

```
openssl spkac -in spkac.cnf -noout -verify
```

Create an SPKAC using the challenge string “hello”:

```
openssl spkac -key key.pem -challenge hello -out spkac.cnf
```

Example of an SPKAC, (long lines split up for clarity):

```
SPKAC=MIG5MGUwXDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANLADBIAkEA1cCoq2Wa3Ixs47uI7F\  
PVwHVIPDx5ysol05Y6zpozam135a8R0CpoRvkkigIyXfcCjiVi5oWk+6FfPaD03u\  
PFoQIDAQABFgVoZWxsbszANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAANBAFpQtY/FoJdwkJh1bEiYuc\  
2EeM2KHTWPEepWYeawvHD0gQ3DngSC75YCWnnDdq+NQ3F+X4deMx9AaEglZtULwV\  
4=
```

## NOTES

A created SPKAC with suitable DN components appended can be fed into the **ca** utility.

SPKACs are typically generated by Netscape when a form is submitted containing the **KEYGEN** tag as part of the certificate enrollment process.

The challenge string permits a primitive form of proof of possession of private key. By checking the SPKAC signature and a random challenge string some guarantee is given that the user knows the private key corresponding to the public key being certified. This is important in some applications. Without this it is possible for a previous SPKAC to be used in a “replay attack”.

## SEE ALSO

*ca* (1)

**NAME**

verify – Utility to verify certificates.

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl verify** [**-CApath** *directory*] [**-CAfile** *file*] [**-purpose** *purpose*] [**-untrusted** *file*] [**-help**] [**-issuer\_checks**] [**-verbose**] [-] [*certificates*]

**DESCRIPTION**

The **verify** command verifies certificate chains.

**COMMAND OPTIONS****-CApath** *directory*

A directory of trusted certificates. The certificates should have names of the form: hash.0 or have symbolic links to them of this form (“hash” is the hashed certificate subject name: see the **-hash** option of the **x509** utility). Under Unix the **c\_rehash** script will automatically create symbolic links to a directory of certificates.

**-CAfile** *file*

A file of trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates in PEM format concatenated together.

**-untrusted** *file*

A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates

**-purpose** *purpose*

the intended use for the certificate. Without this option no chain verification will be done. Currently accepted uses are **sslclient**, **sslserver**, **nssslserver**, **smimesign**, **smimeencrypt**. See the **VERIFY OPERATION** section for more information.

**-help**

prints out a usage message.

**-verbose**

print extra information about the operations being performed.

**-issuer\_checks**

print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate of the current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer certificate was rejected. However the presence of rejection messages does not itself imply that anything is wrong: during the normal verify process several rejections may take place.

- marks the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins with a –.

**certificates**

one or more certificates to verify. If no certificate filenames are included then an attempt is made to read a certificate from standard input. They should all be in PEM format.

**VERIFY OPERATION**

The **verify** program uses the same functions as the internal SSL and S/MIME verification, therefore this description applies to these verify operations too.

There is one crucial difference between the verify operations performed by the **verify** program: wherever possible an attempt is made to continue after an error whereas normally the verify operation would halt on the first error. This allows all the problems with a certificate chain to be determined.

The verify operation consists of a number of separate steps.

Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate and ending in the root CA. It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built up. The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current certificate. If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed to be the root CA.

The process of ‘looking up the issuers certificate’ itself involves a number of steps. In versions of OpenSSL before 0.9.5a the first certificate whose subject name matched the issuer of the current certificate was assumed to be the issuers certificate. In OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later all certificates whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current certificate are subject to further tests. The relevant authority key identifier components of the current certificate (if present) must match the subject key identifier

(if present) and issuer and serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition the keyUsage extension of the candidate issuer (if present) must permit certificate signing.

The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root CA is always looked up in the trusted certificate list: if the certificate to verify is a root certificate then an exact match must be found in the trusted list.

The second operation is to check every untrusted certificate's extensions for consistency with the supplied purpose. If the **-purpose** option is not included then no checks are done. The supplied or "leaf" certificate must have extensions compatible with the supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be valid CA certificates. The precise extensions required are described in more detail in the **CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS** section of the **x509** utility.

The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The root CA should be trusted for the supplied purpose. For compatibility with previous versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL a certificate with no trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes.

The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore and notAfter dates in the certificate. The certificate signatures are also checked at this point.

If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered valid. If any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.

## DIAGNOSTICS

When a verify operation fails the output messages can be somewhat cryptic. The general form of the error message is:

```
server.pem: /C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Test CA (1024 bit)
error 24 at 1 depth lookup:invalid CA certificate
```

The first line contains the name of the certificate being verified followed by the subject name of the certificate. The second line contains the error number and the depth. The depth is number of the certificate being verified when a problem was detected starting with zero for the certificate being verified itself then 1 for the CA that signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text version of the error number is presented.

An exhaustive list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also includes the name of the error code as defined in the header file x509\_vfy.h Some of the error codes are defined but never returned: these are described as "unused".

### 0 X509\_V\_OK: ok

the operation was successful.

### 2 X509\_V\_ERR\_UNABLE\_TO\_GET\_ISSUER\_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate

the issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer certificate of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.

### 3 X509\_V\_ERR\_UNABLE\_TO\_GET\_CRL: unable to get certificate CRL

the CRL of a certificate could not be found. Unused.

### 4 X509\_V\_ERR\_UNABLE\_TO\_DECRYPT\_CERT\_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature

the certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value, this is only meaningful for RSA keys.

### 5 X509\_V\_ERR\_UNABLE\_TO\_DECRYPT\_CRL\_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt CRL's signature

the CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature value could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value. Unused.

### 6 X509\_V\_ERR\_UNABLE\_TO\_DECODE\_ISSUER\_PUBLIC\_KEY: unable to decode issuer public key

the public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read.

- 7 X509\_V\_ERR\_CERT\_SIGNATURE\_FAILURE: certificate signature failure**  
the signature of the certificate is invalid.
- 8 X509\_V\_ERR\_CRL\_SIGNATURE\_FAILURE: CRL signature failure**  
the signature of the certificate is invalid. Unused.
- 9 X509\_V\_ERR\_CERT\_NOT\_YET\_VALID: certificate is not yet valid**  
the certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time.
- 10 X509\_V\_ERR\_CERT\_HAS\_EXPIRED: certificate has expired**  
the certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time.
- 11 X509\_V\_ERR\_CRL\_NOT\_YET\_VALID: CRL is not yet valid**  
the CRL is not yet valid. Unused.
- 12 X509\_V\_ERR\_CRL\_HAS\_EXPIRED: CRL has expired**  
the CRL has expired. Unused.
- 13 X509\_V\_ERR\_ERROR\_IN\_CERT\_NOT\_BEFORE\_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field**  
the certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time.
- 14 X509\_V\_ERR\_ERROR\_IN\_CERT\_NOT\_AFTER\_FIELD: format error in certificate's notAfter field**  
the certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time.
- 15 X509\_V\_ERR\_ERROR\_IN\_CRL\_LAST\_UPDATE\_FIELD: format error in CRL's lastUpdate field**  
the CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time. Unused.
- 16 X509\_V\_ERR\_ERROR\_IN\_CRL\_NEXT\_UPDATE\_FIELD: format error in CRL's nextUpdate field**  
the CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time. Unused.
- 17 X509\_V\_ERR\_OUT\_OF\_MEM: out of memory**  
an error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen.
- 18 X509\_V\_ERR\_DEPTH\_ZERO\_SELF\_SIGNED\_CERT: self signed certificate**  
the passed certificate is self signed and the same certificate cannot be found in the list of trusted certificates.
- 19 X509\_V\_ERR\_SELF\_SIGNED\_CERT\_IN\_CHAIN: self signed certificate in certificate chain**  
the certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but the root could not be found locally.
- 20 X509\_V\_ERR\_UNABLE\_TO\_GET\_ISSUER\_CERT\_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate**  
the issuer certificate of a locally looked up certificate could not be found. This normally means the list of trusted certificates is not complete.
- 21 X509\_V\_ERR\_UNABLE\_TO\_VERIFY\_LEAF\_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate**  
no signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate and it is not self signed.
- 22 X509\_V\_ERR\_CERT\_CHAIN\_TOO\_LONG: certificate chain too long**  
the certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused.
- 23 X509\_V\_ERR\_CERT\_REVOKED: certificate revoked**  
the certificate has been revoked. Unused.
- 24 X509\_V\_ERR\_INVALID\_CA: invalid CA certificate**  
a CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions are not consistent with the supplied purpose.
- 25 X509\_V\_ERR\_PATH\_LENGTH\_EXCEEDED: path length constraint exceeded**  
the basicConstraints pathlength parameter has been exceeded.

**26 X509\_V\_ERR\_INVALID\_PURPOSE: unsupported certificate purpose**

the supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose.

**27 X509\_V\_ERR\_CERT\_UNTRUSTED: certificate not trusted**

the root CA is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose.

**28 X509\_V\_ERR\_CERT\_REJECTED: certificate rejected**

the root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose.

**29 X509\_V\_ERR\_SUBJECT\_ISSUER\_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch**

the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject name did not match the issuer name of the current certificate. Only displayed when the **-issuer\_checks** option is set.

**30 X509\_V\_ERR\_AKID\_SKID\_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch**

the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject key identifier was present and did not match the authority key identifier current certificate. Only displayed when the **-issuer\_checks** option is set.

**31 X509\_V\_ERR\_AKID\_ISSUER\_SERIAL\_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch**

the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its issuer name and serial number was present and did not match the authority key identifier of the current certificate. Only displayed when the **-issuer\_checks** option is set.

**32 X509\_V\_ERR\_KEYUSAGE\_NO\_CERTSIGN: key usage does not include certificate signing**

the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its keyUsage extension does not permit certificate signing.

**50 X509\_V\_ERR\_APPLICATION\_VERIFICATION: application verification failure**

an application specific error. Unused.

**BUGS**

Although the issuer checks are a considerably improvement over the old technique they still suffer from limitations in the underlying X509\_LOOKUP API. One consequence of this is that trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the **-CAfile** option) or a directory (as specified by **-CApath**. If they occur in both then only the certificates in the file will be recognised.

Previous versions of OpenSSL assume certificates with matching subject name are identical and mis-handled them.

**SEE ALSO**

*x509*(1)

**NAME**

version – print OpenSSL version information

**SYNOPSIS**

**openssl version** [-a] [-v] [-b] [-o] [-f] [-p]

**DESCRIPTION**

This command is used to print out version information about OpenSSL.

**OPTIONS**

- a all information, this is the same as setting all the other flags.
- v the current OpenSSL version.
- b the date the current version of OpenSSL was built.
- o option information: various options set when the library was built.
- c compilation flags.
- p platform setting.
- d OPENSSLDIR setting.

**NOTES**

The output of **openssl version -a** would typically be used when sending in a bug report.

**HISTORY**

The -d option was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.



**NAME**

x509 – Certificate display and signing utility

**SYNOPSIS**

```
openssl x509 [-inform DER|PEM|NET] [-outform DER|PEM|NET] [-keyform DER|PEM]
[-CAform DER|PEM] [-CAkeyform DER|PEM] [-in filename] [-out filename] [-serial]
[-hash] [-subject] [-issuer] [-nameopt option] [-email] [-startdate] [-enddate] [-purpose]
[-dates] [-modulus] [-fingerprint] [-alias] [-noout] [-trustout] [-clrtrust] [-clrreject]
[-addtrust arg] [-addreject arg] [-setalias arg] [-days arg] [-set_serial n] [-signkey filename]
[-x509toreq] [-req] [-CA filename] [-CAkey filename] [-CAcreateserial] [-CAserial filename]
[-text] [-C] [-md2|-md5|-sha1|-mdc2] [-clrext] [-extfile filename] [-extensions section]
[-engine id]
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **x509** command is a multi purpose certificate utility. It can be used to display certificate information, convert certificates to various forms, sign certificate requests like a “mini CA” or edit certificate trust settings.

Since there are a large number of options they will split up into various sections.

**OPTIONS****INPUT, OUTPUT AND GENERAL PURPOSE OPTIONS****-inform DER|PEM|NET**

This specifies the input format normally the command will expect an X509 certificate but this can change if other options such as **-req** are present. The DER format is the DER encoding of the certificate and PEM is the base64 encoding of the DER encoding with header and footer lines added. The NET option is an obscure Netscape server format that is now obsolete.

**-outform DER|PEM|NET**

This specifies the output format, the options have the same meaning as the **-inform** option.

**-in filename**

This specifies the input filename to read a certificate from or standard input if this option is not specified.

**-out filename**

This specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by default.

**-md2|-md5|-sha1|-mdc2**

the digest to use. This affects any signing or display option that uses a message digest, such as the **-fingerprint**, **-signkey** and **-CA** options. If not specified then MD5 is used. If the key being used to sign with is a DSA key then this option has no effect: SHA1 is always used with DSA keys.

**-engine id**

specifying an engine (by its unique **id** string) will cause **req** to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms.

**DISPLAY OPTIONS**

Note: the **-alias** and **-purpose** options are also display options but are described in the **TRUST SETTINGS** section.

**-text**

prints out the certificate in text form. Full details are output including the public key, signature algorithms, issuer and subject names, serial number any extensions present and any trust settings.

**-certopt option**

customise the output format used with **-text**. The **option** argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by commas. The **-certopt** switch may be also be used more than once to set multiple options. See the **TEXT OPTIONS** section for more information.

- noout**  
this option prevents output of the encoded version of the request.
- modulus**  
this option prints out the value of the modulus of the public key contained in the certificate.
- serial**  
outputs the certificate serial number.
- hash**  
outputs the “hash” of the certificate subject name. This is used in OpenSSL to form an index to allow certificates in a directory to be looked up by subject name.
- subject**  
outputs the subject name.
- issuer**  
outputs the issuer name.
- nameopt option**  
option which determines how the subject or issuer names are displayed. The **option** argument can be a single option or multiple options separated by commas. Alternatively the **-nameopt** switch may be used more than once to set multiple options. See the **NAME OPTIONS** section for more information.
- email**  
outputs the email address(es) if any.
- startdate**  
prints out the start date of the certificate, that is the notBefore date.
- enddate**  
prints out the expiry date of the certificate, that is the notAfter date.
- dates**  
prints out the start and expiry dates of a certificate.
- fingerprint**  
prints out the digest of the DER encoded version of the whole certificate (see digest options).
- C** this outputs the certificate in the form of a C source file.

## TRUST SETTINGS

Please note these options are currently experimental and may well change.

A **trusted certificate** is an ordinary certificate which has several additional pieces of information attached to it such as the permitted and prohibited uses of the certificate and an “alias”.

Normally when a certificate is being verified at least one certificate must be “trusted”. By default a trusted certificate must be stored locally and must be a root CA: any certificate chain ending in this CA is then usable for any purpose.

Trust settings currently are only used with a root CA. They allow a finer control over the purposes the root CA can be used for. For example a CA may be trusted for SSL client but not SSL server use.

See the description of the **verify** utility for more information on the meaning of trust settings.

Future versions of OpenSSL will recognize trust settings on any certificate: not just root CAs.

- trustout**  
this causes **x509** to output a **trusted** certificate. An ordinary or trusted certificate can be input but by default an ordinary certificate is output and any trust settings are discarded. With the **-trustout** option a trusted certificate is output. A trusted certificate is automatically output if any trust settings are modified.
- setalias arg**  
sets the alias of the certificate. This will allow the certificate to be referred to using a nickname for example “Steve’s Certificate”.

- alias**  
outputs the certificate alias, if any.
- clrtrust**  
clears all the permitted or trusted uses of the certificate.
- clrreject**  
clears all the prohibited or rejected uses of the certificate.
- addtrust arg**  
adds a trusted certificate use. Any object name can be used here but currently only **clientAuth** (SSL client use), **serverAuth** (SSL server use) and **emailProtection** (S/MIME email) are used. Other OpenSSL applications may define additional uses.
- addreject arg**  
adds a prohibited use. It accepts the same values as the **-addtrust** option.
- purpose**  
this option performs tests on the certificate extensions and outputs the results. For a more complete description see the **CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS** section.

## SIGNING OPTIONS

The **x509** utility can be used to sign certificates and requests: it can thus behave like a “mini CA”.

- signkey filename**  
this option causes the input file to be self signed using the supplied private key.  
  
If the input file is a certificate it sets the issuer name to the subject name (i.e. makes it self signed) changes the public key to the supplied value and changes the start and end dates. The start date is set to the current time and the end date is set to a value determined by the **-days** option. Any certificate extensions are retained unless the **-clrext** option is supplied.  
  
If the input is a certificate request then a self signed certificate is created using the supplied private key using the subject name in the request.
- clrext**  
delete any extensions from a certificate. This option is used when a certificate is being created from another certificate (for example with the **-signkey** or the **-CA** options). Normally all extensions are retained.
- keyform PEM|DER**  
specifies the format (DER or PEM) of the private key file used in the **-signkey** option.
- days arg**  
specifies the number of days to make a certificate valid for. The default is 30 days.
- x509toreq**  
converts a certificate into a certificate request. The **-signkey** option is used to pass the required private key.
- req**  
by default a certificate is expected on input. With this option a certificate request is expected instead.
- set\_serial n**  
specifies the serial number to use. This option can be used with either the **-signkey** or **-CA** options. If used in conjunction with the **-CA** option the serial number file (as specified by the **-CAserial** or **-CAcreateserial** options) is not used.  
  
The serial number can be decimal or hex (if preceded by **0x**). Negative serial numbers can also be specified but their use is not recommended.
- CA filename**  
specifies the CA certificate to be used for signing. When this option is present **x509** behaves like a “mini CA”. The input file is signed by this CA using this option: that is its issuer name is set to the subject name of the CA and it is digitally signed using the CAs private key.  
  
This option is normally combined with the **-req** option. Without the **-req** option the input is a

certificate which must be self signed.

**-CAkey filename**

sets the CA private key to sign a certificate with. If this option is not specified then it is assumed that the CA private key is present in the CA certificate file.

**-CAserial filename**

sets the CA serial number file to use.

When the **-CA** option is used to sign a certificate it uses a serial number specified in a file. This file consist of one line containing an even number of hex digits with the serial number to use. After each use the serial number is incremented and written out to the file again.

The default filename consists of the CA certificate file base name with “.srl” appended. For example if the CA certificate file is called “mycacert.pem” it expects to find a serial number file called “mycacert.srl”.

**-CAcreateserial**

with this option the CA serial number file is created if it does not exist: it will contain the serial number “02” and the certificate being signed will have the 1 as its serial number. Normally if the **-CA** option is specified and the serial number file does not exist it is an error.

**-extfile filename**

file containing certificate extensions to use. If not specified then no extensions are added to the certificate.

**-extensions section**

the section to add certificate extensions from. If this option is not specified then the extensions should either be contained in the unnamed (default) section or the default section should contain a variable called “extensions” which contains the section to use.

## NAME OPTIONS

The **nameopt** command line switch determines how the subject and issuer names are displayed. If no **nameopt** switch is present the default “oneline” format is used which is compatible with previous versions of OpenSSL. Each option is described in detail below, all options can be preceded by a **-** to turn the option off. Only the first four will normally be used.

**compat**

use the old format. This is equivalent to specifying no name options at all.

**RFC2253**

displays names compatible with RFC2253 equivalent to **esc\_2253**, **esc\_ctrl**, **esc\_msb**, **utf8**, **dump\_nostr**, **dump\_unknown**, **dump\_der**, **sep\_comma\_plus**, **dn\_rev** and **sname**.

**oneline**

a oneline format which is more readable than RFC2253. It is equivalent to specifying the **esc\_2253**, **esc\_ctrl**, **esc\_msb**, **utf8**, **dump\_nostr**, **dump\_der**, **use\_quote**, **sep\_comma\_plus\_spc**, **spc\_eq** and **sname** options.

**multiline**

a multiline format. It is equivalent **esc\_ctrl**, **esc\_msb**, **sep\_multiline**, **spc\_eq**, **lname** and **align**.

**esc\_2253**

escape the “special” characters required by RFC2253 in a field That is ,+ "<>,. Additionally # is escaped at the beginning of a string and a space character at the beginning or end of a string.

**esc\_ctrl**

escape control characters. That is those with ASCII values less than 0x20 (space) and the delete (0x7f) character. They are escaped using the RFC2253 \XX notation (where XX are two hex digits representing the character value).

**esc\_msb**

escape characters with the MSB set, that is with ASCII values larger than 127.

**use\_quote**

escapes some characters by surrounding the whole string with " characters, without the option all escaping is done with the \ character.

**utf8**

convert all strings to UTF8 format first. This is required by RFC2253. If you are lucky enough to have a UTF8 compatible terminal then the use of this option (and **not** setting **esc\_msb**) may result in the correct display of multibyte (international) characters. If this option is not present then multibyte characters larger than 0xff will be represented using the format \UXXXX for 16 bits and \XXXXXXXX for 32 bits. Also if this option is off any UTF8Strings will be converted to their character form first.

**no\_type**

this option does not attempt to interpret multibyte characters in any way. That is their content octets are merely dumped as though one octet represents each character. This is useful for diagnostic purposes but will result in rather odd looking output.

**show\_type**

show the type of the ASN1 character string. The type precedes the field contents. For example “BMPSTRING: Hello World”.

**dump\_der**

when this option is set any fields that need to be hexdumped will be dumped using the DER encoding of the field. Otherwise just the content octets will be displayed. Both options use the RFC2253 #XXXX... format.

**dump\_nostr**

dump non character string types (for example OCTET STRING) if this option is not set then non character string types will be displayed as though each content octet represents a single character.

**dump\_all**

dump all fields. This option when used with **dump\_der** allows the DER encoding of the structure to be unambiguously determined.

**dump\_unknown**

dump any field whose OID is not recognised by OpenSSL.

**sep\_comma\_plus, sep\_comma\_plus\_space, sep\_semi\_plus\_space, sep\_multiline**

these options determine the field separators. The first character is between RDNs and the second between multiple AVAs (multiple AVAs are very rare and their use is discouraged). The options ending in “space” additionally place a space after the separator to make it more readable. The **sep\_multiline** uses a linefeed character for the RDN separator and a spaced + for the AVA separator. It also indents the fields by four characters.

**dn\_rev**

reverse the fields of the DN. This is required by RFC2253. As a side effect this also reverses the order of multiple AVAs but this is permissible.

**nofname, sname, lname, oid**

these options alter how the field name is displayed. **nofname** does not display the field at all. **sname** uses the “short name” form (CN for commonName for example). **lname** uses the long form. **oid** represents the OID in numerical form and is useful for diagnostic purpose.

**align**

align field values for a more readable output. Only usable with **sep\_multiline**.

**spc\_eq**

places spaces round the = character which follows the field name.

**TEXT OPTIONS**

As well as customising the name output format, it is also possible to customise the actual fields printed using the **certopt** options when the **text** option is present. The default behaviour is to print all fields.

**compatible**

use the old format. This is equivalent to specifying no output options at all.

**no\_header**

don't print header information: that is the lines saying “Certificate” and “Data”.

**no\_version**  
don't print out the version number.

**no\_serial**  
don't print out the serial number.

**no\_signame**  
don't print out the signature algorithm used.

**no\_validity**  
don't print the validity, that is the **notBefore** and **notAfter** fields.

**no\_subject**  
don't print out the subject name.

**no\_issuer**  
don't print out the issuer name.

**no\_pubkey**  
don't print out the public key.

**no\_sigdump**  
don't give a hexadecimal dump of the certificate signature.

**no\_aux**  
don't print out certificate trust information.

**no\_extensions**  
don't print out any X509V3 extensions.

**ext\_default**  
retain default extension behaviour: attempt to print out unsupported certificate extensions.

**ext\_error**  
print an error message for unsupported certificate extensions.

**ext\_parse**  
ASN1 parse unsupported extensions.

**ext\_dump**  
hex dump unsupported extensions.

**ca\_default**  
the value used by the **ca** utility, equivalent to **no\_issuer**, **no\_pubkey**, **no\_header**, **no\_version**, **no\_sigdump** and **no\_signame**.

## EXAMPLES

Note: in these examples the '\`' means the example should be all on one line.

Display the contents of a certificate:

```
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text
```

Display the certificate serial number:

```
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -serial
```

Display the certificate subject name:

```
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject
```

Display the certificate subject name in RFC2253 form:

```
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject -nameopt RFC2253
```

Display the certificate subject name in oneline form on a terminal supporting UTF8:

```
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -subject -nameopt oneline,-escmsb
```

Display the certificate MD5 fingerprint:

```
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint
```

Display the certificate SHA1 fingerprint:

```
openssl x509 -sha1 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint
```

Convert a certificate from PEM to DER format:

```
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -inform PEM -out cert.der -outform DER
```

Convert a certificate to a certificate request:

```
openssl x509 -x509toreq -in cert.pem -out req.pem -signkey key.pem
```

Convert a certificate request into a self signed certificate using extensions for a CA:

```
openssl x509 -req -in careq.pem -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_ca \
    -signkey key.pem -out cacert.pem
```

Sign a certificate request using the CA certificate above and add user certificate extensions:

```
openssl x509 -req -in req.pem -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_usr \
    -CA cacert.pem -CAkey key.pem -CAcreateserial
```

Set a certificate to be trusted for SSL client use and change set its alias to “Steve’s Class 1 CA”

```
openssl x509 -in cert.pem -addtrust clientAuth \
    -setalias "Steve’s Class 1 CA" -out trust.pem
```

## NOTES

The PEM format uses the header and footer lines:

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

it will also handle files containing:

```
-----BEGIN X509 CERTIFICATE-----
-----END X509 CERTIFICATE-----
```

Trusted certificates have the lines

```
-----BEGIN TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----
```

The conversion to UTF8 format used with the name options assumes that T61Strings use the ISO8859-1 character set. This is wrong but Netscape and MSIE do this as do many certificates. So although this is incorrect it is more likely to display the majority of certificates correctly.

The **–fingerprint** option takes the digest of the DER encoded certificate. This is commonly called a “fingerprint”. Because of the nature of message digests the fingerprint of a certificate is unique to that certificate and two certificates with the same fingerprint can be considered to be the same.

The Netscape fingerprint uses MD5 whereas MSIE uses SHA1.

The **–email** option searches the subject name and the subject alternative name extension. Only unique email addresses will be printed out: it will not print the same address more than once.

## CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS

The **–purpose** option checks the certificate extensions and determines what the certificate can be used for. The actual checks done are rather complex and include various hacks and workarounds to handle broken certificates and software.

The same code is used when verifying untrusted certificates in chains so this section is useful if a chain is rejected by the verify code.

The basicConstraints extension CA flag is used to determine whether the certificate can be used as a CA. If the CA flag is true then it is a CA, if the CA flag is false then it is not a CA. **All** CAs should have the CA flag set to true.

If the basicConstraints extension is absent then the certificate is considered to be a “possible CA” other extensions are checked according to the intended use of the certificate. A warning is given in this case because the certificate should really not be regarded as a CA: however it is allowed to be a CA to work around some broken software.

If the certificate is a V1 certificate (and thus has no extensions) and it is self signed it is also assumed to be a CA but a warning is again given: this is to work around the problem of Verisign roots which are V1 self signed certificates.

If the keyUsage extension is present then additional restraints are made on the uses of the certificate. A CA certificate **must** have the keyCertSign bit set if the keyUsage extension is present.

The extended key usage extension places additional restrictions on the certificate uses. If this extension is present (whether critical or not) the key can only be used for the purposes specified.

A complete description of each test is given below. The comments about basicConstraints and keyUsage and V1 certificates above apply to **all** CA certificates.

#### **SSL Client**

The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the “web client authentication” OID. keyUsage must be absent or it must have the digitalSignature bit set. Netscape certificate type must be absent or it must have the SSL client bit set.

#### **SSL Client CA**

The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the “web client authentication” OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or it must have the SSL CA bit set: this is used as a work around if the basicConstraints extension is absent.

#### **SSL Server**

The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the “web server authentication” and/or one of the SGC OIDs. keyUsage must be absent or it must have the digitalSignature, the keyEncipherment set or both bits set. Netscape certificate type must be absent or have the SSL server bit set.

#### **SSL Server CA**

The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the “web server authentication” and/or one of the SGC OIDs. Netscape certificate type must be absent or the SSL CA bit must be set: this is used as a work around if the basicConstraints extension is absent.

#### **Netscape SSL Server**

For Netscape SSL clients to connect to an SSL server it must have the keyEncipherment bit set if the keyUsage extension is present. This isn’t always valid because some cipher suites use the key for digital signing. Otherwise it is the same as a normal SSL server.

#### **Common S/MIME Client Tests**

The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the “email protection” OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or should have the S/MIME bit set. If the S/MIME bit is not set in netscape certificate type then the SSL client bit is tolerated as an alternative but a warning is shown: this is because some Verisign certificates don’t set the S/MIME bit.

#### **S/MIME Signing**

In addition to the common S/MIME client tests the digitalSignature bit must be set if the keyUsage extension is present.

#### **S/MIME Encryption**

In addition to the common S/MIME tests the keyEncipherment bit must be set if the keyUsage extension is present.

#### **S/MIME CA**

The extended key usage extension must be absent or include the “email protection” OID. Netscape certificate type must be absent or must have the S/MIME CA bit set: this is used as a work around if the basicConstraints extension is absent.

#### **CRL Signing**

The keyUsage extension must be absent or it must have the CRL signing bit set.

#### **CRL Signing CA**

The normal CA tests apply. Except in this case the basicConstraints extension must be present.

### **BUGS**

Extensions in certificates are not transferred to certificate requests and vice versa.

It is possible to produce invalid certificates or requests by specifying the wrong private key or using inconsistent options in some cases: these should be checked.

There should be options to explicitly set such things as start and end dates rather than an offset from the current time.



The code to implement the verify behaviour described in the **TRUST SETTINGS** is currently being developed. It thus describes the intended behaviour rather than the current behaviour. It is hoped that it will represent reality in OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later.

**SEE ALSO**

*req*(1), *ca*(1), *genrsa*(1), *gendsa*(1), *verify*(1)

**NAME**

ASN1\_OBJECT\_new, ASN1\_OBJECT\_free, – object allocation functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void);  
void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The ASN1\_OBJECT allocation routines, allocate and free an ASN1\_OBJECT structure, which represents an ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER.

*ASN1\_OBJECT\_new()* allocates and initializes a ASN1\_OBJECT structure.

*ASN1\_OBJECT\_free()* frees up the **ASN1\_OBJECT** structure **a**.

**NOTES**

Although *ASN1\_OBJECT\_new()* allocates a new ASN1\_OBJECT structure it is almost never used in applications. The ASN1 object utility functions such as *OBJ\_nid2obj()* are used instead.

**RETURN VALUES**

If the allocation fails, *ASN1\_OBJECT\_new()* returns **NULL** and sets an error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.

*ASN1\_OBJECT\_free()* returns no value.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *d2i\_ASN1\_OBJECT(3)*

**HISTORY**

*ASN1\_OBJECT\_new()* and *ASN1\_OBJECT\_free()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

ASN1\_STRING\_dup, ASN1\_STRING\_cmp, ASN1\_STRING\_set, ASN1\_STRING\_length, ASN1\_STRING\_length\_set, ASN1\_STRING\_type, ASN1\_STRING\_data – ASN1\_STRING utility functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
int ASN1_STRING_length(ASN1_STRING *x);
unsigned char * ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x);
ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_dup(ASN1_STRING *a);
int ASN1_STRING_cmp(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_STRING *b);
int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *data, int len);
int ASN1_STRING_type(ASN1_STRING *x);
int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions allow an **ASN1\_STRING** structure to be manipulated.

*ASN1\_STRING\_length()* returns the length of the content of **x**.

*ASN1\_STRING\_data()* returns an internal pointer to the data of **x**. Since this is an internal pointer it should **not** be freed or modified in any way.

*ASN1\_STRING\_dup()* returns a copy of the structure **a**.

*ASN1\_STRING\_cmp()* compares **a** and **b** returning 0 if the two are identical. The string types and content are compared.

*ASN1\_STRING\_set()* sets the data of string **str** to the buffer **data** or length **len**. The supplied data is copied. If **len** is -1 then the length is determined by strlen(data).

*ASN1\_STRING\_type()* returns the type of **x**, using standard constants such as **V\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING**.

*ASN1\_STRING\_to\_UTF8()* converts the string **in** to UTF8 format, the converted data is allocated in a buffer in **\*out**. The length of **out** is returned or a negative error code. The buffer **\*out** should be free using *OPENSSL\_free()*.

**NOTES**

Almost all ASN1 types in OpenSSL are represented as an **ASN1\_STRING** structure. Other types such as **ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING** are simply typedefed to **ASN1\_STRING** and the functions call the **ASN1\_STRING** equivalents. **ASN1\_STRING** is also used for some **CHOICE** types which consist entirely of primitive string types such as **DirectoryString** and **Time**.

These functions should **not** be used to examine or modify **ASN1\_INTEGER** or **ASN1\_ENUMERATED** types: the relevant **INTEGER** or **ENUMERATED** utility functions should be used instead.

In general it cannot be assumed that the data returned by *ASN1\_STRING\_data()* is null terminated or does not contain embedded nulls. The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string type itself: for example for and IA5String the data will be ASCII, for a BMPString two bytes per character in big endian format, UTF8String will be in UTF8 format.

Similar care should be taken to ensure the data is in the correct format when calling *ASN1\_STRING\_set()*.

**RETURN VALUES****SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*

**HISTORY**

**NAME**

ASN1\_STRING\_new, ASN1\_STRING\_type\_new, ASN1\_STRING\_free – ASN1\_STRING allocation functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_new(void);
ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type);
void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*ASN1\_STRING\_new()* returns an allocated **ASN1\_STRING** structure. Its type is undefined.

*ASN1\_STRING\_type\_new()* returns an allocated **ASN1\_STRING** structure of type **type**.

*ASN1\_STRING\_free()* frees up **a**.

**NOTES**

Other string types call the **ASN1\_STRING** functions. For example *ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING\_new()* calls *ASN1\_STRING\_type(V\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING)*.

**RETURN VALUES**

*ASN1\_STRING\_new()* and *ASN1\_STRING\_type\_new()* return a valid **ASN1\_STRING** structure or **NULL** if an error occurred.

*ASN1\_STRING\_free()* does not return a value.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*

**HISTORY**

TBA

**NAME**

ASN1\_STRING\_print\_ex, ASN1\_STRING\_print\_ex\_fp – ASN1\_STRING output routines.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/asn1.h>

int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags);
int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags);
int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *out, ASN1_STRING *str);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions output an **ASN1\_STRING** structure. **ASN1\_STRING** is used to represent all the ASN1 string types.

*ASN1\_STRING\_print\_ex()* outputs **str** to **out**, the format is determined by the options **flags**. *ASN1\_STRING\_print\_ex\_fp()* is identical except it outputs to **fp** instead.

*ASN1\_STRING\_print()* prints **str** to **out** but using a different format to *ASN1\_STRING\_print\_ex()*. It replaces unprintable characters (other than CR, LF) with `.`.

**NOTES**

*ASN1\_STRING\_print()* is a legacy function which should be avoided in new applications.

Although there are a large number of options frequently **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_RFC2253** is suitable, or on UTF8 terminals **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_RFC2253** & **~ASN1\_STRFLGS\_ESC\_MSB**.

The complete set of supported options for **flags** is listed below.

Various characters can be escaped. If **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_ESC\_2253** is set the characters determined by RFC2253 are escaped. If **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_ESC\_CTRL** is set control characters are escaped. If **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_ESC\_MSB** is set characters with the MSB set are escaped: this option should **not** be used if the terminal correctly interprets UTF8 sequences.

Escaping takes several forms.

If the character being escaped is a 16 bit character then the form “\WXXXX” is used using exactly four characters for the hex representation. If it is 32 bits then “\UXXXXXXXX” is used using eight characters of its hex representation. These forms will only be used if UTF8 conversion is not set (see below).

Printable characters are normally escaped using the backslash ‘\’ character. If **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_ESC\_QUOTE** is set then the whole string is instead surrounded by double quote characters: this is arguably more readable than the backslash notation. Other characters use the “\XX” using exactly two characters of the hex representation.

If **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_UTF8\_CONVERT** is set then characters are converted to UTF8 format first. If the terminal supports the display of UTF8 sequences then this option will correctly display multi byte characters.

If **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_IGNORE\_TYPE** is set then the string type is not interpreted at all: everything is assumed to be one byte per character. This is primarily for debugging purposes and can result in confusing output in multi character strings.

If **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_SHOW\_TYPE** is set then the string type itself is printed out before its value (for example “BMPSTRING”), this actually uses *ASN1\_tag2str()*.

The content of a string instead of being interpreted can be “dumped”: this just outputs the value of the string using the form #XXXX using hex format for each octet.

If **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_DUMP\_ALL** is set then any type is dumped.

Normally non character string types (such as OCTET STRING) are assumed to be one byte per character, if **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_DUMP\_UNKNOWN** is set then they will be dumped instead.

When a type is dumped normally just the content octets are printed, if **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_DUMP\_DER** is set then the complete encoding is dumped instead (including tag and length octets).

**ASN1\_STRFLGS\_RFC2253** includes all the flags required by RFC2253. It is equivalent to:

**ASN1\_STRFLGS\_ESC\_2253** | **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_ESC\_CTRL** | **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_ESC\_MSB** |

ASN1\_STRING\_print\_ex(3)

OpenSSL

ASN1\_STRING\_print\_ex(3)

ASN1\_STRFLGS\_UTF8\_CONVERT  
FLGS\_DUMP\_DER

|

ASN1\_STRFLGS\_DUMP\_UNKNOWN

ASN1\_STR-

## SEE ALSO

*X509\_NAME\_print\_ex(3)*, *ASN1\_tag2str(3)*

## HISTORY

TBA

**NAME**

bio – I/O abstraction

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>
```

TBA

**DESCRIPTION**

A BIO is an I/O abstraction, it hides many of the underlying I/O details from an application. If an application uses a BIO for its I/O it can transparently handle SSL connections, unencrypted network connections and file I/O.

There are two type of BIO, a source/sink BIO and a filter BIO.

As its name implies a source/sink BIO is a source and/or sink of data, examples include a socket BIO and a file BIO.

A filter BIO takes data from one BIO and passes it through to another, or the application. The data may be left unmodified (for example a message digest BIO) or translated (for example an encryption BIO). The effect of a filter BIO may change according to the I/O operation it is performing: for example an encryption BIO will encrypt data if it is being written to and decrypt data if it is being read from.

BIOs can be joined together to form a chain (a single BIO is a chain with one component). A chain normally consist of one source/sink BIO and one or more filter BIOs. Data read from or written to the first BIO then traverses the chain to the end (normally a source/sink BIO).

**SEE ALSO**

*BIO\_ctrl(3)*, *BIO\_f\_base64(3)*, *BIO\_f\_buffer(3)*, *BIO\_f\_cipher(3)*, *BIO\_f\_md(3)*, *BIO\_f\_null(3)*, *BIO\_f\_ssl(3)*, *BIO\_find\_type(3)*, *BIO\_new(3)*, *BIO\_new\_bio\_pair(3)*, *BIO\_push(3)*, *BIO\_read(3)*, *BIO\_s\_accept(3)*, *BIO\_s\_bio(3)*, *BIO\_s\_connect(3)*, *BIO\_s\_fd(3)*, *BIO\_s\_file(3)*, *BIO\_s\_mem(3)*, *BIO\_s\_null(3)*, *BIO\_s\_socket(3)*, *BIO\_set\_callback(3)*, *BIO\_should\_retry(3)*

## NAME

BIO\_ctrl, BIO\_callback\_ctrl, BIO\_ptr\_ctrl, BIO\_int\_ctrl, BIO\_reset, BIO\_seek, BIO\_tell, BIO\_flush, BIO\_eof, BIO\_set\_close, BIO\_get\_close, BIO\_pending, BIO\_wpending, BIO\_ctrl\_pending, BIO\_ctrl\_wpending, BIO\_get\_info\_callback, BIO\_set\_info\_callback – BIO control operations

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

long BIO_ctrl(BIO *bp,int cmd,long larg,void *parg);
long BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, void (*fp)(struct bio_st *, int, const char *));
char * BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *bp,int cmd,long larg);
long BIO_int_ctrl(BIO *bp,int cmd,long larg,int iarg);

int BIO_reset(BIO *b);
int BIO_seek(BIO *b, int ofs);
int BIO_tell(BIO *b);
int BIO_flush(BIO *b);
int BIO_eof(BIO *b);
int BIO_set_close(BIO *b,long flag);
int BIO_get_close(BIO *b);
int BIO_pending(BIO *b);
int BIO_wpending(BIO *b);
size_t BIO_ctrl_pending(BIO *b);
size_t BIO_ctrl_wpending(BIO *b);

int BIO_get_info_callback(BIO *b,bio_info_cb **cbp);
int BIO_set_info_callback(BIO *b,bio_info_cb *cb);

typedef void bio_info_cb(BIO *b, int oper, const char *ptr, int arg1, long arg2,
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_ctrl()*, *BIO\_callback\_ctrl()*, *BIO\_ptr\_ctrl()* and *BIO\_int\_ctrl()* are BIO “control” operations taking arguments of various types. These functions are not normally called directly, various macros are used instead. The standard macros are described below, macros specific to a particular type of BIO are described in the specific BIOs manual page as well as any special features of the standard calls.

*BIO\_reset()* typically resets a BIO to some initial state, in the case of file related BIOs for example it rewinds the file pointer to the start of the file.

*BIO\_seek()* resets a file related BIO’s (that is file descriptor and FILE BIOs) file position pointer to **ofs** bytes from start of file.

*BIO\_tell()* returns the current file position of a file related BIO.

*BIO\_flush()* normally writes out any internally buffered data, in some cases it is used to signal EOF and that no more data will be written.

*BIO\_eof()* returns 1 if the BIO has read EOF, the precise meaning of “EOF” varies according to the BIO type.

*BIO\_set\_close()* sets the BIO **b** close flag to **flag**. **flag** can take the value BIO\_CLOSE or BIO\_NOCLOSE. Typically BIO\_CLOSE is used in a source/sink BIO to indicate that the underlying I/O stream should be closed when the BIO is freed.

*BIO\_get\_close()* returns the BIOs close flag.

*BIO\_pending()*, *BIO\_ctrl\_pending()*, *BIO\_wpending()* and *BIO\_ctrl\_wpending()* return the number of pending characters in the BIOs read and write buffers. Not all BIOs support these calls. *BIO\_ctrl\_pending()* and *BIO\_ctrl\_wpending()* return a size\_t type and are functions, *BIO\_pending()* and *BIO\_wpending()* are macros which call *BIO\_ctrl()*.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_reset()* normally returns 1 for success and 0 or –1 for failure. File BIOs are an exception, they return 0 for success and –1 for failure.

*BIO\_seek()* and *BIO\_tell()* both return the current file position on success and –1 for failure, except file BIOs which for *BIO\_seek()* always return 0 for success and –1 for failure.



*BIO\_flush()* returns 1 for success and 0 or -1 for failure.

*BIO\_eof()* returns 1 if EOF has been reached 0 otherwise.

*BIO\_set\_close()* always returns 1.

*BIO\_get\_close()* returns the close flag value: BIO\_CLOSE or BIO\_NOCLOSE.

*BIO\_pending()*, *BIO\_ctrl\_pending()*, *BIO\_wpending()* and *BIO\_ctrl\_wpending()* return the amount of pending data.

## NOTES

*BIO\_flush()*, because it can write data may return 0 or -1 indicating that the call should be retried later in a similar manner to *BIO\_write()*. The *BIO\_should\_retry()* call should be used and appropriate action taken is the call fails.

The return values of *BIO\_pending()* and *BIO\_wpending()* may not reliably determine the amount of pending data in all cases. For example in the case of a file BIO some data may be available in the FILE structures internal buffers but it is not possible to determine this in a portably way. For other types of BIO they may not be supported.

Filter BIOs if they do not internally handle a particular *BIO\_ctrl()* operation usually pass the operation to the next BIO in the chain. This often means there is no need to locate the required BIO for a particular operation, it can be called on a chain and it will be automatically passed to the relevant BIO. However this can cause unexpected results: for example no current filter BIOs implement *BIO\_seek()*, but this may still succeed if the chain ends in a FILE or file descriptor BIO.

Source/sink BIOs return an 0 if they do not recognize the *BIO\_ctrl()* operation.

## BUGS

Some of the return values are ambiguous and care should be taken. In particular a return value of 0 can be returned if an operation is not supported, if an error occurred, if EOF has not been reached and in the case of *BIO\_seek()* on a file BIO for a successful operation.

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_f\_base64 – base64 BIO filter

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>

BIO_METHOD * BIO_f_base64(void);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_f\_base64()* returns the base64 BIO method. This is a filter BIO that base64 encodes any data written through it and decodes any data read through it.

Base64 BIOs do not support *BIO\_gets()* or *BIO\_puts()*.

*BIO\_flush()* on a base64 BIO that is being written through is used to signal that no more data is to be encoded: this is used to flush the final block through the BIO.

The flag `BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL` can be set with *BIO\_set\_flags()* to encode the data all on one line or expect the data to be all on one line.

## NOTES

Because of the format of base64 encoding the end of the encoded block cannot always be reliably determined.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_f\_base64()* returns the base64 BIO method.

## EXAMPLES

Base64 encode the string “Hello World\n” and write the result to standard output:

```
BIO *bio, *b64;
char message[] = "Hello World \n";

b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64());
bio = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
bio = BIO_push(b64, bio);
BIO_write(bio, message, strlen(message));
BIO_flush(bio);

BIO_free_all(bio);
```

Read Base64 encoded data from standard input and write the decoded data to standard output:

```
BIO *bio, *b64, *bio_out;
char inbuf[512];
int inlen;

b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64());
bio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE);
bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
bio = BIO_push(b64, bio);
while((inlen = BIO_read(bio, inbuf, 512) > 0)
    BIO_write(bio_out, inbuf, inlen);

BIO_free_all(bio);
```

## BUGS

The ambiguity of EOF in base64 encoded data can cause additional data following the base64 encoded block to be misinterpreted.

There should be some way of specifying a test that the BIO can perform to reliably determine EOF (for example a MIME boundary).

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_f\_buffer – buffering BIO

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO_METHOD * BIO_f_buffer(void);

#define BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(b)      BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_BUFF_NUM_LINES,0,NULL)
#define BIO_set_read_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size)
#define BIO_set_write_buffer_size(b,size) BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size)
#define BIO_set_buffer_size(b,size)     BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_SIZE,size,NULL)
#define BIO_set_buffer_read_data(b,buf,num) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_BUFF_READ_DATA,num,buf)
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_f\_buffer()* returns the buffering BIO method.

Data written to a buffering BIO is buffered and periodically written to the next BIO in the chain. Data read from a buffering BIO comes from an internal buffer which is filled from the next BIO in the chain. Both *BIO\_gets()* and *BIO\_puts()* are supported.

Calling *BIO\_reset()* on a buffering BIO clears any buffered data.

*BIO\_get\_buffer\_num\_lines()* returns the number of lines currently buffered.

*BIO\_set\_read\_buffer\_size()*, *BIO\_set\_write\_buffer\_size()* and *BIO\_set\_buffer\_size()* set the read, write or both read and write buffer sizes to **size**. The initial buffer size is DEFAULT\_BUFFER\_SIZE, currently 1024. Any attempt to reduce the buffer size below DEFAULT\_BUFFER\_SIZE is ignored. Any buffered data is cleared when the buffer is resized.

*BIO\_set\_buffer\_read\_data()* clears the read buffer and fills it with **num** bytes of **buf**. If **num** is larger than the current buffer size the buffer is expanded.

## NOTES

Buffering BIOs implement *BIO\_gets()* by using *BIO\_read()* operations on the next BIO in the chain. By prepending a buffering BIO to a chain it is therefore possible to provide *BIO\_gets()* functionality if the following BIOs do not support it (for example SSL BIOs).

Data is only written to the next BIO in the chain when the write buffer fills or when *BIO\_flush()* is called. It is therefore important to call *BIO\_flush()* whenever any pending data should be written such as when removing a buffering BIO using *BIO\_pop()*. *BIO\_flush()* may need to be retried if the ultimate source/sink BIO is non blocking.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_f\_buffer()* returns the buffering BIO method.

*BIO\_get\_buffer\_num\_lines()* returns the number of lines buffered (may be 0).

*BIO\_set\_read\_buffer\_size()*, *BIO\_set\_write\_buffer\_size()* and *BIO\_set\_buffer\_size()* return 1 if the buffer was successfully resized or 0 for failure.

*BIO\_set\_buffer\_read\_data()* returns 1 if the data was set correctly or 0 if there was an error.

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_f\_cipher, BIO\_set\_cipher, BIO\_get\_cipher\_status, BIO\_get\_cipher\_ctx – cipher BIO filter

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>

BIO_METHOD * BIO_f_cipher(void);
void BIO_set_cipher(BIO *b, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
                   unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc);
int BIO_get_cipher_status(BIO *b)
int BIO_get_cipher_ctx(BIO *b, EVP_CIPHER_CTX **pctx)
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_f\_cipher()* returns the cipher BIO method. This is a filter BIO that encrypts any data written through it, and decrypts any data read from it. It is a BIO wrapper for the cipher routines *EVP\_CipherInit()*, *EVP\_CipherUpdate()* and *EVP\_CipherFinal()*.

Cipher BIOs do not support *BIO\_gets()* or *BIO\_puts()*.

*BIO\_flush()* on an encryption BIO that is being written through is used to signal that no more data is to be encrypted: this is used to flush and possibly pad the final block through the BIO.

*BIO\_set\_cipher()* sets the cipher of BIO **b** to **cipher** using key **key** and IV **iv**. **enc** should be set to 1 for encryption and zero for decryption.

When reading from an encryption BIO the final block is automatically decrypted and checked when EOF is detected. *BIO\_get\_cipher\_status()* is a *BIO\_ctrl()* macro which can be called to determine whether the decryption operation was successful.

*BIO\_get\_cipher\_ctx()* is a *BIO\_ctrl()* macro which retrieves the internal BIO cipher context. The retrieved context can be used in conjunction with the standard cipher routines to set it up. This is useful when *BIO\_set\_cipher()* is not flexible enough for the applications needs.

## NOTES

When encrypting *BIO\_flush()* **must** be called to flush the final block through the BIO. If it is not then the final block will fail a subsequent decrypt.

When decrypting an error on the final block is signalled by a zero return value from the read operation. A successful decrypt followed by EOF will also return zero for the final read. *BIO\_get\_cipher\_status()* should be called to determine if the decrypt was successful.

As always, if *BIO\_gets()* or *BIO\_puts()* support is needed then it can be achieved by preceding the cipher BIO with a buffering BIO.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_f\_cipher()* returns the cipher BIO method.

*BIO\_set\_cipher()* does not return a value.

*BIO\_get\_cipher\_status()* returns 1 for a successful decrypt and 0 for failure.

*BIO\_get\_cipher\_ctx()* currently always returns 1.

## EXAMPLES

TBA

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_f\_md, BIO\_set\_md, BIO\_get\_md, BIO\_get\_md\_ctx – message digest BIO filter

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>

BIO_METHOD *    BIO_f_md(void);
int BIO_set_md(BIO *b, EVP_MD *md);
int BIO_get_md(BIO *b, EVP_MD **mdp);
int BIO_get_md_ctx(BIO *b, EVP_MD_CTX **mdcp);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_f\_md()* returns the message digest BIO method. This is a filter BIO that digests any data passed through it, it is a BIO wrapper for the digest routines *EVP\_DigestInit()*, *EVP\_DigestUpdate()* and *EVP\_DigestFinal()*.

Any data written or read through a digest BIO using *BIO\_read()* and *BIO\_write()* is digested.

*BIO\_gets()*, if its **size** parameter is large enough finishes the digest calculation and returns the digest value. *BIO\_puts()* is not supported.

*BIO\_reset()* reinitialises a digest BIO.

*BIO\_set\_md()* sets the message digest of BIO **b** to **md**: this must be called to initialize a digest BIO before any data is passed through it. It is a *BIO\_ctrl()* macro.

*BIO\_get\_md()* places the a pointer to the digest BIOs digest method in **mdp**, it is a *BIO\_ctrl()* macro.

*BIO\_get\_md\_ctx()* returns the digest BIOs context into **mdcp**.

## NOTES

The context returned by *BIO\_get\_md\_ctx()* can be used in calls to *EVP\_DigestFinal()* and also the signature routines *EVP\_SignFinal()* and *EVP\_VerifyFinal()*.

The context returned by *BIO\_get\_md\_ctx()* is an internal context structure. Changes made to this context will affect the digest BIO itself and the context pointer will become invalid when the digest BIO is freed.

After the digest has been retrieved from a digest BIO it must be reinitialized by calling *BIO\_reset()*, or *BIO\_set\_md()* before any more data is passed through it.

If an application needs to call *BIO\_gets()* or *BIO\_puts()* through a chain containing digest BIOs then this can be done by prepending a buffering BIO.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_f\_md()* returns the digest BIO method.

*BIO\_set\_md()*, *BIO\_get\_md()* and *BIO\_md\_ctx()* return 1 for success and 0 for failure.

## EXAMPLES

The following example creates a BIO chain containing an SHA1 and MD5 digest BIO and passes the string “Hello World” through it. Error checking has been omitted for clarity.

```

BIO *bio, *mdtmp;
char message[] = "Hello World";
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_null());
mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_sha1());
/* For BIO_push() we want to append the sink BIO and keep a note of
 * the start of the chain.
 */
bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio);
mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_md5());
bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio);
/* Note: mdtmp can now be discarded */
BIO_write(bio, message, strlen(message));

```

The next example digests data by reading through a chain instead:

```

BIO *bio, *mdtmp;
char buf[1024];
int rrlen;
bio = BIO_new_file(file, "rb");
mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_sha1());
bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio);
mdtmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_md());
BIO_set_md(mdtmp, EVP_md5());
bio = BIO_push(mdtmp, bio);
do {
    rrlen = BIO_read(bio, buf, sizeof(buf));
    /* Might want to do something with the data here */
} while(rrlen > 0);

```

This next example retrieves the message digests from a BIO chain and outputs them. This could be used with the examples above.

```

BIO *mdtmp;
unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int mdlen;
int i;
mdtmp = bio; /* Assume bio has previously been set up */
do {
    EVP_MD *md;
    mdtmp = BIO_find_type(mdtmp, BIO_TYPE_MD);
    if(!mdtmp) break;
    BIO_get_md(mdtmp, &md);
    printf("%s digest", OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(md)));
    mdlen = BIO_gets(mdtmp, mdbuf, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
    for(i = 0; i < mdlen; i++) printf(":%02X", mdbuf[i]);
    printf("\n");
    mdtmp = BIO_next(mdtmp);
} while(mdtmp);
BIO_free_all(bio);

```

## BUGS

The lack of support for *BIO\_puts()* and the non standard behaviour of *BIO\_gets()* could be regarded as anomalous. It could be argued that *BIO\_gets()* and *BIO\_puts()* should be passed to the next BIO in the chain and digest the data passed through and that digests should be retrieved using a separate *BIO\_ctrl()* call.

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_f\_null – null filter

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO_METHOD * BIO_f_null(void);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_f\_null()* returns the null filter BIO method. This is a filter BIO that does nothing.

All requests to a null filter BIO are passed through to the next BIO in the chain: this means that a BIO chain containing a null filter BIO behaves just as though the BIO was not there.

## NOTES

As may be apparent a null filter BIO is not particularly useful.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_f\_null()* returns the null filter BIO method.

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_f\_ssl, BIO\_set\_ssl, BIO\_get\_ssl, BIO\_set\_ssl\_mode, BIO\_set\_ssl\_renegotiate\_bytes, BIO\_get\_num\_renegotiates, BIO\_set\_ssl\_renegotiate\_timeout, BIO\_new\_ssl, BIO\_new\_ssl\_connect, BIO\_new\_buffer\_ssl\_connect, BIO\_ssl\_copy\_session\_id, BIO\_ssl\_shutdown – SSL BIO

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void);

#define BIO_set_ssl(b,ssl,c)    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL,c,(char *)ssl)
#define BIO_get_ssl(b,sslp)    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_SSL,0,(char *)sslp)
#define BIO_set_ssl_mode(b,client)    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SSL_MODE,client,NULL)
#define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(b,num) \
    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES,num,NULL);
#define BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(b,seconds) \
    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT,seconds,NULL);
#define BIO_get_num_renegotiates(b) \
    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES,0,NULL);

BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int client);
BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to,BIO *from);
void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *bio);

#define BIO_do_handshake(b)    BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE,0,NULL)
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_f\_ssl()* returns the SSL BIO method. This is a filter BIO which is a wrapper round the OpenSSL SSL routines adding a BIO “flavour” to SSL I/O.

I/O performed on an SSL BIO communicates using the SSL protocol with the SSLs read and write BIOs. If an SSL connection is not established then an attempt is made to establish one on the first I/O call.

If a BIO is appended to an SSL BIO using *BIO\_push()* it is automatically used as the SSL BIOs read and write BIOs.

Calling *BIO\_reset()* on an SSL BIO closes down any current SSL connection by calling *SSL\_shutdown()*. *BIO\_reset()* is then sent to the next BIO in the chain: this will typically disconnect the underlying transport. The SSL BIO is then reset to the initial accept or connect state.

If the close flag is set when an SSL BIO is freed then the internal SSL structure is also freed using *SSL\_free()*.

*BIO\_set\_ssl()* sets the internal SSL pointer of BIO **b** to **ssl** using the close flag **c**.

*BIO\_get\_ssl()* retrieves the SSL pointer of BIO **b**, it can then be manipulated using the standard SSL library functions.

*BIO\_set\_ssl\_mode()* sets the SSL BIO mode to **client**. If **client** is 1 client mode is set. If **client** is 0 server mode is set.

*BIO\_set\_ssl\_renegotiate\_bytes()* sets the renegotiate byte count to **num**. When set after every **num** bytes of I/O (read and write) the SSL session is automatically renegotiated. **num** must be at least 512 bytes.

*BIO\_set\_ssl\_renegotiate\_timeout()* sets the renegotiate timeout to **seconds**. When the renegotiate timeout elapses the session is automatically renegotiated.

*BIO\_get\_num\_renegotiates()* returns the total number of session renegotiations due to I/O or timeout.

*BIO\_new\_ssl()* allocates an SSL BIO using SSL\_CTX **ctx** and using client mode if **client** is non zero.

*BIO\_new\_ssl\_connect()* creates a new BIO chain consisting of an SSL BIO (using **ctx**) followed by a connect BIO.



*BIO\_new\_buffer\_ssl\_connect()* creates a new BIO chain consisting of a buffering BIO, an SSL BIO (using **ctx**) and a connect BIO.

*BIO\_ssl\_copy\_session\_id()* copies an SSL session id between BIO chains **from** and **to**. It does this by locating the SSL BIOs in each chain and calling *SSL\_copy\_session\_id()* on the internal SSL pointer.

*BIO\_ssl\_shutdown()* closes down an SSL connection on BIO chain **bio**. It does this by locating the SSL BIO in the chain and calling *SSL\_shutdown()* on its internal SSL pointer.

*BIO\_do\_handshake()* attempts to complete an SSL handshake on the supplied BIO and establish the SSL connection. It returns 1 if the connection was established successfully. A zero or negative value is returned if the connection could not be established, the call *BIO\_should\_retry()* should be used for non blocking connect BIOs to determine if the call should be retried. If an SSL connection has already been established this call has no effect.

## NOTES

SSL BIOs are exceptional in that if the underlying transport is non blocking they can still request a retry in exceptional circumstances. Specifically this will happen if a session renegotiation takes place during a *BIO\_read()* operation, one case where this happens is when SGC or step up occurs.

In OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later the SSL flag `SSL_AUTO_RETRY` can be set to disable this behaviour. That is when this flag is set an SSL BIO using a blocking transport will never request a retry.

Since unknown *BIO\_ctrl()* operations are sent through filter BIOs the servers name and port can be set using *BIO\_set\_host()* on the BIO returned by *BIO\_new\_ssl\_connect()* without having to locate the connect BIO first.

Applications do not have to call *BIO\_do\_handshake()* but may wish to do so to separate the handshake process from other I/O processing.

## RETURN VALUES

TBA

## EXAMPLE

This SSL/TLS client example, attempts to retrieve a page from an SSL/TLS web server. The I/O routines are identical to those of the unencrypted example in *BIO\_s\_connect(3)*.

```
BIO *sbio, *out;
int len;
char tmpbuf[1024];
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *ssl;

ERR_load_crypto_strings();
ERR_load_SSL_strings();
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();

/* We would seed the PRNG here if the platform didn't
 * do it automatically
 */

ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());

/* We'd normally set some stuff like the verify paths and
 * mode here because as things stand this will connect to
 * any server whose certificate is signed by any CA.
 */

sbio = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx);
BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl);
if(!ssl) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n");
    /* whatever ... */
}
```

```

/* Don't want any retries */
SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);

/* We might want to do other things with ssl here */
BIO_set_conn_hostname(sbio, "localhost:https");

out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
if(BIO_do_connect(sbio) <= 0) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n");
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    /* whatever ... */
}

if(BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error establishing SSL connection\n");
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    /* whatever ... */
}

/* Could examine ssl here to get connection info */
BIO_puts(sbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n");
for(;;) {
    len = BIO_read(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024);
    if(len <= 0) break;
    BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len);
}
BIO_free_all(sbio);
BIO_free(out);

```

Here is a simple server example. It makes use of a buffering BIO to allow lines to be read from the SSL BIO using BIO\_gets. It creates a pseudo web page containing the actual request from a client and also echoes the request to standard output.

```

BIO *sbio, *bbio, *acpt, *out;
int len;
char tmpbuf[1024];
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *ssl;

ERR_load_crypto_strings();
ERR_load_SSL_strings();
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();

/* Might seed PRNG here */
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, "server.pem", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
    || !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, "server.pem", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
    || !SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up SSL_CTX\n");
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    return 0;
}

/* Might do other things here like setting verify locations and
 * DH and/or RSA temporary key callbacks
 */

/* New SSL BIO setup as server */
sbio=BIO_new_ssl(ctx,0);
BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl);

```

```

if(!ssl) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n");
    /* whatever ... */
}

/* Don't want any retries */
SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);

/* Create the buffering BIO */
bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());

/* Add to chain */
sbio = BIO_push(bbio, sbio);
acpt=BIO_new_accept("4433");

/* By doing this when a new connection is established
 * we automatically have sbio inserted into it. The
 * BIO chain is now 'swallowed' by the accept BIO and
 * will be freed when the accept BIO is freed.
 */

BIO_set_accept_bios(acpt,sbio);

out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);

/* Setup accept BIO */
if(BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up accept BIO\n");
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    return 0;
}

/* Now wait for incoming connection */
if(BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error in connection\n");
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    return 0;
}

/* We only want one connection so remove and free
 * accept BIO
 */
sbio = BIO_pop(acpt);
BIO_free_all(acpt);

if(BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error in SSL handshake\n");
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    return 0;
}

BIO_puts(sbio, "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n");
BIO_puts(sbio, "<pre>\r\nConnection Established\r\nRequest headers:\r\n");
BIO_puts(sbio, "-----\r\n");

for(;;) {
    len = BIO_gets(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024);
    if(len <= 0) break;
    BIO_write(sbio, tmpbuf, len);
    BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len);
    /* Look for blank line signifying end of headers*/
    if((tmpbuf[0] == '\r') || (tmpbuf[0] == '\n')) break;
}

```

```
BIO_puts(sbio, "-----\r\n");
BIO_puts(sbio, "</pre>\r\n");
/* Since there is a buffering BIO present we had better flush it */
BIO_flush(sbio);
BIO_free_all(sbio);
```

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_find\_type, BIO\_next – BIO chain traversal

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO * BIO_find_type(BIO *b,int bio_type);
BIO * BIO_next(BIO *b);

#define BIO_method_type(b) ((b)->method->type)

#define BIO_TYPE_NONE 0
#define BIO_TYPE_MEM (1|0x0400)
#define BIO_TYPE_FILE (2|0x0400)

#define BIO_TYPE_FD (4|0x0400|0x0100)
#define BIO_TYPE_SOCKET (5|0x0400|0x0100)
#define BIO_TYPE_NULL (6|0x0400)
#define BIO_TYPE_SSL (7|0x0200)
#define BIO_TYPE_MD (8|0x0200)
#define BIO_TYPE_BUFFER (9|0x0200)
#define BIO_TYPE_CIPHER (10|0x0200)
#define BIO_TYPE_BASE64 (11|0x0200)
#define BIO_TYPE_CONNECT (12|0x0400|0x0100)
#define BIO_TYPE_ACCEPT (13|0x0400|0x0100)
#define BIO_TYPE_PROXY_CLIENT (14|0x0200)
#define BIO_TYPE_PROXY_SERVER (15|0x0200)
#define BIO_TYPE_NBIO_TEST (16|0x0200)
#define BIO_TYPE_NULL_FILTER (17|0x0200)
#define BIO_TYPE_BER (18|0x0200)
#define BIO_TYPE_BIO (19|0x0400)

#define BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 0x0100
#define BIO_TYPE_FILTER 0x0200
#define BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK 0x0400
```

## DESCRIPTION

The *BIO\_find\_type()* searches for a BIO of a given type in a chain, starting at BIO **b**. If **type** is a specific type (such as **BIO\_TYPE\_MEM**) then a search is made for a BIO of that type. If **type** is a general type (such as **BIO\_TYPE\_SOURCE\_SINK**) then the next matching BIO of the given general type is searched for. *BIO\_find\_type()* returns the next matching BIO or NULL if none is found.

Note: not all the **BIO\_TYPE\_\*** types above have corresponding BIO implementations.

*BIO\_next()* returns the next BIO in a chain. It can be used to traverse all BIOs in a chain or used in conjunction with *BIO\_find\_type()* to find all BIOs of a certain type.

*BIO\_method\_type()* returns the type of a BIO.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_find\_type()* returns a matching BIO or NULL for no match.

*BIO\_next()* returns the next BIO in a chain.

*BIO\_method\_type()* returns the type of the BIO **b**.

## NOTES

*BIO\_next()* was added to OpenSSL 0.9.6 to provide a 'clean' way to traverse a BIO chain or find multiple matches using *BIO\_find\_type()*. Previous versions had to use:

```
next = bio->next_bio;
```

## BUGS

*BIO\_find\_type()* in OpenSSL 0.9.5a and earlier could not be safely passed a NULL pointer for the **b** argument.

## EXAMPLE

Traverse a chain looking for digest BIOs:

```
BIO *btmp;
btmp = in_bio; /* in_bio is chain to search through */
do {
    btmp = BIO_find_type(btmp, BIO_TYPE_MD);
    if(btmp == NULL) break; /* Not found */
    /* btmp is a digest BIO, do something with it ...*/
    ...
    btmp = BIO_next(btmp);
} while(btmp);
```

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_new, BIO\_set, BIO\_free, BIO\_vfree, BIO\_free\_all – BIO allocation and freeing functions

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO *   BIO_new(BIO_METHOD *type);
int      BIO_set(BIO *a, BIO_METHOD *type);
int      BIO_free(BIO *a);
void     BIO_vfree(BIO *a);
void     BIO_free_all(BIO *a);
```

## DESCRIPTION

The *BIO\_new()* function returns a new BIO using method **type**.

*BIO\_set()* sets the method of an already existing BIO.

*BIO\_free()* frees up a single BIO, *BIO\_vfree()* also frees up a single BIO but it does not return a value. Calling *BIO\_free()* may also have some effect on the underlying I/O structure, for example it may close the file being referred to under certain circumstances. For more details see the individual BIO\_METHOD descriptions.

*BIO\_free\_all()* frees up an entire BIO chain, it does not halt if an error occurs freeing up an individual BIO in the chain.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_new()* returns a newly created BIO or NULL if the call fails.

*BIO\_set()*, *BIO\_free()* return 1 for success and 0 for failure.

*BIO\_free\_all()* and *BIO\_vfree()* do not return values.

## NOTES

Some BIOs (such as memory BIOs) can be used immediately after calling *BIO\_new()*. Others (such as file BIOs) need some additional initialization, and frequently a utility function exists to create and initialize such BIOs.

If *BIO\_free()* is called on a BIO chain it will only free one BIO resulting in a memory leak.

Calling *BIO\_free\_all()* a single BIO has the same effect as calling *BIO\_free()* on it other than the discarded return value.

Normally the **type** argument is supplied by a function which returns a pointer to a BIO\_METHOD. There is a naming convention for such functions: a source/sink BIO is normally called *BIO\_s\_\**() and a filter BIO *BIO\_f\_\**();

## EXAMPLE

Create a memory BIO:

```
BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
```

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_push, BIO\_pop – add and remove BIOs from a chain.

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO * BIO_push(BIO *b, BIO *append);
BIO * BIO_pop(BIO *b);
```

## DESCRIPTION

The *BIO\_push()* function appends the BIO **append** to **b**, it returns **b**.

*BIO\_pop()* removes the BIO **b** from a chain and returns the next BIO in the chain, or NULL if there is no next BIO. The removed BIO then becomes a single BIO with no association with the original chain, it can thus be freed or attached to a different chain.

## NOTES

The names of these functions are perhaps a little misleading. *BIO\_push()* joins two BIO chains whereas *BIO\_pop()* deletes a single BIO from a chain, the deleted BIO does not need to be at the end of a chain.

The process of calling *BIO\_push()* and *BIO\_pop()* on a BIO may have additional consequences (a control call is made to the affected BIOs) any effects will be noted in the descriptions of individual BIOs.

## EXAMPLES

For these examples suppose **md1** and **md2** are digest BIOs, **b64** is a base64 BIO and **f** is a file BIO.

If the call:

```
BIO_push(b64, f);
```

is made then the new chain will be **b64-chain**. After making the calls

```
BIO_push(md2, b64);
BIO_push(md1, md2);
```

the new chain is **md1-md2-b64-f**. Data written to **md1** will be digested by **md1** and **md2**, **base64** encoded and written to **f**.

It should be noted that reading causes data to pass in the reverse direction, that is data is read from **f**, base64 **decoded** and digested by **md1** and **md2**. If the call:

```
BIO_pop(md2);
```

The call will return **b64** and the new chain will be **md1-b64-f** data can be written to **md1** as before.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_push()* returns the end of the chain, **b**.

*BIO\_pop()* returns the next BIO in the chain, or NULL if there is no next BIO.

## SEE ALSO

TBA



## NAME

`BIO_read`, `BIO_write`, `BIO_gets`, `BIO_puts` – BIO I/O functions

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

int     BIO_read(BIO *b, void *buf, int len);
int     BIO_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size);
int     BIO_write(BIO *b, const void *buf, int len);
int     BIO_puts(BIO *b, const char *buf);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_read()* attempts to read **len** bytes from BIO **b** and places the data in **buf**.

*BIO\_gets()* performs the BIOs “gets” operation and places the data in **buf**. Usually this operation will attempt to read a line of data from the BIO of maximum length **len**. There are exceptions to this however, for example *BIO\_gets()* on a digest BIO will calculate and return the digest and other BIOs may not support *BIO\_gets()* at all.

*BIO\_write()* attempts to write **len** bytes from **buf** to BIO **b**.

*BIO\_puts()* attempts to write a null terminated string **buf** to BIO **b**

## RETURN VALUES

All these functions return either the amount of data successfully read or written (if the return value is positive) or that no data was successfully read or written if the result is 0 or -1. If the return value is -2 then the operation is not implemented in the specific BIO type.

## NOTES

A 0 or -1 return is not necessarily an indication of an error. In particular when the source/sink is non-blocking or of a certain type it may merely be an indication that no data is currently available and that the application should retry the operation later.

One technique sometimes used with blocking sockets is to use a system call (such as *select()*, *poll()* or equivalent) to determine when data is available and then call *read()* to read the data. The equivalent with BIOs (that is call *select()* on the underlying I/O structure and then call *BIO\_read()* to read the data) should **not** be used because a single call to *BIO\_read()* can cause several reads (and writes in the case of SSL BIOs) on the underlying I/O structure and may block as a result. Instead *select()* (or equivalent) should be combined with non blocking I/O so successive reads will request a retry instead of blocking.

See *BIO\_should\_retry(3)* for details of how to determine the cause of a retry and other I/O issues.

If the *BIO\_gets()* function is not supported by a BIO then it possible to work around this by adding a buffering BIO *BIO\_f\_buffer(3)* to the chain.

## SEE ALSO

*BIO\_should\_retry(3)*

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_s\_accept, BIO\_set\_accept\_port, BIO\_get\_accept\_port, BIO\_set\_nbio\_accept,  
BIO\_set\_accept\_bios, BIO\_set\_bind\_mode, BIO\_get\_bind\_mode, BIO\_do\_accept – accept BIO

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void);

long BIO_set_accept_port(BIO *b, char *name);
char *BIO_get_accept_port(BIO *b);

BIO *BIO_new_accept(char *host_port);

long BIO_set_nbio_accept(BIO *b, int n);
long BIO_set_accept_bios(BIO *b, char *bios);

long BIO_set_bind_mode(BIO *b, long mode);
long BIO_get_bind_mode(BIO *b, long dummy);

#define BIO_BIND_NORMAL          0
#define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR_IF_UNUSED 1
#define BIO_BIND_REUSEADDR      2

int BIO_do_accept(BIO *b);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_s\_accept()* returns the accept BIO method. This is a wrapper round the platform's TCP/IP socket accept routines.

Using accept BIOs, TCP/IP connections can be accepted and data transferred using only BIO routines. In this way any platform specific operations are hidden by the BIO abstraction.

Read and write operations on an accept BIO will perform I/O on the underlying connection. If no connection is established and the port (see below) is set up properly then the BIO waits for an incoming connection.

Accept BIOs support *BIO\_puts()* but not *BIO\_gets()*.

If the close flag is set on an accept BIO then any active connection on that chain is shutdown and the socket closed when the BIO is freed.

Calling *BIO\_reset()* on a accept BIO will close any active connection and reset the BIO into a state where it awaits another incoming connection.

*BIO\_get\_fd()* and *BIO\_set\_fd()* can be called to retrieve or set the accept socket. See *BIO\_s\_fd(3)*

*BIO\_set\_accept\_port()* uses the string **name** to set the accept port. The port is represented as a string of the form "host:port", where "host" is the interface to use and "port" is the port. Either or both values can be "\*" which is interpreted as meaning any interface or port respectively. "port" has the same syntax as the port specified in *BIO\_set\_conn\_port()* for connect BIOs, that is it can be a numerical port string or a string to lookup using *getservbyname()* and a string table.

*BIO\_new\_accept()* combines *BIO\_new()* and *BIO\_set\_accept\_port()* into a single call: that is it creates a new accept BIO with port **host\_port**.

*BIO\_set\_nbio\_accept()* sets the accept socket to blocking mode (the default) if **n** is 0 or non blocking mode if **n** is 1.

*BIO\_set\_accept\_bios()* can be used to set a chain of BIOs which will be duplicated and prepended to the chain when an incoming connection is received. This is useful if, for example, a buffering or SSL BIO is required for each connection. The chain of BIOs must not be freed after this call, they will be automatically freed when the accept BIO is freed.

*BIO\_set\_bind\_mode()* and *BIO\_get\_bind\_mode()* set and retrieve the current bind mode. If BIO\_BIND\_NORMAL (the default) is set then another socket cannot be bound to the same port. If BIO\_BIND\_REUSEADDR is set then other sockets can bind to the same port. If BIO\_BIND\_REUSEADDR\_IF\_UNUSED is set then an attempt is first made to use BIO\_BIND\_NORMAL, if this fails and the port is not in use then a second attempt is made using BIO\_BIND\_REUSEADDR.

*BIO\_do\_accept()* serves two functions. When it is first called, after the accept BIO has been setup, it will attempt to create the accept socket and bind an address to it. Second and subsequent calls to *BIO\_do\_accept()* will await an incoming connection, or request a retry in non blocking mode.

## NOTES

When an accept BIO is at the end of a chain it will await an incoming connection before processing I/O calls. When an accept BIO is not at then end of a chain it passes I/O calls to the next BIO in the chain.

When a connection is established a new socket BIO is created for the connection and appended to the chain. That is the chain is now accept->socket. This effectively means that attempting I/O on an initial accept socket will await an incoming connection then perform I/O on it.

If any additional BIOs have been set using *BIO\_set\_accept\_bios()* then they are placed between the socket and the accept BIO, that is the chain will be accept->otherbios->socket.

If a server wishes to process multiple connections (as is normally the case) then the accept BIO must be made available for further incoming connections. This can be done by waiting for a connection and then calling:

```
connection = BIO_pop(accept);
```

After this call **connection** will contain a BIO for the recently established connection and **accept** will now be a single BIO again which can be used to await further incoming connections. If no further connections will be accepted the **accept** can be freed using *BIO\_free()*.

If only a single connection will be processed it is possible to perform I/O using the accept BIO itself. This is often undesirable however because the accept BIO will still accept additional incoming connections. This can be resolved by using *BIO\_pop()* (see above) and freeing up the accept BIO after the initial connection.

If the underlying accept socket is non-blocking and *BIO\_do\_accept()* is called to await an incoming connection it is possible for *BIO\_should\_io\_special()* with the reason BIO\_RR\_ACCEPT. If this happens then it is an indication that an accept attempt would block: the application should take appropriate action to wait until the underlying socket has accepted a connection and retry the call.

*BIO\_set\_accept\_port()*, *BIO\_get\_accept\_port()*, *BIO\_set\_nbio\_accept()*, *BIO\_set\_accept\_bios()*, *BIO\_set\_bind\_mode()*, *BIO\_get\_bind\_mode()* and *BIO\_do\_accept()* are macros.

## RETURN VALUES

TBA

## EXAMPLE

This example accepts two connections on port 4444, sends messages down each and finally closes both down.

```
BIO *abio, *cbio, *cbio2;
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
abio = BIO_new_accept("4444");

/* First call to BIO_accept() sets up accept BIO */
if(BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up accept\n");
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    exit(0);
}
```

```

/* Wait for incoming connection */
if(BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error accepting connection\n");
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    exit(0);
}
fprintf(stderr, "Connection 1 established\n");
/* Retrieve BIO for connection */
cbio = BIO_pop(abio);
BIO_puts(cbio, "Connection 1: Sending out Data on initial connection\n");
fprintf(stderr, "Sent out data on connection 1\n");
/* Wait for another connection */
if(BIO_do_accept(abio) <= 0) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error accepting connection\n");
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    exit(0);
}
fprintf(stderr, "Connection 2 established\n");
/* Close accept BIO to refuse further connections */
cbio2 = BIO_pop(abio);
BIO_free(abio);
BIO_puts(cbio2, "Connection 2: Sending out Data on second\n");
fprintf(stderr, "Sent out data on connection 2\n");
BIO_puts(cbio, "Connection 1: Second connection established\n");
/* Close the two established connections */
BIO_free(cbio);
BIO_free(cbio2);

```

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

`BIO_s_bio`, `BIO_make_bio_pair`, `BIO_destroy_bio_pair`, `BIO_shutdown_wr`, `BIO_set_write_buf_size`, `BIO_get_write_buf_size`, `BIO_new_bio_pair`, `BIO_get_write_guarantee`, `BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee`, `BIO_get_read_request`, `BIO_ctrl_get_read_request`, `BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request` – BIO pair BIO

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_bio(void);

#define BIO_make_bio_pair(b1,b2)    (int)BIO_ctrl(b1,BIO_C_MAKE_BIO_PAIR,0,b2)
#define BIO_destroy_bio_pair(b)    (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_DESTROY_BIO_PAIR,0,NULL)
#define BIO_shutdown_wr(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR, 0, NULL)

#define BIO_set_write_buf_size(b,size) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,0,size)
#define BIO_get_write_buf_size(b,size) (size_t)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE,0,size)

int BIO_new_bio_pair(BIO **bio1, size_t writebuf1, BIO **bio2, size_t writebuf2)

#define BIO_get_write_guarantee(b) (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_WRITE_GUARANTEE,0,NULL)
size_t BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(BIO *b);

#define BIO_get_read_request(b)    (int)BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_READ_REQUEST,0,NULL)
size_t BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(BIO *b);

int BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request(BIO *b);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_s\_bio()* returns the method for a BIO pair. A BIO pair is a pair of source/sink BIOs where data written to either half of the pair is buffered and can be read from the other half. Both halves must usually be handled by the same application thread since no locking is done on the internal data structures.

Since BIO chains typically end in a source/sink BIO it is possible to make this one half of a BIO pair and have all the data processed by the chain under application control.

One typical use of BIO pairs is to place TLS/SSL I/O under application control, this can be used when the application wishes to use a non standard transport for TLS/SSL or the normal socket routines are inappropriate.

Calls to *BIO\_read()* will read data from the buffer or request a retry if no data is available.

Calls to *BIO\_write()* will place data in the buffer or request a retry if the buffer is full.

The standard calls *BIO\_ctrl\_pending()* and *BIO\_ctrl\_wpending()* can be used to determine the amount of pending data in the read or write buffer.

*BIO\_reset()* clears any data in the write buffer.

*BIO\_make\_bio\_pair()* joins two separate BIOs into a connected pair.

*BIO\_destroy\_pair()* destroys the association between two connected BIOs. Freeing up any half of the pair will automatically destroy the association.

*BIO\_shutdown\_wr()* is used to close down a BIO **b**. After this call no further writes on BIO **b** are allowed (they will return an error). Reads on the other half of the pair will return any pending data or EOF when all pending data has been read.

*BIO\_set\_write\_buf\_size()* sets the write buffer size of BIO **b** to **size**. If the size is not initialized a default value is used. This is currently 17K, sufficient for a maximum size TLS record.

*BIO\_get\_write\_buf\_size()* returns the size of the write buffer.

*BIO\_new\_bio\_pair()* combines the calls to *BIO\_new()*, *BIO\_make\_bio\_pair()* and *BIO\_set\_write\_buf\_size()* to create a connected pair of BIOs **bio1**, **bio2** with write buffer sizes **writebuf1** and **writebuf2**. If either size is zero then the default size is used. *BIO\_new\_bio\_pair()* does not check whether **bio1** or **bio2** do point to some other BIO, the values are overwritten, *BIO\_free()* is not called.

*BIO\_get\_write\_guarantee()* and *BIO\_ctrl\_get\_write\_guarantee()* return the maximum length of data that can be currently written to the BIO. Writes larger than this value will return a value from

*BIO\_write()* less than the amount requested or if the buffer is full request a retry. *BIO\_ctrl\_get\_write\_guarantee()* is a function whereas *BIO\_get\_write\_guarantee()* is a macro.

*BIO\_get\_read\_request()* and *BIO\_ctrl\_get\_read\_request()* return the amount of data requested, or the buffer size if it is less, if the last read attempt at the other half of the BIO pair failed due to an empty buffer. This can be used to determine how much data should be written to the BIO so the next read will succeed: this is most useful in TLS/SSL applications where the amount of data read is usually meaningful rather than just a buffer size. After a successful read this call will return zero. It also will return zero once new data has been written satisfying the read request or part of it. Note that *BIO\_get\_read\_request()* never returns an amount larger than that returned by *BIO\_get\_write\_guarantee()*.

*BIO\_ctrl\_reset\_read\_request()* can also be used to reset the value returned by *BIO\_get\_read\_request()* to zero.

## NOTES

Both halves of a BIO pair should be freed. That is even if one half is implicit freed due to a *BIO\_free\_all()* or *SSL\_free()* call the other half needs to be freed.

When used in bidirectional applications (such as TLS/SSL) care should be taken to flush any data in the write buffer. This can be done by calling *BIO\_pending()* on the other half of the pair and, if any data is pending, reading it and sending it to the underlying transport. This must be done before any normal processing (such as calling *select()*) due to a request and *BIO\_should\_read()* being true.

To see why this is important consider a case where a request is sent using *BIO\_write()* and a response read with *BIO\_read()*, this can occur during an TLS/SSL handshake for example. *BIO\_write()* will succeed and place data in the write buffer. *BIO\_read()* will initially fail and *BIO\_should\_read()* will be true. If the application then waits for data to be available on the underlying transport before flushing the write buffer it will never succeed because the request was never sent!

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_new\_bio\_pair()* returns 1 on success, with the new BIOs available in **bio1** and **bio2**, or 0 on failure, with NULL pointers stored into the locations for **bio1** and **bio2**. Check the error stack for more information.

[XXXXX: More return values need to be added here]

## EXAMPLE

The BIO pair can be used to have full control over the network access of an application. The application can call *select()* on the socket as required without having to go through the SSL-interface.

```

BIO *internal_bio, *network_bio;
...
BIO_new_bio_pair(internal_bio, 0, network_bio, 0);
SSL_set_bio(ssl, internal_bio, internal_bio);
SSL_operations();
...
application |   TLS-engine
  |           |
  +-----> SSL_operations()
              |   /\   ||
              |   ||   \/
              |   BIO-pair (internal_bio)
  +-----< BIO-pair (network_bio)
  |           |
socket        |
...
SSL_free(ssl);                               /* implicitly frees internal_bio */
BIO_free(network_bio);
...

```

As the BIO pair will only buffer the data and never directly access the connection, it behaves non-blocking and will return as soon as the write buffer is full or the read buffer is drained. Then the application has to flush the write buffer and/or fill the read buffer.

Use the *BIO\_ctrl\_pending()*, to find out whether data is buffered in the BIO and must be transferred to the network. Use *BIO\_ctrl\_get\_read\_request()* to find out, how many bytes must be written into the buffer before the *SSL\_operation()* can successfully be continued.

**WARNING**

As the data is buffered, *SSL\_operation()* may return with a *ERROR\_SSL\_WANT\_READ* condition, but there is still data in the write buffer. An application must not rely on the error value of *SSL\_operation()* but must assure that the write buffer is always flushed first. Otherwise a deadlock may occur as the peer might be waiting for the data before being able to continue.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_set\_bio(3)*, *ssl(3)*, *bio(3)*, *BIO\_should\_retry(3)*, *BIO\_read(3)*

## NAME

BIO\_s\_connect, BIO\_set\_conn\_hostname, BIO\_set\_conn\_port, BIO\_set\_conn\_ip,  
 BIO\_set\_conn\_int\_port, BIO\_get\_conn\_hostname, BIO\_get\_conn\_port, BIO\_get\_conn\_ip,  
 BIO\_get\_conn\_int\_port, BIO\_set\_nbio, BIO\_do\_connect – connect BIO

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_connect(void);

BIO *BIO_new_connect(char *name);

long BIO_set_conn_hostname(BIO *b, char *name);
long BIO_set_conn_port(BIO *b, char *port);
long BIO_set_conn_ip(BIO *b, char *ip);
long BIO_set_conn_int_port(BIO *b, char *port);
char *BIO_get_conn_hostname(BIO *b);
char *BIO_get_conn_port(BIO *b);
char *BIO_get_conn_ip(BIO *b, dummy);
long BIO_get_conn_int_port(BIO *b, int port);

long BIO_set_nbio(BIO *b, long n);

int BIO_do_connect(BIO *b);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_s\_connect()* returns the connect BIO method. This is a wrapper round the platform's TCP/IP socket connection routines.

Using connect BIOs, TCP/IP connections can be made and data transferred using only BIO routines. In this way any platform specific operations are hidden by the BIO abstraction.

Read and write operations on a connect BIO will perform I/O on the underlying connection. If no connection is established and the port and hostname (see below) is set up properly then a connection is established first.

Connect BIOs support *BIO\_puts()* but not *BIO\_gets()*.

If the close flag is set on a connect BIO then any active connection is shutdown and the socket closed when the BIO is freed.

Calling *BIO\_reset()* on a connect BIO will close any active connection and reset the BIO into a state where it can connect to the same host again.

*BIO\_get\_fd()* places the underlying socket in *c* if it is not NULL, it also returns the socket . If *c* is not NULL it should be of type (int \*).

*BIO\_set\_conn\_hostname()* uses the string **name** to set the hostname. The hostname can be an IP address. The hostname can also include the port in the form hostname:port . It is also acceptable to use the form "hostname/any/other/path" or "hostname:port/any/other/path".

*BIO\_set\_conn\_port()* sets the port to **port**. **port** can be the numerical form or a string such as "http". A string will be looked up first using *getservbyname()* on the host platform but if that fails a standard table of port names will be used. Currently the list is http, telnet, socks, https, ssl, ftp, gopher and wais.

*BIO\_set\_conn\_ip()* sets the IP address to **ip** using binary form, that is four bytes specifying the IP address in big-endian form.

*BIO\_set\_conn\_int\_port()* sets the port using **port**. **port** should be of type (int \*).

*BIO\_get\_conn\_hostname()* returns the hostname of the connect BIO or NULL if the BIO is initialized but no hostname is set. This return value is an internal pointer which should not be modified.

*BIO\_get\_conn\_port()* returns the port as a string.

*BIO\_get\_conn\_ip()* returns the IP address in binary form.

*BIO\_get\_conn\_int\_port()* returns the port as an int.

*BIO\_set\_nbio()* sets the non blocking I/O flag to **n**. If **n** is zero then blocking I/O is set. If **n** is 1 then



non blocking I/O is set. Blocking I/O is the default. The call to *BIO\_set\_nbio()* should be made before the connection is established because non blocking I/O is set during the connect process.

*BIO\_new\_connect()* combines *BIO\_new()* and *BIO\_set\_conn\_hostname()* into a single call: that is it creates a new connect BIO with **name**.

*BIO\_do\_connect()* attempts to connect the supplied BIO. It returns 1 if the connection was established successfully. A zero or negative value is returned if the connection could not be established, the call *BIO\_should\_retry()* should be used for non blocking connect BIOs to determine if the call should be retried.

## NOTES

If blocking I/O is set then a non positive return value from any I/O call is caused by an error condition, although a zero return will normally mean that the connection was closed.

If the port name is supplied as part of the host name then this will override any value set with *BIO\_set\_conn\_port()*. This may be undesirable if the application does not wish to allow connection to arbitrary ports. This can be avoided by checking for the presence of the ':' character in the passed host-name and either indicating an error or truncating the string at that point.

The values returned by *BIO\_get\_conn\_hostname()*, *BIO\_get\_conn\_port()*, *BIO\_get\_conn\_ip()* and *BIO\_get\_conn\_int\_port()* are updated when a connection attempt is made. Before any connection attempt the values returned are those set by the application itself.

Applications do not have to call *BIO\_do\_connect()* but may wish to do so to separate the connection process from other I/O processing.

If non blocking I/O is set then retries will be requested as appropriate.

In addition to *BIO\_should\_read()* and *BIO\_should\_write()* it is also possible for *BIO\_should\_io\_special()* to be true during the initial connection process with the reason *BIO\_RR\_CONNECT*. If this is returned then this is an indication that a connection attempt would block, the application should then take appropriate action to wait until the underlying socket has connected and retry the call.

*BIO\_set\_conn\_hostname()*, *BIO\_set\_conn\_port()*, *BIO\_set\_conn\_ip()*, *BIO\_set\_conn\_int\_port()*, *BIO\_get\_conn\_hostname()*, *BIO\_get\_conn\_port()*, *BIO\_get\_conn\_ip()*, *BIO\_get\_conn\_int\_port()*, *BIO\_set\_nbio()* and *BIO\_do\_connect()* are macros.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_s\_connect()* returns the connect BIO method.

*BIO\_get\_fd()* returns the socket or -1 if the BIO has not been initialized.

*BIO\_set\_conn\_hostname()*, *BIO\_set\_conn\_port()*, *BIO\_set\_conn\_ip()* and *BIO\_set\_conn\_int\_port()* always return 1.

*BIO\_get\_conn\_hostname()* returns the connected hostname or NULL if none was set.

*BIO\_get\_conn\_port()* returns a string representing the connected port or NULL if not set.

*BIO\_get\_conn\_ip()* returns a pointer to the connected IP address in binary form or all zeros if not set.

*BIO\_get\_conn\_int\_port()* returns the connected port or 0 if none was set.

*BIO\_set\_nbio()* always returns 1.

*BIO\_do\_connect()* returns 1 if the connection was successfully established and 0 or -1 if the connection failed.

## EXAMPLE

This example connects to a webserver on the local host and attempts to retrieve a page and copy the result to standard output.

```

BIO *cbio, *out;
int len;
char tmpbuf[1024];
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
cbio = BIO_new_connect("localhost:http");
out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
if(BIO_do_connect(cbio) <= 0) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n");
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    /* whatever ... */
}
BIO_puts(cbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n");
for(;;) {
    len = BIO_read(cbio, tmpbuf, 1024);
    if(len <= 0) break;
    BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len);
}
BIO_free(cbio);
BIO_free(out);

```

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_s\_fd, BIO\_set\_fd, BIO\_get\_fd, BIO\_new\_fd – file descriptor BIO

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO_METHOD *    BIO_s_fd(void);

#define BIO_set_fd(b,fd,c)      BIO_int_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_FD,c,fd)
#define BIO_get_fd(b,c)        BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_FD,0,(char *)c)

BIO *BIO_new_fd(int fd, int close_flag);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_s\_fd()* returns the file descriptor BIO method. This is a wrapper round the platforms file descriptor routines such as *read()* and *write()*.

*BIO\_read()* and *BIO\_write()* read or write the underlying descriptor. *BIO\_puts()* is supported but *BIO\_gets()* is not.

If the close flag is set then then *close()* is called on the underlying file descriptor when the BIO is freed.

*BIO\_reset()* attempts to change the file pointer to the start of file using *lseek(fd, 0, 0)*.

*BIO\_seek()* sets the file pointer to position **ofs** from start of file using *lseek(fd, ofs, 0)*.

*BIO\_tell()* returns the current file position by calling *lseek(fd, 0, 1)*.

*BIO\_set\_fd()* sets the file descriptor of BIO **b** to **fd** and the close flag to **c**.

*BIO\_get\_fd()* places the file descriptor in **c** if it is not NULL, it also returns the file descriptor. If **c** is not NULL it should be of type (int \*).

*BIO\_new\_fd()* returns a file descriptor BIO using **fd** and **close\_flag**.

## NOTES

The behaviour of *BIO\_read()* and *BIO\_write()* depends on the behavior of the platforms *read()* and *write()* calls on the descriptor. If the underlying file descriptor is in a non blocking mode then the BIO will behave in the manner described in the *BIO\_read(3)* and *BIO\_should\_retry(3)* manual pages.

File descriptor BIOs should not be used for socket I/O. Use socket BIOs instead.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_s\_fd()* returns the file descriptor BIO method.

*BIO\_reset()* returns zero for success and -1 if an error occurred. *BIO\_seek()* and *BIO\_tell()* return the current file position or -1 if an error occurred. These values reflect the underlying *lseek()* behaviour.

*BIO\_set\_fd()* always returns 1.

*BIO\_get\_fd()* returns the file descriptor or -1 if the BIO has not been initialized.

*BIO\_new\_fd()* returns the newly allocated BIO or NULL if an error occurred.

## EXAMPLE

This is a file descriptor BIO version of “Hello World”:

```
BIO *out;
out = BIO_new_fd(fileno(stdout), BIO_NOCLOSE);
BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n");
BIO_free(out);
```

## SEE ALSO

*BIO\_seek(3)*, *BIO\_tell(3)*, *BIO\_reset(3)*, *BIO\_read(3)*, *BIO\_write(3)*, *BIO\_puts(3)*, *BIO\_gets(3)*, *BIO\_printf(3)*, *BIO\_set\_close(3)*, *BIO\_get\_close(3)*

## NAME

BIO\_s\_file, BIO\_new\_file, BIO\_new\_fp, BIO\_set\_fp, BIO\_get\_fp, BIO\_read\_filename, BIO\_write\_filename, BIO\_append\_filename, BIO\_rw\_filename – FILE bio

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO_METHOD * BIO_s_file(void);
BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode);
BIO *BIO_new_fp(FILE *stream, int flags);

BIO_set_fp(BIO *b, FILE *fp, int flags);
BIO_get_fp(BIO *b, FILE **fpp);

int BIO_read_filename(BIO *b, char *name)
int BIO_write_filename(BIO *b, char *name)
int BIO_append_filename(BIO *b, char *name)
int BIO_rw_filename(BIO *b, char *name)
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_s\_file()* returns the BIO file method. As its name implies it is a wrapper round the stdio FILE structure and it is a source/sink BIO.

Calls to *BIO\_read()* and *BIO\_write()* read and write data to the underlying stream. *BIO\_gets()* and *BIO\_puts()* are supported on file BIOs.

*BIO\_flush()* on a file BIO calls the *fflush()* function on the wrapped stream.

*BIO\_reset()* attempts to change the file pointer to the start of file using *fseek(stream, 0, 0)*.

*BIO\_seek()* sets the file pointer to position **ofs** from start of file using *fseek(stream, ofs, 0)*.

*BIO\_eof()* calls *feof()*.

Setting the BIO\_CLOSE flag calls *fclose()* on the stream when the BIO is freed.

*BIO\_new\_file()* creates a new file BIO with mode **mode** the meaning of **mode** is the same as the stdio function *fopen()*. The BIO\_CLOSE flag is set on the returned BIO.

*BIO\_new\_fp()* creates a file BIO wrapping **stream**. Flags can be: BIO\_CLOSE, BIO\_NOCLOSE (the close flag) BIO\_FP\_TEXT (sets the underlying stream to text mode, default is binary: this only has any effect under Win32).

*BIO\_set\_fp()* set the fp of a file BIO to **fp**. **flags** has the same meaning as in *BIO\_new\_fp()*, it is a macro.

*BIO\_get\_fp()* retrieves the fp of a file BIO, it is a macro.

*BIO\_seek()* is a macro that sets the position pointer to **offset** bytes from the start of file.

*BIO\_tell()* returns the value of the position pointer.

*BIO\_read\_filename()*, *BIO\_write\_filename()*, *BIO\_append\_filename()* and *BIO\_rw\_filename()* set the file BIO **b** to use file **name** for reading, writing, append or read write respectively.

## NOTES

When wrapping stdout, stdin or stderr the underlying stream should not normally be closed so the BIO\_NOCLOSE flag should be set.

Because the file BIO calls the underlying stdio functions any quirks in stdio behaviour will be mirrored by the corresponding BIO.

## EXAMPLES

File BIO “hello world”:

```
BIO *bio_out;
bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
BIO_printf(bio_out, "Hello World\n");
```

Alternative technique:

```
BIO *bio_out;
bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if(bio_out == NULL) /* Error ... */
if(!BIO_set_fp(bio_out, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE)) /* Error ... */
BIO_printf(bio_out, "Hello World\n");
```

Write to a file:

```
BIO *out;
out = BIO_new_file("filename.txt", "w");
if(!out) /* Error occurred */
BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n");
BIO_free(out);
```

Alternative technique:

```
BIO *out;
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if(out == NULL) /* Error ... */
if(!BIO_write_filename(out, "filename.txt")) /* Error ... */
BIO_printf(out, "Hello World\n");
BIO_free(out);
```

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_s\_file()* returns the file BIO method.

*BIO\_new\_file()* and *BIO\_new\_fp()* return a file BIO or NULL if an error occurred.

*BIO\_set\_fp()* and *BIO\_get\_fp()* return 1 for success or 0 for failure (although the current implementation never return 0).

*BIO\_seek()* returns the same value as the underlying *fseek()* function: 0 for success or -1 for failure.

*BIO\_tell()* returns the current file position.

*BIO\_read\_filename()*, *BIO\_write\_filename()*, *BIO\_append\_filename()* and *BIO\_rw\_filename()* return 1 for success or 0 for failure.

## BUGS

*BIO\_reset()* and *BIO\_seek()* are implemented using *fseek()* on the underlying stream. The return value for *fseek()* is 0 for success or -1 if an error occurred this differs from other types of BIO which will typically return 1 for success and a non positive value if an error occurred.

## SEE ALSO

*BIO\_seek*(3), *BIO\_tell*(3), *BIO\_reset*(3), *BIO\_flush*(3), *BIO\_read*(3), *BIO\_write*(3), *BIO\_puts*(3), *BIO\_gets*(3), *BIO\_printf*(3), *BIO\_set\_close*(3), *BIO\_get\_close*(3)

## NAME

BIO\_s\_mem, BIO\_set\_mem\_eof\_return, BIO\_get\_mem\_data, BIO\_set\_mem\_buf, BIO\_get\_mem\_ptr, BIO\_new\_mem\_buf – memory BIO

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO_METHOD *    BIO_s_mem(void);

BIO_set_mem_eof_return(BIO *b, int v)
long BIO_get_mem_data(BIO *b, char **pp)
BIO_set_mem_buf(BIO *b, BUF_MEM *bm, int c)
BIO_get_mem_ptr(BIO *b, BUF_MEM **pp)

BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_s\_mem()* return the memory BIO method function.

A memory BIO is a source/sink BIO which uses memory for its I/O. Data written to a memory BIO is stored in a BUF\_MEM structure which is extended as appropriate to accommodate the stored data.

Any data written to a memory BIO can be recalled by reading from it. Unless the memory BIO is read only any data read from it is deleted from the BIO.

Memory BIOs support *BIO\_gets()* and *BIO\_puts()*.

If the BIO\_CLOSE flag is set when a memory BIO is freed then the underlying BUF\_MEM structure is also freed.

Calling *BIO\_reset()* on a read write memory BIO clears any data in it. On a read only BIO it restores the BIO to its original state and the read only data can be read again.

*BIO\_eof()* is true if no data is in the BIO.

*BIO\_ctrl\_pending()* returns the number of bytes currently stored.

*BIO\_set\_mem\_eof\_return()* sets the behaviour of memory BIO **b** when it is empty. If the **v** is zero then an empty memory BIO will return EOF (that is it will return zero and *BIO\_should\_retry(b)* will be false. If **v** is non zero then it will return **v** when it is empty and it will set the read retry flag (that is *BIO\_read\_retry(b)* is true). To avoid ambiguity with a normal positive return value **v** should be set to a negative value, typically **-1**.

*BIO\_get\_mem\_data()* sets **pp** to a pointer to the start of the memory BIOs data and returns the total amount of data available. It is implemented as a macro.

*BIO\_set\_mem\_buf()* sets the internal BUF\_MEM structure to **bm** and sets the close flag to **c**, that is **c** should be either BIO\_CLOSE or BIO\_NOCLOSE. It is a macro.

*BIO\_get\_mem\_ptr()* places the underlying BUF\_MEM structure in **pp**. It is a macro.

*BIO\_new\_mem\_buf()* creates a memory BIO using **len** bytes of data at **buf**, if **len** is **-1** then the **buf** is assumed to be null terminated and its length is determined by **strlen**. The BIO is set to a read only state and as a result cannot be written to. This is useful when some data needs to be made available from a static area of memory in the form of a BIO. The supplied data is read directly from the supplied buffer: it is **not** copied first, so the supplied area of memory must be unchanged until the BIO is freed.

## NOTES

Writes to memory BIOs will always succeed if memory is available: that is their size can grow indefinitely.

Every read from a read write memory BIO will remove the data just read with an internal copy operation, if a BIO contains a lots of data and it is read in small chunks the operation can be very slow. The use of a read only memory BIO avoids this problem. If the BIO must be read write then adding a buffering BIO to the chain will speed up the process.

## BUGS

There should be an option to set the maximum size of a memory BIO.

There should be a way to “rewind” a read write BIO without destroying its contents.

The copying operation should not occur after every small read of a large BIO to improve efficiency.

### EXAMPLE

Create a memory BIO and write some data to it:

```
BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BIO_puts(mem, "Hello World\n");
```

Create a read only memory BIO:

```
char data[] = "Hello World";
BIO *mem;
mem = BIO_new_mem_buf(data, -1);
```

Extract the BUF\_MEM structure from a memory BIO and then free up the BIO:

```
BUF_MEM *bptr;
BIO_get_mem_ptr(mem, &bptr);
BIO_set_close(mem, BIO_NOCLOSE); /* So BIO_free() leaves BUF_MEM alone */
BIO_free(mem);
```

### SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_s\_null – null data sink

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO_METHOD *    BIO_s_null(void);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_s\_null()* returns the null sink BIO method. Data written to the null sink is discarded, reads return EOF.

## NOTES

A null sink BIO behaves in a similar manner to the Unix /dev/null device.

A null bio can be placed on the end of a chain to discard any data passed through it.

A null sink is useful if, for example, an application wishes to digest some data by writing through a digest bio but not send the digested data anywhere. Since a BIO chain must normally include a source/sink BIO this can be achieved by adding a null sink BIO to the end of the chain

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_s\_null()* returns the null sink BIO method.

## SEE ALSO

TBA



## NAME

BIO\_s\_socket, BIO\_new\_socket – socket BIO

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void);

long BIO_set_fd(BIO *b, int fd, long close_flag);
long BIO_get_fd(BIO *b, int *c);

BIO *BIO_new_socket(int sock, int close_flag);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_s\_socket()* returns the socket BIO method. This is a wrapper round the platform's socket routines.

*BIO\_read()* and *BIO\_write()* read or write the underlying socket. *BIO\_puts()* is supported but *BIO\_gets()* is not.

If the close flag is set then the socket is shut down and closed when the BIO is freed.

*BIO\_set\_fd()* sets the socket of BIO **b** to **fd** and the close flag to **close\_flag**.

*BIO\_get\_fd()* places the socket in **c** if it is not NULL, it also returns the socket. If **c** is not NULL it should be of type (int \*).

*BIO\_new\_socket()* returns a socket BIO using **sock** and **close\_flag**.

## NOTES

Socket BIOs also support any relevant functionality of file descriptor BIOs.

The reason for having separate file descriptor and socket BIOs is that on some platforms sockets are not file descriptors and use distinct I/O routines, Windows is one such platform. Any code mixing the two will not work on all platforms.

*BIO\_set\_fd()* and *BIO\_get\_fd()* are macros.

## RETURN VALUES

*BIO\_s\_socket()* returns the socket BIO method.

*BIO\_set\_fd()* always returns 1.

*BIO\_get\_fd()* returns the socket or -1 if the BIO has not been initialized.

*BIO\_new\_socket()* returns the newly allocated BIO or NULL is an error occurred.

## SEE ALSO

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_set\_callback, BIO\_get\_callback, BIO\_set\_callback\_arg, BIO\_get\_callback\_arg, BIO\_debug\_callback – BIO callback functions

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

#define BIO_set_callback(b,cb)      ((b)->callback=(cb))
#define BIO_get_callback(b)        ((b)->callback)
#define BIO_set_callback_arg(b,arg) ((b)->cb_arg=(char *) (arg))
#define BIO_get_callback_arg(b)    ((b)->cb_arg)

long BIO_debug_callback(BIO *bio,int cmd,const char *argp,int argi,
                        long argl,long ret);

typedef long callback(BIO *b, int oper, const char *argp,
                    int argi, long argl, long retvalue);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*BIO\_set\_callback()* and *BIO\_get\_callback()* set and retrieve the BIO callback, they are both macros. The callback is called during most high level BIO operations. It can be used for debugging purposes to trace operations on a BIO or to modify its operation.

*BIO\_set\_callback\_arg()* and *BIO\_get\_callback\_arg()* are macros which can be used to set and retrieve an argument for use in the callback.

*BIO\_debug\_callback()* is a standard debugging callback which prints out information relating to each BIO operation. If the callback argument is set if is interpreted as a BIO to send the information to, otherwise stderr is used.

*callback()* is the callback function itself. The meaning of each argument is described below.

The BIO the callback is attached to is passed in **b**.

**oper** is set to the operation being performed. For some operations the callback is called twice, once before and once after the actual operation, the latter case has **oper** or'ed with BIO\_CB\_RETURN.

The meaning of the arguments **argp**, **argi** and **argl** depends on the value of **oper**, that is the operation being performed.

**retvalue** is the return value that would be returned to the application if no callback were present. The actual value returned is the return value of the callback itself. In the case of callbacks called before the actual BIO operation 1 is placed in retvalue, if the return value is not positive it will be immediately returned to the application and the BIO operation will not be performed.

The callback should normally simply return **retvalue** when it has finished processing, unless if specifically wishes to modify the value returned to the application.

## CALLBACK OPERATIONS

### BIO\_free(b)

callback(b, BIO\_CB\_FREE, NULL, 0L, 0L, 1L) is called before the free operation.

### BIO\_read(b, out, outl)

callback(b, BIO\_CB\_READ, out, outl, 0L, 1L) is called before the read and callback(b, BIO\_CB\_READ|BIO\_CB\_RETURN, out, outl, 0L, retvalue) after.

### BIO\_write(b, in, inl)

callback(b, BIO\_CB\_WRITE, in, inl, 0L, 1L) is called before the write and callback(b, BIO\_CB\_WRITE|BIO\_CB\_RETURN, in, inl, 0L, retvalue) after.

### BIO\_gets(b, out, outl)

callback(b, BIO\_CB\_GETS, out, outl, 0L, 1L) is called before the operation and callback(b, BIO\_CB\_GETS|BIO\_CB\_RETURN, out, outl, 0L, retvalue) after.

### BIO\_puts(b, in)

callback(b, BIO\_CB\_WRITE, in, 0, 0L, 1L) is called before the operation and callback(b, BIO\_CB\_WRITE|BIO\_CB\_RETURN, in, 0, 0L, retvalue) after.

**BIO\_ctrl(BIO \*b, int cmd, long larg, void \*parg)**

callback(b,BIO\_CB\_CTRL,parg,cmd,larg,1L) is called before the call and call-back(b,BIO\_CB\_CTRL|BIO\_CB\_RETURN,parg,cmd, larg,ret) after.

#### **EXAMPLE**

The *BIO\_debug\_callback()* function is a good example, its source is in crypto/bio/bio\_cb.c

#### **SEE ALSO**

TBA

## NAME

BIO\_should\_retry, BIO\_should\_read, BIO\_should\_write, BIO\_should\_io\_special, BIO\_retry\_type, BIO\_should\_retry, BIO\_get\_retry\_BIO, BIO\_get\_retry\_reason – BIO retry functions

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/bio.h>

#define BIO_should_read(a)                ((a)->flags & BIO_FLAGS_READ)
#define BIO_should_write(a)               ((a)->flags & BIO_FLAGS_WRITE)
#define BIO_should_io_special(a)           ((a)->flags & BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL)
#define BIO_retry_type(a)                  ((a)->flags & BIO_FLAGS_RWS)
#define BIO_should_retry(a)                ((a)->flags & BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY)

#define BIO_FLAGS_READ                    0x01
#define BIO_FLAGS_WRITE                   0x02
#define BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL              0x04
#define BIO_FLAGS_RWS (BIO_FLAGS_READ|BIO_FLAGS_WRITE|BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL)
#define BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY 0x08

BIO * BIO_get_retry_BIO(BIO *bio, int *reason);
int BIO_get_retry_reason(BIO *bio);
```

## DESCRIPTION

These functions determine why a BIO is not able to read or write data. They will typically be called after a failed *BIO\_read()* or *BIO\_write()* call.

*BIO\_should\_retry()* is true if the call that produced this condition should then be retried at a later time.

If *BIO\_should\_retry()* is false then the cause is an error condition.

*BIO\_should\_read()* is true if the cause of the condition is that a BIO needs to read data.

*BIO\_should\_write()* is true if the cause of the condition is that a BIO needs to read data.

*BIO\_should\_io\_special()* is true if some “special” condition, that is a reason other than reading or writing is the cause of the condition.

*BIO\_get\_retry\_reason()* returns a mask of the cause of a retry condition consisting of the values **BIO\_FLAGS\_READ**, **BIO\_FLAGS\_WRITE**, **BIO\_FLAGS\_IO\_SPECIAL** though current BIO types will only set one of these.

*BIO\_get\_retry\_BIO()* determines the precise reason for the special condition, it returns the BIO that caused this condition and if **reason** is not NULL it contains the reason code. The meaning of the reason code and the action that should be taken depends on the type of BIO that resulted in this condition.

*BIO\_get\_retry\_reason()* returns the reason for a special condition if passed the relevant BIO, for example as returned by *BIO\_get\_retry\_BIO()*.

## NOTES

If *BIO\_should\_retry()* returns false then the precise “error condition” depends on the BIO type that caused it and the return code of the BIO operation. For example if a call to *BIO\_read()* on a socket BIO returns 0 and *BIO\_should\_retry()* is false then the cause will be that the connection closed. A similar condition on a file BIO will mean that it has reached EOF. Some BIO types may place additional information on the error queue. For more details see the individual BIO type manual pages.

If the underlying I/O structure is in a blocking mode almost all current BIO types will not request a retry, because the underlying I/O calls will not. If the application knows that the BIO type will never signal a retry then it need not call *BIO\_should\_retry()* after a failed BIO I/O call. This is typically done with file BIOs.

SSL BIOs are the only current exception to this rule: they can request a retry even if the underlying I/O structure is blocking, if a handshake occurs during a call to *BIO\_read()*. An application can retry the failed call immediately or avoid this situation by setting **SSL\_MODE\_AUTO\_RETRY** on the underlying SSL structure.

While an application may retry a failed non blocking call immediately this is likely to be very inefficient because the call will fail repeatedly until data can be processed or is available. An application will

normally wait until the necessary condition is satisfied. How this is done depends on the underlying I/O structure.

For example if the cause is ultimately a socket and *BIO\_should\_read()* is true then a call to *select()* may be made to wait until data is available and then retry the BIO operation. By combining the retry conditions of several non blocking BIOs in a single *select()* call it is possible to service several BIOs in a single thread, though the performance may be poor if SSL BIOs are present because long delays can occur during the initial handshake process.

It is possible for a BIO to block indefinitely if the underlying I/O structure cannot process or return any data. This depends on the behaviour of the platforms I/O functions. This is often not desirable: one solution is to use non blocking I/O and use a timeout on the *select()* (or equivalent) call.

## BUGS

The OpenSSL ASN1 functions cannot gracefully deal with non blocking I/O: that is they cannot retry after a partial read or write. This is usually worked around by only passing the relevant data to ASN1 functions when the entire structure can be read or written.

## SEE ALSO

TBA

**NAME**

blowfish, BF\_set\_key, BF\_encrypt, BF\_decrypt, BF\_ecb\_encrypt, BF\_cbc\_encrypt, BF\_cfb64\_encrypt, BF\_ofb64\_encrypt, BF\_options – Blowfish encryption

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/blowfish.h>

void BF_set_key(BF_KEY *key, int len, const unsigned char *data);

void BF_ecb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
    BF_KEY *key, int enc);

void BF_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
    long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int enc);

void BF_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
    long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num,
    int enc);

void BF_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
    long length, BF_KEY *schedule, unsigned char *ivec, int *num);

const char *BF_options(void);

void BF_encrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key);
void BF_decrypt(BF_LONG *data, const BF_KEY *key);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

This library implements the Blowfish cipher, which was invented and described by Counterpane (see <http://www.counterpane.com/blowfish.html>).

Blowfish is a block cipher that operates on 64 bit (8 byte) blocks of data. It uses a variable size key, but typically, 128 bit (16 byte) keys are a considered good for strong encryption. Blowfish can be used in the same modes as DES (see *des\_modes*(7)). Blowfish is currently one of the faster block ciphers. It is quite a bit faster than DES, and much faster than IDEA or RC2.

Blowfish consists of a key setup phase and the actual encryption or decryption phase.

*BF\_set\_key()* sets up the **BF\_KEY** key using the **len** bytes long key at **data**.

*BF\_ecb\_encrypt()* is the basic Blowfish encryption and decryption function. It encrypts or decrypts the first 64 bits of **in** using the key **key**, putting the result in **out**. **enc** decides if encryption (**BF\_ENCRYPT**) or decryption (**BF\_DECRYPT**) shall be performed. The vector pointed at by **in** and **out** must be 64 bits in length, no less. If they are larger, everything after the first 64 bits is ignored.

The mode functions *BF\_cbc\_encrypt()*, *BF\_cfb64\_encrypt()* and *BF\_ofb64\_encrypt()* all operate on variable length data. They all take an initialization vector **ivec** which needs to be passed along into the next call of the same function for the same message. **ivec** may be initialized with anything, but the recipient needs to know what it was initialized with, or it won't be able to decrypt. Some programs and protocols simplify this, like SSH, where **ivec** is simply initialized to zero. *BF\_cbc\_encrypt()* operates on data that is a multiple of 8 bytes long, while *BF\_cfb64\_encrypt()* and *BF\_ofb64\_encrypt()* are used to encrypt an variable number of bytes (the amount does not have to be an exact multiple of 8). The purpose of the latter two is to simulate stream ciphers, and therefore, they need the parameter **num**, which is a pointer to an integer where the current offset in **ivec** is stored between calls. This integer must be initialized to zero when **ivec** is initialized.

*BF\_cbc\_encrypt()* is the Cipher Block Chaining function for Blowfish. It encrypts or decrypts the 64 bits chunks of **in** using the key **schedule**, putting the result in **out**. **enc** decides if encryption (**BF\_ENCRYPT**) or decryption (**BF\_DECRYPT**) shall be performed. **ivec** must point at an 8 byte long initialization vector.

*BF\_cfb64\_encrypt()* is the CFB mode for Blowfish with 64 bit feedback. It encrypts or decrypts the bytes in **in** using the key **schedule**, putting the result in **out**. **enc** decides if encryption (**BF\_ENCRYPT**) or decryption (**BF\_DECRYPT**) shall be performed. **ivec** must point at an 8 byte long initialization vector. **num** must point at an integer which must be initially zero.

*BF\_ofb64\_encrypt()* is the OFB mode for Blowfish with 64 bit feedback. It uses the same parameters as *BF\_cfb64\_encrypt()*, which must be initialized the same way.

*BF\_encrypt()* and *BF\_decrypt()* are the lowest level functions for Blowfish encryption. They

encrypt/decrypt the first 64 bits of the vector pointed by **data**, using the key **key**. These functions should not be used unless you implement 'modes' of Blowfish. The alternative is to use *BF\_ecb\_encrypt()*. If you still want to use these functions, you should be aware that they take each 32-bit chunk in host-byte order, which is little-endian on little-endian platforms and big-endian on big-endian ones.

## RETURN VALUES

None of the functions presented here return any value.

## NOTE

Applications should use the higher level functions *EVP\_EncryptInit*(3) etc. instead of calling the blowfish functions directly.

## SEE ALSO

*des\_modes*(7)

## HISTORY

The Blowfish functions are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

bn – multiprecision integer arithmetics

**SYNOPSIS**

```

#include <openssl/bn.h>

BIGNUM *BN_new(void);
void BN_free(BIGNUM *a);
void BN_init(BIGNUM *);
void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a);
void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a);

BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void);
void BN_CTX_init(BN_CTX *c);
void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *c);

BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *a);

BIGNUM *BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);

int BN_num_bytes(const BIGNUM *a);
int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a);
int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG w);

int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *d,
           BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod(BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
              BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
              BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
              BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *ret, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
              const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);

int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
int BN_sub_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);

int BN_cmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
int BN_ucmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
int BN_is_zero(BIGNUM *a);
int BN_is_one(BIGNUM *a);
int BN_is_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
int BN_is_odd(BIGNUM *a);

```



```

int BN_zero(BIGNUM *a);
int BN_one(BIGNUM *a);
const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void);
int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w);
unsigned long BN_get_word(BIGNUM *a);

int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);
int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);

BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe, BIGNUM *add,
    BIGNUM *rem, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);
int BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks,
    void (*callback)(int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg);

int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n);
int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n);
int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n);
int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n);
int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a);
int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n);
int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a);

int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to);
BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);
char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a);
char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a);
int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str);
int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str);
int BN_print(BIO *fp, const BIGNUM *a);
int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a);
int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to);
BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);

BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
    BN_CTX *ctx);

BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void);
void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp);
void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp);
int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b,
    BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx);

BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void);
void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx);
void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont);
int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from);
int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b,
    BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
    BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
    BN_CTX *ctx);

```

## DESCRIPTION

This library performs arithmetic operations on integers of arbitrary size. It was written for use in public key cryptography, such as RSA and Diffie–Hellman.

It uses dynamic memory allocation for storing its data structures. That means that there is no limit on the size of the numbers manipulated by these functions, but return values must always be checked in

case a memory allocation error has occurred.

The basic object in this library is a **BIGNUM**. It is used to hold a single large integer. This type should be considered opaque and fields should not be modified or accessed directly.

The creation of **BIGNUM** objects is described in *BN\_new(3)*; *BN\_add(3)* describes most of the arithmetic operations. Comparison is described in *BN\_cmp(3)*; *BN\_zero(3)* describes certain assignments, *BN\_rand(3)* the generation of random numbers, *BN\_generate\_prime(3)* deals with prime numbers and *BN\_set\_bit(3)* with bit operations. The conversion of **BIGNUMs** to external formats is described in *BN\_bn2bin(3)*.

#### SEE ALSO

*bn\_internal(3)*, *dh(3)*, *err(3)*, *rand(3)*, *rsa(3)*, *BN\_new(3)*, *BN\_CTX\_new(3)*, *BN\_copy(3)*, *BN\_swap(3)*, *BN\_num\_bytes(3)*, *BN\_add(3)*, *BN\_add\_word(3)*, *BN\_cmp(3)*, *BN\_zero(3)*, *BN\_rand(3)*, *BN\_generate\_prime(3)*, *BN\_set\_bit(3)*, *BN\_bn2bin(3)*, *BN\_mod\_inverse(3)*, *BN\_mod\_mul\_reciprocal(3)*, *BN\_mod\_mul\_montgomery(3)*

**NAME**

BN\_add, BN\_sub, BN\_mul, BN\_sqr, BN\_div, BN\_mod, BN\_nnmod, BN\_mod\_add, BN\_mod\_sub, BN\_mod\_mul, BN\_mod\_sqr, BN\_exp, BN\_mod\_exp, BN\_gcd – arithmetic operations on **BIGNUM**s

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b);
int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *d,
           BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod(BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
              BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
              BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m,
              BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
              const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_add()* adds *a* and *b* and places the result in *r* ( $r=a+b$ ). *r* may be the same **BIGNUM** as *a* or *b*.

*BN\_sub()* subtracts *b* from *a* and places the result in *r* ( $r=a-b$ ).

*BN\_mul()* multiplies *a* and *b* and places the result in *r* ( $r=a*b$ ). *r* may be the same **BIGNUM** as *a* or *b*. For multiplication by powers of 2, use *BN\_lshift*(3).

*BN\_sqr()* takes the square of *a* and places the result in *r* ( $r=a^2$ ). *r* and *a* may be the same **BIGNUM**. This function is faster than *BN\_mul*(*r*,*a*,*a*).

*BN\_div()* divides *a* by *d* and places the result in *dv* and the remainder in *rem* ( $dv=a/d$ ,  $rem=a\%d$ ). Either of *dv* and *rem* may be **NULL**, in which case the respective value is not returned. The result is rounded towards zero; thus if *a* is negative, the remainder will be zero or negative. For division by powers of 2, use *BN\_rshift*(3).

*BN\_mod()* corresponds to *BN\_div()* with *dv* set to **NULL**.

*BN\_nnmod()* reduces *a* modulo *m* and places the non-negative remainder in *r*.

*BN\_mod\_add()* adds *a* to *b* modulo *m* and places the non-negative result in *r*.

*BN\_mod\_sub()* subtracts *b* from *a* modulo *m* and places the non-negative result in *r*.

*BN\_mod\_mul()* multiplies *a* by *b* and finds the non-negative remainder respective to modulus *m* ( $r=(a*b) \bmod m$ ). *r* may be the same **BIGNUM** as *a* or *b*. For more efficient algorithms for repeated computations using the same modulus, see *BN\_mod\_mul\_montgomery*(3) and *BN\_mod\_mul\_reciprocal*(3).

*BN\_mod\_sqr()* takes the square of *a* modulo *m* and places the result in *r*.

*BN\_exp()* raises *a* to the *p*-th power and places the result in *r* ( $r=a^p$ ). This function is faster than repeated applications of *BN\_mul*().

*BN\_mod\_exp()* computes  $a$  to the  $p$ -th power modulo  $m$  ( $r = a^p \bmod m$ ). This function uses less time and space than *BN\_exp()*.

*BN\_gcd()* computes the greatest common divisor of  $a$  and  $b$  and places the result in  $r$ .  $r$  may be the same **BIGNUM** as  $a$  or  $b$ .

For all functions, *ctx* is a previously allocated **BN\_CTX** used for temporary variables; see *BN\_CTX\_new(3)*.

Unless noted otherwise, the result **BIGNUM** must be different from the arguments.

## RETURN VALUES

For all functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return value should always be checked (e.g., `if (!BN_add(r,a,b)) goto err;`). The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

## SEE ALSO

*bn(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *BN\_CTX\_new(3)*, *BN\_add\_word(3)*, *BN\_set\_bit(3)*

## HISTORY

*BN\_add()*, *BN\_sub()*, *BN\_sqr()*, *BN\_div()*, *BN\_mod()*, *BN\_mod\_mul()*, *BN\_mod\_exp()* and *BN\_gcd()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. The *ctx* argument to *BN\_mul()* was added in SSLeay 0.9.1b. *BN\_exp()* appeared in SSLeay 0.9.0. *BN\_nnmod()*, *BN\_mod\_add()*, *BN\_mod\_sub()*, and *BN\_mod\_sqr()* were added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

**NAME**

BN\_add\_word, BN\_sub\_word, BN\_mul\_word, BN\_div\_word, BN\_mod\_word – arithmetic functions on BIGNUMs with integers

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

int BN_add_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
int BN_sub_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
int BN_mul_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
BN_ULONG BN_div_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions perform arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs with unsigned integers. They are much more efficient than the normal BIGNUM arithmetic operations.

*BN\_add\_word()* adds **w** to **a** ( $a+=w$ ).

*BN\_sub\_word()* subtracts **w** from **a** ( $a-=w$ ).

*BN\_mul\_word()* multiplies **a** and **w** ( $a*=b$ ).

*BN\_div\_word()* divides **a** by **w** ( $a/=w$ ) and returns the remainder.

*BN\_mod\_word()* returns the remainder of **a** divided by **w** ( $a\%m$ ).

For *BN\_div\_word()* and *BN\_mod\_word()*, **w** must not be 0.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_add\_word()*, *BN\_sub\_word()* and *BN\_mul\_word()* return 1 for success, 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

*BN\_mod\_word()* and *BN\_div\_word()* return  $a\%w$ .

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *BN\_add(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BN\_add\_word()* and *BN\_mod\_word()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. *BN\_div\_word()* was added in SSLeay 0.8, and *BN\_sub\_word()* and *BN\_mul\_word()* in SSLeay 0.9.0.

**NAME**

BN\_bn2bin, BN\_bin2bn, BN\_bn2hex, BN\_bn2dec, BN\_hex2bn, BN\_dec2bn, BN\_print, BN\_print\_fp, BN\_bn2mpi, BN\_mpi2bn – format conversions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

int BN_bn2bin(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to);
BIGNUM *BN_bin2bn(const unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);

char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a);
char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a);
int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str);
int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **a, const char *str);

int BN_print(BIO *fp, const BIGNUM *a);
int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a);

int BN_bn2mpi(const BIGNUM *a, unsigned char *to);
BIGNUM *BN_mpi2bn(unsigned char *s, int len, BIGNUM *ret);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_bn2bin()* converts the absolute value of **a** into big-endian form and stores it at **to**. **to** must point to **BN\_num\_bytes(a)** bytes of memory.

*BN\_bin2bn()* converts the positive integer in big-endian form of length **len** at **s** into a **BIGNUM** and places it in **ret**. If **ret** is NULL, a new **BIGNUM** is created.

*BN\_bn2hex()* and *BN\_bn2dec()* return printable strings containing the hexadecimal and decimal encoding of **a** respectively. For negative numbers, the string is prefaced with a leading '-'. The string must be freed later using *OPENSSL\_free()*.

*BN\_hex2bn()* converts the string **str** containing a hexadecimal number to a **BIGNUM** and stores it in **\*\*bn**. If **\*bn** is NULL, a new **BIGNUM** is created. If **bn** is NULL, it only computes the number's length in hexadecimal digits. If the string starts with '-', the number is negative. *BN\_dec2bn()* is the same using the decimal system.

*BN\_print()* and *BN\_print\_fp()* write the hexadecimal encoding of **a**, with a leading '-' for negative numbers, to the **BIO** or **FILE fp**.

*BN\_bn2mpi()* and *BN\_mpi2bn()* convert **BIGNUM**s from and to a format that consists of the number's length in bytes represented as a 4-byte big-endian number, and the number itself in big-endian format, where the most significant bit signals a negative number (the representation of numbers with the MSB set is prefixed with null byte).

*BN\_bn2mpi()* stores the representation of **a** at **to**, where **to** must be large enough to hold the result. The size can be determined by calling *BN\_bn2mpi(a, NULL)*.

*BN\_mpi2bn()* converts the **len** bytes long representation at **s** to a **BIGNUM** and stores it at **ret**, or in a newly allocated **BIGNUM** if **ret** is NULL.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_bn2bin()* returns the length of the big-endian number placed at **to**. *BN\_bin2bn()* returns the **BIGNUM**, NULL on error.

*BN\_bn2hex()* and *BN\_bn2dec()* return a null-terminated string, or NULL on error. *BN\_hex2bn()* and *BN\_dec2bn()* return the number's length in hexadecimal or decimal digits, and 0 on error.

*BN\_print\_fp()* and *BN\_print()* return 1 on success, 0 on write errors.

*BN\_bn2mpi()* returns the length of the representation. *BN\_mpi2bn()* returns the **BIGNUM**, and NULL on error.

The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *BN\_zero(3)*, *ASN1\_INTEGER\_to\_BN(3)*, *BN\_num\_bytes(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BN\_bn2bin()*, *BN\_bin2bn()*, *BN\_print\_fp()* and *BN\_print()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

*BN\_bn2hex()*, *BN\_bn2dec()*, *BN\_hex2bn()*, *BN\_dec2bn()*, *BN\_bn2mpi()* and *BN\_mpi2bn()* were added in SSLeay 0.9.0.

**NAME**

**BN\_cmp**, **BN\_ucmp**, **BN\_is\_zero**, **BN\_is\_one**, **BN\_is\_word**, **BN\_is\_odd** – BIGNUM comparison and test functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

int BN_cmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
int BN_ucmp(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);

int BN_is_zero(BIGNUM *a);
int BN_is_one(BIGNUM *a);
int BN_is_word(BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w);
int BN_is_odd(BIGNUM *a);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_cmp()* compares the numbers **a** and **b**. *BN\_ucmp()* compares their absolute values.

*BN\_is\_zero()*, *BN\_is\_one()* and *BN\_is\_word()* test if **a** equals 0, 1, or **w** respectively. *BN\_is\_odd()* tests if **a** is odd.

*BN\_is\_zero()*, *BN\_is\_one()*, *BN\_is\_word()* and *BN\_is\_odd()* are macros.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_cmp()* returns -1 if **a** < **b**, 0 if **a** == **b** and 1 if **a** > **b**. *BN\_ucmp()* is the same using the absolute values of **a** and **b**.

*BN\_is\_zero()*, *BN\_is\_one()*, *BN\_is\_word()* and *BN\_is\_odd()* return 1 if the condition is true, 0 otherwise.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BN\_cmp()*, *BN\_ucmp()*, *BN\_is\_zero()*, *BN\_is\_one()* and *BN\_is\_word()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. *BN\_is\_odd()* was added in SSLeay 0.8.



**NAME**

BN\_copy, BN\_dup – copy BIGNUMs

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *to, const BIGNUM *from);

BIGNUM *BN_dup(const BIGNUM *from);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_copy()* copies **from** to **to**. *BN\_dup()* creates a new **BIGNUM** containing the value **from**.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_copy()* returns **to** on success, NULL on error. *BN\_dup()* returns the new **BIGNUM**, and NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BN\_copy()* and *BN\_dup()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

BN\_CTX\_new, BN\_CTX\_init, BN\_CTX\_free – allocate and free BN\_CTX structures

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

BN_CTX *BN_CTX_new(void);

void BN_CTX_init(BN_CTX *c);

void BN_CTX_free(BN_CTX *c);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

A **BN\_CTX** is a structure that holds **BIGNUM** temporary variables used by library functions. Since dynamic memory allocation to create **BIGNUMs** is rather expensive when used in conjunction with repeated subroutine calls, the **BN\_CTX** structure is used.

*BN\_CTX\_new()* allocates and initializes a **BN\_CTX** structure. *BN\_CTX\_init()* initializes an existing uninitialized **BN\_CTX**.

*BN\_CTX\_free()* frees the components of the **BN\_CTX**, and if it was created by *BN\_CTX\_new()*, also the structure itself. If *BN\_CTX\_start*(3) has been used on the **BN\_CTX**, *BN\_CTX\_end*(3) must be called before the **BN\_CTX** may be freed by *BN\_CTX\_free()*.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_CTX\_new()* returns a pointer to the **BN\_CTX**. If the allocation fails, it returns **NULL** and sets an error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error*(3).

*BN\_CTX\_init()* and *BN\_CTX\_free()* have no return values.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn*(3), *ERR\_get\_error*(3), *BN\_add*(3), *BN\_CTX\_start*(3)

**HISTORY**

*BN\_CTX\_new()* and *BN\_CTX\_free()* are available in all versions on SSLeay and OpenSSL. *BN\_CTX\_init()* was added in SSLeay 0.9.1b.

**NAME**

BN\_CTX\_start, BN\_CTX\_get, BN\_CTX\_end – use temporary **BIGNUM** variables

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

void BN_CTX_start(BN_CTX *ctx);

BIGNUM *BN_CTX_get(BN_CTX *ctx);

void BN_CTX_end(BN_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions are used to obtain temporary **BIGNUM** variables from a **BN\_CTX** (which can be created by using *BN\_CTX\_new*(3)) in order to save the overhead of repeatedly creating and freeing **BIGNUM**s in functions that are called from inside a loop.

A function must call *BN\_CTX\_start*() first. Then, *BN\_CTX\_get*() may be called repeatedly to obtain temporary **BIGNUM**s. All *BN\_CTX\_get*() calls must be made before calling any other functions that use the **ctx** as an argument.

Finally, *BN\_CTX\_end*() must be called before returning from the function. When *BN\_CTX\_end*() is called, the **BIGNUM** pointers obtained from *BN\_CTX\_get*() become invalid.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_CTX\_start*() and *BN\_CTX\_end*() return no values.

*BN\_CTX\_get*() returns a pointer to the **BIGNUM**, or **NULL** on error. Once *BN\_CTX\_get*() has failed, the subsequent calls will return **NULL** as well, so it is sufficient to check the return value of the last *BN\_CTX\_get*() call. In case of an error, an error code is set, which can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error*(3).

**SEE ALSO**

*BN\_CTX\_new*(3)

**HISTORY**

*BN\_CTX\_start*(), *BN\_CTX\_get*() and *BN\_CTX\_end*() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.5.

**NAME**

BN\_generate\_prime, BN\_is\_prime, BN\_is\_prime\_fasttest – generate primes and test for primality

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

BIGNUM *BN_generate_prime(BIGNUM *ret, int num, int safe, BIGNUM *add,
    BIGNUM *rem, void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);

int BN_is_prime(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, void (*callback)(int, int,
    void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg);

int BN_is_prime_fasttest(const BIGNUM *a, int checks,
    void (*callback)(int, int, void *), BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb_arg,
    int do_trial_division);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_generate\_prime()* generates a pseudo-random prime number of **num** bits. If **ret** is not **NULL**, it will be used to store the number.

If **callback** is not **NULL**, it is called as follows:

- **callback(0, i, cb\_arg)** is called after generating the *i*-th potential prime number.
- While the number is being tested for primality, **callback(1, j, cb\_arg)** is called as described below.
- When a prime has been found, **callback(2, i, cb\_arg)** is called.

The prime may have to fulfill additional requirements for use in Diffie-Hellman key exchange:

If **add** is not **NULL**, the prime will fulfill the condition  $p \% \text{add} == \text{rem}$  ( $p \% \text{add} == 1$  if **rem** == **NULL**) in order to suit a given generator.

If **safe** is true, it will be a safe prime (i.e. a prime  $p$  so that  $(p-1)/2$  is also prime).

The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling *BN\_generate\_prime()*. The prime number generation has a negligible error probability.

*BN\_is\_prime()* and *BN\_is\_prime\_fasttest()* test if the number **a** is prime. The following tests are performed until one of them shows that **a** is composite; if **a** passes all these tests, it is considered prime.

*BN\_is\_prime\_fasttest()*, when called with **do\_trial\_division** == **1**, first attempts trial division by a number of small primes; if no divisors are found by this test and **callback** is not **NULL**, **callback(1, -1, cb\_arg)** is called. If **do\_trial\_division** == **0**, this test is skipped.

Both *BN\_is\_prime()* and *BN\_is\_prime\_fasttest()* perform a Miller-Rabin probabilistic primality test with **checks** iterations. If **checks** == **BN\_prime\_checks**, a number of iterations is used that yields a false positive rate of at most  $2^{-80}$  for random input.

If **callback** is not **NULL**, **callback(1, j, cb\_arg)** is called after the *j*-th iteration (*j* = 0, 1, ...). **ctx** is a pre-allocated **BN\_CTX** (to save the overhead of allocating and freeing the structure in a loop), or **NULL**.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_generate\_prime()* returns the prime number on success, **NULL** otherwise.

*BN\_is\_prime()* returns 0 if the number is composite, 1 if it is prime with an error probability of less than  $0.25^{\text{checks}}$ , and -1 on error.

The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *rand(3)*

**HISTORY**

The **cb\_arg** arguments to *BN\_generate\_prime()* and to *BN\_is\_prime()* were added in SSLeay 0.9.0. The **ret** argument to *BN\_generate\_prime()* was added in SSLeay 0.9.1. *BN\_is\_prime\_fasttest()* was added in OpenSSL 0.9.5.

**NAME**

bn\_mul\_words, bn\_mul\_add\_words, bn\_sqr\_words, bn\_div\_words, bn\_add\_words, bn\_sub\_words, bn\_mul\_comba4, bn\_mul\_comba8, bn\_sqr\_comba4, bn\_sqr\_comba8, bn\_cmp\_words, bn\_mul\_normal, bn\_mul\_low\_normal, bn\_mul\_recursive, bn\_mul\_part\_recursive, bn\_mul\_low\_recursive, bn\_mul\_high, bn\_sqr\_normal, bn\_sqr\_recursive, bn\_expand, bn\_wexpand, bn\_expand2, bn\_fix\_top, bn\_check\_top, bn\_print, bn\_dump, bn\_set\_max, bn\_set\_high, bn\_set\_low – BIGNUM library internal functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w);
BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num,
    BN_ULONG w);
void      bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num);
BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d);
BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,
    int num);
BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,
    int num);

void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b);
void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b);
void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a);
void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a);

int bn_cmp_words(BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n);

void bn_mul_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int na, BN_ULONG *b,
    int nb);
void bn_mul_low_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n);
void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
    int dna, int دنب, BN_ULONG *tmp);
void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b,
    int n, int tna, int دنب, BN_ULONG *tmp);
void bn_mul_low_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b,
    int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp);
void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l,
    int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp);

void bn_sqr_normal(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int n, BN_ULONG *tmp);
void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *tmp);

void mul(BN_ULONG r, BN_ULONG a, BN_ULONG w, BN_ULONG c);
void mul_add(BN_ULONG r, BN_ULONG a, BN_ULONG w, BN_ULONG c);
void sqr(BN_ULONG r0, BN_ULONG r1, BN_ULONG a);

BIGNUM *bn_expand(BIGNUM *a, int bits);
BIGNUM *bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *a, int n);
BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int n);
void bn_fix_top(BIGNUM *a);

void bn_check_top(BIGNUM *a);
void bn_print(BIGNUM *a);
void bn_dump(BN_ULONG *d, int n);
void bn_set_max(BIGNUM *a);
void bn_set_high(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n);
void bn_set_low(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

This page documents the internal functions used by the OpenSSL **BIGNUM** implementation. They are described here to facilitate debugging and extending the library. They are *not* to be used by applications.

### The BIGNUM structure

```
typedef struct bignum_st
{
    int top;          /* index of last used d (most significant word) */
    BN_ULONG *d;      /* pointer to an array of 'BITS2' bit chunks */
    int max;          /* size of the d array */
    int neg;          /* sign */
} BIGNUM;
```

The big number is stored in **d**, a *malloc()*ed array of **BN\_ULONGs**, least significant first. A **BN\_ULONG** can be either 16, 32 or 64 bits in size (**BITS2**), depending on the 'number of bits' specified in `openssl/bn.h`.

**max** is the size of the **d** array that has been allocated. **top** is the 'last' entry being used, so for a value of 4, `bn.d[0]=4` and `bn.top=1`. **neg** is 1 if the number is negative. When a **BIGNUM** is **0**, the **d** field can be **NULL** and **top == 0**.

Various routines in this library require the use of temporary **BIGNUM** variables during their execution. Since dynamic memory allocation to create **BIGNUMs** is rather expensive when used in conjunction with repeated subroutine calls, the **BN\_CTX** structure is used. This structure contains **BN\_CTX\_NUM** **BIGNUMs**, see *BN\_CTX\_start*(3).

### Low-level arithmetic operations

These functions are implemented in C and for several platforms in assembly language:

`bn_mul_words(rp, ap, num, w)` operates on the **num** word arrays **rp** and **ap**. It computes **ap \* w**, places the result in **rp**, and returns the high word (carry).

`bn_mul_add_words(rp, ap, num, w)` operates on the **num** word arrays **rp** and **ap**. It computes **ap \* w + rp**, places the result in **rp**, and returns the high word (carry).

`bn_sqr_words(rp, ap, n)` operates on the **num** word array **ap** and the **2\*num** word array **ap**. It computes **ap \* ap** word-wise, and places the low and high bytes of the result in **rp**.

`bn_div_words(h, l, d)` divides the two word number (**h,l**) by **d** and returns the result.

`bn_add_words(rp, ap, bp, num)` operates on the **num** word arrays **ap**, **bp** and **rp**. It computes **ap + bp**, places the result in **rp**, and returns the high word (carry).

`bn_sub_words(rp, ap, bp, num)` operates on the **num** word arrays **ap**, **bp** and **rp**. It computes **ap - bp**, places the result in **rp**, and returns the carry (1 if **bp > ap**, 0 otherwise).

`bn_mul_comba4(r, a, b)` operates on the 4 word arrays **a** and **b** and the 8 word array **r**. It computes **a\*b** and places the result in **r**.

`bn_mul_comba8(r, a, b)` operates on the 8 word arrays **a** and **b** and the 16 word array **r**. It computes **a\*b** and places the result in **r**.

`bn_sqr_comba4(r, a, b)` operates on the 4 word arrays **a** and **b** and the 8 word array **r**.

`bn_sqr_comba8(r, a, b)` operates on the 8 word arrays **a** and **b** and the 16 word array **r**.

The following functions are implemented in C:

`bn_cmp_words(a, b, n)` operates on the **n** word arrays **a** and **b**. It returns 1, 0 and -1 if **a** is greater than, equal and less than **b**.

`bn_mul_normal(r, a, na, b, nb)` operates on the **na** word array **a**, the **nb** word array **b** and the **na+nb** word array **r**. It computes **a\*b** and places the result in **r**.

`bn_mul_low_normal(r, a, b, n)` operates on the **n** word arrays **r**, **a** and **b**. It computes the **n** low words of **a\*b** and places the result in **r**.

`bn_mul_recursive(r, a, b, n2, dna, دنب, t)` operates on the word arrays **a** and **b** of length **n2+dna** and **n2+دنب** (**dna** and **دنب** are currently allowed to be 0 or negative) and the **2\*n2** word arrays **r** and **t**. **n2** must be a power of 2. It computes **a\*b** and places the result in **r**.

`bn_mul_part_recursive(r, a, b, n, tna, دنب, tmp)` operates on the word arrays **a** and **b** of length **n+tna** and **n+دنب** and the **4\*n** word arrays **r** and **tmp**.

`bn_mul_low_recursive(r, a, b, n2, tmp)` operates on the **n2** word arrays **r** and **tmp** and the **n2/2** word arrays **a** and **b**.

`bn_mul_high(r, a, b, l, n2, tmp)` operates on the **n2** word arrays **r**, **a**, **b** and **l** (?) and the **3\*n2** word array **tmp**.

`BN_mul()` calls `bn_mul_normal()`, or an optimized implementation if the factors have the same size: `bn_mul_comba8()` is used if they are 8 words long, `bn_mul_recursive()` if they are larger than **BN\_MULL\_SIZE\_NORMAL** and the size is an exact multiple of the word size, and `bn_mul_part_recursive()` for others that are larger than **BN\_MULL\_SIZE\_NORMAL**.

`bn_sqr_normal(r, a, n, tmp)` operates on the **n** word array **a** and the **2\*n** word arrays **tmp** and **r**.

The implementations use the following macros which, depending on the architecture, may use “long long” C operations or inline assembler. They are defined in `bn_lcl.h`.

`mul(r, a, w, c)` computes  $w*a+c$  and places the low word of the result in **r** and the high word in **c**.

`mul_add(r, a, w, c)` computes  $w*a+r+c$  and places the low word of the result in **r** and the high word in **c**.

`sqr(r0, r1, a)` computes  $a*a$  and places the low word of the result in **r0** and the high word in **r1**.

### Size changes

`bn_expand()` ensures that **b** has enough space for a **bits** bit number. `bn_wexpand()` ensures that **b** has enough space for an **n** word number. If the number has to be expanded, both macros call `bn_expand2()`, which allocates a new **d** array and copies the data. They return **NULL** on error, **b** otherwise.

The `bn_fix_top()` macro reduces `a->top` to point to the most significant non-zero word when **a** has shrunk.

### Debugging

`bn_check_top()` verifies that `((a)->top >= 0 && (a)->top <= (a)->max)`. A violation will cause the program to abort.

`bn_print()` prints **a** to stderr. `bn_dump()` prints **n** words at **d** (in reverse order, i.e. most significant word first) to stderr.

`bn_set_max()` makes **a** a static number with a **max** of its current size. This is used by `bn_set_low()` and `bn_set_high()` to make **r** a read-only **BIGNUM** that contains the **n** low or high words of **a**.

If **BN\_DEBUG** is not defined, `bn_check_top()`, `bn_print()`, `bn_dump()` and `bn_set_max()` are defined as empty macros.

### SEE ALSO

`bn(3)`

**NAME**

BN\_mod\_inverse – compute inverse modulo *n*

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,
                       BN_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_mod\_inverse()* computes the inverse of **a** modulo **n** places the result in **r** ( $(a * r) \% n == 1$ ). If **r** is NULL, a new **BIGNUM** is created.

**ctx** is a previously allocated **BN\_CTX** used for temporary variables. **r** may be the same **BIGNUM** as **a** or **n**.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_mod\_inverse()* returns the **BIGNUM** containing the inverse, and NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *BN\_add(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BN\_mod\_inverse()* is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.



**NAME**

BN\_mod\_mul\_montgomery, BN\_MONT\_CTX\_new, BN\_MONT\_CTX\_init, BN\_MONT\_CTX\_free, BN\_MONT\_CTX\_set, BN\_MONT\_CTX\_copy, BN\_from\_montgomery, BN\_to\_montgomery – Montgomery multiplication

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_new(void);
void BN_MONT_CTX_init(BN_MONT_CTX *ctx);
void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont);

int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
BN_MONT_CTX *BN_MONT_CTX_copy(BN_MONT_CTX *to, BN_MONT_CTX *from);

int BN_mod_mul_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b,
                          BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);

int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
                      BN_CTX *ctx);

int BN_to_montgomery(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
                    BN_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions implement Montgomery multiplication. They are used automatically when *BN\_mod\_exp*(3) is called with suitable input, but they may be useful when several operations are to be performed using the same modulus.

*BN\_MONT\_CTX\_new*() allocates and initializes a **BN\_MONT\_CTX** structure. *BN\_MONT\_CTX\_init*() initializes an existing uninitialized **BN\_MONT\_CTX**.

*BN\_MONT\_CTX\_set*() sets up the *mont* structure from the modulus *m* by precomputing its inverse and a value *R*.

*BN\_MONT\_CTX\_copy*() copies the **BN\_MONT\_CTX** *from* to *to*.

*BN\_MONT\_CTX\_free*() frees the components of the **BN\_MONT\_CTX**, and, if it was created by *BN\_MONT\_CTX\_new*(), also the structure itself.

*BN\_mod\_mul\_montgomery*() computes  $\text{Mont}(a,b) := a * b * R^{-1}$  and places the result in *r*.

*BN\_from\_montgomery*() performs the Montgomery reduction  $r = a * R^{-1}$ .

*BN\_to\_montgomery*() computes  $\text{Mont}(a, R^2)$ , i.e.  $a * R$ . Note that *a* must be non-negative and smaller than the modulus.

For all functions, *ctx* is a previously allocated **BN\_CTX** used for temporary variables.

The **BN\_MONT\_CTX** structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct bn_mont_ctx_st
{
    int ri;           /* number of bits in R */
    BIGNUM RR;        /* R^2 (used to convert to Montgomery form) */
    BIGNUM N;          /* The modulus */
    BIGNUM Ni;         /* R*(1/R mod N) - N*Ni = 1
                        * (Ni is only stored for bignum algorithm) */
    BN_ULONG n0;       /* least significant word of Ni */
    int flags;
} BN_MONT_CTX;
```

*BN\_to\_montgomery*() is a macro.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_MONT\_CTX\_new*() returns the newly allocated **BN\_MONT\_CTX**, and NULL on error.

*BN\_MONT\_CTX\_init*() and *BN\_MONT\_CTX\_free*() have no return values.

For the other functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by

*ERR\_get\_error(3).*

**WARNING**

The inputs must be reduced modulo **m**, otherwise the result will be outside the expected range.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3), ERR\_get\_error(3), BN\_add(3), BN\_CTX\_new(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BN\_MONT\_CTX\_new()*, *BN\_MONT\_CTX\_free()*, *BN\_MONT\_CTX\_set()*, *BN\_mod\_mul\_montgomery()*, *BN\_from\_montgomery()* and *BN\_to\_montgomery()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

*BN\_MONT\_CTX\_init()* and *BN\_MONT\_CTX\_copy()* were added in SSLeay 0.9.1b.

**NAME**

BN\_mod\_mul\_reciprocal, BN\_div\_rec, BN\_RECP\_CTX\_new, BN\_RECP\_CTX\_init, BN\_RECP\_CTX\_free, BN\_RECP\_CTX\_set – modular multiplication using reciprocal

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

BN_RECP_CTX *BN_RECP_CTX_new(void);
void BN_RECP_CTX_init(BN_RECP_CTX *recp);
void BN_RECP_CTX_free(BN_RECP_CTX *recp);

int BN_RECP_CTX_set(BN_RECP_CTX *recp, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);

int BN_div_rec(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, BIGNUM *a, BN_RECP_CTX *recp,
               BN_CTX *ctx);

int BN_mod_mul_reciprocal(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b,
                          BN_RECP_CTX *recp, BN_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_mod\_mul\_reciprocal()* can be used to perform an efficient *BN\_mod\_mul(3)* operation when the operation will be performed repeatedly with the same modulus. It computes  $r=(a*b)\%m$  using **recp**= $1/m$ , which is set as described below. **ctx** is a previously allocated **BN\_CTX** used for temporary variables.

*BN\_RECP\_CTX\_new()* allocates and initializes a **BN\_RECP** structure. *BN\_RECP\_CTX\_init()* initializes an existing uninitialized **BN\_RECP**.

*BN\_RECP\_CTX\_free()* frees the components of the **BN\_RECP**, and, if it was created by *BN\_RECP\_CTX\_new()*, also the structure itself.

*BN\_RECP\_CTX\_set()* stores **m** in **recp** and sets it up for computing  $1/m$  and shifting it left by  $\text{BN\_num\_bits}(\mathbf{m})+1$  to make it an integer. The result and the number of bits it was shifted left will later be stored in **recp**.

*BN\_div\_rec()* divides **a** by **m** using **recp**. It places the quotient in **dv** and the remainder in **rem**.

The **BN\_RECP\_CTX** structure is defined as follows:

```
typedef struct bn_recp_ctx_st
{
    BIGNUM N;          /* the divisor */
    BIGNUM Nr;         /* the reciprocal */
    int num_bits;
    int shift;
    int flags;
} BN_RECP_CTX;
```

It cannot be shared between threads.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_RECP\_CTX\_new()* returns the newly allocated **BN\_RECP\_CTX**, and NULL on error.

*BN\_RECP\_CTX\_init()* and *BN\_RECP\_CTX\_free()* have no return values.

For the other functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *BN\_add(3)*, *BN\_CTX\_new(3)*

**HISTORY**

**BN\_RECP\_CTX** was added in SSLeay 0.9.0. Before that, the function *BN\_reciprocal()* was used instead, and the *BN\_mod\_mul\_reciprocal()* arguments were different.

**NAME**

BN\_new, BN\_init, BN\_clear, BN\_free, BN\_clear\_free – allocate and free BIGNUMs

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

BIGNUM *BN_new(void);

void BN_init(BIGNUM *);

void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a);

void BN_free(BIGNUM *a);

void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_new()* allocates and initializes a **BIGNUM** structure. *BN\_init()* initializes an existing uninitialized **BIGNUM**.

*BN\_clear()* is used to destroy sensitive data such as keys when they are no longer needed. It erases the memory used by **a** and sets it to the value 0.

*BN\_free()* frees the components of the **BIGNUM**, and if it was created by *BN\_new()*, also the structure itself. *BN\_clear\_free()* additionally overwrites the data before the memory is returned to the system.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_new()* returns a pointer to the **BIGNUM**. If the allocation fails, it returns **NULL** and sets an error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

*BN\_init()*, *BN\_clear()*, *BN\_free()* and *BN\_clear\_free()* have no return values.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BN\_new()*, *BN\_clear()*, *BN\_free()* and *BN\_clear\_free()* are available in all versions on SSLeay and OpenSSL. *BN\_init()* was added in SSLeay 0.9.1b.

**NAME**

BN\_num\_bits, BN\_num\_bytes, BN\_num\_bits\_word – get BIGNUM size

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

int BN_num_bytes(const BIGNUM *a);

int BN_num_bits(const BIGNUM *a);

int BN_num_bits_word(BN_ULONG w);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions return the size of a **BIGNUM** in bytes or bits, and the size of an unsigned integer in bits.

*BN\_num\_bytes()* is a macro.

**RETURN VALUES**

The size.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BN\_num\_bytes()*, *BN\_num\_bits()* and *BN\_num\_bits\_word()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

BN\_rand, BN\_pseudo\_rand – generate pseudo-random number

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom);
int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);
int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_rand()* generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number of **bits** bits in length and stores it in **rnd**. If **top** is -1, the most significant bit of the random number can be zero. If **top** is 0, it is set to 1, and if **top** is 1, the two most significant bits of the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random numbers will always have 2\***bits** length. If **bottom** is true, the number will be odd.

*BN\_pseudo\_rand()* does the same, but pseudo-random numbers generated by this function are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used for non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.

*BN\_rand\_range()* generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number **rnd** in the range 0 <= **rnd** < **range**. *BN\_pseudo\_rand\_range()* does the same, but is based on *BN\_pseudo\_rand()*, and hence numbers generated by it are not necessarily unpredictable.

The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling *BN\_rand()* or *BN\_rand\_range()*.

**RETURN VALUES**

The functions return 1 on success, 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *rand(3)*, *RAND\_add(3)*, *RAND\_bytes(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BN\_rand()* is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. *BN\_pseudo\_rand()* was added in OpenSSL 0.9.5. The **top** == -1 case and the function *BN\_rand\_range()* were added in OpenSSL 0.9.6a. *BN\_pseudo\_rand\_range()* was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6c.

**NAME**

BN\_set\_bit, BN\_clear\_bit, BN\_is\_bit\_set, BN\_mask\_bits, BN\_lshift, BN\_lshift1, BN\_rshift, BN\_rshift1 – bit operations on BIGNUMs

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n);
int BN_clear_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n);

int BN_is_bit_set(const BIGNUM *a, int n);

int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n);

int BN_lshift(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, int n);
int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a);

int BN_rshift(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, int n);
int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_set\_bit()* sets bit **n** in **a** to 1 ( $a \mid= (1 < n)$ ). The number is expanded if necessary.

*BN\_clear\_bit()* sets bit **n** in **a** to 0 ( $a \&= \sim (1 < n)$ ). An error occurs if **a** is shorter than **n** bits.

*BN\_is\_bit\_set()* tests if bit **n** in **a** is set.

*BN\_mask\_bits()* truncates **a** to an **n** bit number ( $a \&= \sim ((\sim 0) >> n)$ ). An error occurs if **a** already is shorter than **n** bits.

*BN\_lshift()* shifts **a** left by **n** bits and places the result in **r** ( $r = a * 2^n$ ). *BN\_lshift1()* shifts **a** left by one and places the result in **r** ( $r = 2 * a$ ).

*BN\_rshift()* shifts **a** right by **n** bits and places the result in **r** ( $r = a / 2^n$ ). *BN\_rshift1()* shifts **a** right by one and places the result in **r** ( $r = a / 2$ ).

For the shift functions, **r** and **a** may be the same variable.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_is\_bit\_set()* returns 1 if the bit is set, 0 otherwise.

All other functions return 1 for success, 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*, *BN\_num\_bytes(3)*, *BN\_add(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BN\_set\_bit()*, *BN\_clear\_bit()*, *BN\_is\_bit\_set()*, *BN\_mask\_bits()*, *BN\_lshift()*, *BN\_lshift1()*, *BN\_rshift()*, and *BN\_rshift1()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

BN\_swap – exchange BIGNUMs

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

void BN_swap(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_swap()* exchanges the values of *a* and *b*.

*bn*(3)

**HISTORY**

BN\_swap was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.



**NAME**

BN\_zero, BN\_one, BN\_value\_one, BN\_set\_word, BN\_get\_word – BIGNUM assignment operations

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/bn.h>

int BN_zero(BIGNUM *a);
int BN_one(BIGNUM *a);

const BIGNUM *BN_value_one(void);

int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w);
unsigned long BN_get_word(BIGNUM *a);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*BN\_zero()*, *BN\_one()* and *BN\_set\_word()* set **a** to the values 0, 1 and **w** respectively. *BN\_zero()* and *BN\_one()* are macros.

*BN\_value\_one()* returns a **BIGNUM** constant of value 1. This constant is useful for use in comparisons and assignment.

*BN\_get\_word()* returns **a**, if it can be represented as an unsigned long.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BN\_get\_word()* returns the value **a**, and 0xffffffffL if **a** cannot be represented as an unsigned long.

*BN\_zero()*, *BN\_one()* and *BN\_set\_word()* return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. *BN\_value\_one()* returns the constant.

**BUGS**

Someone might change the constant.

If a **BIGNUM** is equal to 0xffffffffL it can be represented as an unsigned long but this value is also returned on error.

**SEE ALSO**

*bn(3)*, *BN\_bn2bin(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BN\_zero()*, *BN\_one()* and *BN\_set\_word()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. *BN\_value\_one()* and *BN\_get\_word()* were added in SSLeay 0.8.

*BN\_value\_one()* was changed to return a true const BIGNUM \* in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

**NAME**

BUF\_MEM\_new, BUF\_MEM\_free, BUF\_MEM\_grow, BUF\_strdup – simple character arrays structure

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/buffer.h>

BUF_MEM *BUF_MEM_new(void);

void    BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a);

int     BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, int len);

char *  BUF_strdup(const char *str);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The buffer library handles simple character arrays. Buffers are used for various purposes in the library, most notably memory BIOs.

The library uses the BUF\_MEM structure defined in buffer.h:

```
typedef struct buf_mem_st
{
    int length;        /* current number of bytes */
    char *data;
    int max;           /* size of buffer */
} BUF_MEM;
```

**length** is the current size of the buffer in bytes, **max** is the amount of memory allocated to the buffer. There are three functions which handle these and one “miscellaneous” function.

*BUF\_MEM\_new()* allocates a new buffer of zero size.

*BUF\_MEM\_free()* frees up an already existing buffer. The data is zeroed before freeing up in case the buffer contains sensitive data.

*BUF\_MEM\_grow()* changes the size of an already existing buffer to **len**. Any data already in the buffer is preserved if it increases in size.

*BUF\_strdup()* copies a null terminated string into a block of allocated memory and returns a pointer to the allocated block. Unlike the standard C library *strdup()* this function uses *OPENSSL\_malloc()* and so should be used in preference to the standard library *strdup()* because it can be used for memory leak checking or replacing the *malloc()* function.

The memory allocated from *BUF\_strdup()* should be freed up using the *OPENSSL\_free()* function.

**RETURN VALUES**

*BUF\_MEM\_new()* returns the buffer or NULL on error.

*BUF\_MEM\_free()* has no return value.

*BUF\_MEM\_grow()* returns zero on error or the new size (i.e. **len**).

**SEE ALSO**

*bio(3)*

**HISTORY**

*BUF\_MEM\_new()*, *BUF\_MEM\_free()* and *BUF\_MEM\_grow()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. *BUF\_strdup()* was added in SSLeay 0.8.

**NAME**

crypto – OpenSSL cryptographic library

**SYNOPSIS****DESCRIPTION**

The OpenSSL **crypto** library implements a wide range of cryptographic algorithms used in various Internet standards. The services provided by this library are used by the OpenSSL implementations of SSL, TLS and S/MIME, and they have also been used to implement SSH, OpenPGP, and other cryptographic standards.

**OVERVIEW**

**libcrypto** consists of a number of sub-libraries that implement the individual algorithms.

The functionality includes symmetric encryption, public key cryptography and key agreement, certificate handling, cryptographic hash functions and a cryptographic pseudo-random number generator.

**SYMMETRIC CIPHERS**

*blowfish* (3), *cast* (3), *des* (3), *idea* (3), *rc2* (3), *rc4* (3), *rc5* (3)

**PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND KEY AGREEMENT**

*dsa* (3), *dh* (3), *rsa* (3)

**CERTIFICATES**

*x509* (3), *x509v3* (3)

**AUTHENTICATION CODES, HASH FUNCTIONS**

*hmac* (3), *md2* (3), *md4* (3), *md5* (3), *mdc2* (3), *ripemd* (3), *sha* (3)

**AUXILIARY FUNCTIONS**

*err* (3), *threads* (3), *rand* (3), *OPENSSL\_VERSION\_NUMBER* (3)

**INPUT/OUTPUT, DATA ENCODING**

*asn1* (3), *bio* (3), *evp* (3), *pem* (3), *pkcs7* (3), *pkcs12* (3)

**INTERNAL FUNCTIONS**

*bn* (3), *buffer* (3), *lhash* (3), *objects* (3), *stack* (3), *txt\_db* (3)

**NOTES**

Some of the newer functions follow a naming convention using the numbers **0** and **1**. For example the functions:

```
int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev);
int X509_add1_trust_object(X509 *x, ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
```

The **0** version uses the supplied structure pointer directly in the parent and it will be freed up when the parent is freed. In the above example **crl** would be freed but **rev** would not.

The **1** function uses a copy of the supplied structure pointer (or in some cases increases its link count) in the parent and so both (**x** and **obj** above) should be freed up.

**SEE ALSO**

*openssl* (1), *ssl* (3)

**NAME**

CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data, CRYPTO\_get\_ex\_data – internal application specific data functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
int CRYPTO_set_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *r, int idx, void *arg);  
void *CRYPTO_get_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *r, int idx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

Several OpenSSL structures can have application specific data attached to them. These functions are used internally by OpenSSL to manipulate application specific data attached to a specific structure.

These functions should only be used by applications to manipulate **CRYPTO\_EX\_DATA** structures passed to the *new\_func()*, *free\_func()* and *dup\_func()* callbacks: as passed to *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index()* for example.

*CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data()* is used to set application specific data, the data is supplied in the **arg** parameter and its precise meaning is up to the application.

*CRYPTO\_get\_ex\_data()* is used to retrieve application specific data. The data is returned to the application, this will be the same value as supplied to a previous *CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data()* call.

**RETURN VALUES**

*CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data()* returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.

*CRYPTO\_get\_ex\_data()* returns the application data or 0 on failure. 0 may also be valid application data but currently it can only fail if given an invalid **idx** parameter.

On failure an error code can be obtained from *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*, *DSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*, *DH\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*

**HISTORY**

*CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data()* and *CRYPTO\_get\_ex\_data()* have been available since SSLeay 0.9.0.

**NAME**

d2i\_ASN1\_OBJECT, i2d\_ASN1\_OBJECT – ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/objects.h>

ASN1_OBJECT *d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions decode and encode an ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER.

Othwise these behave in a similar way to *d2i\_X509()* and *i2d\_X509()* described in the *d2i\_X509(3)* manual page.

**SEE ALSO**

*d2i\_X509(3)*

**HISTORY**

TBA

**NAME**

d2i\_DHparams, i2d\_DHparams – PKCS#3 DH parameter functions.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dh.h>

DH *d2i_DHparams(DH **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_DHparams(DH *a, unsigned char **pp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions decode and encode PKCS#3 DH parameters using the DHparameter structure described in PKCS#3.

Othwise these behave in a similar way to *d2i\_X509()* and *i2d\_X509()* described in the *d2i\_X509(3)* manual page.

**SEE ALSO**

*d2i\_X509(3)*

**HISTORY**

TBA

**NAME**

`d2i_DSAPublicKey`, `i2d_DSAPublicKey`, `d2i_DSAPrivateKey`, `i2d_DSAPrivateKey`, `d2i_DSA_PUBKEY`, `i2d_DSA_PUBKEY`, `d2i_DSA_SIG`, `i2d_DSA_SIG` – DSA key encoding and parsing functions.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dsa.h>

DSA * d2i_DSAPublicKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_DSAPublicKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);

DSA * d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);

DSA * d2i_DSAPrivateKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_DSAPrivateKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);

DSA * d2i_DSAPrivateParams(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_DSAPrivateParams(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);

DSA * d2i_DSA_SIG(DSA_SIG **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_DSA_SIG(const DSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

`d2i_DSAPublicKey()` and `i2d_DSAPublicKey()` decode and encode the DSA public key components structure.

`d2i_DSA_PUBKEY()` and `i2d_DSA_PUBKEY()` decode and encode an DSA public key using a SubjectPublicKeyInfo (certificate public key) structure.

`d2i_DSAPrivateKey()`, `i2d_DSAPrivateKey()` decode and encode the DSA private key components.

`d2i_DSAPrivateParams()`, `i2d_DSAPrivateParams()` decode and encode the DSA parameters using a **Dss-Parms** structure as defined in RFC2459.

`d2i_DSA_SIG()`, `i2d_DSA_SIG()` decode and encode a DSA signature using a **Dss-Sig-Value** structure as defined in RFC2459.

The usage of all of these functions is similar to the `d2i_X509()` and `i2d_X509()` described in the `d2i_X509(3)` manual page.

**NOTES**

The **DSA** structure passed to the private key encoding functions should have all the private key components present.

The data encoded by the private key functions is unencrypted and therefore offers no private key security.

The **DSA\_PUBKEY** functions should be used in preference to the **DSAPublicKey** functions when encoding public keys because they use a standard format.

The **DSAPublicKey** functions use a non standard format the actual data encoded depends on the value of the **write\_params** field of the **a** key parameter. If **write\_params** is zero then only the **pub\_key** field is encoded as an **INTEGER**. If **write\_params** is 1 then a **SEQUENCE** consisting of the **p**, **q**, **g** and **pub\_key** respectively fields are encoded.

The **DSAPrivateKey** functions also use a non standard structure consisting of a **SEQUENCE** containing the **p**, **q**, **g** and **pub\_key** and **priv\_key** fields respectively.

**SEE ALSO**

`d2i_X509(3)`

**HISTORY**

TBA

**NAME**

d2i\_PKCS8PrivateKey\_bio, d2i\_PKCS8PrivateKey\_fp, i2d\_PKCS8PrivateKey\_bio, i2d\_PKCS8PrivateKey\_fp, i2d\_PKCS8PrivateKey\_nid\_bio, i2d\_PKCS8PrivateKey\_nid\_fp – PKCS#8 format private key functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);

int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
                           char *kstr, int klen,
                           pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);

int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
                           char *kstr, int klen,
                           pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);

int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
                                char *kstr, int klen,
                                pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);

int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
                                char *kstr, int klen,
                                pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The PKCS#8 functions encode and decode private keys in PKCS#8 format using both PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption algorithms.

Other than the use of DER as opposed to PEM these functions are identical to the corresponding **PEM** function as described in the *pem*(3) manual page.

**NOTES**

Before using these functions *OpenSSL\_add\_all\_algorithms*(3) should be called to initialize the internal algorithm lookup tables otherwise errors about unknown algorithms will occur if an attempt is made to decrypt a private key.

These functions are currently the only way to store encrypted private keys using DER format.

Currently all the functions use BIOs or FILE pointers, there are no functions which work directly on memory: this can be readily worked around by converting the buffers to memory BIOs, see *BIO\_s\_mem*(3) for details.

**SEE ALSO**

*pem*(3)



**NAME**

*d2i\_RSAPublicKey*, *i2d\_RSAPublicKey*, *d2i\_RSAPrivateKey*, *i2d\_RSAPrivateKey*, *d2i\_RSA\_PUBKEY*, *i2d\_RSA\_PUBKEY*, *i2d\_Netscape\_RSA*, *d2i\_Netscape\_RSA* – RSA public and private key encoding functions.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

RSA * d2i_RSAPublicKey(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_RSAPublicKey(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
RSA * d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
RSA * d2i_RSAPrivateKey(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_RSAPrivateKey(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
int i2d_Netscape_RSA(RSA *a, unsigned char **pp, int (*cb)());
RSA * d2i_Netscape_RSA(RSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length, int (*cb)());
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*d2i\_RSAPublicKey()* and *i2d\_RSAPublicKey()* decode and encode a PKCS#1 *RSAPublicKey* structure.

*d2i\_RSA\_PUBKEY()* and *i2d\_RSA\_PUBKEY()* decode and encode an RSA public key using a *SubjectPublicKeyInfo* (certificate public key) structure.

*d2i\_RSAPrivateKey()*, *i2d\_RSAPrivateKey()* decode and encode a PKCS#1 *RSAPrivateKey* structure.

*d2i\_Netscape\_RSA()*, *i2d\_Netscape\_RSA()* decode and encode an RSA private key in NET format.

The usage of all of these functions is similar to the *d2i\_X509()* and *i2d\_X509()* described in the *d2i\_X509(3)* manual page.

**NOTES**

The *RSA* structure passed to the private key encoding functions should have all the PKCS#1 private key components present.

The data encoded by the private key functions is unencrypted and therefore offers no private key security.

The NET format functions are present to provide compatibility with certain very old software. This format has some severe security weaknesses and should be avoided if possible.

**SEE ALSO**

*d2i\_X509(3)*

**HISTORY**

TBA

**NAME**

`d2i_SSL_SESSION`, `i2d_SSL_SESSION` – convert `SSL_SESSION` object from/to ASN1 representation

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

`d2i_SSL_SESSION()` transforms the external ASN1 representation of an SSL/TLS session, stored as binary data at location **pp** with length **length**, into an `SSL_SESSION` object.

`i2d_SSL_SESSION()` transforms the `SSL_SESSION` object **in** into the ASN1 representation and stores it into the memory location pointed to by **pp**. The length of the resulting ASN1 representation is returned. If **pp** is the NULL pointer, only the length is calculated and returned.

**NOTES**

The `SSL_SESSION` object is built from several *malloc*(ed) parts, it can therefore not be moved, copied or stored directly. In order to store session data on disk or into a database, it must be transformed into a binary ASN1 representation.

When using `d2i_SSL_SESSION()`, the `SSL_SESSION` object is automatically allocated. The reference count is 1, so that the session must be explicitly removed using `SSL_SESSION_free(3)`, unless the `SSL_SESSION` object is completely taken over, when being called inside the `get_session_cb()` (see `SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)`).

`SSL_SESSION` objects keep internal link information about the session cache list, when being inserted into one `SSL_CTX` object's session cache. One `SSL_SESSION` object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore only be used with one `SSL_CTX` object (and the `SSL` objects created from this `SSL_CTX` object).

When using `i2d_SSL_SESSION()`, the memory location pointed to by **pp** must be large enough to hold the binary representation of the session. There is no known limit on the size of the created ASN1 representation, so the necessary amount of space should be obtained by first calling `i2d_SSL_SESSION()` with **pp=NULL**, and obtain the size needed, then allocate the memory and call `i2d_SSL_SESSION()` again.

**RETURN VALUES**

`d2i_SSL_SESSION()` returns a pointer to the newly allocated `SSL_SESSION` object. In case of failure the NULL-pointer is returned and the error message can be retrieved from the error stack.

`i2d_SSL_SESSION()` returns the size of the ASN1 representation in bytes. When the session is not valid, 0 is returned and no operation is performed.

**SEE ALSO**

`ssl(3)`, `SSL_SESSION_free(3)`, `SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)`

**NAME**

d2i\_X509, i2d\_X509, d2i\_X509\_bio, d2i\_X509\_fp, i2d\_X509\_bio, i2d\_X509\_fp – X509 encode and decode functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/x509.h>

X509 *d2i_X509(X509 **px, unsigned char **in, int len);
int i2d_X509(X509 *x, unsigned char **out);

X509 *d2i_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 **x);
X509 *d2i_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 **x);

int i2d_X509_bio(X509 *x, BIO *bp);
int i2d_X509_fp(X509 *x, FILE *fp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The X509 encode and decode routines encode and parse an **X509** structure, which represents an X509 certificate.

*d2i\_X509()* attempts to decode **len** bytes at **\*out**. If successful a pointer to the **X509** structure is returned. If an error occurred then **NULL** is returned. If **px** is not **NULL** then the returned structure is written to **\*px**. If **\*px** is not **NULL** then it is assumed that **\*px** contains a valid **X509** structure and an attempt is made to reuse it. If the call is successful **\*out** is incremented to the byte following the parsed data.

*i2d\_X509()* encodes the structure pointed to by **x** into DER format. If **out** is not **NULL** it writes the DER encoded data to the buffer at **\*out**, and increments it to point after the data just written. If the return value is negative an error occurred, otherwise it returns the length of the encoded data.

For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if **\*out** is **NULL** memory will be allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this case **\*out** is not incremented and it points to the start of the data just written.

*d2i\_X509\_bio()* is similar to *d2i\_X509()* except it attempts to parse data from BIO **bp**.

*d2i\_X509\_fp()* is similar to *d2i\_X509()* except it attempts to parse data from FILE pointer **fp**.

*i2d\_X509\_bio()* is similar to *i2d\_X509()* except it writes the encoding of the structure **x** to BIO **bp** and it returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.

*i2d\_X509\_fp()* is similar to *i2d\_X509()* except it writes the encoding of the structure **x** to BIO **fp** and it returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.

**NOTES**

The letters **i** and **d** in for example **i2d\_X509** stand for “internal” (that is an internal C structure) and “DER”. So that **i2d\_X509** converts from internal to DER.

The functions can also understand **BER** forms.

The actual X509 structure passed to *i2d\_X509()* must be a valid populated **X509** structure it can **not** simply be fed with an empty structure such as that returned by *X509\_new()*.

The encoded data is in binary form and may contain embedded zeroes. Therefore any FILE pointers or BIOs should be opened in binary mode. Functions such as *strlen()* will **not** return the correct length of the encoded structure.

The ways that **\*in** and **\*out** are incremented after the operation can trap the unwary. See the **WARNINGS** section for some common errors.

The reason for the auto increment behaviour is to reflect a typical usage of ASN1 functions: after one structure is encoded or decoded another will be processed after it.

**EXAMPLES**

Allocate and encode the DER encoding of an X509 structure:

```
int len;
unsigned char *buf, *p;
len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
```

```

buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (buf == NULL)
    /* error */

p = buf;
i2d_X509(x, &p);

```

If you are using OpenSSL 0.9.7 or later then this can be simplified to:

```

int len;
unsigned char *buf;

buf = NULL;
len = i2d_X509(x, &buf);
if (len < 0)
    /* error */

```

Attempt to decode a buffer:

```

X509 *x;
unsigned char *buf, *p;
int len;
/* Something to setup buf and len */
p = buf;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, len);
if (x == NULL)
    /* Some error */

```

Alternative technique:

```

X509 *x;
unsigned char *buf, *p;
int len;
/* Something to setup buf and len */
p = buf;
x = NULL;
if(!d2i_X509(&x, &p, len))
    /* Some error */

```

## WARNINGS

The use of temporary variable is mandatory. A common mistake is to attempt to use a buffer directly as follows:

```

int len;
unsigned char *buf;
len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (buf == NULL)
    /* error */

i2d_X509(x, &buf);
/* Other stuff ... */
OPENSSL_free(buf);

```

This code will result in **buf** apparently containing garbage because it was incremented after the call to point after the data just written. Also **buf** will no longer contain the pointer allocated by *OPENSSL\_malloc()* and the subsequent call to *OPENSSL\_free()* may well crash.

The auto allocation feature (setting buf to NULL) only works on OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later. Attempts to use it on earlier versions will typically cause a segmentation violation.

Another trap to avoid is misuse of the **xp** argument to *d2i\_X509()*:

```
X509 *x;

if (!d2i_X509(&x, &p, len))
    /* Some error */
```

This will probably crash somewhere in *d2i\_X509()*. The reason for this is that the variable **x** is uninitialized and an attempt will be made to interpret its (invalid) value as an **X509** structure, typically causing a segmentation violation. If **x** is set to NULL first then this will not happen.

## BUGS

In some versions of OpenSSL the “reuse” behaviour of *d2i\_X509()* when **\*px** is valid is broken and some parts of the reused structure may persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use of this “reuse” behaviour is strongly discouraged.

*i2d\_X509()* will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL, if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the fields entirely and will not be parsed by *d2i\_X509()*. This may be fixed in future so code should not assume that *i2d\_X509()* will always succeed.

## RETURN VALUES

*d2i\_X509()*, *d2i\_X509\_bio()* and *d2i\_X509\_fp()* return a valid **X509** structure or **NULL** if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

*i2d\_X509()*, *i2d\_X509\_bio()* and *i2d\_X509\_fp()* return a the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative value if an error occurs. The error code can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

*i2d\_X509\_bio()* and *i2d\_X509\_fp()* returns 1 for success and 0 if an error occurs The error code can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

## SEE ALSO

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*

## HISTORY

d2i\_X509, i2d\_X509, d2i\_X509\_bio, d2i\_X509\_fp, i2d\_X509\_bio and i2d\_X509\_fp are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

d2i\_X509\_ALGOR, i2d\_X509\_ALGOR – AlgorithmIdentifier functions.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/x509.h>

X509_ALGOR *d2i_X509_ALGOR(X509_ALGOR **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_X509_ALGOR(X509_ALGOR *a, unsigned char **pp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions decode and encode an **X509\_ALGOR** structure which is equivalent to the **AlgorithmIdentifier** structure.

Othewise these behave in a similar way to *d2i\_X509()* and *i2d\_X509()* described in the *d2i\_X509(3)* manual page.

**SEE ALSO**

*d2i\_X509(3)*

**HISTORY**

TBA

**NAME**

d2i\_X509\_CRL, i2d\_X509\_CRL, d2i\_X509\_CRL\_bio, d2i\_X509\_CRL\_fp, i2d\_X509\_CRL\_bio, i2d\_X509\_CRL\_fp – PKCS#10 certificate request functions.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/x509.h>

X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL(X509_CRL **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_X509_CRL(X509_CRL *a, unsigned char **pp);

X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **x);
X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **x);

int i2d_X509_CRL_bio(X509_CRL *x, BIO *bp);
int i2d_X509_CRL_fp(X509_CRL *x, FILE *fp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions decode and encode an X509 CRL (certificate revocation list).

Othwise the functions behave in a similar way to *d2i\_X509()* and *i2d\_X509()* described in the *d2i\_X509(3)* manual page.

**SEE ALSO**

*d2i\_X509(3)*

**HISTORY**

TBA

**NAME**

d2i\_X509\_NAME, i2d\_X509\_NAME – X509\_NAME encoding functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/x509.h>

X509_NAME *d2i_X509_NAME(X509_NAME **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_X509_NAME(X509_NAME *a, unsigned char **pp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions decode and encode an **X509\_NAME** structure which is the the same as the **Name** type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used for example in certificate subject and issuer names.

Othwise the functions behave in a similar way to *d2i\_X509()* and *i2d\_X509()* described in the *d2i\_X509(3)* manual page.

**SEE ALSO**

*d2i\_X509(3)*

**HISTORY**

TBA



**NAME**

d2i\_X509\_REQ, i2d\_X509\_REQ, d2i\_X509\_REQ\_bio, d2i\_X509\_REQ\_fp, i2d\_X509\_REQ\_bio, i2d\_X509\_REQ\_fp – PKCS#10 certificate request functions.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/x509.h>

X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ(X509_REQ **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_X509_REQ(X509_REQ *a, unsigned char **pp);

X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **x);
X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **x);

int i2d_X509_REQ_bio(X509_REQ *x, BIO *bp);
int i2d_X509_REQ_fp(X509_REQ *x, FILE *fp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions decode and encode a PKCS#10 certificate request.

Othwise these behave in a similar way to *d2i\_X509()* and *i2d\_X509()* described in the *d2i\_X509(3)* manual page.

**SEE ALSO**

*d2i\_X509(3)*

**HISTORY**

TBA

**NAME**

d2i\_X509\_SIG, i2d\_X509\_SIG – DigestInfo functions.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/x509.h>

X509_SIG *d2i_X509_SIG(X509_SIG **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int i2d_X509_SIG(X509_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions decode and encode an X509\_SIG structure which is equivalent to the **DigestInfo** structure defined in PKCS#1 and PKCS#7.

Othwise these behave in a similar way to *d2i\_X509()* and *i2d\_X509()* described in the *d2i\_X509(3)* manual page.

**SEE ALSO**

*d2i\_X509(3)*

**HISTORY**

TBA

**NAME**

DES\_random\_key, DES\_set\_key, DES\_key\_sched, DES\_set\_key\_checked, DES\_set\_key\_unchecked, DES\_set\_odd\_parity, DES\_is\_weak\_key, DES\_ecb\_encrypt, DES\_ecb2\_encrypt, DES\_ecb3\_encrypt, DES\_ncbc\_encrypt, DES\_cfb\_encrypt, DES\_ofb\_encrypt, DES\_pcbc\_encrypt, DES\_cfb64\_encrypt, DES\_ofb64\_encrypt, DES\_xcbc\_encrypt, DES\_ede2\_cbc\_encrypt, DES\_ede2\_cfb64\_encrypt, DES\_ede2\_ofb64\_encrypt, DES\_ede3\_cbc\_encrypt, DES\_ede3\_cbcm\_encrypt, DES\_ede3\_cfb64\_encrypt, DES\_ede3\_ofb64\_encrypt, DES\_cbc\_cksum, DES\_quad\_cksum, DES\_string\_to\_key, DES\_string\_to\_2keys, DES\_fcrypt, DES\_crypt, DES\_enc\_read, DES\_enc\_write – DES encryption

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/des.h>

void DES_random_key(DES_cblock *ret);

int DES_set_key(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule);
int DES_key_sched(const_DES_cblock *key, DES_key_schedule *schedule);
int DES_set_key_checked(const_DES_cblock *key,
    DES_key_schedule *schedule);
void DES_set_key_unchecked(const_DES_cblock *key,
    DES_key_schedule *schedule);

void DES_set_odd_parity(DES_cblock *key);
int DES_is_weak_key(const_DES_cblock *key);

void DES_ecb_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output,
    DES_key_schedule *ks, int enc);
void DES_ecb2_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output,
    DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2, int enc);
void DES_ecb3_encrypt(const_DES_cblock *input, DES_cblock *output,
    DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2,
    DES_key_schedule *ks3, int enc);

void DES_ncbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
    long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec,
    int enc);
void DES_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
    int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
    DES_cblock *ivec, int enc);
void DES_ofb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
    int numbits, long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
    DES_cblock *ivec);
void DES_pcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
    long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec,
    int enc);
void DES_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
    long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec,
    int *num, int enc);
void DES_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
    long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec,
    int *num);
void DES_xcbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
    long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule, DES_cblock *ivec,
    const_DES_cblock *inw, const_DES_cblock *outw, int enc);
```

```

void DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input,
    unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
    DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int enc);
void DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
    unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
    DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc);
void DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in,
    unsigned char *out, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
    DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num);

void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *input,
    unsigned char *output, long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
    DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec,
    int enc);
void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
    long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2,
    DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec1, DES_cblock *ivec2,
    int enc);
void DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
    long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1, DES_key_schedule *ks2,
    DES_key_schedule *ks3, DES_cblock *ivec, int *num, int enc);
void DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
    long length, DES_key_schedule *ks1,
    DES_key_schedule *ks2, DES_key_schedule *ks3,
    DES_cblock *ivec, int *num);

DES_LONG DES_cbc_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock *output,
    long length, DES_key_schedule *schedule,
    const DES_cblock *ivec);
DES_LONG DES_quad_cksum(const unsigned char *input, DES_cblock output[],
    long length, int out_count, DES_cblock *seed);
void DES_string_to_key(const char *str, DES_cblock *key);
void DES_string_to_2keys(const char *str, DES_cblock *key1,
    DES_cblock *key2);

char *DES_fcrypt(const char *buf, const char *salt, char *ret);
char *DES_crypt(const char *buf, const char *salt);

int DES_enc_read(int fd, void *buf, int len, DES_key_schedule *sched,
    DES_cblock *iv);
int DES_enc_write(int fd, const void *buf, int len,
    DES_key_schedule *sched, DES_cblock *iv);

```

## DESCRIPTION

This library contains a fast implementation of the DES encryption algorithm.

There are two phases to the use of DES encryption. The first is the generation of a *DES\_key\_schedule* from a key, the second is the actual encryption. A DES key is of type *DES\_cblock*. This type consists of 8 bytes with odd parity. The least significant bit in each byte is the parity bit. The key schedule is an expanded form of the key; it is used to speed the encryption process.

*DES\_random\_key()* generates a random key. The PRNG must be seeded prior to using this function (see *rand(3)*). If the PRNG could not generate a secure key, 0 is returned.

Before a DES key can be used, it must be converted into the architecture dependent *DES\_key\_schedule* via the *DES\_set\_key\_checked()* or *DES\_set\_key\_unchecked()* function.

*DES\_set\_key\_checked()* will check that the key passed is of odd parity and is not a weak or semi-weak key. If the parity is wrong, then -1 is returned. If the key is a weak key, then -2 is returned. If an error is returned, the key schedule is not generated.

*DES\_set\_key()* works like *DES\_set\_key\_checked()* if the *DES\_check\_key* flag is non-zero, otherwise like *DES\_set\_key\_unchecked()*. These functions are available for compatibility; it is recommended to use a function that does not depend on a global variable.

*DES\_set\_odd\_parity()* sets the parity of the passed *key* to odd.

*DES\_is\_weak\_key()* returns 1 if the passed key is a weak key, 0 if it is ok. The probability that a randomly generated key is weak is  $1/2^{52}$ , so it is not really worth checking for them.

The following routines mostly operate on an input and output stream of *DES\_cblocks*.

*DES\_ecb\_encrypt()* is the basic DES encryption routine that encrypts or decrypts a single 8-byte *DES\_cblock* in *electronic code book* (ECB) mode. It always transforms the input data, pointed to by *input*, into the output data, pointed to by the *output* argument. If the *encrypt* argument is non-zero (DES\_ENCRYPT), the *input* (cleartext) is encrypted into the *output* (ciphertext) using the key schedule specified by the *schedule* argument, previously set via *DES\_set\_key*. If *encrypt* is zero (DES\_DECRYPT), the *input* (now ciphertext) is decrypted into the *output* (now cleartext). Input and output may overlap. *DES\_ecb\_encrypt()* does not return a value.

*DES\_ecb3\_encrypt()* encrypts/decrypts the *input* block by using three-key Triple-DES encryption in ECB mode. This involves encrypting the input with *ks1*, decrypting with the key schedule *ks2*, and then encrypting with *ks3*. This routine greatly reduces the chances of brute force breaking of DES and has the advantage of if *ks1*, *ks2* and *ks3* are the same, it is equivalent to just encryption using ECB mode and *ks1* as the key.

The macro *DES\_ecb2\_encrypt()* is provided to perform two-key Triple-DES encryption by using *ks1* for the final encryption.

*DES\_ncbc\_encrypt()* encrypts/decrypts using the *cipher-block-chaining* (CBC) mode of DES. If the *encrypt* argument is non-zero, the routine cipher-block-chain encrypts the cleartext data pointed to by the *input* argument into the ciphertext pointed to by the *output* argument, using the key schedule provided by the *schedule* argument, and initialization vector provided by the *ivec* argument. If the *length* argument is not an integral multiple of eight bytes, the last block is copied to a temporary area and zero filled. The output is always an integral multiple of eight bytes.

*DES\_xcbc\_encrypt()* is RSA's DESX mode of DES. It uses *inw* and *outw* to 'whiten' the encryption. *inw* and *outw* are secret (unlike the iv) and are as such, part of the key. So the key is sort of 24 bytes. This is much better than CBC DES.

*DES\_ede3\_cbc\_encrypt()* implements outer triple CBC DES encryption with three keys. This means that each DES operation inside the CBC mode is really an  $C=E(ks3, D(ks2, E(ks1, M)))$ . This mode is used by SSL.

The *DES\_ede2\_cbc\_encrypt()* macro implements two-key Triple-DES by reusing *ks1* for the final encryption.  $C=E(ks1, D(ks2, E(ks1, M)))$ . This form of Triple-DES is used by the RSAREF library.

*DES\_pcbc\_encrypt()* encrypt/decrypts using the propagating cipher block chaining mode used by Kerberos v4. Its parameters are the same as *DES\_ncbc\_encrypt()*.

*DES\_cfb\_encrypt()* encrypt/decrypts using cipher feedback mode. This method takes an array of characters as input and outputs and array of characters. It does not require any padding to 8 character groups. Note: the *ivec* variable is changed and the new changed value needs to be passed to the next call to this function. Since this function runs a complete DES ECB encryption per *numbits*, this function is only suggested for use when sending small numbers of characters.

*DES\_cfb64\_encrypt()* implements CFB mode of DES with 64bit feedback. Why is this useful you ask? Because this routine will allow you to encrypt an arbitrary number of bytes, no 8 byte padding. Each call to this routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update *ivec* and *num*. *num* contains 'how far' we are though *ivec*. If this does not make much sense, read more about cfb mode of DES :-).

*DES\_ede3\_cfb64\_encrypt()* and *DES\_ede2\_cfb64\_encrypt()* is the same as *DES\_cfb64\_encrypt()* except that Triple-DES is used.

*DES\_ofb\_encrypt()* encrypts using output feedback mode. This method takes an array of characters as input and outputs and array of characters. It does not require any padding to 8 character groups. Note: the *ivec* variable is changed and the new changed value needs to be passed to the next call to this function. Since this function runs a complete DES ECB encryption per *numbits*, this function is only suggested for use when sending small numbers of characters.

*DES\_ofb64\_encrypt()* is the same as *DES\_cfb64\_encrypt()* using Output Feed Back mode.

*DES\_ede3\_ofb64\_encrypt()* and *DES\_ede2\_ofb64\_encrypt()* is the same as *DES\_ofb64\_encrypt()*, using Triple-DES.

The following functions are included in the DES library for compatibility with the MIT Kerberos library.

*DES\_cbc\_cksum()* produces an 8 byte checksum based on the input stream (via CBC encryption). The last 4 bytes of the checksum are returned and the complete 8 bytes are placed in *output*. This function is used by Kerberos v4. Other applications should use *EVP\_DigestInit(3)* etc. instead.

*DES\_quad\_cksum()* is a Kerberos v4 function. It returns a 4 byte checksum from the input bytes. The algorithm can be iterated over the input, depending on *out\_count*, 1, 2, 3 or 4 times. If *output* is non-NULL, the 8 bytes generated by each pass are written into *output*.

The following are DES-based transformations:

*DES\_fcrypt()* is a fast version of the Unix *crypt(3)* function. This version takes only a small amount of space relative to other fast *crypt()* implementations. This is different to the normal *crypt* in that the third parameter is the buffer that the return value is written into. It needs to be at least 14 bytes long. This function is thread safe, unlike the normal *crypt*.

*DES\_crypt()* is a faster replacement for the normal system *crypt()*. This function calls *DES\_fcrypt()* with a static array passed as the third parameter. This emulates the normal non-thread safe semantics of *crypt(3)*.

*DES\_enc\_write()* writes *len* bytes to file descriptor *fd* from buffer *buf*. The data is encrypted via *pcbc\_encrypt* (default) using *sched* for the key and *iv* as a starting vector. The actual data send down *fd* consists of 4 bytes (in network byte order) containing the length of the following encrypted data. The encrypted data then follows, padded with random data out to a multiple of 8 bytes.

*DES\_enc\_read()* is used to read *len* bytes from file descriptor *fd* into buffer *buf*. The data being read from *fd* is assumed to have come from *DES\_enc\_write()* and is decrypted using *sched* for the key schedule and *iv* for the initial vector.

**Warning:** The data format used by *DES\_enc\_write()* and *DES\_enc\_read()* has a cryptographic weakness: When asked to write more than MAXWRITE bytes, *DES\_enc\_write()* will split the data into several chunks that are all encrypted using the same IV. So don't use these functions unless you are sure you know what you do (in which case you might not want to use them anyway). They cannot handle non-blocking sockets. *DES\_enc\_read()* uses an internal state and thus cannot be used on multiple files.

*DES\_rw\_mode* is used to specify the encryption mode to use with *DES\_enc\_read()* and *DES\_end\_write()*. If set to *DES\_PCBC\_MODE* (the default), *DES\_pcbc\_encrypt* is used. If set to *DES\_CBC\_MODE* *DES\_cbc\_encrypt* is used.

## NOTES

Single-key DES is insecure due to its short key size. ECB mode is not suitable for most applications; see *DES\_modes(7)*.

The *evp(3)* library provides higher-level encryption functions.

## BUGS

*DES\_3cbc\_encrypt()* is flawed and must not be used in applications.

*DES\_cbc\_encrypt()* does not modify **ivec**; use *DES\_ncbc\_encrypt()* instead.

*DES\_cfb\_encrypt()* and *DES\_ofb\_encrypt()* operates on input of 8 bits. What this means is that if you set numbits to 12, and length to 2, the first 12 bits will come from the 1st input byte and the low half of the second input byte. The second 12 bits will have the low 8 bits taken from the 3rd input byte and the top 4 bits taken from the 4th input byte. The same holds for output. This function has been implemented this way because most people will be using a multiple of 8 and because once you get into pulling bytes input bytes apart things get ugly!

*DES\_string\_to\_key()* is available for backward compatibility with the MIT library. New applications should use a cryptographic hash function. The same applies for *DES\_string\_to\_2key()*.

## CONFORMING TO

ANSI X3.106

The **des** library was written to be source code compatible with the MIT Kerberos library.

**SEE ALSO**

*crypt*(3), *des\_modes*(7), *evp*(3), *rand*(3)

**HISTORY**

In OpenSSL 0.9.7, all *des\_* functions were renamed to *DES\_* to avoid clashes with older versions of *lib-des*. Compatibility *des\_* functions are provided for a short while, as well as *crypt*(). Declarations for these are in `<openssl/des_old.h>`. There is no *DES\_* variant for *des\_random\_seed*(). This will happen to other functions as well if they are deemed redundant (*des\_random\_seed*() just calls *RAND\_seed*() and is present for backward compatibility only), buggy or already scheduled for removal.

*des\_cbc\_cksum*(), *des\_cbc\_encrypt*(), *des\_ecb\_encrypt*(), *des\_is\_weak\_key*(), *des\_key\_sched*(), *des\_pcbc\_encrypt*(), *des\_quad\_cksum*(), *des\_random\_key*() and *des\_string\_to\_key*() are available in the MIT Kerberos library; *des\_check\_key\_parity*(), *des\_fixup\_key\_parity*() and *des\_is\_weak\_key*() are available in newer versions of that library.

*des\_set\_key\_checked*() and *des\_set\_key\_unchecked*() were added in OpenSSL 0.9.5.

*des\_generate\_random\_block*(), *des\_init\_random\_number\_generator*(), *des\_new\_random\_key*(), *des\_set\_random\_generator\_seed*() and *des\_set\_sequence\_number*() and *des\_rand\_data*() are used in newer versions of Kerberos but are not implemented here.

*des\_random\_key*() generated cryptographically weak random data in SSLeay and in OpenSSL prior version 0.9.5, as well as in the original MIT library.

**AUTHOR**

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**NAME**

dh – Diffie–Hellman key agreement

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>

DH *   DH_new(void);
void   DH_free(DH *dh);

int     DH_size(const DH *dh);

DH *   DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator,
                             void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);
int     DH_check(const DH *dh, int *codes);

int     DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
int     DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);

void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth);
const DH_METHOD *DH_get_default_method(void);
int DH_set_method(DH *dh, const DH_METHOD *meth);
DH *DH_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void);

int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(),
                        int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)());
int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, char *arg);
char *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx);

DH *   d2i_DHparams(DH **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int     i2d_DHparams(const DH *a, unsigned char **pp);

int     DHparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DH *x);
int     DHparams_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions implement the Diffie–Hellman key agreement protocol. The generation of shared DH parameters is described in *DH\_generate\_parameters*(3); *DH\_generate\_key*(3) describes how to perform a key agreement.

The **DH** structure consists of several BIGNUM components.

```
struct
{
    BIGNUM *p;           // prime number (shared)
    BIGNUM *g;           // generator of Z_p (shared)
    BIGNUM *priv_key;    // private DH value x
    BIGNUM *pub_key;     // public DH value g^x
    // ...
};

DH
```

Note that DH keys may use non-standard **DH\_METHOD** implementations, either directly or by the use of **ENGINE** modules. In some cases (eg. an ENGINE providing support for hardware-embedded keys), these BIGNUM values will not be used by the implementation or may be used for alternative data storage. For this reason, applications should generally avoid using DH structure elements directly and instead use API functions to query or modify keys.

**SEE ALSO**

*dhparam*(1), *bn*(3), *dsa*(3), *err*(3), *rand*(3), *rsa*(3), *engine*(3), *DH\_set\_method*(3), *DH\_new*(3), *DH\_get\_ex\_new\_index*(3), *DH\_generate\_parameters*(3), *DH\_compute\_key*(3), *d2i\_DHparams*(3), *RSA\_print*(3)



**NAME**

DH\_generate\_key, DH\_compute\_key – perform Diffie–Hellman key exchange

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dh.h>

int DH_generate_key(DH *dh);

int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*DH\_generate\_key()* performs the first step of a Diffie–Hellman key exchange by generating private and public DH values. By calling *DH\_compute\_key()*, these are combined with the other party’s public value to compute the shared key.

*DH\_generate\_key()* expects **dh** to contain the shared parameters **dh**→**p** and **dh**→**g**. It generates a random private DH value unless **dh**→**priv\_key** is already set, and computes the corresponding public value **dh**→**pub\_key**, which can then be published.

*DH\_compute\_key()* computes the shared secret from the private DH value in **dh** and the other party’s public value in **pub\_key** and stores it in **key**. **key** must point to **DH\_size(dh)** bytes of memory.

**RETURN VALUES**

*DH\_generate\_key()* returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.

*DH\_compute\_key()* returns the size of the shared secret on success, –1 on error.

The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*dh(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *rand(3)*, *DH\_size(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DH\_generate\_key()* and *DH\_compute\_key()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

DH\_generate\_parameters, DH\_check – generate and check Diffie–Hellman parameters

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dh.h>

DH *DH_generate_parameters(int prime_len, int generator,
    void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);

int DH_check(DH *dh, int *codes);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*DH\_generate\_parameters()* generates Diffie–Hellman parameters that can be shared among a group of users, and returns them in a newly allocated **DH** structure. The pseudo-random number generator must be seeded prior to calling *DH\_generate\_parameters()*.

**prime\_len** is the length in bits of the safe prime to be generated. **generator** is a small number > 1, typically 2 or 5.

A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress of the key generation. If **callback** is not **NULL**, it will be called as described in *BN\_generate\_prime*(3) while a random prime number is generated, and when a prime has been found, **callback(3, 0, cb\_arg)** is called.

*DH\_check()* validates Diffie–Hellman parameters. It checks that **p** is a safe prime, and that **g** is a suitable generator. In the case of an error, the bit flags **DH\_CHECK\_P\_NOT\_SAFE\_PRIME** or **DH\_NOT\_SUITABLE\_GENERATOR** are set in **\*codes**. **DH\_UNABLE\_TO\_CHECK\_GENERATOR** is set if the generator cannot be checked, i.e. it does not equal 2 or 5.

**RETURN VALUES**

*DH\_generate\_parameters()* returns a pointer to the DH structure, or **NULL** if the parameter generation fails. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error*(3).

*DH\_check()* returns 1 if the check could be performed, 0 otherwise.

**NOTES**

*DH\_generate\_parameters()* may run for several hours before finding a suitable prime.

The parameters generated by *DH\_generate\_parameters()* are not to be used in signature schemes.

**BUGS**

If **generator** is not 2 or 5, **dh->g=generator** is not a usable generator.

**SEE ALSO**

*dh*(3), *ERR\_get\_error*(3), *rand*(3), *DH\_free*(3)

**HISTORY**

*DH\_check()* is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. The **cb\_arg** argument to *DH\_generate\_parameters()* was added in SSLeay 0.9.0.

In versions before OpenSSL 0.9.5, **DH\_CHECK\_P\_NOT\_STRONG\_PRIME** is used instead of **DH\_CHECK\_P\_NOT\_SAFE\_PRIME**.

**NAME**

DH\_get\_ex\_new\_index, DH\_set\_ex\_data, DH\_get\_ex\_data – add application specific data to DH structures

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dh.h>

int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
                        CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
                        CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
                        CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);

int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg);

char *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions handle application specific data in DH structures. Their usage is identical to that of *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index()*, *RSA\_set\_ex\_data()* and *RSA\_get\_ex\_data()* as described in *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*, *dh(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DH\_get\_ex\_new\_index()*, *DH\_set\_ex\_data()* and *DH\_get\_ex\_data()* are available since OpenSSL 0.9.5.

**NAME**

DH\_new, DH\_free – allocate and free DH objects

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dh.h>

DH* DH_new(void);

void DH_free(DH *dh);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*DH\_new()* allocates and initializes a **DH** structure.

*DH\_free()* frees the **DH** structure and its components. The values are erased before the memory is returned to the system.

**RETURN VALUES**

If the allocation fails, *DH\_new()* returns **NULL** and sets an error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.

*DH\_free()* returns no value.

**SEE ALSO**

*dh(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *DH\_generate\_parameters(3)*, *DH\_generate\_key(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DH\_new()* and *DH\_free()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

DH\_set\_default\_method, DH\_get\_default\_method, DH\_set\_method, DH\_new\_method, DH\_OpenSSL  
– select DH method

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>

void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth);

const DH_METHOD *DH_get_default_method(void);

int DH_set_method(DH *dh, const DH_METHOD *meth);

DH *DH_new_method(ENGINE *engine);

const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

A **DH\_METHOD** specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for Diffie-Hellman operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as hardware accelerators may be used. **IMPORTANT:** See the **NOTES** section for important information about how these DH API functions are affected by the use of **ENGINE** API calls.

Initially, the default DH\_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as returned by *DH\_OpenSSL()*.

*DH\_set\_default\_method()* makes **meth** the default method for all DH structures created later. **NB:** This is true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for DH, so this function is no longer recommended.

*DH\_get\_default\_method()* returns a pointer to the current default DH\_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended.

*DH\_set\_method()* selects **meth** to perform all operations using the key **dh**. This will replace the DH\_METHOD used by the DH key and if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will be released during the change. It is possible to have DH keys that only work with certain DH\_METHOD implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases attempting to change the DH\_METHOD for the key can have unexpected results.

*DH\_new\_method()* allocates and initializes a DH structure so that **engine** will be used for the DH operations. If **engine** is NULL, the default ENGINE for DH operations is used, and if no default ENGINE is set, the DH\_METHOD controlled by *DH\_set\_default\_method()* is used.

**THE DH\_METHOD STRUCTURE**

```
typedef struct dh_meth_st
{
    /* name of the implementation */
    const char *name;

    /* generate private and public DH values for key agreement */
    int (*generate_key)(DH *dh);

    /* compute shared secret */
    int (*compute_key)(unsigned char *key, BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);

    /* compute r = a ^ p mod m (May be NULL for some implementations) */
    int (*bn_mod_exp)(DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
                     const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
                     BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);

    /* called at DH_new */
    int (*init)(DH *dh);
```

```

    /* called at DH_free */
    int (*finish)(DH *dh);

    int flags;

    char *app_data; /* ?? */
} DH_METHOD;

```

## RETURN VALUES

*DH\_OpenSSL()* and *DH\_get\_default\_method()* return pointers to the respective **DH\_METHODS**.

*DH\_set\_default\_method()* returns no value.

*DH\_set\_method()* returns non-zero if the provided **meth** was successfully set as the method for **dh** (including unloading the ENGINE handle if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE).

*DH\_new\_method()* returns NULL and sets an error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error*(3) if the allocation fails. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.

## NOTES

As of version 0.9.7, DH\_METHOD implementations are grouped together with other algorithmic APIs (eg. RSA\_METHOD, EVP\_CIPHER, etc) in **ENGINE** modules. If a default ENGINE is specified for DH functionality using an ENGINE API function, that will override any DH defaults set using the DH API (ie. *DH\_set\_default\_method()*). For this reason, the ENGINE API is the recommended way to control default implementations for use in DH and other cryptographic algorithms.

## SEE ALSO

*dh*(3), *DH\_new*(3)

## HISTORY

*DH\_set\_default\_method()*, *DH\_get\_default\_method()*, *DH\_set\_method()*, *DH\_new\_method()* and *DH\_OpenSSL()* were added in OpenSSL 0.9.4.

*DH\_set\_default\_openssl\_method()* and *DH\_get\_default\_openssl\_method()* replaced *DH\_set\_default\_method()* and *DH\_get\_default\_method()* respectively, and *DH\_set\_method()* and *DH\_new\_method()* were altered to use **ENGINEs** rather than **DH\_METHODS** during development of the engine version of OpenSSL 0.9.6. For 0.9.7, the handling of defaults in the ENGINE API was restructured so that this change was reversed, and behaviour of the other functions resembled more closely the previous behaviour. The behaviour of defaults in the ENGINE API now transparently overrides the behaviour of defaults in the DH API without requiring changing these function prototypes.

**NAME**

DH\_size – get Diffie–Hellman prime size

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dh.h>

int DH_size(DH *dh);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

This function returns the Diffie–Hellman size in bytes. It can be used to determine how much memory must be allocated for the shared secret computed by *DH\_compute\_key()*.

**dh**→**p** must not be **NULL**.

**RETURN VALUE**

The size in bytes.

**SEE ALSO**

*dh*(3), *DH\_generate\_key*(3)

**HISTORY**

*DH\_size()* is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

dsa – Digital Signature Algorithm

**SYNOPSIS**

```

#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>

DSA *   DSA_new(void);
void    DSA_free(DSA *dsa);

int     DSA_size(const DSA *dsa);

DSA *   DSA_generate_parameters(int bits, unsigned char *seed,
                                int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
                                void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);

DH *    DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r);

int     DSA_generate_key(DSA *dsa);

int     DSA_sign(int dummy, const unsigned char *dgst, int len,
                 unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa);
int     DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinvp,
                       BIGNUM **rp);
int     DSA_verify(int dummy, const unsigned char *dgst, int len,
                  const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa);

void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth);
const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void);
int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *meth);
DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine);
const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void);

int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(),
                          int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)());
int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, char *arg);
char *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx);

DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void);
void    DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *a);
int     i2d_DSA_SIG(const DSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp);
DSA_SIG *d2i_DSA_SIG(DSA_SIG **v, unsigned char **pp, long length);

DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
int     DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
                     DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);

DSA *   d2i_DSAPublicKey(DSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
DSA *   d2i_DSAPrivateKey(DSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
DSA *   d2i_DSAPrivateParams(DSA **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
int     i2d_DSAPublicKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
int     i2d_DSAPrivateKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
int     i2d_DSAPrivateParams(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);

int     DSAPrivateParams_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x);
int     DSAPrivateParams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x);
int     DSA_print(BIO *bp, const DSA *x, int off);
int     DSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const DSA *x, int off);

```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions implement the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). The generation of shared DSA parameters is described in *DSA\_generate\_parameters*(3); *DSA\_generate\_key*(3) describes how to generate a signature key. Signature generation and verification are described in *DSA\_sign*(3).

The **DSA** structure consists of several BIGNUM components.



```

struct
{
    BIGNUM *p;           // prime number (public)
    BIGNUM *q;           // 160-bit subprime, q | p-1 (public)
    BIGNUM *g;           // generator of subgroup (public)
    BIGNUM *priv_key;    // private key x
    BIGNUM *pub_key;     // public key y = g^x
    // ...
}
DSA;

```

In public keys, **priv\_key** is NULL.

Note that DSA keys may use non-standard **DSA\_METHOD** implementations, either directly or by the use of **ENGINE** modules. In some cases (eg. an ENGINE providing support for hardware-embedded keys), these BIGNUM values will not be used by the implementation or may be used for alternative data storage. For this reason, applications should generally avoid using DSA structure elements directly and instead use API functions to query or modify keys.

## CONFORMING TO

US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186 (Digital Signature Standard, DSS), ANSI X9.30

## SEE ALSO

*bn(3)*, *dh(3)*, *err(3)*, *rand(3)*, *rsa(3)*, *sha(3)*, *engine(3)*, *DSA\_new(3)*, *DSA\_size(3)*, *DSA\_generate\_parameters(3)*, *DSA\_dup\_DH(3)*, *DSA\_generate\_key(3)*, *DSA\_sign(3)*, *DSA\_set\_method(3)*, *DSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*, *RSA\_print(3)*

**NAME**

DSA\_do\_sign, DSA\_do\_verify – raw DSA signature operations

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dsa.h>

DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);

int DSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
                  DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*DSA\_do\_sign()* computes a digital signature on the **len** byte message digest **dgst** using the private key **dsa** and returns it in a newly allocated **DSA\_SIG** structure.

*DSA\_sign\_setup(3)* may be used to precompute part of the signing operation in case signature generation is time-critical.

*DSA\_do\_verify()* verifies that the signature **sig** matches a given message digest **dgst** of size **len**. **dsa** is the signer's public key.

**RETURN VALUES**

*DSA\_do\_sign()* returns the signature, NULL on error. *DSA\_do\_verify()* returns 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an incorrect signature and -1 on error. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*dsa(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *rand(3)*, *DSA\_SIG\_new(3)*, *DSA\_sign(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DSA\_do\_sign()* and *DSA\_do\_verify()* were added in OpenSSL 0.9.3.

**NAME**

DSA\_dup\_DH – create a DH structure out of DSA structure

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dsa.h>

DH * DSA_dup_DH(const DSA *r);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*DSA\_dup\_DH()* duplicates DSA parameters/keys as DH parameters/keys. *q* is lost during that conversion, but the resulting DH parameters contain its length.

**RETURN VALUE**

*DSA\_dup\_DH()* returns the new **DH** structure, and NULL on error. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**NOTE**

Be careful to avoid small subgroup attacks when using this.

**SEE ALSO**

*dh(3)*, *dsa(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DSA\_dup\_DH()* was added in OpenSSL 0.9.4.

**NAME**

DSA\_generate\_key – generate DSA key pair

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dsa.h>

int DSA_generate_key(DSA *a);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*DSA\_generate\_key()* expects **a** to contain DSA parameters. It generates a new key pair and stores it in **a->pub\_key** and **a->priv\_key**.

The PRNG must be seeded prior to calling *DSA\_generate\_key()*.

**RETURN VALUE**

*DSA\_generate\_key()* returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*dsa(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *rand(3)*, *DSA\_generate\_parameters(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DSA\_generate\_key()* is available since SSLeay 0.8.

**NAME**

DSA\_generate\_parameters – generate DSA parameters

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dsa.h>

DSA *DSA_generate_parameters(int bits, unsigned char *seed,
                             int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret,
                             void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*DSA\_generate\_parameters()* generates primes p and q and a generator g for use in the DSA.

**bits** is the length of the prime to be generated; the DSS allows a maximum of 1024 bits.

If **seed** is **NULL** or **seed\_len** < 20, the primes will be generated at random. Otherwise, the seed is used to generate them. If the given seed does not yield a prime q, a new random seed is chosen and placed at **seed**.

*DSA\_generate\_parameters()* places the iteration count in **\*counter\_ret** and a counter used for finding a generator in **\*h\_ret**, unless these are **NULL**.

A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress of the key generation. If **callback** is not **NULL**, it will be called as follows:

- When a candidate for q is generated, **callback(0, m++, cb\_arg)** is called (m is 0 for the first candidate).
- When a candidate for q has passed a test by trial division, **callback(1, -1, cb\_arg)** is called. While a candidate for q is tested by Miller-Rabin primality tests, **callback(1, i, cb\_arg)** is called in the outer loop (once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime); i is the loop counter (starting at 0).
- When a prime q has been found, **callback(2, 0, cb\_arg)** and **callback(3, 0, cb\_arg)** are called.
- Before a candidate for p (other than the first) is generated and tested, **callback(0, counter, cb\_arg)** is called.
- When a candidate for p has passed the test by trial division, **callback(1, -1, cb\_arg)** is called. While it is tested by the Miller-Rabin primality test, **callback(1, i, cb\_arg)** is called in the outer loop (once for each witness that confirms that the candidate may be prime). i is the loop counter (starting at 0).
- When p has been found, **callback(2, 1, cb\_arg)** is called.
- When the generator has been found, **callback(3, 1, cb\_arg)** is called.

**RETURN VALUE**

*DSA\_generate\_parameters()* returns a pointer to the DSA structure, or **NULL** if the parameter generation fails. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**BUGS**

Seed lengths > 20 are not supported.

**SEE ALSO**

*dsa(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *rand(3)*, *DSA\_free(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DSA\_generate\_parameters()* appeared in SSLeay 0.8. The **cb\_arg** argument was added in SSLeay 0.9.0. In versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.4, **callback(1, ...)** was called in the inner loop of the Miller-Rabin test whenever it reached the squaring step (the parameters to **callback** did not reveal how many witnesses had been tested); since OpenSSL 0.9.5, **callback(1, ...)** is called as in *BN\_is\_prime(3)*, i.e. once for each witness. =cut

**NAME**

DSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index, DSA\_set\_ex\_data, DSA\_get\_ex\_data – add application specific data to DSA structures

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/DSA.h>

int DSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
                        CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
                        CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
                        CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);

int DSA_set_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx, void *arg);

char *DSA_get_ex_data(DSA *d, int idx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions handle application specific data in DSA structures. Their usage is identical to that of *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index()*, *RSA\_set\_ex\_data()* and *RSA\_get\_ex\_data()* as described in *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*, *dsa(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index()*, *DSA\_set\_ex\_data()* and *DSA\_get\_ex\_data()* are available since OpenSSL 0.9.5.

**NAME**

DSA\_new, DSA\_free – allocate and free DSA objects

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dsa.h>

DSA* DSA_new(void);

void DSA_free(DSA *dsa);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*DSA\_new()* allocates and initializes a **DSA** structure. It is equivalent to calling *DSA\_new\_method(NULL)*.

*DSA\_free()* frees the **DSA** structure and its components. The values are erased before the memory is returned to the system.

**RETURN VALUES**

If the allocation fails, *DSA\_new()* returns **NULL** and sets an error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.

*DSA\_free()* returns no value.

**SEE ALSO**

*dsa(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *DSA\_generate\_parameters(3)*, *DSA\_generate\_key(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DSA\_new()* and *DSA\_free()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

DSA\_set\_default\_method, DSA\_get\_default\_method, DSA\_set\_method, DSA\_new\_method,  
DSA\_OpenSSL – select DSA method

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>

void DSA_set_default_method(const DSA_METHOD *meth);

const DSA_METHOD *DSA_get_default_method(void);

int DSA_set_method(DSA *dsa, const DSA_METHOD *meth);

DSA *DSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine);

DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

A **DSA\_METHOD** specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for DSA operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as hardware accelerators may be used. **IMPORTANT:** See the NOTES section for important information about how these DSA API functions are affected by the use of **ENGINE** API calls.

Initially, the default DSA\_METHOD is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as returned by *DSA\_OpenSSL()*.

*DSA\_set\_default\_method()* makes **meth** the default method for all DSA structures created later. **NB:** This is true only whilst no ENGINE has been set as a default for DSA, so this function is no longer recommended.

*DSA\_get\_default\_method()* returns a pointer to the current default DSA\_METHOD. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on whether the ENGINE API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended.

*DSA\_set\_method()* selects **meth** to perform all operations using the key **rsa**. This will replace the DSA\_METHOD used by the DSA key and if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE, the handle to that ENGINE will be released during the change. It is possible to have DSA keys that only work with certain DSA\_METHOD implementations (eg. from an ENGINE module that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases attempting to change the DSA\_METHOD for the key can have unexpected results.

*DSA\_new\_method()* allocates and initializes a DSA structure so that **engine** will be used for the DSA operations. If **engine** is NULL, the default engine for DSA operations is used, and if no default ENGINE is set, the DSA\_METHOD controlled by *DSA\_set\_default\_method()* is used.

**THE DSA\_METHOD STRUCTURE**

```
struct
{
    /* name of the implementation */
    const char *name;

    /* sign */
    DSA_SIG *(*dsa_do_sign)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
                           DSA *dsa);

    /* pre-compute k-1 and r */
    int (*dsa_sign_setup)(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
                        BIGNUM **rp);

    /* verify */
    int (*dsa_do_verify)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
                        DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
```



```

/* compute rr = a1^p1 * a2^p2 mod m (May be NULL for some
                                     implementations) */
int (*dsa_mod_exp)(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1,
                  BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m,
                  BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont);

/* compute r = a ^ p mod m (May be NULL for some implementations) */
int (*bn_mod_exp)(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a,
                  const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
                  BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);

/* called at DSA_new */
int (*init)(DSA *DSA);

/* called at DSA_free */
int (*finish)(DSA *DSA);

int flags;

char *app_data; /* ?? */
} DSA_METHOD;

```

## RETURN VALUES

*DSA\_OpenSSL()* and *DSA\_get\_default\_method()* return pointers to the respective **DSA\_METHOD**s.

*DSA\_set\_default\_method()* returns no value.

*DSA\_set\_method()* returns non-zero if the provided **meth** was successfully set as the method for **dsa** (including unloading the ENGINE handle if the previous method was supplied by an ENGINE).

*DSA\_new\_method()* returns NULL and sets an error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error*(3) if the allocation fails. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.

## NOTES

As of version 0.9.7, DSA\_METHOD implementations are grouped together with other algorithmic APIs (eg. RSA\_METHOD, EVP\_CIPHER, etc) in **ENGINE** modules. If a default ENGINE is specified for DSA functionality using an ENGINE API function, that will override any DSA defaults set using the DSA API (ie. *DSA\_set\_default\_method()*). For this reason, the ENGINE API is the recommended way to control default implementations for use in DSA and other cryptographic algorithms.

## SEE ALSO

*dsa*(3), *DSA\_new*(3)

## HISTORY

*DSA\_set\_default\_method()*, *DSA\_get\_default\_method()*, *DSA\_set\_method()*, *DSA\_new\_method()* and *DSA\_OpenSSL()* were added in OpenSSL 0.9.4.

*DSA\_set\_default\_openssl\_method()* and *DSA\_get\_default\_openssl\_method()* replaced *DSA\_set\_default\_method()* and *DSA\_get\_default\_method()* respectively, and *DSA\_set\_method()* and *DSA\_new\_method()* were altered to use **ENGINE**s rather than **DSA\_METHOD**s during development of the engine version of OpenSSL 0.9.6. For 0.9.7, the handling of defaults in the ENGINE API was restructured so that this change was reversed, and behaviour of the other functions resembled more closely the previous behaviour. The behaviour of defaults in the ENGINE API now transparently overrides the behaviour of defaults in the DSA API without requiring changing these function prototypes.

**NAME**

DSA\_SIG\_new, DSA\_SIG\_free – allocate and free DSA signature objects

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dsa.h>

DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void);

void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *a);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*DSA\_SIG\_new()* allocates and initializes a **DSA\_SIG** structure.

*DSA\_SIG\_free()* frees the **DSA\_SIG** structure and its components. The values are erased before the memory is returned to the system.

**RETURN VALUES**

If the allocation fails, *DSA\_SIG\_new()* returns **NULL** and sets an error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.

*DSA\_SIG\_free()* returns no value.

**SEE ALSO**

*dsa(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *DSA\_do\_sign(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DSA\_SIG\_new()* and *DSA\_SIG\_free()* were added in OpenSSL 0.9.3.

**NAME**

DSA\_sign, DSA\_sign\_setup, DSA\_verify – DSA signatures

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dsa.h>

int    DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int len,
               unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa);

int    DSA_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinvp,
                   BIGNUM **rpp);

int    DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int len,
               unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*DSA\_sign()* computes a digital signature on the **len** byte message digest **dgst** using the private key **dsa** and places its ASN.1 DER encoding at **sigret**. The length of the signature is places in **\*siglen**. **sigret** must point to *DSA\_size(dsa)* bytes of memory.

*DSA\_sign\_setup()* may be used to precompute part of the signing operation in case signature generation is time-critical. It expects **dsa** to contain DSA parameters. It places the precomputed values in newly allocated **BIGNUM**s at **\*kinvp** and **\*rpp**, after freeing the old ones unless **\*kinvp** and **\*rpp** are NULL. These values may be passed to *DSA\_sign()* in **dsa->kinv** and **dsa->r**. **ctx** is a pre-allocated **BN\_CTX** or NULL.

*DSA\_verify()* verifies that the signature **sigbuf** of size **siglen** matches a given message digest **dgst** of size **len**. **dsa** is the signer's public key.

The **type** parameter is ignored.

The PRNG must be seeded before *DSA\_sign()* (or *DSA\_sign\_setup()*) is called.

**RETURN VALUES**

*DSA\_sign()* and *DSA\_sign\_setup()* return 1 on success, 0 on error. *DSA\_verify()* returns 1 for a valid signature, 0 for an incorrect signature and -1 on error. The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**CONFORMING TO**

US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS 186 (Digital Signature Standard, DSS), ANSI X9.30

**SEE ALSO**

*dsa(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *rand(3)*, *DSA\_do\_sign(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DSA\_sign()* and *DSA\_verify()* are available in all versions of SSLeay. *DSA\_sign\_setup()* was added in SSLeay 0.8.

**NAME**

DSA\_size – get DSA signature size

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/dsa.h>

int DSA_size(const DSA *dsa);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

This function returns the size of an ASN.1 encoded DSA signature in bytes. It can be used to determine how much memory must be allocated for a DSA signature.

**dsa->q** must not be **NULL**.

**RETURN VALUE**

The size in bytes.

**SEE ALSO**

*dsa(3)*, *DSA\_sign(3)*

**HISTORY**

*DSA\_size()* is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

engine – ENGINE cryptographic module support

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/engine.h>

ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void);
ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void);
ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e);
ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e);

int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e);
int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e);

ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id);

int ENGINE_init(ENGINE *e);
int ENGINE_finish(ENGINE *e);

void ENGINE_load_openssl(void);
void ENGINE_load_dynamic(void);
void ENGINE_load_cswift(void);
void ENGINE_load_chil(void);
void ENGINE_load_atalla(void);
void ENGINE_load_nuron(void);
void ENGINE_load_ubsec(void);
void ENGINE_load_aep(void);
void ENGINE_load_sureware(void);
void ENGINE_load_4758cca(void);
void ENGINE_load_openbsd_dev_crypto(void);
void ENGINE_load_built_in_engines(void);

void ENGINE_cleanup(void);

ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RSA(void);
ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DSA(void);
ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DH(void);
ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RAND(void);
ENGINE *ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(int nid);
ENGINE *ENGINE_get_digest_engine(int nid);

int ENGINE_set_default_RSA(ENGINE *e);
int ENGINE_set_default_DSA(ENGINE *e);
int ENGINE_set_default_DH(ENGINE *e);
int ENGINE_set_default_RAND(ENGINE *e);
int ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(ENGINE *e);
int ENGINE_set_default_digests(ENGINE *e);
int ENGINE_set_default_string(ENGINE *e, const char *list);

int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags);

unsigned int ENGINE_get_table_flags(void);
void ENGINE_set_table_flags(unsigned int flags);
```

```

int ENGINE_register_RSA(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_unregister_RSA(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_register_all_RSA(void);
int ENGINE_register_DSA(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_unregister_DSA(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_register_all_DSA(void);
int ENGINE_register_DH(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_unregister_DH(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_register_all_DH(void);
int ENGINE_register_RAND(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_unregister_RAND(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_register_all_RAND(void);
int ENGINE_register_ciphers(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_unregister_ciphers(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_register_all_ciphers(void);
int ENGINE_register_digests(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_unregister_digests(ENGINE *e);
void ENGINE_register_all_digests(void);
int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e);
int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void);

int ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
int ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(ENGINE *e, int cmd);
int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name,
                    long i, void *p, void (*f)(), int cmd_optional);
int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, const char *arg,
                           int cmd_optional);

int ENGINE_set_ex_data(ENGINE *e, int idx, void *arg);
void *ENGINE_get_ex_data(const ENGINE *e, int idx);

int ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
                           CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);

ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void);
int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e);

int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id);
int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name);
int ENGINE_set_RSA(ENGINE *e, const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth);
int ENGINE_set_DSA(ENGINE *e, const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth);
int ENGINE_set_DH(ENGINE *e, const DH_METHOD *dh_meth);
int ENGINE_set_RAND(ENGINE *e, const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth);
int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f);
int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f);
int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f);
int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f);
int ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpriv_f);
int ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpub_f);
int ENGINE_set_ciphers(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR f);
int ENGINE_set_digests(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR f);
int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags);
int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns);

```

```

const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e);
const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e);
const RSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RSA(const ENGINE *e);
const DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA(const ENGINE *e);
const DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH(const ENGINE *e);
const RAND_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RAND(const ENGINE *e);
ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e);
ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e);
ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e);
ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e);
ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function(const ENGINE *e);
ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function(const ENGINE *e);
ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ENGINE_get_ciphers(const ENGINE *e);
ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR ENGINE_get_digests(const ENGINE *e);
const EVP_CIPHER *ENGINE_get_cipher(ENGINE *e, int nid);
const EVP_MD *ENGINE_get_digest(ENGINE *e, int nid);
int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e);
const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e);

EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
    UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_public_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
    UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);

void ENGINE_add_conf_module(void);

```

## DESCRIPTION

These functions create, manipulate, and use cryptographic modules in the form of **ENGINE** objects. These objects act as containers for implementations of cryptographic algorithms, and support a reference-counted mechanism to allow them to be dynamically loaded in and out of the running application.

The cryptographic functionality that can be provided by an **ENGINE** implementation includes the following abstractions;

```

RSA_METHOD - for providing alternative RSA implementations
DSA_METHOD, DH_METHOD, RAND_METHOD - alternative DSA, DH, and RAND
EVP_CIPHER - potentially multiple cipher algorithms (indexed by 'nid')
EVP_DIGEST - potentially multiple hash algorithms (indexed by 'nid')
key-loading - loading public and/or private EVP_PKEY keys

```

## Reference counting and handles

Due to the modular nature of the ENGINE API, pointers to **ENGINE**s need to be treated as handles – ie. not only as pointers, but also as references to the underlying **ENGINE** object. Ie. you should obtain a new reference when making copies of an **ENGINE** pointer if the copies will be used (and released) independantly.

**ENGINE** objects have two levels of reference-counting to match the way in which the objects are used. At the most basic level, each **ENGINE** pointer is inherently a **structural** reference – you need a structural reference simply to refer to the pointer value at all, as this kind of reference is your guarantee that the structure can not be deallocated until you release your reference.

However, a structural reference provides no guarantee that the **ENGINE** has been initialised to be usable to perform any of its cryptographic implementations – and indeed it's quite possible that most **ENGINE**s will not be initialised at all on standard setups, as **ENGINE**s are typically used to support specialised hardware. To use an **ENGINE**'s functionality, you need a **functional** reference. This kind of reference can be considered a specialised form of structural reference, because each functional reference implicitly contains a structural reference as well – however to avoid difficult-to-find programming bugs, it is recommended to treat the two kinds of reference independantly. If you have a functional reference to an **ENGINE**, you have a guarantee that the **ENGINE** has been initialised ready to perform cryptographic operations and will not be uninitialised or cleaned up until after you have released your reference.

We will discuss the two kinds of reference separately, including how to tell which one you are dealing

with at any given point in time (after all they are both simply (ENGINE \*) pointers, the difference is in the way they are used).

#### *Structural references*

This basic type of reference is typically used for creating new ENGINES dynamically, iterating across OpenSSL's internal linked-list of loaded ENGINES, reading information about an ENGINE, etc. Essentially a structural reference is sufficient if you only need to query or manipulate the data of an ENGINE implementation rather than use its functionality.

The *ENGINE\_new()* function returns a structural reference to a new (empty) ENGINE object. Other than that, structural references come from return values to various ENGINE API functions such as; *ENGINE\_by\_id()*, *ENGINE\_get\_first()*, *ENGINE\_get\_last()*, *ENGINE\_get\_next()*, *ENGINE\_get\_prev()*. All structural references should be released by a corresponding call to the *ENGINE\_free()* function – the ENGINE object itself will only actually be cleaned up and deallocated when the last structural reference is released.

It should also be noted that many ENGINE API function calls that accept a structural reference will internally obtain another reference – typically this happens whenever the supplied ENGINE will be needed by OpenSSL after the function has returned. Eg. the function to add a new ENGINE to OpenSSL's internal list is *ENGINE\_add()* – if this function returns success, then OpenSSL will have stored a new structural reference internally so the caller is still responsible for freeing their own reference with *ENGINE\_free()* when they are finished with it. In a similar way, some functions will automatically release the structural reference passed to it if part of the function's job is to do so. Eg. the *ENGINE\_get\_next()* and *ENGINE\_get\_prev()* functions are used for iterating across the internal ENGINE list – they will return a new structural reference to the next (or previous) ENGINE in the list or NULL if at the end (or beginning) of the list, but in either case the structural reference passed to the function is released on behalf of the caller.

To clarify a particular function's handling of references, one should always consult that function's documentation “man” page, or failing that the *openssl/engine.h* header file includes some hints.

#### *Functional references*

As mentioned, functional references exist when the cryptographic functionality of an ENGINE is required to be available. A functional reference can be obtained in one of two ways; from an existing structural reference to the required ENGINE, or by asking OpenSSL for the default operational ENGINE for a given cryptographic purpose.

To obtain a functional reference from an existing structural reference, call the *ENGINE\_init()* function. This returns zero if the ENGINE was not already operational and couldn't be successfully initialised (eg. lack of system drivers, no special hardware attached, etc), otherwise it will return non-zero to indicate that the ENGINE is now operational and will have allocated a new **functional** reference to the ENGINE. In this case, the supplied ENGINE pointer is, from the point of the view of the caller, both a structural reference and a functional reference – so if the caller intends to use it as a functional reference it should free the structural reference with *ENGINE\_free()* first. If the caller wishes to use it only as a structural reference (eg. if the *ENGINE\_init()* call was simply to test if the ENGINE seems available/online), then it should free the functional reference; all functional references are released by the *ENGINE\_finish()* function.

The second way to get a functional reference is by asking OpenSSL for a default implementation for a given task, eg. by *ENGINE\_get\_default\_RSA()*, *ENGINE\_get\_default\_cipher\_engine()*, etc. These are discussed in the next section, though they are not usually required by application programmers as they are used automatically when creating and using the relevant algorithm-specific types in OpenSSL, such as RSA, DSA, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX, etc.

### **Default implementations**

For each supported abstraction, the ENGINE code maintains an internal table of state to control which implementations are available for a given abstraction and which should be used by default. These implementations are registered in the tables separated-out by an 'nid' index, because abstractions like EVP\_CIPHER and EVP\_DIGEST support many distinct algorithms and modes – ENGINES will support different numbers and combinations of these. In the case of other abstractions like RSA, DSA, etc, there is only one “algorithm” so all implementations implicitly register using the same 'nid' index. ENGINES can be **registered** into these tables to make themselves available for use automatically by the



various abstractions, eg. RSA. For illustrative purposes, we continue with the RSA example, though all comments apply similarly to the other abstractions (they each get their own table and linkage to the corresponding section of openssl code).

When a new RSA key is being created, ie. in *RSA\_new\_method()*, a “get\_default” call will be made to the ENGINE subsystem to process the RSA state table and return a functional reference to an initialised ENGINE whose RSA\_METHOD should be used. If no ENGINE should (or can) be used, it will return NULL and the RSA key will operate with a NULL ENGINE handle by using the conventional RSA implementation in OpenSSL (and will from then on behave the way it used to before the ENGINE API existed – for details see *RSA\_new\_method(3)*).

Each state table has a flag to note whether it has processed this “get\_default” query since the table was last modified, because to process this question it must iterate across all the registered ENGINES in the table trying to initialise each of them in turn, in case one of them is operational. If it returns a functional reference to an ENGINE, it will also cache another reference to speed up processing future queries (without needing to iterate across the table). Likewise, it will cache a NULL response if no ENGINE was available so that future queries won’t repeat the same iteration unless the state table changes. This behaviour can also be changed; if the ENGINE\_TABLE\_FLAG\_NOINIT flag is set (using *ENGINE\_set\_table\_flags()*), no attempted initialisations will take place, instead the only way for the state table to return a non-NULL ENGINE to the “get\_default” query will be if one is expressly set in the table. Eg. *ENGINE\_set\_default\_RSA()* does the same job as *ENGINE\_register\_RSA()* except that it also sets the state table’s cached response for the “get\_default” query.

In the case of abstractions like EVP\_CIPHER, where implementations are indexed by ‘nid’, these flags and cached-responses are distinct for each ‘nid’ value.

It is worth illustrating the difference between “registration” of ENGINES into these per-algorithm state tables and using the alternative “set\_default” functions. The latter handles both “registration” and also setting the cached “default” ENGINE in each relevant state table – so registered ENGINES will only have a chance to be initialised for use as a default if a default ENGINE wasn’t already set for the same state table. Eg. if ENGINE X supports cipher nids {A,B} and RSA, ENGINE Y supports ciphers {A} and DSA, and the following code is executed;

```
ENGINE_register_complete(X);
ENGINE_set_default(Y, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL);
e1 = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
e2 = ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(A);
e3 = ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(B);
e4 = ENGINE_get_default_DSA();
e5 = ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(C);
```

The results would be as follows;

```
assert(e1 == X);
assert(e2 == Y);
assert(e3 == X);
assert(e4 == Y);
assert(e5 == NULL);
```

### Application requirements

This section will explain the basic things an application programmer should support to make the most useful elements of the ENGINE functionality available to the user. The first thing to consider is whether the programmer wishes to make alternative ENGINE modules available to the application and user. OpenSSL maintains an internal linked list of “visible” ENGINES from which it has to operate – at start-up, this list is empty and in fact if an application does not call any ENGINE API calls and it uses static linking against openssl, then the resulting application binary will not contain any alternative ENGINE code at all. So the first consideration is whether any/all available ENGINE implementations should be made visible to OpenSSL – this is controlled by calling the various “load” functions, eg.

```
/* Make the "dynamic" ENGINE available */
void ENGINE_load_dynamic(void);
/* Make the CryptoSwift hardware acceleration support available */
void ENGINE_load_cswift(void);
/* Make support for nCipher's "CHIL" hardware available */
void ENGINE_load_chil(void);
...
/* Make ALL ENGINE implementations bundled with OpenSSL available */
void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void);
```

Having called any of these functions, ENGINE objects would have been dynamically allocated and populated with these implementations and linked into OpenSSL's internal linked list. At this point it is important to mention an important API function;

```
void ENGINE_cleanup(void);
```

If no ENGINE API functions are called at all in an application, then there are no inherent memory leaks to worry about from the ENGINE functionality, however if any ENGINES are “load”ed, even if they are never registered or used, it is necessary to use the *ENGINE\_cleanup()* function to correspondingly cleanup before program exit, if the caller wishes to avoid memory leaks. This mechanism uses an internal callback registration table so that any ENGINE API functionality that knows it requires cleanup can register its cleanup details to be called during *ENGINE\_cleanup()*. This approach allows *ENGINE\_cleanup()* to clean up after any ENGINE functionality at all that your program uses, yet doesn't automatically create linker dependencies to all possible ENGINE functionality – only the cleanup callbacks required by the functionality you do use will be required by the linker.

The fact that ENGINES are made visible to OpenSSL (and thus are linked into the program and loaded into memory at run-time) does not mean they are “registered” or called into use by OpenSSL automatically – that behaviour is something for the application to have control over. Some applications will want to allow the user to specify exactly which ENGINE they want used if any is to be used at all. Others may prefer to load all support and have OpenSSL automatically use at run-time any ENGINE that is able to successfully initialise – ie. to assume that this corresponds to acceleration hardware attached to the machine or some such thing. There are probably numerous other ways in which applications may prefer to handle things, so we will simply illustrate the consequences as they apply to a couple of simple cases and leave developers to consider these and the source code to openssl's builtin utilities as guides.

#### *Using a specific ENGINE implementation*

Here we'll assume an application has been configured by its user or admin to want to use the “ACME” ENGINE if it is available in the version of OpenSSL the application was compiled with. If it is available, it should be used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operation, otherwise OpenSSL should use its builtin software as per usual. The following code illustrates how to approach this;

```
ENGINE *e;
const char *engine_id = "ACME";
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id);
if(!e)
    /* the engine isn't available */
    return;
if(!ENGINE_init(e)) {
    /* the engine couldn't initialise, release 'e' */
    ENGINE_free(e);
    return;
}
if(!ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e))
    /* This should only happen when 'e' can't initialise, but the previous
     * statement suggests it did. */
    abort();
ENGINE_set_default_DSA(e);
ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(e);
/* Release the functional reference from ENGINE_init() */
ENGINE_finish(e);
/* Release the structural reference from ENGINE_by_id() */
ENGINE_free(e);
```

#### *Automatically using builtin ENGINE implementations*

Here we'll assume we want to load and register all ENGINE implementations bundled with OpenSSL, such that for any cryptographic algorithm required by OpenSSL – if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialised, it should be used. The following code illustrates how this can work;

```
/* Load all bundled ENGINES into memory and make them visible */
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
/* Register all of them for every algorithm they collectively implement */
ENGINE_register_all_complete();
```

That's all that's required. Eg. the next time OpenSSL tries to set up an RSA key, any bundled ENGINES that implement RSA\_METHOD will be passed to *ENGINE\_init()* and if any of those succeed, that ENGINE will be set as the default for use with RSA from then on.

#### **Advanced configuration support**

There is a mechanism supported by the ENGINE framework that allows each ENGINE implementation to define an arbitrary set of configuration “commands” and expose them to OpenSSL and any applications based on OpenSSL. This mechanism is entirely based on the use of name-value pairs and assumes ASCII input (no unicode or UTF for now!), so it is ideal if applications want to provide a transparent way for users to provide arbitrary configuration “directives” directly to such ENGINES. It is also possible for the application to dynamically interrogate the loaded ENGINE implementations for the names, descriptions, and input flags of their available “control commands”, providing a more flexible configuration scheme. However, if the user is expected to know which ENGINE device he/she is using (in the case of specialised hardware, this goes without saying) then applications may not need to concern themselves with discovering the supported control commands and simply prefer to allow settings to be passed into ENGINES exactly as they are provided by the user.

Before illustrating how control commands work, it is worth mentioning what they are typically used for. Broadly speaking there are two uses for control commands; the first is to provide the necessary details to the implementation (which may know nothing at all specific to the host system) so that it can be initialised for use. This could include the path to any driver or config files it needs to load, required network addresses, smart-card identifiers, passwords to initialise password-protected devices, logging information, etc etc. This class of commands typically needs to be passed to an ENGINE **before** attempting to initialise it, ie. before calling *ENGINE\_init()*. The other class of commands consist of settings or operations that tweak certain behaviour or cause certain operations to take place, and these commands may work either before or after *ENGINE\_init()*, or in some cases both. ENGINE implementations should provide indications of this in the descriptions attached to builtin control commands

and/or in external product documentation.

#### *Issuing control commands to an ENGINE*

Let's illustrate by example; a function for which the caller supplies the name of the ENGINE it wishes to use, a table of string-pairs for use before initialisation, and another table for use after initialisation. Note that the string-pairs used for control commands consist of a command "name" followed by the command "parameter" – the parameter could be NULL in some cases but the name can not. This function should initialise the ENGINE (issuing the "pre" commands beforehand and the "post" commands afterwards) and set it as the default for everything except RAND and then return a boolean success or failure.

```
int generic_load_engine_fn(const char *engine_id,
                          const char **pre_cmds, int pre_num,
                          const char **post_cmds, int post_num)
{
    ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id);
    if(!e) return 0;
    while(pre_num-- > 0) {
        if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, pre_cmds[0], pre_cmds[1], 0)) {
            fprintf(stderr, "Failed command (%s - %s:%s)\n", engine_id,
                    pre_cmds[0], pre_cmds[1] ? pre_cmds[1] : "(NULL)");
            ENGINE_free(e);
            return 0;
        }
        pre_cmds += 2;
    }
    if(!ENGINE_init(e)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Failed initialisation\n");
        ENGINE_free(e);
        return 0;
    }
    /* ENGINE_init() returned a functional reference, so free the structural
     * reference from ENGINE_by_id(). */
    ENGINE_free(e);
    while(post_num-- > 0) {
        if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, post_cmds[0], post_cmds[1], 0)) {
            fprintf(stderr, "Failed command (%s - %s:%s)\n", engine_id,
                    post_cmds[0], post_cmds[1] ? post_cmds[1] : "(NULL)");
            ENGINE_finish(e);
            return 0;
        }
        post_cmds += 2;
    }
    ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL & ~ENGINE_METHOD_RAND);
    /* Success */
    return 1;
}
```

Note that *ENGINE\_ctrl\_cmd\_string()* accepts a boolean argument that can relax the semantics of the function – if set non-zero it will only return failure if the ENGINE supported the given command name but failed while executing it, if the ENGINE doesn't support the command name it will simply return success without doing anything. In this case we assume the user is only supplying commands specific to the given ENGINE so we set this to FALSE.

#### *Discovering supported control commands*

It is possible to discover at run-time the names, numerical-ids, descriptions and input parameters of the control commands supported from a structural reference to any ENGINE. It is first important to note that some control commands are defined by OpenSSL itself and it will intercept and handle these control commands on behalf of the ENGINE, ie. the ENGINE's *ctrl()* handler is not used for the control command. `openssl/engine.h` defines a symbol, `ENGINE_CMD_BASE`, that all control commands

implemented by ENGINES from. Any command value lower than this symbol is considered a “generic” command is handled directly by the OpenSSL core routines.

It is using these “core” control commands that one can discover the the control commands implemented by a given ENGINE, specifically the commands;

```
#define ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION          10
#define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE    11
#define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE     12
#define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME     13
#define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD 14
#define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD     15
#define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD 16
#define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD     17
#define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS         18
```

Whilst these commands are automatically processed by the OpenSSL framework code, they use various properties exposed by each ENGINE by which to process these queries. An ENGINE has 3 properties it exposes that can affect this behaviour; it can supply a *ctrl()* handler, it can specify ENGINE\_FLAGS\_MANUAL\_CMD\_CTRL in the ENGINE’s flags, and it can expose an array of control command descriptions. If an ENGINE specifies the ENGINE\_FLAGS\_MANUAL\_CMD\_CTRL flag, then it will simply pass all these “core” control commands directly to the ENGINE’s *ctrl()* handler (and thus, it must have supplied one), so it is up to the ENGINE to reply to these “discovery” commands itself. If that flag is not set, then the OpenSSL framework code will work with the following rules;

```
if no ctrl() handler supplied;
    ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns FALSE (zero),
    all other commands fail.
if a ctrl() handler was supplied but no array of control commands;
    ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns TRUE,
    all other commands fail.
if a ctrl() handler and array of control commands was supplied;
    ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns TRUE,
    all other commands proceed processing ...
```

If the ENGINE’s array of control commands is empty then all other commands will fail, otherwise; ENGINE\_CTRL\_GET\_FIRST\_CMD\_TYPE returns the identifier of the first command supported by the ENGINE, ENGINE\_GET\_NEXT\_CMD\_TYPE takes the identifier of a command supported by the ENGINE and returns the next command identifier or fails if there are no more, ENGINE\_CMD\_FROM\_NAME takes a string name for a command and returns the corresponding identifier or fails if no such command name exists, and the remaining commands take a command identifier and return properties of the corresponding commands. All except ENGINE\_CTRL\_GET\_FLAGS return the string length of a command name or description, or populate a supplied character buffer with a copy of the command name or description. ENGINE\_CTRL\_GET\_FLAGS returns a bitwise-OR’d mask of the following possible values;

```
#define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC           (unsigned int)0x0001
#define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING           (unsigned int)0x0002
#define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT         (unsigned int)0x0004
#define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL         (unsigned int)0x0008
```

If the ENGINE\_CMD\_FLAG\_INTERNAL flag is set, then any other flags are purely informational to the caller – this flag will prevent the command being usable for any higher-level ENGINE functions such as *ENGINE\_ctrl\_cmd\_string()*. “INTERNAL” commands are not intended to be exposed to text-based configuration by applications, administrations, users, etc. These can support arbitrary operations via *ENGINE\_ctrl()*, including passing to and/or from the control commands data of any arbitrary type. These commands are supported in the discovery mechanisms simply to allow applications determine if an ENGINE supports certain specific commands it might want to use (eg. application “foo” might query various ENGINES to see if they implement “FOO\_GET\_VENDOR\_LOGO\_GIF” – and ENGINE could therefore decide whether or not to support this “foo”-specific extension).

**Future developments**

The ENGINE API and internal architecture is currently being reviewed. Slated for possible release in 0.9.8 is support for transparent loading of “dynamic” ENGINEs (built as self-contained shared-libraries). This would allow ENGINE implementations to be provided independantly of OpenSSL libraries and/or OpenSSL-based applications, and would also remove any requirement for applications to explicitly use the “dynamic” ENGINE to bind to shared-library implementations.

**SEE ALSO**

*rsa(3), dsa(3), dh(3), rand(3), RSA\_new\_method(3)*

**NAME**

err – error codes

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/err.h>

unsigned long ERR_get_error(void);
unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void);
unsigned long ERR_get_error_line(const char **file, int *line);
unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line(const char **file, int *line);
unsigned long ERR_get_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
    const char **data, int *flags);
unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
    const char **data, int *flags);

int ERR_GET_LIB(unsigned long e);
int ERR_GET_FUNC(unsigned long e);
int ERR_GET_REASON(unsigned long e);

void ERR_clear_error(void);

char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long e, char *buf);
const char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e);
const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e);
const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e);

void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp);
void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp);

void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void);
void ERR_free_strings(void);

void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid);

void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file,
    int line);
void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...);

void ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA str[]);
unsigned long ERR_PACK(int lib, int func, int reason);
int ERR_get_next_error_library(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

When a call to the OpenSSL library fails, this is usually signalled by the return value, and an error code is stored in an error queue associated with the current thread. The **err** library provides functions to obtain these error codes and textual error messages.

The *ERR\_get\_error*(3) manpage describes how to access error codes.

Error codes contain information about where the error occurred, and what went wrong. *ERR\_GET\_LIB*(3) describes how to extract this information. A method to obtain human-readable error messages is described in *ERR\_error\_string*(3).

*ERR\_clear\_error*(3) can be used to clear the error queue.

Note that *ERR\_remove\_state*(3) should be used to avoid memory leaks when threads are terminated.

**ADDING NEW ERROR CODES TO OPENSLL**

See *ERR\_put\_error*(3) if you want to record error codes in the OpenSSL error system from within your application.

The remainder of this section is of interest only if you want to add new error codes to OpenSSL or add error codes from external libraries.

## Reporting errors

Each sub-library has a specific macro `XXXerr()` that is used to report errors. Its first argument is a function code `XXX_F_...`, the second argument is a reason code `XXX_R_...`. Function codes are derived from the function names; reason codes consist of textual error descriptions. For example, the function `ssl23_read()` reports a “handshake failure” as follows:

```
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_READ, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
```

Function and reason codes should consist of upper case characters, numbers and underscores only. The error file generation script translates function codes into function names by looking in the header files for an appropriate function name, if none is found it just uses the capitalized form such as “SSL23\_READ” in the above example.

The trailing section of a reason code (after the “\_R\_”) is translated into lower case and underscores changed to spaces.

When you are using new function or reason codes, run **make errors**. The necessary **#defines** will then automatically be added to the sub-library’s header file.

Although a library will normally report errors using its own specific `XXXerr` macro, another library’s macro can be used. This is normally only done when a library wants to include ASN1 code which must use the `ASN1err()` macro.

## Adding new libraries

When adding a new sub-library to OpenSSL, assign it a library number **ERR\_LIB\_XXX**, define a macro `XXXerr()` (both in **err.h**), add its name to **ERR\_str\_libraries[]** (in **crypto/err/err.c**), and add `ERR_load_XXX_strings()` to the `ERR_load_crypto_strings()` function (in **crypto/err/err\_all.c**). Finally, add an entry

```
L      XXX      xxx.h      xxx_err.c
```

to **crypto/err/openssl.ec**, and add **xxx\_err.c** to the Makefile. Running **make errors** will then generate a file **xxx\_err.c**, and add all error codes used in the library to **xxx.h**.

Additionally the library include file must have a certain form. Typically it will initially look like this:

```
#ifndef HEADER_XXX_H
#define HEADER_XXX_H

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

/* Include files */

#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>

/* Macros, structures and function prototypes */

/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
```

The **BEGIN ERROR CODES** sequence is used by the error code generation script as the point to place new error codes, any text after this point will be overwritten when **make errors** is run. The closing **#endif** etc will be automatically added by the script.

The generated C error code file **xxx\_err.c** will load the header files **stdio.h**, **openssl/err.h** and **openssl/xxx.h** so the header file must load any additional header files containing any definitions it uses.

## USING ERROR CODES IN EXTERNAL LIBRARIES

It is also possible to use OpenSSL’s error code scheme in external libraries. The library needs to load its own codes and call the OpenSSL error code insertion script **mkerr.pl** explicitly to add codes to the header file and generate the C error code file. This will normally be done if the external library needs to generate new ASN1 structures but it can also be used to add more general purpose error code handling.

TBA more details



## INTERNALS

The error queues are stored in a hash table with one **ERR\_STATE** entry for each pid. *ERR\_get\_state()* returns the current thread's **ERR\_STATE**. An **ERR\_STATE** can hold up to **ERR\_NUM\_ERRORS** error codes. When more error codes are added, the old ones are overwritten, on the assumption that the most recent errors are most important.

Error strings are also stored in hash table. The hash tables can be obtained by calling *ERR\_get\_err\_state\_table(void)* and *ERR\_get\_string\_table(void)* respectively.

## SEE ALSO

*CRYPTO\_set\_id\_callback(3)*, *CRYPTO\_set\_locking\_callback(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*,  
*ERR\_GET\_LIB(3)*, *ERR\_clear\_error(3)*, *ERR\_error\_string(3)*, *ERR\_print\_errors(3)*,  
*ERR\_load\_crypto\_strings(3)*, *ERR\_remove\_state(3)*, *ERR\_put\_error(3)*, *ERR\_load\_strings(3)*,  
*SSL\_get\_error(3)*

**NAME**

ERR\_clear\_error – clear the error queue

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/err.h>

void ERR_clear_error(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*ERR\_clear\_error()* empties the current thread's error queue.

**RETURN VALUES**

*ERR\_clear\_error()* has no return value.

**SEE ALSO**

*err(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*

**HISTORY**

*ERR\_clear\_error()* is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

`ERR_error_string`, `ERR_error_string_n`, `ERR_lib_error_string`, `ERR_func_error_string`, `ERR_reason_error_string` – obtain human-readable error message

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/err.h>

char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long e, char *buf);
char *ERR_error_string_n(unsigned long e, char *buf, size_t len);

const char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e);
const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e);
const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

`ERR_error_string()` generates a human-readable string representing the error code *e*, and places it at *buf*. *buf* must be at least 120 bytes long. If *buf* is `NULL`, the error string is placed in a static buffer. `ERR_error_string_n()` is a variant of `ERR_error_string()` that writes at most *len* characters (including the terminating 0) and truncates the string if necessary. For `ERR_error_string_n()`, *buf* may not be `NULL`.

The string will have the following format:

```
error:[error code]:[library name]:[function name]:[reason string]
```

*error code* is an 8 digit hexadecimal number, *library name*, *function name* and *reason string* are ASCII text.

`ERR_lib_error_string()`, `ERR_func_error_string()` and `ERR_reason_error_string()` return the library name, function name and reason string respectively.

The OpenSSL error strings should be loaded by calling `ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)` or, for SSL applications, `SSL_load_error_strings(3)` first. If there is no text string registered for the given error code, the error string will contain the numeric code.

`ERR_print_errors(3)` can be used to print all error codes currently in the queue.

**RETURN VALUES**

`ERR_error_string()` returns a pointer to a static buffer containing the string if *buf* == `NULL`, *buf* otherwise.

`ERR_lib_error_string()`, `ERR_func_error_string()` and `ERR_reason_error_string()` return the strings, and `NULL` if none is registered for the error code.

**SEE ALSO**

`err(3)`, `ERR_get_error(3)`, `ERR_load_crypto_strings(3)`, `SSL_load_error_strings(3)`  
`ERR_print_errors(3)`

**HISTORY**

`ERR_error_string()` is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. `ERR_error_string_n()` was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6.

**NAME**

`ERR_get_error`, `ERR_peek_error`, `ERR_peek_last_error`, `ERR_get_error_line`, `ERR_peek_error_line`, `ERR_peek_last_error_line`, `ERR_get_error_line_data`, `ERR_peek_error_line_data`, `ERR_peek_last_error_line_data` – obtain error code and data

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/err.h>

unsigned long ERR_get_error(void);
unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void);
unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error(void);

unsigned long ERR_get_error_line(const char **file, int *line);
unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line(const char **file, int *line);
unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line(const char **file, int *line);

unsigned long ERR_get_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
                                     const char **data, int *flags);
unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
                                     const char **data, int *flags);
unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line,
                                     const char **data, int *flags);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

`ERR_get_error()` returns the earliest error code from the thread's error queue and removes the entry. This function can be called repeatedly until there are no more error codes to return.

`ERR_peek_error()` returns the earliest error code from the thread's error queue without modifying it.

`ERR_peek_last_error()` returns the latest error code from the thread's error queue without modifying it.

See `ERR_GET_LIB(3)` for obtaining information about location and reason of the error, and `ERR_error_string(3)` for human-readable error messages.

`ERR_get_error_line()`, `ERR_peek_error_line()` and `ERR_peek_last_error_line()` are the same as the above, but they additionally store the file name and line number where the error occurred in `*file` and `*line`, unless these are `NULL`.

`ERR_get_error_line_data()`, `ERR_peek_error_line_data()` and `ERR_peek_last_error_line_data()` store additional data and flags associated with the error code in `*data` and `*flags`, unless these are `NULL`. `*data` contains a string if `*flags & ERR_TXT_STRING`. If it has been allocated by `OPENSSL_malloc()`, `*flags & ERR_TXT_MALLOCED` is true.

**RETURN VALUES**

The error code, or 0 if there is no error in the queue.

**SEE ALSO**

`err(3)`, `ERR_error_string(3)`, `ERR_GET_LIB(3)`

**HISTORY**

`ERR_get_error()`, `ERR_peek_error()`, `ERR_get_error_line()` and `ERR_peek_error_line()` are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. `ERR_get_error_line_data()` and `ERR_peek_error_line_data()` were added in SSLeay 0.9.0. `ERR_peek_last_error()`, `ERR_peek_last_error_line()` and `ERR_peek_last_error_line_data()` were added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

**NAME**

ERR\_GET\_LIB, ERR\_GET\_FUNC, ERR\_GET\_REASON – get library, function and reason code

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/err.h>

int ERR_GET_LIB(unsigned long e);

int ERR_GET_FUNC(unsigned long e);

int ERR_GET_REASON(unsigned long e);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The error code returned by *ERR\_get\_error()* consists of a library number, function code and reason code. *ERR\_GET\_LIB()*, *ERR\_GET\_FUNC()* and *ERR\_GET\_REASON()* can be used to extract these.

The library number and function code describe where the error occurred, the reason code is the information about what went wrong.

Each sub-library of OpenSSL has a unique library number; function and reason codes are unique within each sub-library. Note that different libraries may use the same value to signal different functions and reasons.

**ERR\_R...** reason codes such as **ERR\_R\_MALLOC\_FAILURE** are globally unique. However, when checking for sub-library specific reason codes, be sure to also compare the library number.

*ERR\_GET\_LIB()*, *ERR\_GET\_FUNC()* and *ERR\_GET\_REASON()* are macros.

**RETURN VALUES**

The library number, function code and reason code respectively.

**SEE ALSO**

*err(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*

**HISTORY**

*ERR\_GET\_LIB()*, *ERR\_GET\_FUNC()* and *ERR\_GET\_REASON()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

ERR\_load\_crypto\_strings, SSL\_load\_error\_strings, ERR\_free\_strings – load and free error strings

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/err.h>

void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void);
void ERR_free_strings(void);

#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_load_error_strings(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*ERR\_load\_crypto\_strings()* registers the error strings for all **libcrypto** functions. *SSL\_load\_error\_strings()* does the same, but also registers the **libssl** error strings.

One of these functions should be called before generating textual error messages. However, this is not required when memory usage is an issue.

*ERR\_free\_strings()* frees all previously loaded error strings.

**RETURN VALUES**

*ERR\_load\_crypto\_strings()*, *SSL\_load\_error\_strings()* and *ERR\_free\_strings()* return no values.

**SEE ALSO**

*err*(3), *ERR\_error\_string*(3)

**HISTORY**

*ERR\_load\_error\_strings()*, *SSL\_load\_error\_strings()* and *ERR\_free\_strings()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

ERR\_load\_strings, ERR\_PACK, ERR\_get\_next\_error\_library – load arbitrary error strings

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/err.h>

void ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA str[]);

int ERR_get_next_error_library(void);

unsigned long ERR_PACK(int lib, int func, int reason);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*ERR\_load\_strings()* registers error strings for library number **lib**.

**str** is an array of error string data:

```
typedef struct ERR_string_data_st
{
    unsigned long error;
    char *string;
} ERR_STRING_DATA;
```

The error code is generated from the library number and a function and reason code: **error** = ERR\_PACK(**lib**, **func**, **reason**). *ERR\_PACK()* is a macro.

The last entry in the array is {0,0}.

*ERR\_get\_next\_error\_library()* can be used to assign library numbers to user libraries at runtime.

**RETURN VALUE**

*ERR\_load\_strings()* returns no value. *ERR\_PACK()* return the error code. *ERR\_get\_next\_error\_library()* returns a new library number.

**SEE ALSO**

*err(3)*, *ERR\_load\_strings(3)*

**HISTORY**

*ERR\_load\_error\_strings()* and *ERR\_PACK()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. *ERR\_get\_next\_error\_library()* was added in SSLeay 0.9.0.

**NAME**

ERR\_print\_errors, ERR\_print\_errors\_fp – print error messages

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/err.h>

void ERR_print_errors(BIO *bp);
void ERR_print_errors_fp(FILE *fp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*ERR\_print\_errors()* is a convenience function that prints the error strings for all errors that OpenSSL has recorded to **bp**, thus emptying the error queue.

*ERR\_print\_errors\_fp()* is the same, except that the output goes to a **FILE**.

The error strings will have the following format:

```
[pid]:error:[error code]:[library name]:[function name]:[reason string]:[file name]
```

*error code* is an 8 digit hexadecimal number. *library name*, *function name* and *reason string* are ASCII text, as is *optional text message* if one was set for the respective error code.

If there is no text string registered for the given error code, the error string will contain the numeric code.

**RETURN VALUES**

*ERR\_print\_errors()* and *ERR\_print\_errors\_fp()* return no values.

**SEE ALSO**

*err(3)*, *ERR\_error\_string(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *ERR\_load\_crypto\_strings(3)*,  
*SSL\_load\_error\_strings(3)*

**HISTORY**

*ERR\_print\_errors()* and *ERR\_print\_errors\_fp()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.



**NAME**

ERR\_put\_error, ERR\_add\_error\_data – record an error

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/err.h>

void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file,
                  int line);

void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*ERR\_put\_error()* adds an error code to the thread's error queue. It signals that the error of reason code **reason** occurred in function **func** of library **lib**, in line number **line** of **file**. This function is usually called by a macro.

*ERR\_add\_error\_data()* associates the concatenation of its **num** string arguments with the error code added last.

*ERR\_load\_strings(3)* can be used to register error strings so that the application can generate human-readable error messages for the error code.

**RETURN VALUES**

*ERR\_put\_error()* and *ERR\_add\_error\_data()* return no values.

**SEE ALSO**

*err(3)*, *ERR\_load\_strings(3)*

**HISTORY**

*ERR\_put\_error()* is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. *ERR\_add\_error\_data()* was added in SSLeay 0.9.0.

**NAME**

ERR\_remove\_state – free a thread’s error queue

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/err.h>

void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*ERR\_remove\_state()* frees the error queue associated with thread **pid**. If **pid** == 0, the current thread will have its error queue removed.

Since error queue data structures are allocated automatically for new threads, they must be freed when threads are terminated in order to avoid memory leaks.

**RETURN VALUE**

*ERR\_remove\_state()* returns no value.

**SEE ALSO**

*err*(3)

**HISTORY**

*ERR\_remove\_state()* is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

evp – high-level cryptographic functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The EVP library provides a high-level interface to cryptographic functions.

**EVP\_Seal...** and **EVP\_Open...** provide public key encryption and decryption to implement digital “envelopes”.

The **EVP\_Sign...** and **EVP\_Verify...** functions implement digital signatures.

Symmetric encryption is available with the **EVP\_Encrypt...** functions. The **EVP\_Digest...** functions provide message digests.

Algorithms are loaded with *OpenSSL\_add\_all\_algorithms*(3).

All the symmetric algorithms (ciphers) and digests can be replaced by ENGINE modules providing alternative implementations. If ENGINE implementations of ciphers or digests are registered as defaults, then the various EVP functions will automatically use those implementations automatically in preference to built in software implementations. For more information, consult the *engine*(3) man page.

**SEE ALSO**

*EVP\_DigestInit*(3), *EVP\_EncryptInit*(3), *EVP\_OpenInit*(3), *EVP\_SealInit*(3), *EVP\_SignInit*(3), *EVP\_VerifyInit*(3), *OpenSSL\_add\_all\_algorithms*(3), *engine*(3)

**NAME**

EVP\_MD\_CTX\_init, EVP\_MD\_CTX\_create, EVP\_DigestInit\_ex, EVP\_DigestUpdate, EVP\_DigestFinal\_ex, EVP\_MD\_CTX\_cleanup, EVP\_MD\_CTX\_destroy, EVP\_MAX\_MD\_SIZE, EVP\_MD\_CTX\_copy\_ex, EVP\_MD\_CTX\_copy, EVP\_MD\_type, EVP\_MD\_pkey\_type, EVP\_MD\_size, EVP\_MD\_block\_size, EVP\_MD\_CTX\_md, EVP\_MD\_CTX\_size, EVP\_MD\_CTX\_block\_size, EVP\_MD\_CTX\_type, EVP\_md\_null, EVP\_md2, EVP\_md5, EVP\_sha, EVP\_sha1, EVP\_dss, EVP\_dss1, EVP\_mdc2, EVP\_ripemd160, EVP\_get\_digestbyname, EVP\_get\_digestbynid, EVP\_get\_digestbyobj – EVP digest routines

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

void EVP_MD_CTX_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_create(void);

int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl);
int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt);
int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md,
    unsigned int *s);

int EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
void EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);

int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in);

int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);
int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md,
    unsigned int *s);

int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, EVP_MD_CTX *in);

#define EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE (16+20) /* The SSLv3 md5+sha1 type */

#define EVP_MD_type(e) ((e)->type)
#define EVP_MD_pkey_type(e) ((e)->pkey_type)
#define EVP_MD_size(e) ((e)->md_size)
#define EVP_MD_block_size(e) ((e)->block_size)

#define EVP_MD_CTX_md(e) (e)->digest
#define EVP_MD_CTX_size(e) EVP_MD_size((e)->digest)
#define EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(e) EVP_MD_block_size((e)->digest)
#define EVP_MD_CTX_type(e) EVP_MD_type((e)->digest)

const EVP_MD *EVP_md_null(void);
const EVP_MD *EVP_md2(void);
const EVP_MD *EVP_md5(void);
const EVP_MD *EVP_sha(void);
const EVP_MD *EVP_sha1(void);
const EVP_MD *EVP_dss(void);
const EVP_MD *EVP_dss1(void);
const EVP_MD *EVP_mdc2(void);
const EVP_MD *EVP_ripemd160(void);

const EVP_MD *EVP_get_digestbyname(const char *name);
#define EVP_get_digestbynid(a) EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(a))
#define EVP_get_digestbyobj(a) EVP_get_digestbynid(OBJ_obj2nid(a))
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The EVP digest routines are a high level interface to message digests.

*EVP\_MD\_CTX\_init()* initializes digest context **ctx**.

*EVP\_MD\_CTX\_create()* allocates, initializes and returns a digest context.

*EVP\_DigestInit\_ex()* sets up digest context **ctx** to use a digest **type** from ENGINE **impl**. **ctx** must be initialized before calling this function. **type** will typically be supplied by a function such as *EVP\_sha1()*. If **impl** is NULL then the default implementation of digest **type** is used.

*EVP\_DigestUpdate()* hashes **cnt** bytes of data at **d** into the digest context **ctx**. This function can be called several times on the same **ctx** to hash additional data.

*EVP\_DigestFinal\_ex()* retrieves the digest value from **ctx** and places it in **md**. If the **s** parameter is not NULL then the number of bytes of data written (i.e. the length of the digest) will be written to the integer at **s**, at most **EVP\_MAX\_MD\_SIZE** bytes will be written. After calling *EVP\_DigestFinal\_ex()* no additional calls to *EVP\_DigestUpdate()* can be made, but *EVP\_DigestInit\_ex()* can be called to initialize a new digest operation.

*EVP\_MD\_CTX\_cleanup()* cleans up digest context **ctx**, it should be called after a digest context is no longer needed.

*EVP\_MD\_CTX\_destroy()* cleans up digest context **ctx** and frees up the space allocated to it, it should be called only on a context created using *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_create()*.

*EVP\_MD\_CTX\_copy\_ex()* can be used to copy the message digest state from **in** to **out**. This is useful if large amounts of data are to be hashed which only differ in the last few bytes. **out** must be initialized before calling this function.

*EVP\_DigestInit()* behaves in the same way as *EVP\_DigestInit\_ex()* except the passed context **ctx** does not have to be initialized, and it always uses the default digest implementation.

*EVP\_DigestFinal()* is similar to *EVP\_DigestFinal\_ex()* except the digest context **ctx** is automatically cleaned up.

*EVP\_MD\_CTX\_copy()* is similar to *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_copy\_ex()* except the destination **out** does not have to be initialized.

*EVP\_MD\_size()* and *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_size()* return the size of the message digest when passed an **EVP\_MD** or an **EVP\_MD\_CTX** structure, i.e. the size of the hash.

*EVP\_MD\_block\_size()* and *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_block\_size()* return the block size of the message digest when passed an **EVP\_MD** or an **EVP\_MD\_CTX** structure.

*EVP\_MD\_type()* and *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_type()* return the NID of the OBJECT IDENTIFIER representing the given message digest when passed an **EVP\_MD** structure. For example *EVP\_MD\_type(EVP\_sha1())* returns **NID\_sha1**. This function is normally used when setting ASN1 OIDs.

*EVP\_MD\_CTX\_md()* returns the **EVP\_MD** structure corresponding to the passed **EVP\_MD\_CTX**.

*EVP\_MD\_pkey\_type()* returns the NID of the public key signing algorithm associated with this digest. For example *EVP\_sha1()* is associated with RSA so this will return **NID\_sha1WithRSAEncryption**. This “link” between digests and signature algorithms may not be retained in future versions of OpenSSL.

*EVP\_md2()*, *EVP\_md5()*, *EVP\_sha()*, *EVP\_sha1()*, *EVP\_md5c2()* and *EVP\_ripemd160()* return **EVP\_MD** structures for the MD2, MD5, SHA, SHA1, MDC2 and RIPEMD160 digest algorithms respectively. The associated signature algorithm is RSA in each case.

*EVP\_dss()* and *EVP\_dss1()* return **EVP\_MD** structures for SHA and SHA1 digest algorithms but using DSS (DSA) for the signature algorithm.

*EVP\_md\_null()* is a “null” message digest that does nothing: i.e. the hash it returns is of zero length.

*EVP\_get\_digestbyname()*, *EVP\_get\_digestbynid()* and *EVP\_get\_digestbyobj()* return an **EVP\_MD** structure when passed a digest name, a digest NID or an ASN1\_OBJECT structure respectively. The digest table must be initialized using, for example, *OpenSSL\_add\_all\_digests()* for these functions to work.

## RETURN VALUES

*EVP\_DigestInit\_ex()*, *EVP\_DigestUpdate()* and *EVP\_DigestFinal\_ex()* return 1 for success and 0 for failure.

*EVP\_MD\_CTX\_copy\_ex()* returns 1 if successful or 0 for failure.

*EVP\_MD\_type()*, *EVP\_MD\_pkey\_type()* and *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_type()* return the NID of the corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER or **NID\_undef** if none exists.

*EVP\_MD\_size()*, *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_size()*, *EVP\_MD\_block\_size()*, *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_block\_size()* and *EVP\_MD\_pkey\_type()* return the digest or block size in bytes.

*EVP\_md\_null()*, *EVP\_md2()*, *EVP\_md5()*, *EVP\_sha()*, *EVP\_sha1()*, *EVP\_dss()*, *EVP\_dss1()*, *EVP\_md2c()* and *EVP\_ripemd160()* return pointers to the corresponding EVP\_MD structures.

*EVP\_get\_digestbyname()*, *EVP\_get\_digestbynid()* and *EVP\_get\_digestbyobj()* return either an **EVP\_MD** structure or NULL if an error occurs.

## NOTES

The **EVP** interface to message digests should almost always be used in preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the digest used and much more flexible.

SHA1 is the digest of choice for new applications. The other digest algorithms are still in common use.

For most applications the **impl** parameter to *EVP\_DigestInit\_ex()* will be set to NULL to use the default digest implementation.

The functions *EVP\_DigestInit()*, *EVP\_DigestFinal()* and *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_copy()* are obsolete but are retained to maintain compatibility with existing code. New applications should use *EVP\_DigestInit\_ex()*, *EVP\_DigestFinal\_ex()* and *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_copy\_ex()* because they can efficiently reuse a digest context instead of initializing and cleaning it up on each call and allow non default implementations of digests to be specified.

In OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if digest contexts are not cleaned up after use memory leaks will occur.

## EXAMPLE

This example digests the data "Test Message\n" and "Hello World\n", using the digest name passed on the command line.

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>

main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    EVP_MD_CTX mdctx;
    const EVP_MD *md;
    char mess1[] = "Test Message\n";
    char mess2[] = "Hello World\n";
    unsigned char md_value[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
    int md_len, i;

    OpenSSL_add_all_digests();

    if(!argv[1]) {
        printf("Usage: mdtest digestname\n");
        exit(1);
    }

    md = EVP_get_digestbyname(argv[1]);

    if(!md) {
        printf("Unknown message digest %s\n", argv[1]);
        exit(1);
    }

    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mdctx);
    EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mdctx, md, NULL);
    EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, mess1, strlen(mess1));
    EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, mess2, strlen(mess2));
    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mdctx, md_value, &md_len);
    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mdctx);

    printf("Digest is: ");
    for(i = 0; i < md_len; i++) printf("%02x", md_value[i]);
    printf("\n");
}
```

## BUGS

The link between digests and signing algorithms results in a situation where *EVP\_sha1()* must be used with RSA and *EVP\_dss1()* must be used with DSS even though they are identical digests.

**SEE ALSO**

*evp*(3), *hmac*(3), *md2*(3), *md5*(3), *mdc2*(3), *ripemd*(3), *sha*(3), *dgst*(1)

**HISTORY**

*EVP\_DigestInit()*, *EVP\_DigestUpdate()* and *EVP\_DigestFinal()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

*EVP\_MD\_CTX\_init()*, *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_create()*, *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_copy\_ex()*, *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_cleanup()*, *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_destroy()*, *EVP\_DigestInit\_ex()* and *EVP\_DigestFinal\_ex()* were added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

*EVP\_md\_null()*, *EVP\_md2()*, *EVP\_md5()*, *EVP\_sha()*, *EVP\_sha1()*, *EVP\_dss()*, *EVP\_dss1()*, *EVP\_mdc2()* and *EVP\_ripemd160()* were changed to return truly const EVP\_MD \* in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

**NAME**

EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_init, EVP\_EncryptInit\_ex, EVP\_EncryptUpdate, EVP\_EncryptFinal\_ex, EVP\_DecryptInit\_ex, EVP\_DecryptUpdate, EVP\_DecryptFinal\_ex, EVP\_CipherInit\_ex, EVP\_CipherUpdate, EVP\_CipherFinal\_ex, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_set\_key\_length, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_ctrl, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_cleanup, EVP\_EncryptInit, EVP\_EncryptFinal, EVP\_DecryptInit, EVP\_DecryptFinal, EVP\_CipherInit, EVP\_CipherFinal, EVP\_get\_cipherbyname, EVP\_get\_cipherbynid, EVP\_get\_cipherbyobj, EVP\_CIPHER\_nid, EVP\_CIPHER\_block\_size, EVP\_CIPHER\_key\_length, EVP\_CIPHER\_iv\_length, EVP\_CIPHER\_flags, EVP\_CIPHER\_mode, EVP\_CIPHER\_type, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_cipher, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_nid, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_block\_size, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_key\_length, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_iv\_length, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_get\_app\_data, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_set\_app\_data, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_type, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_flags, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_mode, EVP\_CIPHER\_param\_to\_asn1, EVP\_CIPHER\_asn1\_to\_param, EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_set\_padding – EVP cipher routines

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *a);

int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
    ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
    int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl);
int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
    int *outl);

int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
    ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
    int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl);
int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
    int *outl);

int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
    ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc);
int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
    int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl);
int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
    int *outl);

int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
    unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
    int *outl);

int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
    unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
    int *outl);

int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
    unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc);
int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
    int *outl);

int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int padding);
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int keylen);
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *a);
```



```

const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyname(const char *name);
#define EVP_get_cipherbynid(a) EVP_get_cipherbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(a))
#define EVP_get_cipherbyobj(a) EVP_get_cipherbynid(OBJ_obj2nid(a))

#define EVP_CIPHER_nid(e) ((e)->nid)
#define EVP_CIPHER_block_size(e) ((e)->block_size)
#define EVP_CIPHER_key_length(e) ((e)->key_len)
#define EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(e) ((e)->iv_len)
#define EVP_CIPHER_flags(e) ((e)->flags)
#define EVP_CIPHER_mode(e) ((e)->flags) & EVP_CIPH_MODE)
int EVP_CIPHER_type(const EVP_CIPHER *ctx);

#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(e) ((e)->cipher)
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(e) ((e)->cipher->nid)
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(e) ((e)->cipher->block_size)
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(e) ((e)->key_len)
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(e) ((e)->cipher->iv_len)
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(e) ((e)->app_data)
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(e,d) ((e)->app_data=(char *) (d))
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(c) EVP_CIPHER_type(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(c))
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags(e) ((e)->cipher->flags)
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(e) ((e)->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_MODE)

int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type);
int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type);

```

## DESCRIPTION

The EVP cipher routines are a high level interface to certain symmetric ciphers.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_init()* initializes cipher context **ctx**.

*EVP\_EncryptInit\_ex()* sets up cipher context **ctx** for encryption with cipher **type** from ENGINE **impl**. **ctx** must be initialized before calling this function. **type** is normally supplied by a function such as *EVP\_des\_cbc()*. If **impl** is NULL then the default implementation is used. **key** is the symmetric key to use and **iv** is the IV to use (if necessary), the actual number of bytes used for the key and IV depends on the cipher. It is possible to set all parameters to NULL except **type** in an initial call and supply the remaining parameters in subsequent calls, all of which have **type** set to NULL. This is done when the default cipher parameters are not appropriate.

*EVP\_EncryptUpdate()* encrypts **inl** bytes from the buffer **in** and writes the encrypted version to **out**. This function can be called multiple times to encrypt successive blocks of data. The amount of data written depends on the block alignment of the encrypted data: as a result the amount of data written may be anything from zero bytes to  $(\text{inl} + \text{cipher\_block\_size} - 1)$  so **outl** should contain sufficient room. The actual number of bytes written is placed in **outl**.

If padding is enabled (the default) then *EVP\_EncryptFinal\_ex()* encrypts the “final” data, that is any data that remains in a partial block. It uses standard block padding (aka PKCS padding). The encrypted final data is written to **out** which should have sufficient space for one cipher block. The number of bytes written is placed in **outl**. After this function is called the encryption operation is finished and no further calls to *EVP\_EncryptUpdate()* should be made.

If padding is disabled then *EVP\_EncryptFinal\_ex()* will not encrypt any more data and it will return an error if any data remains in a partial block: that is if the total data length is not a multiple of the block size.

*EVP\_DecryptInit\_ex()*, *EVP\_DecryptUpdate()* and *EVP\_DecryptFinal\_ex()* are the corresponding decryption operations. *EVP\_DecryptFinal()* will return an error code if padding is enabled and the final block is not correctly formatted. The parameters and restrictions are identical to the encryption operations except that if padding is enabled the decrypted data buffer **out** passed to *EVP\_DecryptUpdate()* should have sufficient room for  $(\text{inl} + \text{cipher\_block\_size})$  bytes unless the cipher block size is 1 in which case **inl** bytes is sufficient.

*EVP\_CipherInit\_ex()*, *EVP\_CipherUpdate()* and *EVP\_CipherFinal\_ex()* are functions that can be used for decryption or encryption. The operation performed depends on the value of the **enc** parameter. It should be set to 1 for encryption, 0 for decryption and -1 to leave the value unchanged (the actual value

of 'enc' being supplied in a previous call).

*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_cleanup()* clears all information from a cipher context and free up any allocated memory associate with it. It should be called after all operations using a cipher are complete so sensitive information does not remain in memory.

*EVP\_EncryptInit()*, *EVP\_DecryptInit()* and *EVP\_CipherInit()* behave in a similar way to *EVP\_EncryptInit\_ex()*, *EVP\_DecryptInit\_ex* and *EVP\_CipherInit\_ex()* except the **ctx** paramter does not need to be initialized and they always use the default cipher implementation.

*EVP\_EncryptFinal()*, *EVP\_DecryptFinal()* and *EVP\_CipherFinal()* behave in a similar way to *EVP\_EncryptFinal\_ex()*, *EVP\_DecryptFinal\_ex()* and *EVP\_CipherFinal\_ex()* except **ctx** is automatically cleaned up after the call.

*EVP\_get\_cipherbyname()*, *EVP\_get\_cipherbynid()* and *EVP\_get\_cipherbyobj()* return an **EVP\_CIPHER** structure when passed a cipher name, a NID or an **ASN1\_OBJECT** structure.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_nid()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_nid()* return the NID of a cipher when passed an **EVP\_CIPHER** or **EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX** structure. The actual NID value is an internal value which may not have a corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_set\_padding()* enables or disables padding. By default encryption operations are padded using standard block padding and the padding is checked and removed when decrypting. If the **pad** parameter is zero then no padding is performed, the total amount of data encrypted or decrypted must then be a multiple of the block size or an error will occur.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_key\_length()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_key\_length()* return the key length of a cipher when passed an **EVP\_CIPHER** or **EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX** structure. The constant **EVP\_MAX\_KEY\_LENGTH** is the maximum key length for all ciphers. Note: although *EVP\_CIPHER\_key\_length()* is fixed for a given cipher, the value of *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_key\_length()* may be different for variable key length ciphers.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_set\_key\_length()* sets the key length of the cipher ctx. If the cipher is a fixed length cipher then attempting to set the key length to any value other than the fixed value is an error.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_iv\_length()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_iv\_length()* return the IV length of a cipher when passed an **EVP\_CIPHER** or **EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX**. It will return zero if the cipher does not use an IV. The constant **EVP\_MAX\_IV\_LENGTH** is the maximum IV length for all ciphers.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_block\_size()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_block\_size()* return the block size of a cipher when passed an **EVP\_CIPHER** or **EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX** structure. The constant **EVP\_MAX\_IV\_LENGTH** is also the maximum block length for all ciphers.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_type()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_type()* return the type of the passed cipher or context. This "type" is the actual NID of the cipher OBJECT IDENTIFIER as such it ignores the cipher parameters and 40 bit RC2 and 128 bit RC2 have the same NID. If the cipher does not have an object identifier or does not have ASN1 support this function will return **NID\_undef**.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_cipher()* returns the **EVP\_CIPHER** structure when passed an **EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX** structure.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_mode()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_mode()* return the block cipher mode: **EVP\_CIPH\_ECB\_MODE**, **EVP\_CIPH\_CBC\_MODE**, **EVP\_CIPH\_CFB\_MODE** or **EVP\_CIPH\_OFB\_MODE**. If the cipher is a stream cipher then **EVP\_CIPH\_STREAM\_CIPHER** is returned.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_param\_to\_asn1()* sets the AlgorithmIdentifier "parameter" based on the passed cipher. This will typically include any parameters and an IV. The cipher IV (if any) must be set when this call is made. This call should be made before the cipher is actually "used" (before any *EVP\_EncryptUpdate()*, *EVP\_DecryptUpdate()* calls for example). This function may fail if the cipher does not have any ASN1 support.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_asn1\_to\_param()* sets the cipher parameters based on an ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier "parameter". The precise effect depends on the cipher In the case of RC2, for example, it will set the IV and effective key length. This function should be called after the base cipher type is set but before the key is set. For example *EVP\_CipherInit()* will be called with the IV and key set to NULL, *EVP\_CIPHER\_asn1\_to\_param()* will be called and finally *EVP\_CipherInit()* again with all parameters except the key set to NULL. It is possible for this function to fail if the cipher does not have any ASN1 support or the parameters cannot be set (for example the RC2 effective key length is not supported).

*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_ctrl()* allows various cipher specific parameters to be determined and set. Currently only the RC2 effective key length and the number of rounds of RC5 can be set.

## RETURN VALUES

*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_init*, *EVP\_EncryptInit\_ex()*, *EVP\_EncryptUpdate()* and *EVP\_EncryptFinal\_ex()* return 1 for success and 0 for failure.

*EVP\_DecryptInit\_ex()* and *EVP\_DecryptUpdate()* return 1 for success and 0 for failure. *EVP\_DecryptFinal\_ex()* returns 0 if the decrypt failed or 1 for success.

*EVP\_CipherInit\_ex()* and *EVP\_CipherUpdate()* return 1 for success and 0 for failure. *EVP\_CipherFinal\_ex()* returns 0 for a decryption failure or 1 for success.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_cleanup()* returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.

*EVP\_get\_cipherbyname()*, *EVP\_get\_cipherbynid()* and *EVP\_get\_cipherbyobj()* return an **EVP\_CIPHER** structure or NULL on error.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_nid()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_nid()* return a NID.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_block\_size()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_block\_size()* return the block size.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_key\_length()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_key\_length()* return the key length.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_set\_padding()* always returns 1.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_iv\_length()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_iv\_length()* return the IV length or zero if the cipher does not use an IV.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_type()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_type()* return the NID of the cipher's OBJECT IDENTIFIER or NID\_undef if it has no defined OBJECT IDENTIFIER.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_cipher()* returns an **EVP\_CIPHER** structure.

*EVP\_CIPHER\_param\_to\_asn1()* and *EVP\_CIPHER\_asn1\_to\_param()* return 1 for success or zero for failure.

## CIPHER LISTING

All algorithms have a fixed key length unless otherwise stated.

*EVP\_enc\_null()*

Null cipher: does nothing.

*EVP\_des\_cbc(void)*, *EVP\_des\_ecb(void)*, *EVP\_des\_cfb(void)*, *EVP\_des\_ofb(void)*

DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.

*EVP\_des\_ede\_cbc(void)*, *EVP\_des\_ede(void)*, *EVP\_des\_ede\_ofb(void)*, *EVP\_des\_ede\_cfb(void)*

Two key triple DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.

*EVP\_des\_ede3\_cbc(void)*, *EVP\_des\_ede3(void)*, *EVP\_des\_ede3\_ofb(void)*, *EVP\_des\_ede3\_cfb(void)*

Three key triple DES in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.

*EVP\_desx\_cbc(void)*

DESX algorithm in CBC mode.

*EVP\_rc4(void)*

RC4 stream cipher. This is a variable key length cipher with default key length 128 bits.

*EVP\_rc4\_40(void)*

RC4 stream cipher with 40 bit key length. This is obsolete and new code should use *EVP\_rc4()* and the *EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_set\_key\_length()* function.

*EVP\_idea\_cbc()*      *EVP\_idea\_ecb(void)*,      *EVP\_idea\_cfb(void)*,      *EVP\_idea\_ofb(void)*,  
*EVP\_idea\_cbc(void)*

IDEA encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively.

*EVP\_rc2\_cbc(void)*, *EVP\_rc2\_ecb(void)*, *EVP\_rc2\_cfb(void)*, *EVP\_rc2\_ofb(void)*

RC2 encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key length cipher with an additional parameter called "effective key bits" or "effective key length". By default both are set to 128 bits.

`EVP_rc2_40_cbc(void)`, `EVP_rc2_64_cbc(void)`

RC2 algorithm in CBC mode with a default key length and effective key length of 40 and 64 bits. These are obsolete and new code should use `EVP_rc2_cbc()`, `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length()` and `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl()` to set the key length and effective key length.

`EVP_bf_cbc(void)`, `EVP_bf_ecb(void)`, `EVP_bf_cfb(void)`, `EVP_bf_ofb(void)`;

Blowfish encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key length cipher.

`EVP_cast5_cbc(void)`, `EVP_cast5_ecb(void)`, `EVP_cast5_cfb(void)`, `EVP_cast5_ofb(void)`

CAST encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key length cipher.

`EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc(void)`, `EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb(void)`, `EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb(void)`, `EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb(void)`

RC5 encryption algorithm in CBC, ECB, CFB and OFB modes respectively. This is a variable key length cipher with an additional “number of rounds” parameter. By default the key length is set to 128 bits and 12 rounds.

## NOTES

Where possible the **EVP** interface to symmetric ciphers should be used in preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the cipher used and much more flexible.

PKCS padding works by adding **n** padding bytes of value **n** to make the total length of the encrypted data a multiple of the block size. Padding is always added so if the data is already a multiple of the block size **n** will equal the block size. For example if the block size is 8 and 11 bytes are to be encrypted then 5 padding bytes of value 5 will be added.

When decrypting the final block is checked to see if it has the correct form.

Although the decryption operation can produce an error if padding is enabled, it is not a strong test that the input data or key is correct. A random block has better than 1 in 256 chance of being of the correct format and problems with the input data earlier on will not produce a final decrypt error.

If padding is disabled then the decryption operation will always succeed if the total amount of data decrypted is a multiple of the block size.

The functions `EVP_EncryptInit()`, `EVP_EncryptFinal()`, `EVP_DecryptInit()`, `EVP_CipherInit()` and `EVP_CipherFinal()` are obsolete but are retained for compatibility with existing code. New code should use `EVP_EncryptInit_ex()`, `EVP_EncryptFinal_ex()`, `EVP_DecryptInit_ex()`, `EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()`, `EVP_CipherInit_ex()` and `EVP_CipherFinal_ex()` because they can reuse an existing context without allocating and freeing it up on each call.

## BUGS

For RC5 the number of rounds can currently only be set to 8, 12 or 16. This is a limitation of the current RC5 code rather than the EVP interface.

`EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH` and `EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH` only refer to the internal ciphers with default key lengths. If custom ciphers exceed these values the results are unpredictable. This is because it has become standard practice to define a generic key as a fixed unsigned char array containing `EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH` bytes.

The ASN1 code is incomplete (and sometimes inaccurate) it has only been tested for certain common S/MIME ciphers (RC2, DES, triple DES) in CBC mode.

## EXAMPLES

Get the number of rounds used in RC5:

```
int nrounds;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GET_RC5_ROUNDS, 0, &nrounds);
```

Get the RC2 effective key length:

```
int key_bits;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GET_RC2_KEY_BITS, 0, &key_bits);
```

Set the number of rounds used in RC5:

```
int nrounds;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC5_ROUNDS, nrounds, NULL);
```

Set the effective key length used in RC2:

```
int key_bits;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_SET_RC2_KEY_BITS, key_bits, NULL);
```

Encrypt a string using blowfish:

```
int do_crypt(char *outfile)
{
    unsigned char outbuf[1024];
    int outlen, tmplen;
    /* Bogus key and IV: we'd normally set these from
     * another source.
     */
    unsigned char key[] = {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15};
    unsigned char iv[] = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8};
    char intext[] = "Some Crypto Text";
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
    FILE *out;
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
    EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_bf_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
    if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, outbuf, &outlen, intext, strlen(intext)))
    {
        /* Error */
        return 0;
    }
    /* Buffer passed to EVP_EncryptFinal() must be after data just
     * encrypted to avoid overwriting it.
     */
    if(!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, outbuf + outlen, &tmplen))
    {
        /* Error */
        return 0;
    }
    outlen += tmplen;
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
    /* Need binary mode for fopen because encrypted data is
     * binary data. Also cannot use strlen() on it because
     * it wont be null terminated and may contain embedded
     * nulls.
     */
    out = fopen(outfile, "wb");
    fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out);
    fclose(out);
    return 1;
}
```

The ciphertext from the above example can be decrypted using the **openssl** utility with the command line:

```
S<openssl bf -in cipher.bin -K 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F -iv 010203040506
```

General encryption, decryption function example using FILE I/O and RC2 with an 80 bit key:

```

int do_crypt(FILE *in, FILE *out, int do_encrypt)
{
    /* Allow enough space in output buffer for additional block */
    inbuf[1024], outbuf[1024 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
    int inlen, outlen;
    /* Bogus key and IV: we'd normally set these from
     * another source.
     */
    unsigned char key[] = "0123456789";
    unsigned char iv[] = "12345678";
    /* Don't set key or IV because we will modify the parameters */
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
    EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_rc2(), NULL, NULL, NULL, do_encrypt);
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ctx, 10);
    /* We finished modifying parameters so now we can set key and IV */
    EVP_CipherInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv, do_encrypt);
    for(;;)
    {
        inlen = fread(inbuf, 1, 1024, in);
        if(inlen <= 0) break;
        if(!EVP_CipherUpdate(&ctx, outbuf, &outlen, inbuf, inlen))
        {
            /* Error */
            return 0;
        }
        fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out);
    }
    if(!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(&ctx, outbuf, &outlen))
    {
        /* Error */
        return 0;
    }
    fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out);
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
    return 1;
}

```

**SEE ALSO***evp(3)***HISTORY**

*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_init()*, *EVP\_EncryptInit\_ex()*, *EVP\_EncryptFinal\_ex()*, *EVP\_DecryptInit\_ex()*,  
*EVP\_DecryptFinal\_ex()*, *EVP\_CipherInit\_ex()*, *EVP\_CipherFinal\_ex()* and  
*EVP\_CIPHER\_CTX\_set\_padding()* appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

**NAME**

EVP\_OpenInit, EVP\_OpenUpdate, EVP\_OpenFinal – EVP envelope decryption

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

int EVP_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char *ek,
                 int ekl, unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY *priv);
int EVP_OpenUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                  int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl);
int EVP_OpenFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                  int *outl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The EVP envelope routines are a high level interface to envelope decryption. They decrypt a public key encrypted symmetric key and then decrypt data using it.

*EVP\_OpenInit()* initializes a cipher context **ctx** for decryption with cipher **type**. It decrypts the encrypted symmetric key of length **ekl** bytes passed in the **ek** parameter using the private key **priv**. The IV is supplied in the **iv** parameter.

*EVP\_OpenUpdate()* and *EVP\_OpenFinal()* have exactly the same properties as the *EVP\_DecryptUpdate()* and *EVP\_DecryptFinal()* routines, as documented on the *EVP\_EncryptInit*(3) manual page.

**NOTES**

It is possible to call *EVP\_OpenInit()* twice in the same way as *EVP\_DecryptInit()*. The first call should have **priv** set to NULL and (after setting any cipher parameters) it should be called again with **type** set to NULL.

If the cipher passed in the **type** parameter is a variable length cipher then the key length will be set to the value of the recovered key length. If the cipher is a fixed length cipher then the recovered key length must match the fixed cipher length.

**RETURN VALUES**

*EVP\_OpenInit()* returns 0 on error or a non zero integer (actually the recovered secret key size) if successful.

*EVP\_OpenUpdate()* returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.

*EVP\_OpenFinal()* returns 0 if the decrypt failed or 1 for success.

**SEE ALSO**

*evp*(3), *rand*(3), *EVP\_EncryptInit*(3), *EVP\_SealInit*(3)

**HISTORY**

**NAME**

*EVP\_PKEY\_new*, *EVP\_PKEY\_free* – private key allocation functions.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void);
void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *key);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The *EVP\_PKEY\_new()* function allocates an empty **EVP\_PKEY** structure which is used by OpenSSL to store private keys.

*EVP\_PKEY\_free()* frees up the private key **key**.

**NOTES**

The **EVP\_PKEY** structure is used by various OpenSSL functions which require a general private key without reference to any particular algorithm.

The structure returned by *EVP\_PKEY\_new()* is empty. To add a private key to this empty structure the functions described in *EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_RSA*(3) should be used.

**RETURN VALUES**

*EVP\_PKEY\_new()* returns either the newly allocated **EVP\_PKEY** structure or **NULL** if an error occurred.

*EVP\_PKEY\_free()* does not return a value.

**SEE ALSO**

*EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_RSA*(3)

**HISTORY**

TBA



**NAME**

EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_RSA, EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_DSA, EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_DH, EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_EC\_KEY, EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_RSA, EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_DSA, EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_DH, EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_EC\_KEY, EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_RSA, EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_DSA, EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_DH, EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_EC\_KEY, EVP\_PKEY\_type – EVP\_PKEY assignment functions.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key);
int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key);
int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key);
int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key);

RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey);

int EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key);
int EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key);
int EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key);
int EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key);

int EVP_PKEY_type(int type);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_RSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_DSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_DH()* and *EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_EC\_KEY()* set the key referenced by **pkey** to **key**.

*EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_RSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_DSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_DH()* and *EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_EC\_KEY()* return the referenced key in **pkey** or **NULL** if the key is not of the correct type.

*EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_RSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_DSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_DH()* and *EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_EC\_KEY()* also set the referenced key to **key** however these use the supplied **key** internally and so **key** will be freed when the parent **pkey** is freed.

*EVP\_PKEY\_type()* returns the type of key corresponding to the value **type**. The type of a key can be obtained with *EVP\_PKEY\_type(pkey->type)*. The return value will be *EVP\_PKEY\_RSA*, *EVP\_PKEY\_DSA*, *EVP\_PKEY\_DH* or *EVP\_PKEY\_EC* for the corresponding key types or *NID\_undef* if the key type is unassigned.

**NOTES**

In accordance with the OpenSSL naming convention the key obtained from or assigned to the **pkey** using the **1** functions must be freed as well as **pkey**.

*EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_RSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_DSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_DH()* and *EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_EC\_KEY()* are implemented as macros.

**RETURN VALUES**

*EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_RSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_DSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_DH()* and *EVP\_PKEY\_set1\_EC\_KEY()* return 1 for success or 0 for failure.

*EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_RSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_DSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_DH()* and *EVP\_PKEY\_get1\_EC\_KEY()* return the referenced key or **NULL** if an error occurred.

*EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_RSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_DSA()*, *EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_DH()* and *EVP\_PKEY\_assign\_EC\_KEY()* return 1 for success and 0 for failure.

**SEE ALSO**

*EVP\_PKEY\_new*(3)

**HISTORY**

TBA

**NAME**

EVP\_SealInit, EVP\_SealUpdate, EVP\_SealFinal – EVP envelope encryption

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

int EVP_SealInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, EVP_CIPHER *type, unsigned char **ek,
                 int *ekl, unsigned char *iv, EVP_PKEY **pubk, int npubk);
int EVP_SealUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                  int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl);
int EVP_SealFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                 int *outl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The EVP envelope routines are a high level interface to envelope encryption. They generate a random key and IV (if required) then “envelope” it by using public key encryption. Data can then be encrypted using this key.

*EVP\_SealInit()* initializes a cipher context **ctx** for encryption with cipher **type** using a random secret key and IV. **type** is normally supplied by a function such as *EVP\_des\_cbc()*. The secret key is encrypted using one or more public keys, this allows the same encrypted data to be decrypted using any of the corresponding private keys. **ek** is an array of buffers where the public key encrypted secret key will be written, each buffer must contain enough room for the corresponding encrypted key: that is **ek[i]** must have room for **EVP\_PKEY\_size(pubk[i])** bytes. The actual size of each encrypted secret key is written to the array **ekl**. **pubk** is an array of **npubk** public keys.

The **iv** parameter is a buffer where the generated IV is written to. It must contain enough room for the corresponding cipher’s IV, as determined by (for example) *EVP\_CIPHER\_iv\_length(type)*.

If the cipher does not require an IV then the **iv** parameter is ignored and can be **NULL**.

*EVP\_SealUpdate()* and *EVP\_SealFinal()* have exactly the same properties as the *EVP\_EncryptUpdate()* and *EVP\_EncryptFinal()* routines, as documented on the *EVP\_EncryptInit(3)* manual page.

**RETURN VALUES**

*EVP\_SealInit()* returns 0 on error or **npubk** if successful.

*EVP\_SealUpdate()* and *EVP\_SealFinal()* return 1 for success and 0 for failure.

**NOTES**

Because a random secret key is generated the random number generator must be seeded before calling *EVP\_SealInit()*.

The public key must be RSA because it is the only OpenSSL public key algorithm that supports key transport.

Envelope encryption is the usual method of using public key encryption on large amounts of data, this is because public key encryption is slow but symmetric encryption is fast. So symmetric encryption is used for bulk encryption and the small random symmetric key used is transferred using public key encryption.

It is possible to call *EVP\_SealInit()* twice in the same way as *EVP\_EncryptInit()*. The first call should have **npubk** set to 0 and (after setting any cipher parameters) it should be called again with **type** set to **NULL**.

**SEE ALSO**

*evp(3)*, *rand(3)*, *EVP\_EncryptInit(3)*, *EVP\_OpenInit(3)*

**HISTORY**

*EVP\_SealFinal()* did not return a value before OpenSSL 0.9.7.

**NAME**

EVP\_SignInit, EVP\_SignUpdate, EVP\_SignFinal – EVP signing functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

int EVP_SignInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl);
int EVP_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt);
int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey);

void EVP_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);

int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The EVP signature routines are a high level interface to digital signatures.

*EVP\_SignInit\_ex()* sets up signing context **ctx** to use digest **type** from ENGINE **impl**. **ctx** must be initialized with *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_init()* before calling this function.

*EVP\_SignUpdate()* hashes **cnt** bytes of data at **d** into the signature context **ctx**. This function can be called several times on the same **ctx** to include additional data.

*EVP\_SignFinal()* signs the data in **ctx** using the private key **pkey** and places the signature in **sig**. If the **s** parameter is not NULL then the number of bytes of data written (i.e. the length of the signature) will be written to the integer at **s**, at most *EVP\_PKEY\_size(pkey)* bytes will be written.

*EVP\_SignInit()* initializes a signing context **ctx** to use the default implementation of digest **type**.

*EVP\_PKEY\_size()* returns the maximum size of a signature in bytes. The actual signature returned by *EVP\_SignFinal()* may be smaller.

**RETURN VALUES**

*EVP\_SignInit\_ex()*, *EVP\_SignUpdate()* and *EVP\_SignFinal()* return 1 for success and 0 for failure.

*EVP\_PKEY\_size()* returns the maximum size of a signature in bytes.

The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**NOTES**

The **EVP** interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible.

Due to the link between message digests and public key algorithms the correct digest algorithm must be used with the correct public key type. A list of algorithms and associated public key algorithms appears in *EVP\_DigestInit(3)*.

When signing with DSA private keys the random number generator must be seeded or the operation will fail. The random number generator does not need to be seeded for RSA signatures.

The call to *EVP\_SignFinal()* internally finalizes a copy of the digest context. This means that calls to *EVP\_SignUpdate()* and *EVP\_SignFinal()* can be called later to digest and sign additional data.

Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must be cleaned up after use by calling *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_cleanup()* or a memory leak will occur.

**BUGS**

Older versions of this documentation wrongly stated that calls to *EVP\_SignUpdate()* could not be made after calling *EVP\_SignFinal()*.

**SEE ALSO**

*EVP\_VerifyInit(3)*, *EVP\_DigestInit(3)*, *err(3)*, *evp(3)*, *hmac(3)*, *md2(3)*, *md5(3)*, *mdc2(3)*, *ripemd(3)*, *sha(3)*, *dgst(1)*

**HISTORY**

*EVP\_SignInit()*, *EVP\_SignUpdate()* and *EVP\_SignFinal()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

*EVP\_SignInit\_ex()* was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

**NAME**

EVP\_VerifyInit, EVP\_VerifyUpdate, EVP\_VerifyFinal – EVP signature verification functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

int EVP_VerifyInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl);
int EVP_VerifyUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt);
int EVP_VerifyFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, ENGINE *impl);
int EVP_VerifyInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The EVP signature verification routines are a high level interface to digital signatures.

*EVP\_VerifyInit\_ex()* sets up verification context **ctx** to use digest **type** from ENGINE **impl**. **ctx** must be initialized by calling *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_init()* before calling this function.

*EVP\_VerifyUpdate()* hashes **cnt** bytes of data at **d** into the verification context **ctx**. This function can be called several times on the same **ctx** to include additional data.

*EVP\_VerifyFinal()* verifies the data in **ctx** using the public key **pkey** and against the **siglen** bytes at **sigbuf**.

*EVP\_VerifyInit()* initializes verification context **ctx** to use the default implementation of digest **type**.

**RETURN VALUES**

*EVP\_VerifyInit\_ex()* and *EVP\_VerifyUpdate()* return 1 for success and 0 for failure.

*EVP\_VerifyFinal()* returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for failure and -1 if some other error occurred.

The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**NOTES**

The **EVP** interface to digital signatures should almost always be used in preference to the low level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the algorithm used and much more flexible.

Due to the link between message digests and public key algorithms the correct digest algorithm must be used with the correct public key type. A list of algorithms and associated public key algorithms appears in *EVP\_DigestInit(3)*.

The call to *EVP\_VerifyFinal()* internally finalizes a copy of the digest context. This means that calls to *EVP\_VerifyUpdate()* and *EVP\_VerifyFinal()* can be called later to digest and verify additional data.

Since only a copy of the digest context is ever finalized the context must be cleaned up after use by calling *EVP\_MD\_CTX\_cleanup()* or a memory leak will occur.

**BUGS**

Older versions of this documentation wrongly stated that calls to *EVP\_VerifyUpdate()* could not be made after calling *EVP\_VerifyFinal()*.

**SEE ALSO**

*evp(3)*, *EVP\_SignInit(3)*, *EVP\_DigestInit(3)*, *err(3)*, *evp(3)*, *hmac(3)*, *md2(3)*, *md5(3)*, *mdc2(3)*, *ripemd(3)*, *sha(3)*, *dgst(1)*

**HISTORY**

*EVP\_VerifyInit()*, *EVP\_VerifyUpdate()* and *EVP\_VerifyFinal()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

*EVP\_VerifyInit\_ex()* was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7

**NAME**

lh\_stats, lh\_node\_stats, lh\_node\_usage\_stats, lh\_stats\_bio, lh\_node\_stats\_bio, lh\_node\_usage\_stats\_bio  
– LHASH statistics

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/lhash.h>

void lh_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out);
void lh_node_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out);
void lh_node_usage_stats(LHASH *table, FILE *out);

void lh_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out);
void lh_node_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out);
void lh_node_usage_stats_bio(LHASH *table, BIO *out);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The **LHASH** structure records statistics about most aspects of accessing the hash table. This is mostly a legacy of Eric Young writing this library for the reasons of implementing what looked like a nice algorithm rather than for a particular software product.

*lh\_stats()* prints out statistics on the size of the hash table, how many entries are in it, and the number and result of calls to the routines in this library.

*lh\_node\_stats()* prints the number of entries for each 'bucket' in the hash table.

*lh\_node\_usage\_stats()* prints out a short summary of the state of the hash table. It prints the 'load' and the 'actual load'. The load is the average number of data items per 'bucket' in the hash table. The 'actual load' is the average number of items per 'bucket', but only for buckets which contain entries. So the 'actual load' is the average number of searches that will need to find an item in the hash table, while the 'load' is the average number that will be done to record a miss.

*lh\_stats\_bio()*, *lh\_node\_stats\_bio()* and *lh\_node\_usage\_stats\_bio()* are the same as the above, except that the output goes to a **BIO**.

**RETURN VALUES**

These functions do not return values.

**SEE ALSO**

*bio(3)*, *lhash(3)*

**HISTORY**

These functions are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

This manpage is derived from the SSLeay documentation.

**NAME**

lh\_new, lh\_free, lh\_insert, lh\_delete, lh\_retrieve, lh\_doall, lh\_doall\_arg, lh\_error – dynamic hash table

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/lhash.h>

LHASH *lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN_TYPE hash, LHASH_COMP_FN_TYPE compare);
void lh_free(LHASH *table);

void *lh_insert(LHASH *table, void *data);
void *lh_delete(LHASH *table, void *data);
void *lh_retrieve(LHASH *table, void *data);

void lh_doall(LHASH *table, LHASH_DOALL_FN_TYPE func);
void lh_doall_arg(LHASH *table, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE func,
                  void *arg);

int lh_error(LHASH *table);

typedef int (*LHASH_COMP_FN_TYPE)(const void *, const void *);
typedef unsigned long (*LHASH_HASH_FN_TYPE)(const void *);
typedef void (*LHASH_DOALL_FN_TYPE)(const void *);
typedef void (*LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN_TYPE)(const void *, const void *);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

This library implements dynamic hash tables. The hash table entries can be arbitrary structures. Usually they consist of key and value fields.

*lh\_new()* creates a new **LHASH** structure to store arbitrary data entries, and provides the 'hash' and 'compare' callbacks to be used in organising the table's entries. The **hash** callback takes a pointer to a table entry as its argument and returns an unsigned long hash value for its key field. The hash value is normally truncated to a power of 2, so make sure that your hash function returns well mixed low order bits. The **compare** callback takes two arguments (pointers to two hash table entries), and returns 0 if their keys are equal, non-zero otherwise. If your hash table will contain items of some particular type and the **hash** and **compare** callbacks hash/compare these types, then the **DECLARE\_LHASH\_HASH\_FN** and **IMPLEMENT\_LHASH\_COMP\_FN** macros can be used to create callback wrappers of the prototypes required by *lh\_new()*. These provide per-variable casts before calling the type-specific callbacks written by the application author. These macros, as well as those used for the "doall" callbacks, are defined as;

```
#define DECLARE_LHASH_HASH_FN(f_name,o_type) \
    unsigned long f_name##_LHASH_HASH(const void *);
#define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(f_name,o_type) \
    unsigned long f_name##_LHASH_HASH(const void *arg) { \
        o_type a = (o_type)arg; \
        return f_name(a); }
#define LHASH_HASH_FN(f_name) f_name##_LHASH_HASH
#define DECLARE_LHASH_COMP_FN(f_name,o_type) \
    int f_name##_LHASH_COMP(const void *, const void *);
#define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(f_name,o_type) \
    int f_name##_LHASH_COMP(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) { \
        o_type a = (o_type)arg1; \
        o_type b = (o_type)arg2; \
        return f_name(a,b); }
#define LHASH_COMP_FN(f_name) f_name##_LHASH_COMP
```

```

#define DECLARE_LHASH_DOALL_FN(f_name,o_type) \
    void f_name##_LHASH_DOALL(const void *);
#define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_FN(f_name,o_type) \
    void f_name##_LHASH_DOALL(const void *arg) { \
        o_type a = (o_type)arg; \
        f_name(a); }
#define LHASH_DOALL_FN(f_name) f_name##_LHASH_DOALL
#define DECLARE_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(f_name,o_type,a_type) \
    void f_name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(const void *, const void *);
#define IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(f_name,o_type,a_type) \
    void f_name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) { \
        o_type a = (o_type)arg1; \
        a_type b = (a_type)arg2; \
        f_name(a,b); }
#define LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(f_name) f_name##_LHASH_DOALL_ARG

```

An example of a hash table storing (pointers to) structures of type 'STUFF' could be defined as follows;

```

/* Calculates the hash value of 'tohash' (implemented elsewhere) */
unsigned long STUFF_hash(const STUFF *tohash);
/* Orders 'arg1' and 'arg2' (implemented elsewhere) */
int STUFF_cmp(const STUFF *arg1, const STUFF *arg2);
/* Create the type-safe wrapper functions for use in the LHASH internals */
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(STUFF_hash, const STUFF *)
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(STUFF_cmp, const STUFF *)
/* ... */
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    /* Create the new hash table using the hash/compare wrappers */
    LHASH *hashtable = lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(STUFF_hash),
                             LHASH_COMP_FN(STUFF_cmp));
    /* ... */
}

```

*lh\_free()* frees the **LHASH** structure **table**. Allocated hash table entries will not be freed; consider using *lh\_doall()* to deallocate any remaining entries in the hash table (see below).

*lh\_insert()* inserts the structure pointed to by **data** into **table**. If there already is an entry with the same key, the old value is replaced. Note that *lh\_insert()* stores pointers, the data are not copied.

*lh\_delete()* deletes an entry from **table**.

*lh\_retrieve()* looks up an entry in **table**. Normally, **data** is a structure with the key field(s) set; the function will return a pointer to a fully populated structure.

*lh\_doall()* will, for every entry in the hash table, call **func** with the data item as its parameter. For *lh\_doall()* and *lh\_doall\_arg()*, function pointer casting should be avoided in the callbacks (see **NOTE**) – instead, either declare the callbacks to match the prototype required in *lh\_new()* or use the declare/implement macros to create type-safe wrappers that cast variables prior to calling your type-specific callbacks. An example of this is illustrated here where the callback is used to cleanup resources for items in the hash table prior to the hashtable itself being deallocated:

```

/* Cleans up resources belonging to 'a' (this is implemented elsewhere) */
void STUFF_cleanup(STUFF *a);
/* Implement a prototype-compatible wrapper for "STUFF_cleanup" */
IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_FN(STUFF_cleanup, STUFF *)
/* ... then later in the code ... */
/* So to run "STUFF_cleanup" against all items in a hash table ... */
lh_doall(hashtable, LHASH_DOALL_FN(STUFF_cleanup));
/* Then the hash table itself can be deallocated */
lh_free(hashtable);

```

When doing this, be careful if you delete entries from the hash table in your callbacks: the table may decrease in size, moving the item that you are currently on down lower in the hash table – this could cause some entries to be skipped during the iteration. The second best solution to this problem is to set

hash->down\_load=0 before you start (which will stop the hash table ever decreasing in size). The best solution is probably to avoid deleting items from the hash table inside a “doall” callback!

*lh\_doall\_arg()* is the same as *lh\_doall()* except that **func** will be called with **arg** as the second argument and **func** should be of type **LHASH\_DOALL\_ARG\_FN\_TYPE** (a callback prototype that is passed both the table entry and an extra argument). As with *lh\_doall()*, you can instead choose to declare your callback with a prototype matching the types you are dealing with and use the declare/implement macros to create compatible wrappers that cast variables before calling your type-specific callbacks. An example of this is demonstrated here (printing all hash table entries to a BIO that is provided by the caller):

```
/* Prints item 'a' to 'output_bio' (this is implemented elsewhere) */
void STUFF_print(const STUFF *a, BIO *output_bio);
/* Implement a prototype-compatible wrapper for "STUFF_print" */
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(STUFF_print, const STUFF *, BIO *)
    /* ... then later in the code ... */
/* Print out the entire hashtable to a particular BIO */
lh_doall_arg(hashtable, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(STUFF_print), logging_bio);
```

*lh\_error()* can be used to determine if an error occurred in the last operation. *lh\_error()* is a macro.

## RETURN VALUES

*lh\_new()* returns **NULL** on error, otherwise a pointer to the new **LHASH** structure.

When a hash table entry is replaced, *lh\_insert()* returns the value being replaced. **NULL** is returned on normal operation and on error.

*lh\_delete()* returns the entry being deleted. **NULL** is returned if there is no such value in the hash table.

*lh\_retrieve()* returns the hash table entry if it has been found, **NULL** otherwise.

*lh\_error()* returns 1 if an error occurred in the last operation, 0 otherwise.

*lh\_free()*, *lh\_doall()* and *lh\_doall\_arg()* return no values.

## NOTE

The various LHASH macros and callback types exist to make it possible to write type-safe code without resorting to function-prototype casting – an evil that makes application code much harder to audit/verify and also opens the window of opportunity for stack corruption and other hard-to-find bugs. It also, apparently, violates ANSI-C.

The LHASH code regards table entries as constant data. As such, it internally represents *lh\_insert()*'d items with a “const void \*” pointer type. This is why callbacks such as those used by *lh\_doall()* and *lh\_doall\_arg()* declare their prototypes with “const”, even for the parameters that pass back the table items' data pointers – for consistency, user-provided data is “const” at all times as far as the LHASH code is concerned. However, as callers are themselves providing these pointers, they can choose whether they too should be treating all such parameters as constant.

As an example, a hash table may be maintained by code that, for reasons of encapsulation, has only “const” access to the data being indexed in the hash table (ie. it is returned as “const” from elsewhere in their code) – in this case the LHASH prototypes are appropriate as-is. Conversely, if the caller is responsible for the life-time of the data in question, then they may well wish to make modifications to table item passed back in the *lh\_doall()* or *lh\_doall\_arg()* callbacks (see the “STUFF\_cleanup” example above). If so, the caller can either cast the “const” away (if they're providing the raw callbacks themselves) or use the macros to declare/implement the wrapper functions without “const” types.

Callers that only have “const” access to data they're indexing in a table, yet declare callbacks without constant types (or cast the “const” away themselves), are therefore creating their own risks/bugs without being encouraged to do so by the API. On a related note, those auditing code should pay special attention to any instances of **DECLARE/IMPLEMENT\_LHASH\_DOALL\_[ARG\_]FN** macros that provide types without any “const” qualifiers.

## BUGS

*lh\_insert()* returns **NULL** both for success and error.

## INTERNALS

The following description is based on the SSLeay documentation:



The **lhash** library implements a hash table described in the *Communications of the ACM* in 1991. What makes this hash table different is that as the table fills, the hash table is increased (or decreased) in size via *OPENSSL\_realloc()*. When a 'resize' is done, instead of all hashes being redistributed over twice as many 'buckets', one bucket is split. So when an 'expand' is done, there is only a minimal cost to redistribute some values. Subsequent inserts will cause more single 'bucket' redistributions but there will never be a sudden large cost due to redistributing all the 'buckets'.

The state for a particular hash table is kept in the **LHASH** structure. The decision to increase or decrease the hash table size is made depending on the 'load' of the hash table. The load is the number of items in the hash table divided by the size of the hash table. The default values are as follows. If (hash->up\_load < load) => expand. if (hash->down\_load > load) => contract. The **up\_load** has a default value of 1 and **down\_load** has a default value of 2. These numbers can be modified by the application by just playing with the **up\_load** and **down\_load** variables. The 'load' is kept in a form which is multiplied by 256. So hash->up\_load=8\*256; will cause a load of 8 to be set.

If you are interested in performance the field to watch is num\_comp\_calls. The hash library keeps track of the 'hash' value for each item so when a lookup is done, the 'hashes' are compared, if there is a match, then a full compare is done, and hash->num\_comp\_calls is incremented. If num\_comp\_calls is not equal to num\_delete plus num\_retrieve it means that your hash function is generating hashes that are the same for different values. It is probably worth changing your hash function if this is the case because even if your hash table has 10 items in a 'bucket', it can be searched with 10 **unsigned long** compares and 10 linked list traverses. This will be much less expensive than 10 calls to your compare function.

*lh\_strhash()* is a demo string hashing function:

```
unsigned long lh_strhash(const char *c);
```

Since the **LHASH** routines would normally be passed structures, this routine would not normally be passed to *lh\_new()*, rather it would be used in the function passed to *lh\_new()*.

## SEE ALSO

*lh\_stats*(3)

## HISTORY

The **lhash** library is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. *lh\_error()* was added in SSLeay 0.9.1b.

This manpage is derived from the SSLeay documentation.

In OpenSSL 0.9.7, all lhash functions that were passed function pointers were changed for better type safety, and the function types **LHASH\_COMP\_FN\_TYPE**, **LHASH\_HASH\_FN\_TYPE**, **LHASH\_DOALL\_FN\_TYPE** and **LHASH\_DOALL\_ARG\_FN\_TYPE** became available.

**NAME**

OBJ\_nid2obj, OBJ\_nid2ln, OBJ\_nid2sn, OBJ\_obj2nid, OBJ\_txt2nid, OBJ\_ln2nid, OBJ\_sn2nid, OBJ\_cmp, OBJ\_dup, OBJ\_txt2obj, OBJ\_obj2txt, OBJ\_create, OBJ\_cleanup – ASN1 object utility functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_nid2obj(int n);
const char * OBJ_nid2ln(int n);
const char * OBJ_nid2sn(int n);

int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *o);
int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *ln);
int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *sn);

int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s);

ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name);
int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name);

int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *b);
ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o);

int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln);
void OBJ_cleanup(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The ASN1 object utility functions process ASN1\_OBJECT structures which are a representation of the ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER (OID) type.

*OBJ\_nid2obj()*, *OBJ\_nid2ln()* and *OBJ\_nid2sn()* convert the NID **n** to an ASN1\_OBJECT structure, its long name and its short name respectively, or **NULL** is an error occurred.

*OBJ\_obj2nid()*, *OBJ\_ln2nid()*, *OBJ\_sn2nid()* return the corresponding NID for the object **o**, the long name <ln> or the short name <sn> respectively or NID\_undef if an error occurred.

*OBJ\_txt2nid()* returns NID corresponding to text string <s>. **s** can be a long name, a short name or the numerical representation of an object.

*OBJ\_txt2obj()* converts the text string **s** into an ASN1\_OBJECT structure. If **no\_name** is 0 then long names and short names will be interpreted as well as numerical forms. If **no\_name** is 1 only the numerical form is acceptable.

*OBJ\_obj2txt()* converts the **ASN1\_OBJECT a** into a textual representation. The representation is written as a null terminated string to **buf** at most **buf\_len** bytes are written, truncating the result if necessary. The total amount of space required is returned. If **no\_name** is 0 then if the object has a long or short name then that will be used, otherwise the numerical form will be used. If **no\_name** is 1 then the numerical form will always be used.

*OBJ\_cmp()* compares **a** to **b**. If the two are identical 0 is returned.

*OBJ\_dup()* returns a copy of **o**.

*OBJ\_create()* adds a new object to the internal table. **oid** is the numerical form of the object, **sn** the short name and **ln** the long name. A new NID is returned for the created object.

*OBJ\_cleanup()* cleans up OpenSSLs internal object table: this should be called before an application exits if any new objects were added using *OBJ\_create()*.

**NOTES**

Objects in OpenSSL can have a short name, a long name and a numerical identifier (NID) associated with them. A standard set of objects is represented in an internal table. The appropriate values are defined in the header file **objects.h**.

For example the OID for commonName has the following definitions:

```
#define SN_commonName          "CN"
#define LN_commonName          "commonName"
#define NID_commonName         13
```

New objects can be added by calling *OBJ\_create()*.

Table objects have certain advantages over other objects: for example their NIDs can be used in a C language switch statement. They are also static constant structures which are shared: that is there is only a single constant structure for each table object.

Objects which are not in the table have the NID value *NID\_undef*.

Objects do not need to be in the internal tables to be processed, the functions *OBJ\_txt2obj()* and *OBJ\_obj2txt()* can process the numerical form of an OID.

## EXAMPLES

Create an object for **commonName**:

```
ASN1_OBJECT *o;
o = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_commonName);
```

Check if an object is **commonName**

```
if (OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_commonName)
    /* Do something */
```

Create a new NID and initialize an object from it:

```
int new_nid;
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
new_nid = OBJ_create("1.2.3.4", "NewOID", "New Object Identifier");
obj = OBJ_nid2obj(new_nid);
```

Create a new object directly:

```
obj = OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.3.4", 1);
```

## BUGS

*OBJ\_obj2txt()* is awkward and messy to use: it doesn't follow the convention of other OpenSSL functions where the buffer can be set to **NULL** to determine the amount of data that should be written. Instead **buf** must point to a valid buffer and **buf\_len** should be set to a positive value. A buffer length of 80 should be more than enough to handle any OID encountered in practice.

## RETURN VALUES

*OBJ\_nid2obj()* returns an **ASN1\_OBJECT** structure or **NULL** if an error occurred.

*OBJ\_nid2ln()* and *OBJ\_nid2sn()* returns a valid string or **NULL** on error.

*OBJ\_obj2nid()*, *OBJ\_ln2nid()*, *OBJ\_sn2nid()* and *OBJ\_txt2nid()* return a NID or **NID\_undef** on error.

## SEE ALSO

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*

## HISTORY

TBA

**NAME**

OpenSSL\_add\_all\_algorithms, OpenSSL\_add\_all\_ciphers, OpenSSL\_add\_all\_digests – add algorithms to internal table

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/evp.h>

void OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void);
void OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(void);
void OpenSSL_add_all_digests(void);

void EVP_cleanup(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

OpenSSL keeps an internal table of digest algorithms and ciphers. It uses this table to lookup ciphers via functions such as *EVP\_get\_cipher\_byname()*.

*OpenSSL\_add\_all\_digests()* adds all digest algorithms to the table.

*OpenSSL\_add\_all\_algorithms()* adds all algorithms to the table (digests and ciphers).

*OpenSSL\_add\_all\_ciphers()* adds all encryption algorithms to the table including password based encryption algorithms.

*EVP\_cleanup()* removes all ciphers and digests from the table.

**RETURN VALUES**

None of the functions return a value.

**NOTES**

A typical application will call *OpenSSL\_add\_all\_algorithms()* initially and *EVP\_cleanup()* before exiting.

An application does not need to add algorithms to use them explicitly, for example by *EVP\_sha1()*. It just needs to add them if it (or any of the functions it calls) needs to lookup algorithms.

The cipher and digest lookup functions are used in many parts of the library. If the table is not initialized several functions will misbehave and complain they cannot find algorithms. This includes the PEM, PKCS#12, SSL and S/MIME libraries. This is a common query in the OpenSSL mailing lists.

Calling *OpenSSL\_add\_all\_algorithms()* links in all algorithms: as a result a statically linked executable can be quite large. If this is important it is possible to just add the required ciphers and digests.

**BUGS**

Although the functions do not return error codes it is possible for them to fail. This will only happen as a result of a memory allocation failure so this is not too much of a problem in practice.

**SEE ALSO**

*evp(3)*, *EVP\_DigestInit(3)*, *EVP\_EncryptInit(3)*

**NAME**

OPENSSL\_VERSION\_NUMBER, SSLeay, SSLeay\_version – get OpenSSL version number

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0xnnnnnnnnnnL

#include <openssl/crypto.h>
long SSLeay(void);
const char *SSLeay_version(int t);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

OPENSSL\_VERSION\_NUMBER is a numeric release version identifier:

MMNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status

The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas 1 to 14, and f for release.

for example

```
0x000906000 == 0.9.6 dev
0x000906023 == 0.9.6b beta 3
0x00090605f == 0.9.6e release
```

Versions prior to 0.9.3 have identifiers < 0x0930. Versions between 0.9.3 and 0.9.5 had a version identifier with this interpretation:

MMNNFFRBB major minor fix final beta/patch

for example

```
0x000904100 == 0.9.4 release
0x000905000 == 0.9.5 dev
```

Version 0.9.5a had an interim interpretation that is like the current one, except the patch level got the highest bit set, to keep continuity. The number was therefore 0x0090581f.

For backward compatibility, SSLEAY\_VERSION\_NUMBER is also defined.

SSLeay() returns this number. The return value can be compared to the macro to make sure that the correct version of the library has been loaded, especially when using DLLs on Windows systems.

SSLeay\_version() returns different strings depending on t:

**SSLEAY\_VERSION**

The text variant of the version number and the release date. For example, “OpenSSL 0.9.5a 1 Apr 2000”.

**SSLEAY\_CFLAGS**

The compiler flags set for the compilation process in the form “compiler: ...” if available or “compiler: information not available” otherwise.

**SSLEAY\_BUILT\_ON**

The date of the build process in the form “built on: ...” if available or “built on: date not available” otherwise.

**SSLEAY\_PLATFORM**

The “Configure” target of the library build in the form “platform: ...” if available or “platform: information not available” otherwise.

**SSLEAY\_DIR**

The “OPENSSLDIR” setting of the library build in the form “OPENSSLDIR: ”...”“ if available or ”OPENSSLDIR: N/A” otherwise.

For an unknown t, the text “not available” is returned.

**RETURN VALUE**

The version number.

**SEE ALSO**

*crypto*(3)

**HISTORY**

*SSLeay()* and `SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER` are available in all versions of *SSLeay* and *OpenSSL*. `OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER` is available in all versions of *OpenSSL*. **SSLEAY\_DIR** was added in *OpenSSL* 0.9.7.

## NAME

PKCS12\_create – create a PKCS#12 structure

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
```

```
PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca,  
                      int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype)
```

## DESCRIPTION

*PKCS12\_create()* creates a PKCS#12 structure.

**pass** is the passphrase to use. **name** is the **friendlyName** to use for the supplied certificate and key. **pkey** is the private key to include in the structure and **cert** its corresponding certificate. **ca**, if not **NULL** is an optional set of certificates to also include in the structure.

**nid\_key** and **nid\_cert** are the encryption algorithms that should be used for the key and certificate respectively. **iter** is the encryption algorithm iteration count to use and **mac\_iter** is the MAC iteration count to use. **keytype** is the type of key.

## NOTES

The parameters **nid\_key**, **nid\_cert**, **iter**, **mac\_iter** and **keytype** can all be set to zero and sensible defaults will be used.

These defaults are: 40 bit RC2 encryption for certificates, triple DES encryption for private keys, a key iteration count of PKCS12\_DEFAULT\_ITER (currently 2048) and a MAC iteration count of 1.

The default MAC iteration count is 1 in order to retain compatibility with old software which did not interpret MAC iteration counts. If such compatibility is not required then **mac\_iter** should be set to PKCS12\_DEFAULT\_ITER.

**keytype** adds a flag to the store private key. This is a non standard extension that is only currently interpreted by MSIE. If set to zero the flag is omitted, if set to **KEY\_SIG** the key can be used for signing only, if set to **KEY\_EX** it can be used for signing and encryption. This option was useful for old export grade software which could use signing only keys of arbitrary size but had restrictions on the permissible sizes of keys which could be used for encryption.

## SEE ALSO

*d2i\_PKCS12(3)*

## HISTORY

PKCS12\_create was added in OpenSSL 0.9.3

**NAME**

PKCS12\_parse – parse a PKCS#12 structure

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>

int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*PKCS12\_parse()* parses a PKCS12 structure.

**p12** is the **PKCS12** structure to parse. **pass** is the passphrase to use. If successful the private key will be written to **\*pkey**, the corresponding certificate to **\*cert** and any additional certificates to **\*ca**.

**NOTES**

The parameters **pkey** and **cert** cannot be **NULL**. **ca** can be **<NULL>** in which case additional certificates will be discarded. **\*ca** can also be a valid **STACK** in which case additional certificates are appended to **\*ca**. If **\*ca** is **NULL** a new **STACK** will be allocated.

The **friendlyName** and **localKeyID** attributes (if present) on each certificate will be stored in the **alias** and **keyid** attributes of the **X509** structure.

**BUGS**

Only a single private key and corresponding certificate is returned by this function. More complex PKCS#12 files with multiple private keys will only return the first match.

Only **friendlyName** and **localKeyID** attributes are currently stored in certificates. Other attributes are discarded.

Attributes currently cannot be store in the private key **EVP\_PKEY** structure.

**SEE ALSO**

*d2i\_PKCS12(3)*

**HISTORY**

PKCS12\_parse was added in OpenSSL 0.9.3



**NAME**

PKCS7\_decrypt – decrypt content from a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure

**SYNOPSIS**

```
int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*PKCS7\_decrypt()* extracts and decrypts the content from a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure. **pkey** is the private key of the recipient, **cert** is the recipients certificate, **data** is a BIO to write the content to and **flags** is an optional set of flags.

**NOTES**

*OpenSSL\_add\_all\_algorithms()* (or equivalent) should be called before using this function or errors about unknown algorithms will occur.

Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the PKCS#7 structure.

The following flags can be passed in the **flags** parameter.

If the **PKCS7\_TEXT** flag is set MIME headers for type **text/plain** are deleted from the content. If the content is not of type **text/plain** then an error is returned.

**RETURN VALUES**

*PKCS7\_decrypt()* returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure. The error can be obtained from *ERR\_get\_error(3)*

**BUGS**

*PKCS7\_decrypt()* must be passed the correct recipient key and certificate. It would be better if it could look up the correct key and certificate from a database.

The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as mentioned in *PKCS7\_sign()* also applies to *PKCS7\_verify()*.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *PKCS7\_encrypt(3)*

**HISTORY**

*PKCS7\_decrypt()* was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5

**NAME**

PKCS7\_encrypt – create a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure

**SYNOPSIS**

PKCS7 \*PKCS7\_encrypt(STACK\_OF(X509) \*certs, BIO \*in, const EVP\_CIPHER \*cipher, int flags);

**DESCRIPTION**

*PKCS7\_encrypt()* creates and returns a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure. **certs** is a list of recipient certificates. **in** is the content to be encrypted. **cipher** is the symmetric cipher to use. **flags** is an optional set of flags.

**NOTES**

Only RSA keys are supported in PKCS#7 and envelopedData so the recipient certificates supplied to this function must all contain RSA public keys, though they do not have to be signed using the RSA algorithm.

*EVP\_des\_ede3\_cbc()* (triple DES) is the algorithm of choice for S/MIME use because most clients will support it.

Some old “export grade” clients may only support weak encryption using 40 or 64 bit RC2. These can be used by passing *EVP\_rc2\_40\_cbc()* and *EVP\_rc2\_64\_cbc()* respectively.

The algorithm passed in the **cipher** parameter must support ASN1 encoding of its parameters.

Many browsers implement a “sign and encrypt” option which is simply an S/MIME envelopedData containing an S/MIME signed message. This can be readily produced by storing the S/MIME signed message in a memory BIO and passing it to *PKCS7\_encrypt()*.

The following flags can be passed in the **flags** parameter.

If the **PKCS7\_TEXT** flag is set MIME headers for type **text/plain** are prepended to the data.

Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required by the S/MIME specifications) if **PKCS7\_BINARY** is set no translation occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation will corrupt it. If **PKCS7\_BINARY** is set then **PKCS7\_TEXT** is ignored.

**RETURN VALUES**

*PKCS7\_encrypt()* returns either a valid PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**BUGS**

The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as mentioned in *PKCS7\_sign()* also applies to *PKCS7\_verify()*.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *PKCS7\_decrypt(3)*

**HISTORY**

*PKCS7\_decrypt()* was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5

**NAME**

PKCS7\_sign – create a PKCS#7 signedData structure

**SYNOPSIS**

```
PKCS7 *PKCS7_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, int flags);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*PKCS7\_sign()* creates and returns a PKCS#7 signedData structure. **signcert** is the certificate to sign with, **pkey** is the corresponding private key. **certs** is an optional additional set of certificates to include in the PKCS#7 structure (for example any intermediate CAs in the chain).

The data to be signed is read from BIO **data**.

**flags** is an optional set of flags.

**NOTES**

Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the **flags** parameter.

Many S/MIME clients expect the signed content to include valid MIME headers. If the **PKCS7\_TEXT** flag is set MIME headers for type **text/plain** are prepended to the data.

If **PKCS7\_NOCERTS** is set the signer's certificate will not be included in the PKCS7 structure, the signer's certificate must still be supplied in the **signcert** parameter though. This can reduce the size of the signature if the signers certificate can be obtained by other means: for example a previously signed message.

The data being signed is included in the PKCS7 structure, unless **PKCS7\_DETACHED** is set in which case it is omitted. This is used for PKCS7 detached signatures which are used in S/MIME plaintext signed messages for example.

Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required by the S/MIME specifications) if **PKCS7\_BINARY** is set no translation occurs. This option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation will corrupt it.

The signedData structure includes several PKCS#7 authenticatedAttributes including the signing time, the PKCS#7 content type and the supported list of ciphers in an SMIMECapabilities attribute. If **PKCS7\_NOATTR** is set then no authenticatedAttributes will be used. If **PKCS7\_NOSMIMECAP** is set then just the SMIMECapabilities are omitted.

If present the SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates support for the following algorithms: triple DES, 128 bit RC2, 64 bit RC2, DES and 40 bit RC2. If any of these algorithms is disabled then it will not be included.

**BUGS**

*PKCS7\_sign()* is somewhat limited. It does not support multiple signers, some advanced attributes such as counter signatures are not supported.

The SHA1 digest algorithm is currently always used.

When the signed data is not detached it will be stored in memory within the **PKCS7** structure. This effectively limits the size of messages which can be signed due to memory restraints. There should be a way to sign data without having to hold it all in memory, this would however require fairly major revisions of the OpenSSL ASN1 code.

Clear text signing does not store the content in memory but the way *PKCS7\_sign()* operates means that two passes of the data must typically be made: one to compute the signatures and a second to output the data along with the signature. There should be a way to process the data with only a single pass.

**RETURN VALUES**

*PKCS7\_sign()* returns either a valid PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *PKCS7\_verify(3)*

**HISTORY**

*PKCS7\_sign()* was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5

**NAME**

PKCS7\_verify – verify a PKCS#7 signedData structure

**SYNOPSIS**

```
int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *indata, BIO *out,
int flags);
```

```
int PKCS7_get0_signers(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*PKCS7\_verify()* verifies a PKCS#7 signedData structure. **p7** is the PKCS7 structure to verify. **certs** is a set of certificates in which to search for the signer's certificate. **store** is a trusted certificate store (used for chain verification). **indata** is the signed data if the content is not present in **p7** (that is it is detached). The content is written to **out** if it is not NULL.

**flags** is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify operation.

*PKCS7\_get0\_signers()* retrieves the signer's certificates from **p7**, it does **not** check their validity or whether any signatures are valid. The **certs** and **flags** parameters have the same meanings as in *PKCS7\_verify()*.

**VERIFY PROCESS**

Normally the verify process proceeds as follows.

Initially some sanity checks are performed on **p7**. The type of **p7** must be signedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if the content is detached **indata** cannot be NULL.

An attempt is made to locate all the signer's certificates, first looking in the **certs** parameter (if it is not NULL) and then looking in any certificates contained in the **p7** structure itself. If any signer's certificates cannot be located the operation fails.

Each signer's certificate is chain verified using the **smimesign** purpose and the supplied trusted certificate store. Any internal certificates in the message are used as untrusted CAs. If any chain verify fails an error code is returned.

Finally the signed content is read (and written to **out** if it is not NULL) and the signature's checked.

If all signature's verify correctly then the function is successful.

Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the **flags** parameter to change the default verify behaviour. Only the flag **PKCS7\_NOINTERN** is meaningful to *PKCS7\_get0\_signers()*.

If **PKCS7\_NOINTERN** is set the certificates in the message itself are not searched when locating the signer's certificate. This means that all the signers certificates must be in the **certs** parameter.

If the **PKCS7\_TEXT** flag is set MIME headers for type **text/plain** are deleted from the content. If the content is not of type **text/plain** then an error is returned.

If **PKCS7\_NOVERIFY** is set the signer's certificates are not chain verified.

If **PKCS7\_NOCHAIN** is set then the certificates contained in the message are not used as untrusted CAs. This means that the whole verify chain (apart from the signer's certificate) must be contained in the trusted store.

If **PKCS7\_NOSIGS** is set then the signatures on the data are not checked.

**NOTES**

One application of **PKCS7\_NOINTERN** is to only accept messages signed by a small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be passed in the **certs** parameter. In this case if the signer is not one of the certificates supplied in **certs** then the verify will fail because the signer cannot be found.

Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for example setting **PKCS7\_NOVERIFY|PKCS7\_NOSIGS** will totally disable all verification and any signed message will be considered valid. This combination is however useful if one merely wishes to write the content to **out** and its validity is not considered important.

Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time rather than the current time. However since the signing time is supplied by the signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence (such as a trusted timestamp).

**RETURN VALUES**

*PKCS7\_verify()* returns 1 for a successful verification and zero or a negative value if an error occurs.

*PKCS7\_get0\_signers()* returns all signers or **NULL** if an error occurred.

The error can be obtained from *ERR\_get\_error*(3)

**BUGS**

The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signers certificate, this is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current **X509\_STORE** functionality.

The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as mentioned in *PKCS7\_sign()* also applies to *PKCS7\_verify()*.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error*(3), *PKCS7\_sign*(3)

**HISTORY**

*PKCS7\_verify()* was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5

**NAME**

rand – pseudo-random number generator

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rand.h>

int  RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine);

int  RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
int  RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);

void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, int entropy);
int  RAND_status(void);

int  RAND_load_file(const char *file, long max_bytes);
int  RAND_write_file(const char *file);
const char *RAND_file_name(char *file, size_t num);

int  RAND_egd(const char *path);

void RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth);
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void);
RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void);

void RAND_cleanup(void);

/* For Win32 only */
void RAND_screen(void);
int  RAND_event(UINT, WPARAM, LPARAM);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

Since the introduction of the ENGINE API, the recommended way of controlling default implementations is by using the ENGINE API functions. The default **RAND\_METHOD**, as set by *RAND\_set\_rand\_method()* and returned by *RAND\_get\_rand\_method()*, is only used if no ENGINE has been set as the default “rand” implementation. Hence, these two functions are no longer the recommended way to control defaults.

If an alternative **RAND\_METHOD** implementation is being used (either set directly or as provided by an ENGINE module), then it is entirely responsible for the generation and management of a cryptographically secure PRNG stream. The mechanisms described below relate solely to the software PRNG implementation built in to OpenSSL and used by default.

These functions implement a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). It is used by other library functions for example to generate random keys, and applications can use it when they need randomness.

A cryptographic PRNG must be seeded with unpredictable data such as mouse movements or keys pressed at random by the user. This is described in *RAND\_add(3)*. Its state can be saved in a seed file (see *RAND\_load\_file(3)*) to avoid having to go through the seeding process whenever the application is started.

*RAND\_bytes(3)* describes how to obtain random data from the PRNG.

**INTERNALS**

The *RAND\_SSLeay()* method implements a PRNG based on a cryptographic hash function.

The following description of its design is based on the SSLeay documentation:

First up I will state the things I believe I need for a good RNG.

- 1 A good hashing algorithm to mix things up and to convert the RNG ‘state’ to random numbers.
- 2 An initial source of random ‘state’.
- 3 The state should be very large. If the RNG is being used to generate 4096 bit RSA keys, 2 2048 bit random strings are required (at a minimum). If your RNG state only has 128 bits, you are obviously limiting the search space to 128 bits, not 2048. I’m probably getting a little carried away on this last point but it does indicate that it may not be a bad idea to keep quite a lot of RNG state. It

should be easier to break a cipher than guess the RNG seed data.

- 4 Any RNG seed data should influence all subsequent random numbers generated. This implies that any random seed data entered will have an influence on all subsequent random numbers generated.
- 5 When using data to seed the RNG state, the data used should not be extractable from the RNG state. I believe this should be a requirement because one possible source of 'secret' semi random data would be a private key or a password. This data must not be disclosed by either subsequent random numbers or a 'core' dump left by a program crash.
- 6 Given the same initial 'state', 2 systems should deviate in their RNG state (and hence the random numbers generated) over time if at all possible.
- 7 Given the random number output stream, it should not be possible to determine the RNG state or the next random number.

The algorithm is as follows.

There is global state made up of a 1023 byte buffer (the 'state'), a working hash value ('md'), and a counter ('count').

Whenever seed data is added, it is inserted into the 'state' as follows.

The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash function as follows: The data passed to the hash function is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' (the location determined by incremented looping index) as the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' (which is incremented after each use). The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the hash function. I believe this system addresses points 1 (hash function; currently SHA-1), 3 (the 'state'), 4 (via the 'md'), 5 (by the use of a hash function and xor).

When bytes are extracted from the RNG, the following process is used. For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:

Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state' (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.

Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md' are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the global 'md'.

I believe the above addressed points 1 (use of SHA-1), 6 (by hashing into the 'state' the 'old' data from the caller that is about to be overwritten) and 7 (by not using the 10 bytes given to the caller to update the 'state', but they are used to update 'md').

So of the points raised, only 2 is not addressed (but see *RAND\_add(3)*).

## SEE ALSO

*BN\_rand(3)*, *RAND\_add(3)*, *RAND\_load\_file(3)*, *RAND\_egd(3)*, *RAND\_bytes(3)*,  
*RAND\_set\_rand\_method(3)*, *RAND\_cleanup(3)*



**NAME**

RAND\_add, RAND\_seed, RAND\_status, RAND\_event, RAND\_screen – add entropy to the PRNG

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rand.h>

void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);

void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);

int RAND_status(void);

int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam);

void RAND_screen(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*RAND\_add()* mixes the **num** bytes at **buf** into the PRNG state. Thus, if the data at **buf** are unpredictable to an adversary, this increases the uncertainty about the state and makes the PRNG output less predictable. Suitable input comes from user interaction (random key presses, mouse movements) and certain hardware events. The **entropy** argument is (the lower bound of) an estimate of how much randomness is contained in **buf**, measured in bytes. Details about sources of randomness and how to estimate their entropy can be found in the literature, e.g. RFC 1750.

*RAND\_add()* may be called with sensitive data such as user entered passwords. The seed values cannot be recovered from the PRNG output.

OpenSSL makes sure that the PRNG state is unique for each thread. On systems that provide `/dev/urandom`, the randomness device is used to seed the PRNG transparently. However, on all other systems, the application is responsible for seeding the PRNG by calling *RAND\_add()*, *RAND\_egd(3)* or *RAND\_load\_file(3)*.

*RAND\_seed()* is equivalent to *RAND\_add()* when **num** == **entropy**.

*RAND\_event()* collects the entropy from Windows events such as mouse movements and other user interaction. It should be called with the **iMsg**, **wParam** and **lParam** arguments of *all* messages sent to the window procedure. It will estimate the entropy contained in the event message (if any), and add it to the PRNG. The program can then process the messages as usual.

The *RAND\_screen()* function is available for the convenience of Windows programmers. It adds the current contents of the screen to the PRNG. For applications that can catch Windows events, seeding the PRNG by calling *RAND\_event()* is a significantly better source of randomness. It should be noted that both methods cannot be used on servers that run without user interaction.

**RETURN VALUES**

*RAND\_status()* and *RAND\_event()* return 1 if the PRNG has been seeded with enough data, 0 otherwise.

The other functions do not return values.

**SEE ALSO**

*rand(3)*, *RAND\_egd(3)*, *RAND\_load\_file(3)*, *RAND\_cleanup(3)*

**HISTORY**

*RAND\_seed()* and *RAND\_screen()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. *RAND\_add()* and *RAND\_status()* have been added in OpenSSL 0.9.5, *RAND\_event()* in OpenSSL 0.9.5a.

**NAME**

RAND\_bytes, RAND\_pseudo\_bytes – generate random data

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rand.h>

int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);

int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*RAND\_bytes()* puts **num** cryptographically strong pseudo-random bytes into **buf**. An error occurs if the PRNG has not been seeded with enough randomness to ensure an unpredictable byte sequence.

*RAND\_pseudo\_bytes()* puts **num** pseudo-random bytes into **buf**. Pseudo-random byte sequences generated by *RAND\_pseudo\_bytes()* will be unique if they are of sufficient length, but are not necessarily unpredictable. They can be used for non-cryptographic purposes and for certain purposes in cryptographic protocols, but usually not for key generation etc.

**RETURN VALUES**

*RAND\_bytes()* returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. The error code can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*. *RAND\_pseudo\_bytes()* returns 1 if the bytes generated are cryptographically strong, 0 otherwise. Both functions return -1 if they are not supported by the current RAND method.

**SEE ALSO**

*rand(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *RAND\_add(3)*

**HISTORY**

*RAND\_bytes()* is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. It has a return value since OpenSSL 0.9.5. *RAND\_pseudo\_bytes()* was added in OpenSSL 0.9.5.

**NAME**

RAND\_cleanup – erase the PRNG state

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rand.h>

void RAND_cleanup(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*RAND\_cleanup()* erases the memory used by the PRNG.

**RETURN VALUE**

*RAND\_cleanup()* returns no value.

**SEE ALSO**

*rand*(3)

**HISTORY**

*RAND\_cleanup()* is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

RAND\_egd – query entropy gathering daemon

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rand.h>

int RAND_egd(const char *path);
int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes);

int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*RAND\_egd()* queries the entropy gathering daemon EGD on socket **path**. It queries 255 bytes and uses *RAND\_add(3)* to seed the OpenSSL built-in PRNG. *RAND\_egd(path)* is a wrapper for *RAND\_egd\_bytes(path, 255)*;

*RAND\_egd\_bytes()* queries the entropy gathering daemon EGD on socket **path**. It queries **bytes** bytes and uses *RAND\_add(3)* to seed the OpenSSL built-in PRNG. This function is more flexible than *RAND\_egd()*. When only one secret key must be generated, it is not necessary to request the full amount 255 bytes from the EGD socket. This can be advantageous, since the amount of entropy that can be retrieved from EGD over time is limited.

*RAND\_query\_egd\_bytes()* performs the actual query of the EGD daemon on socket **path**. If **buf** is given, **bytes** bytes are queried and written into **buf**. If **buf** is NULL, **bytes** bytes are queried and used to seed the OpenSSL built-in PRNG using *RAND\_add(3)*.

**NOTES**

On systems without */dev/\*random* devices providing entropy from the kernel, the EGD entropy gathering daemon can be used to collect entropy. It provides a socket interface through which entropy can be gathered in chunks up to 255 bytes. Several chunks can be queried during one connection.

EGD is available from <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/> (`perl Makefile.PL; make; make install` to install). It is run as **egd path**, where *path* is an absolute path designating a socket. When *RAND\_egd()* is called with that path as an argument, it tries to read random bytes that EGD has collected. The read is performed in non-blocking mode.

Alternatively, the EGD-interface compatible daemon PRNGD can be used. It is available from [http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix\\_tls/prngd.html](http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html). PRNGD does employ an internal PRNG itself and can therefore never run out of entropy.

OpenSSL automatically queries EGD when entropy is requested via *RAND\_bytes()* or the status is checked via *RAND\_status()* for the first time, if the socket is located at */var/run/egd-pool*, */dev/egd-pool* or */etc/egd-pool*.

**RETURN VALUE**

*RAND\_egd()* and *RAND\_egd\_bytes()* return the number of bytes read from the daemon on success, and -1 if the connection failed or the daemon did not return enough data to fully seed the PRNG.

*RAND\_query\_egd\_bytes()* returns the number of bytes read from the daemon on success, and -1 if the connection failed. The PRNG state is not considered.

**SEE ALSO**

*rand(3)*, *RAND\_add(3)*, *RAND\_cleanup(3)*

**HISTORY**

*RAND\_egd()* is available since OpenSSL 0.9.5.

*RAND\_egd\_bytes()* is available since OpenSSL 0.9.6.

*RAND\_query\_egd\_bytes()* is available since OpenSSL 0.9.7.

The automatic query of */var/run/egd-pool* et al was added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

**NAME**

RAND\_load\_file, RAND\_write\_file, RAND\_file\_name – PRNG seed file

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rand.h>

const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t num);

int RAND_load_file(const char *filename, long max_bytes);

int RAND_write_file(const char *filename);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*RAND\_file\_name()* generates a default path for the random seed file. **buf** points to a buffer of size **num** in which to store the filename. The seed file is \$RANDFILE if that environment variable is set, \$HOME/.rnd otherwise. If \$HOME is not set either, or **num** is too small for the path name, an error occurs.

*RAND\_load\_file()* reads a number of bytes from file **filename** and adds them to the PRNG. If **max\_bytes** is non-negative, up to to **max\_bytes** are read; starting with OpenSSL 0.9.5, if **max\_bytes** is -1, the complete file is read.

*RAND\_write\_file()* writes a number of random bytes (currently 1024) to file **filename** which can be used to initialize the PRNG by calling *RAND\_load\_file()* in a later session.

**RETURN VALUES**

*RAND\_load\_file()* returns the number of bytes read.

*RAND\_write\_file()* returns the number of bytes written, and -1 if the bytes written were generated without appropriate seed.

*RAND\_file\_name()* returns a pointer to **buf** on success, and NULL on error.

**SEE ALSO**

*rand*(3), *RAND\_add*(3), *RAND\_cleanup*(3)

**HISTORY**

*RAND\_load\_file()*, *RAND\_write\_file()* and *RAND\_file\_name()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

RAND\_set\_rand\_method, RAND\_get\_rand\_method, RAND\_SSLeay – select RAND method

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rand.h>

void RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth);

const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void);

RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

A **RAND\_METHOD** specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for random number generation. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as hardware RNGs may be used. **IMPORTANT:** See the **NOTES** section for important information about how these RAND API functions are affected by the use of **ENGINE** API calls.

Initially, the default **RAND\_METHOD** is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as returned by *RAND\_SSLeay()*.

*RAND\_set\_default\_method()* makes **meth** the method for PRNG use. **NB:** This is true only whilst no **ENGINE** has been set as a default for **RAND**, so this function is no longer recommended.

*RAND\_get\_default\_method()* returns a pointer to the current **RAND\_METHOD**. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on whether the **ENGINE** API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended.

**THE RAND\_METHOD STRUCTURE**

```
typedef struct rand_meth_st
{
    void (*seed)(const void *buf, int num);
    int (*bytes)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
    void (*cleanup)(void);
    void (*add)(const void *buf, int num, int entropy);
    int (*pseudorand)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
    int (*status)(void);
} RAND_METHOD;
```

The components point to the implementation of *RAND\_seed()*, *RAND\_bytes()*, *RAND\_cleanup()*, *RAND\_add()*, *RAND\_pseudo\_rand()* and *RAND\_status()*. Each component may be NULL if the function is not implemented.

**RETURN VALUES**

*RAND\_set\_rand\_method()* returns no value. *RAND\_get\_rand\_method()* and *RAND\_SSLeay()* return pointers to the respective methods.

**NOTES**

As of version 0.9.7, **RAND\_METHOD** implementations are grouped together with other algorithmic APIs (eg. **RSA\_METHOD**, **EVP\_CIPHER**, etc) in **ENGINE** modules. If a default **ENGINE** is specified for **RAND** functionality using an **ENGINE** API function, that will override any **RAND** defaults set using the **RAND** API (ie. *RAND\_set\_rand\_method()*). For this reason, the **ENGINE** API is the recommended way to control default implementations for use in **RAND** and other cryptographic algorithms.

**SEE ALSO**

*rand(3)*, *engine(3)*

**HISTORY**

*RAND\_set\_rand\_method()*, *RAND\_get\_rand\_method()* and *RAND\_SSLeay()* are available in all versions of OpenSSL.

In the engine version of version 0.9.6, *RAND\_set\_rand\_method()* was altered to take an **ENGINE** pointer as its argument. As of version 0.9.7, that has been reverted as the **ENGINE** API transparently overrides **RAND** defaults if used, otherwise **RAND** API functions work as before. *RAND\_set\_rand\_engine()* was also introduced in version 0.9.7.

**NAME**

RIPEMD160, RIPEMD160\_Init, RIPEMD160\_Update, RIPEMD160\_Final – RIPEMD–160 hash function

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ripemd.h>

unsigned char *RIPEMD160(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n,
                          unsigned char *md);

void RIPEMD160_Init(RIPEMD160_CTX *c);
void RIPEMD160_Update(RIPEMD160_CTX *c, const void *data,
                     unsigned long len);
void RIPEMD160_Final(unsigned char *md, RIPEMD160_CTX *c);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

RIPEMD–160 is a cryptographic hash function with a 160 bit output.

*RIPEMD160()* computes the RIPEMD–160 message digest of the **n** bytes at **d** and places it in **md** (which must have space for RIPEMD160\_DIGEST\_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output). If **md** is NULL, the digest is placed in a static array.

The following functions may be used if the message is not completely stored in memory:

*RIPEMD160\_Init()* initializes a **RIPEMD160\_CTX** structure.

*RIPEMD160\_Update()* can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to be hashed (**len** bytes at **data**).

*RIPEMD160\_Final()* places the message digest in **md**, which must have space for RIPEMD160\_DIGEST\_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output, and erases the **RIPEMD160\_CTX**.

Applications should use the higher level functions *EVP\_DigestInit*(3) etc. instead of calling the hash functions directly.

**RETURN VALUES**

*RIPEMD160()* returns a pointer to the hash value.

*RIPEMD160\_Init()*, *RIPEMD160\_Update()* and *RIPEMD160\_Final()* do not return values.

**CONFORMING TO**

ISO/IEC 10118–3 (draft) (??)

**SEE ALSO**

*sha*(3), *hmac*(3), *EVP\_DigestInit*(3)

**HISTORY**

*RIPEMD160()*, *RIPEMD160\_Init()*, *RIPEMD160\_Update()* and *RIPEMD160\_Final()* are available since SSLey 0.9.0.

**NAME**

rsa – RSA public key cryptosystem

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>

RSA * RSA_new(void);
void RSA_free(RSA *rsa);

int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);

int RSA_sign(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
    unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa);
int RSA_verify(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
    unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);

int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa);

RSA *RSA_generate_key(int num, unsigned long e,
    void (*callback)(int, int, void *), void *cb_arg);

int RSA_check_key(RSA *rsa);

int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa);

void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void);
int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth);
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa);
RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void);
RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void);
int RSA_flags(const RSA *rsa);
RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine);

int RSA_print(BIO *bp, RSA *x, int offset);
int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *x, int offset);

int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long arg1, char *argp, int (*new_func)(),
    int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)());
int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, char *arg);
char *RSA_get_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx);

int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m,
    unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
    RSA *rsa);
int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m,
    unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
    RSA *rsa);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions implement RSA public key encryption and signatures as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 [RFC 2437].

The **RSA** structure consists of several **BIGNUM** components. It can contain public as well as private RSA keys:



```

struct
{
    BIGNUM *n;           // public modulus
    BIGNUM *e;           // public exponent
    BIGNUM *d;           // private exponent
    BIGNUM *p;           // secret prime factor
    BIGNUM *q;           // secret prime factor
    BIGNUM *dmp1;        // d mod (p-1)
    BIGNUM *dmq1;        // d mod (q-1)
    BIGNUM *iqmp;        // q-1 mod p
    // ...
};

RSA

```

In public keys, the private exponent and the related secret values are **NULL**.

**p**, **q**, **dmp1**, **dmq1** and **iqmp** may be **NULL** in private keys, but the RSA operations are much faster when these values are available.

Note that RSA keys may use non-standard **RSA\_METHOD** implementations, either directly or by the use of **ENGINE** modules. In some cases (eg. an **ENGINE** providing support for hardware-embedded keys), these **BIGNUM** values will not be used by the implementation or may be used for alternative data storage. For this reason, applications should generally avoid using RSA structure elements directly and instead use API functions to query or modify keys.

## CONFORMING TO

SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0

## PATENTS

RSA was covered by a US patent which expired in September 2000.

## SEE ALSO

*rsa*(1), *bn*(3), *dsa*(3), *dh*(3), *rand*(3), *engine*(3), *RSA\_new*(3), *RSA\_public\_encrypt*(3), *RSA\_sign*(3), *RSA\_size*(3), *RSA\_generate\_key*(3), *RSA\_check\_key*(3), *RSA\_blinding\_on*(3), *RSA\_set\_method*(3), *RSA\_print*(3), *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index*(3), *RSA\_private\_encrypt*(3), *RSA\_sign\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING*(3), *RSA\_padding\_add\_PKCS1\_type\_1*(3)

**NAME**

*RSA\_blinding\_on*, *RSA\_blinding\_off* – protect the RSA operation from timing attacks

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);

void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA decryption or signature operations, blinding must be used to protect the RSA operation from that attack.

*RSA\_blinding\_on()* turns blinding on for key **rsa** and generates a random blinding factor. **ctx** is **NULL** or a pre-allocated and initialized **BN\_CTX**. The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling *RSA\_blinding\_on()*.

*RSA\_blinding\_off()* turns blinding off and frees the memory used for the blinding factor.

**RETURN VALUES**

*RSA\_blinding\_on()* returns 1 on success, and 0 if an error occurred.

*RSA\_blinding\_off()* returns no value.

**SEE ALSO**

*rsa*(3), *rand*(3)

**HISTORY**

*RSA\_blinding\_on()* and *RSA\_blinding\_off()* appeared in SSLeay 0.9.0.

**NAME**

RSA\_check\_key – validate private RSA keys

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

int RSA_check_key(RSA *rsa);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

This function validates RSA keys. It checks that **p** and **q** are in fact prime, and that **n = p\*q**.

It also checks that **d\*e = 1 mod (p-1\*q-1)**, and that **dmp1**, **dmq1** and **iqmp** are set correctly or are **NULL**.

As such, this function can not be used with any arbitrary RSA key object, even if it is otherwise fit for regular RSA operation. See **NOTES** for more information.

**RETURN VALUE**

*RSA\_check\_key()* returns 1 if **rsa** is a valid RSA key, and 0 otherwise. -1 is returned if an error occurs while checking the key.

If the key is invalid or an error occurred, the reason code can be obtained using *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**NOTES**

This function does not work on RSA public keys that have only the modulus and public exponent elements populated. It performs integrity checks on all the RSA key material, so the RSA key structure must contain all the private key data too.

Unlike most other RSA functions, this function does **not** work transparently with any underlying ENGINE implementation because it uses the key data in the RSA structure directly. An ENGINE implementation can override the way key data is stored and handled, and can even provide support for HSM keys – in which case the RSA structure may contain **no** key data at all! If the ENGINE in question is only being used for acceleration or analysis purposes, then in all likelihood the RSA key data is complete and untouched, but this can't be assumed in the general case.

**BUGS**

A method of verifying the RSA key using opaque RSA API functions might need to be considered. Right now *RSA\_check\_key()* simply uses the RSA structure elements directly, bypassing the RSA\_METHOD table altogether (and completely violating encapsulation and object-orientation in the process). The best fix will probably be to introduce a “*check\_key()*” handler to the RSA\_METHOD function table so that alternative implementations can also provide their own verifiers.

**SEE ALSO**

*rsa(3)*, *ERR\_get\_error(3)*

**HISTORY**

*RSA\_check\_key()* appeared in OpenSSL 0.9.4.

**NAME**

RSA\_generate\_key – generate RSA key pair

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

RSA *RSA_generate_key(int num, unsigned long e,
    void (*callback)(int,int,void *), void *cb_arg);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*RSA\_generate\_key()* generates a key pair and returns it in a newly allocated **RSA** structure. The pseudo-random number generator must be seeded prior to calling *RSA\_generate\_key()*.

The modulus size will be **num** bits, and the public exponent will be **e**. Key sizes with **num** < 1024 should be considered insecure. The exponent is an odd number, typically 3, 17 or 65537.

A callback function may be used to provide feedback about the progress of the key generation. If **callback** is not **NULL**, it will be called as follows:

- While a random prime number is generated, it is called as described in *BN\_generate\_prime*(3).
- When the n–th randomly generated prime is rejected as not suitable for the key, **callback(2, n, cb\_arg)** is called.
- When a random p has been found with p–1 relatively prime to **e**, it is called as **callback(3, 0, cb\_arg)**.

The process is then repeated for prime q with **callback(3, 1, cb\_arg)**.

**RETURN VALUE**

If key generation fails, *RSA\_generate\_key()* returns **NULL**; the error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error*(3).

**BUGS**

**callback(2, x, cb\_arg)** is used with two different meanings.

*RSA\_generate\_key()* goes into an infinite loop for illegal input values.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error*(3), *rand*(3), *rsa*(3), *RSA\_free*(3)

**HISTORY**

The **cb\_arg** argument was added in SSLeay 0.9.0.

**NAME**

`RSA_get_ex_new_index`, `RSA_set_ex_data`, `RSA_get_ex_data` – add application specific data to RSA structures

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
                        CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
                        CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
                        CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);

int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg);

void *RSA_get_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx);

typedef int new_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
                    int idx, long argl, void *argp);
typedef void free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
                     int idx, long argl, void *argp);
typedef int dup_func(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d,
                    int idx, long argl, void *argp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

Several OpenSSL structures can have application specific data attached to them. This has several potential uses, it can be used to cache data associated with a structure (for example the hash of some part of the structure) or some additional data (for example a handle to the data in an external library).

Since the application data can be anything at all it is passed and retrieved as a **void \*** type.

The `RSA_get_ex_new_index()` function is initially called to “register” some new application specific data. It takes three optional function pointers which are called when the parent structure (in this case an RSA structure) is initially created, when it is copied and when it is freed up. If any or all of these function pointer arguments are not used they should be set to NULL. The precise manner in which these function pointers are called is described in more detail below. `RSA_get_ex_new_index()` also takes additional long and pointer parameters which will be passed to the supplied functions but which otherwise have no special meaning. It returns an **index** which should be stored (typically in a static variable) and passed used in the **idx** parameter in the remaining functions. Each successful call to `RSA_get_ex_new_index()` will return an index greater than any previously returned, this is important because the optional functions are called in order of increasing index value.

`RSA_set_ex_data()` is used to set application specific data, the data is supplied in the **arg** parameter and its precise meaning is up to the application.

`RSA_get_ex_data()` is used to retrieve application specific data. The data is returned to the application, this will be the same value as supplied to a previous `RSA_set_ex_data()` call.

`new_func()` is called when a structure is initially allocated (for example with `RSA_new()`). The parent structure members will not have any meaningful values at this point. This function will typically be used to allocate any application specific structure.

`free_func()` is called when a structure is being freed up. The dynamic parent structure members should not be accessed because they will be freed up when this function is called.

`new_func()` and `free_func()` take the same parameters. **parent** is a pointer to the parent RSA structure. **ptr** is a the application specific data (this wont be of much use in `new_func()`). **ad** is a pointer to the `CRYPTO_EX_DATA` structure from the parent RSA structure: the functions `CRYPTO_get_ex_data()` and `CRYPTO_set_ex_data()` can be called to manipulate it. The **idx** parameter is the index: this will be the same value returned by `RSA_get_ex_new_index()` when the functions were initially registered. Finally the **argl** and **argp** parameters are the values originally passed to the same corresponding parameters when `RSA_get_ex_new_index()` was called.

`dup_func()` is called when a structure is being copied. Pointers to the destination and source `CRYPTO_EX_DATA` structures are passed in the **to** and **from** parameters respectively. The **from\_d** parameter is passed a pointer to the source application data when the function is called, when the function returns the value is copied to the destination: the application can thus modify the data pointed to by

**from\_d** and have different values in the source and destination. The **idx**, **argl** and **argp** parameters are the same as those in *new\_func()* and *free\_func()*.

## RETURN VALUES

*RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index()* returns a new index or  $-1$  on failure (note 0 is a valid index value).

*RSA\_set\_ex\_data()* returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.

*RSA\_get\_ex\_data()* returns the application data or 0 on failure. 0 may also be valid application data but currently it can only fail if given an invalid **idx** parameter.

*new\_func()* and *dup\_func()* should return 0 for failure and 1 for success.

On failure an error code can be obtained from *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

## BUGS

*dup\_func()* is currently never called.

The return value of *new\_func()* is ignored.

The *new\_func()* function isn't very useful because no meaningful values are present in the parent RSA structure when it is called.

## SEE ALSO

*rsa(3)*, *CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data(3)*

## HISTORY

*RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index()*, *RSA\_set\_ex\_data()* and *RSA\_get\_ex\_data()* are available since SSLeay 0.9.0.

**NAME**

*RSA\_new*, *RSA\_free* – allocate and free RSA objects

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

RSA * RSA_new(void);

void RSA_free(RSA *rsa);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*RSA\_new()* allocates and initializes an **RSA** structure. It is equivalent to calling *RSA\_new\_method(NULL)*.

*RSA\_free()* frees the **RSA** structure and its components. The key is erased before the memory is returned to the system.

**RETURN VALUES**

If the allocation fails, *RSA\_new()* returns **NULL** and sets an error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.

*RSA\_free()* returns no value.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *rsa(3)*, *RSA\_generate\_key(3)*, *RSA\_new\_method(3)*

**HISTORY**

*RSA\_new()* and *RSA\_free()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

`RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1`, `RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1`, `RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2`, `RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2`, `RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP`, `RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP`, `RSA_padding_add_SSLv23`, `RSA_padding_check_SSLv23`, `RSA_padding_add_none`, `RSA_padding_check_none` – asymmetric encryption padding

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    unsigned char *f, int fl);

int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);

int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    unsigned char *f, int fl);

int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);

int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    unsigned char *f, int fl, unsigned char *p, int pl);

int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len, unsigned char *p, int pl);

int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    unsigned char *f, int fl);

int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);

int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    unsigned char *f, int fl);

int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
    unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The `RSA_padding_XXX_XXX()` functions are called from the RSA encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify functions. Normally they should not be called from application programs.

However, they can also be called directly to implement padding for other asymmetric ciphers. `RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP()` and `RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP()` may be used in an application combined with **RSA\_NO\_PADDING** in order to implement OAEP with an encoding parameter.

`RSA_padding_add_XXX()` encodes **fl** bytes from **f** so as to fit into **tlen** bytes and stores the result at **to**. An error occurs if **fl** does not meet the size requirements of the encoding method.

The following encoding methods are implemented:

**PKCS1\_type\_1**

PKCS #1 v2.0 EMSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 (PKCS #1 v1.5 block type 1); used for signatures

**PKCS1\_type\_2**

PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-PKCS1-v1\_5 (PKCS #1 v1.5 block type 2)

**PKCS1\_OAEP**

PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-OAEP

**SSLv23**

PKCS #1 EME-PKCS1-v1\_5 with SSL-specific modification

**none**

simply copy the data

The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling `RSA_padding_add_XXX()`.



*RSA\_padding\_check\_xxx()* verifies that the **fl** bytes at **f** contain a valid encoding for a **rsa\_len** byte RSA key in the respective encoding method and stores the recovered data of at most **tlen** bytes (for **RSA\_NO\_PADDING**: of size **tlen**) at **to**.

For *RSA\_padding\_xxx\_OAEP()*, **p** points to the encoding parameter of length **pl**. **p** may be **NULL** if **pl** is 0.

## RETURN VALUES

The *RSA\_padding\_add\_xxx()* functions return 1 on success, 0 on error. The *RSA\_padding\_check\_xxx()* functions return the length of the recovered data, -1 on error. Error codes can be obtained by calling *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

## SEE ALSO

*RSA\_public\_encrypt(3)*, *RSA\_private\_decrypt(3)*, *RSA\_sign(3)*, *RSA\_verify(3)*

## HISTORY

*RSA\_padding\_add\_PKCS1\_type\_1()*, *RSA\_padding\_check\_PKCS1\_type\_1()*, *RSA\_padding\_add\_PKCS1\_type\_2()*, *RSA\_padding\_check\_PKCS1\_type\_2()*, *RSA\_padding\_add\_SSLv23()*, *RSA\_padding\_check\_SSLv23()*, *RSA\_padding\_add\_none()* and *RSA\_padding\_check\_none()* appeared in SSLeay 0.9.0.

*RSA\_padding\_add\_PKCS1\_OAEP()* and *RSA\_padding\_check\_PKCS1\_OAEP()* were added in OpenSSL 0.9.2b.

**NAME**

RSA\_print, RSA\_print\_fp, DSAParams\_print, DSAParams\_print\_fp, DSA\_print, DSA\_print\_fp, DHparams\_print, DHparams\_print\_fp – print cryptographic parameters

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

int RSA_print(BIO *bp, RSA *x, int offset);
int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *x, int offset);

#include <openssl/dsa.h>

int DSAParams_print(BIO *bp, DSA *x);
int DSAParams_print_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *x);
int DSA_print(BIO *bp, DSA *x, int offset);
int DSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *x, int offset);

#include <openssl/dh.h>

int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, DH *x);
int DHparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, DH *x);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

A human-readable hexadecimal output of the components of the RSA key, DSA parameters or key or DH parameters is printed to **bp** or **fp**.

The output lines are indented by **offset** spaces.

**RETURN VALUES**

These functions return 1 on success, 0 on error.

**SEE ALSO**

*dh*(3), *dsa*(3), *rsa*(3), *BN\_bn2bin*(3)

**HISTORY**

*RSA\_print()*, *RSA\_print\_fp()*, *DSA\_print()*, *DSA\_print\_fp()*, *DH\_print()*, *DH\_print\_fp()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. *DSAParams\_print()* and *DSAParams\_print\_fp()* were added in SSLeay 0.8.

**NAME**

RSA\_private\_encrypt, RSA\_public\_decrypt – low level signature operations

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);

int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions handle RSA signatures at a low level.

*RSA\_private\_encrypt()* signs the **flen** bytes at **from** (usually a message digest with an algorithm identifier) using the private key **rsa** and stores the signature in **to**. **to** must point to **RSA\_size(rsa)** bytes of memory.

**padding** denotes one of the following modes:

RSA\_PKCS1\_PADDING

PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This function does not handle the **algorithmIdentifier** specified in PKCS #1. When generating or verifying PKCS #1 signatures, *RSA\_sign*(3) and *RSA\_verify*(3) should be used.

RSA\_NO\_PADDING

Raw RSA signature. This mode should *only* be used to implement cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code. Signing user data directly with RSA is insecure.

*RSA\_public\_decrypt()* recovers the message digest from the **flen** bytes long signature at **from** using the signer's public key **rsa**. **to** must point to a memory section large enough to hold the message digest (which is smaller than **RSA\_size(rsa) – 11**). **padding** is the padding mode that was used to sign the data.

**RETURN VALUES**

*RSA\_private\_encrypt()* returns the size of the signature (i.e., **RSA\_size(rsa)**). *RSA\_public\_decrypt()* returns the size of the recovered message digest.

On error, –1 is returned; the error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error*(3).

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error*(3), *rsa*(3), *RSA\_sign*(3), *RSA\_verify*(3)

**HISTORY**

The **padding** argument was added in SSLeay 0.8. RSA\_NO\_PADDING is available since SSLeay 0.9.0.

**NAME**

RSA\_public\_encrypt, RSA\_private\_decrypt – RSA public key cryptography

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);

int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*RSA\_public\_encrypt()* encrypts the **flen** bytes at **from** (usually a session key) using the public key **rsa** and stores the ciphertext in **to**. **to** must point to `RSA_size(rsa)` bytes of memory.

**padding** denotes one of the following modes:

`RSA_PKCS1_PADDING`

PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode.

`RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING`

EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications.

`RSA_SSLV23_PADDING`

PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes that the server is SSL3 capable.

`RSA_NO_PADDING`

Raw RSA encryption. This mode should *only* be used to implement cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code. Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.

**flen** must be less than `RSA_size(rsa) - 11` for the PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, and less than `RSA_size(rsa) - 41` for `RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING`. The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling *RSA\_public\_encrypt()*.

*RSA\_private\_decrypt()* decrypts the **flen** bytes at **from** using the private key **rsa** and stores the plaintext in **to**. **to** must point to a memory section large enough to hold the decrypted data (which is smaller than `RSA_size(rsa)`). **padding** is the padding mode that was used to encrypt the data.

**RETURN VALUES**

*RSA\_public\_encrypt()* returns the size of the encrypted data (i.e., `RSA_size(rsa)`). *RSA\_private\_decrypt()* returns the size of the recovered plaintext.

On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**CONFORMING TO**

SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *rand(3)*, *rsa(3)*, *RSA\_size(3)*

**HISTORY**

The **padding** argument was added in SSLeay 0.8. `RSA_NO_PADDING` is available since SSLeay 0.9.0, OAEP was added in OpenSSL 0.9.2b.

**NAME**

RSA\_set\_default\_method, RSA\_get\_default\_method, RSA\_set\_method, RSA\_get\_method, RSA\_PKCS1\_SSLeay, RSA\_null\_method, RSA\_flags, RSA\_new\_method – select RSA method

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void);
int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth);
RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa);
RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void);
RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void);
int RSA_flags(const RSA *rsa);
RSA *RSA_new_method(RSA_METHOD *method);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

An **RSA\_METHOD** specifies the functions that OpenSSL uses for RSA operations. By modifying the method, alternative implementations such as hardware accelerators may be used. **IMPORTANT:** See the **NOTES** section for important information about how these RSA API functions are affected by the use of **ENGINE** API calls.

Initially, the default **RSA\_METHOD** is the OpenSSL internal implementation, as returned by *RSA\_PKCS1\_SSLeay()*.

*RSA\_set\_default\_method()* makes **meth** the default method for all RSA structures created later. **NB:** This is true only whilst no **ENGINE** has been set as a default for RSA, so this function is no longer recommended.

*RSA\_get\_default\_method()* returns a pointer to the current default **RSA\_METHOD**. However, the meaningfulness of this result is dependant on whether the **ENGINE** API is being used, so this function is no longer recommended.

*RSA\_set\_method()* selects **meth** to perform all operations using the key **rsa**. This will replace the **RSA\_METHOD** used by the RSA key and if the previous method was supplied by an **ENGINE**, the handle to that **ENGINE** will be released during the change. It is possible to have RSA keys that only work with certain **RSA\_METHOD** implementations (eg. from an **ENGINE** module that supports embedded hardware-protected keys), and in such cases attempting to change the **RSA\_METHOD** for the key can have unexpected results.

*RSA\_get\_method()* returns a pointer to the **RSA\_METHOD** being used by **rsa**. This method may or may not be supplied by an **ENGINE** implementation, but if it is, the return value can only be guaranteed to be valid as long as the RSA key itself is valid and does not have its implementation changed by *RSA\_set\_method()*.

*RSA\_flags()* returns the **flags** that are set for **rsa**'s current **RSA\_METHOD**. See the **BUGS** section.

*RSA\_new\_method()* allocates and initializes an RSA structure so that **engine** will be used for the RSA operations. If **engine** is **NULL**, the default **ENGINE** for RSA operations is used, and if no default **ENGINE** is set, the **RSA\_METHOD** controlled by *RSA\_set\_default\_method()* is used.

*RSA\_flags()* returns the **flags** that are set for **rsa**'s current method.

*RSA\_new\_method()* allocates and initializes an **RSA** structure so that **method** will be used for the RSA operations. If **method** is **NULL**, the default method is used.

**THE RSA\_METHOD STRUCTURE**

```
typedef struct rsa_meth_st
{
    /* name of the implementation */
    const char *name;
```

```

/* encrypt */
int (*rsa_pub_enc)(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);

/* verify arbitrary data */
int (*rsa_pub_dec)(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);

/* sign arbitrary data */
int (*rsa_priv_enc)(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);

/* decrypt */
int (*rsa_priv_dec)(int flen, unsigned char *from,
    unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);

/* compute  $r_0 = r_0^I \bmod \text{rsa} \rightarrow n$  (May be NULL for some
    implementations) */
int (*rsa_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa);

/* compute  $r = a^p \bmod m$  (May be NULL for some implementations) */
int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
    const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);

/* called at RSA_new */
int (*init)(RSA *rsa);

/* called at RSA_free */
int (*finish)(RSA *rsa);

/* RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY          - rsa_mod_exp is called for private key
 *                             operations, even if p,q,dmp1,dmql,iqmp
 *                             are NULL
 * RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER          - enable rsa_sign and rsa_verify
 * RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK   - don't check pub/private match
 */
int flags;
char *app_data; /* ?? */

/* sign. For backward compatibility, this is used only
 * if (flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER)
 */
int (*rsa_sign)(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
    unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa);

/* verify. For backward compatibility, this is used only
 * if (flags & RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER)
 */
int (*rsa_verify)(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
    unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
} RSA_METHOD;

```

## RETURN VALUES

*RSA\_PKCS1\_SSLeay()*, *RSA\_PKCS1\_null\_method()*, *RSA\_get\_default\_method()* and *RSA\_get\_method()* return pointers to the respective RSA\_METHODs.

*RSA\_set\_default\_method()* returns no value.

*RSA\_set\_method()* returns a pointer to the old RSA\_METHOD implementation that was replaced. However, this return value should probably be ignored because if it was supplied by an ENGINE, the pointer could be invalidated at any time if the ENGINE is unloaded (in fact it could be unloaded as a result of the *RSA\_set\_method()* function releasing its handle to the ENGINE). For this reason, the return type may be replaced with a **void** declaration in a future release.

*RSA\_new\_method()* returns NULL and sets an error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)* if the allocation fails. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.

## NOTES

As of version 0.9.7, RSA\_METHOD implementations are grouped together with other algorithmic APIs (eg. DSA\_METHOD, EVP\_CIPHER, etc) into **ENGINE** modules. If a default ENGINE is specified for RSA functionality using an ENGINE API function, that will override any RSA defaults set using the RSA API (ie. *RSA\_set\_default\_method()*). For this reason, the ENGINE API is the recommended way to control default implementations for use in RSA and other cryptographic algorithms.

## BUGS

The behaviour of *RSA\_flags()* is a mis-feature that is left as-is for now to avoid creating compatibility problems. RSA functionality, such as the encryption functions, are controlled by the **flags** value in the RSA key itself, not by the **flags** value in the RSA\_METHOD attached to the RSA key (which is what this function returns). If the flags element of an RSA key is changed, the changes will be honoured by RSA functionality but will not be reflected in the return value of the *RSA\_flags()* function – in effect *RSA\_flags()* behaves more like an *RSA\_default\_flags()* function (which does not currently exist).

## SEE ALSO

*rsa*(3), *RSA\_new*(3)

## HISTORY

*RSA\_new\_method()* and *RSA\_set\_default\_method()* appeared in SSLeay 0.8. *RSA\_get\_default\_method()*, *RSA\_set\_method()* and *RSA\_get\_method()* as well as the *rsa\_sign* and *rsa\_verify* components of RSA\_METHOD were added in OpenSSL 0.9.4.

*RSA\_set\_default\_openssl\_method()* and *RSA\_get\_default\_openssl\_method()* replaced *RSA\_set\_default\_method()* and *RSA\_get\_default\_method()* respectively, and *RSA\_set\_method()* and *RSA\_new\_method()* were altered to use **ENGINE**s rather than **RSA\_METHOD**s during development of the engine version of OpenSSL 0.9.6. For 0.9.7, the handling of defaults in the ENGINE API was restructured so that this change was reversed, and behaviour of the other functions resembled more closely the previous behaviour. The behaviour of defaults in the ENGINE API now transparently overrides the behaviour of defaults in the RSA API without requiring changing these function prototypes.

**NAME**

RSA\_sign, RSA\_verify – RSA signatures

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

int RSA_sign(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
             unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, RSA *rsa);

int RSA_verify(int type, unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
              unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*RSA\_sign()* signs the message digest **m** of size **m\_len** using the private key **rsa** as specified in PKCS #1 v2.0. It stores the signature in **sigret** and the signature size in **siglen**. **sigret** must point to *RSA\_size(rsa)* bytes of memory.

**type** denotes the message digest algorithm that was used to generate **m**. It usually is one of **NID\_sha1**, **NID\_ripemd160** and **NID\_md5**; see *objects*(3) for details. If **type** is **NID\_md5\_sha1**, an SSL signature (MD5 and SHA1 message digests with PKCS #1 padding and no algorithm identifier) is created.

*RSA\_verify()* verifies that the signature **sigbuf** of size **siglen** matches a given message digest **m** of size **m\_len**. **type** denotes the message digest algorithm that was used to generate the signature. **rsa** is the signer's public key.

**RETURN VALUES**

*RSA\_sign()* returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. *RSA\_verify()* returns 1 on successful verification, 0 otherwise.

The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error*(3).

**BUGS**

Certain signatures with an improper algorithm identifier are accepted for compatibility with SSLeay 0.4.5 :-)

**CONFORMING TO**

SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error*(3), *objects*(3), *rsa*(3), *RSA\_private\_encrypt*(3), *RSA\_public\_decrypt*(3)

**HISTORY**

*RSA\_sign()* and *RSA\_verify()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.



**NAME**

RSA\_sign\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING, RSA\_verify\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING – RSA signatures

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m,
                                unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,
                                RSA *rsa);

int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dummy, unsigned char *m,
                                unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
                                RSA *rsa);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*RSA\_sign\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING()* signs the octet string **m** of size **m\_len** using the private key **rsa** represented in DER using PKCS #1 padding. It stores the signature in **sigret** and the signature size in **siglen**. **sigret** must point to **RSA\_size(rsa)** bytes of memory.

**dummy** is ignored.

The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling *RSA\_sign\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING()*.

*RSA\_verify\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING()* verifies that the signature **sigbuf** of size **siglen** is the DER representation of a given octet string **m** of size **m\_len**. **dummy** is ignored. **rsa** is the signer's public key.

**RETURN VALUES**

*RSA\_sign\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING()* returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. *RSA\_verify\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING()* returns 1 on successful verification, 0 otherwise.

The error codes can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**BUGS**

These functions serve no recognizable purpose.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *objects(3)*, *rand(3)*, *rsa(3)*, *RSA\_sign(3)*, *RSA\_verify(3)*

**HISTORY**

*RSA\_sign\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING()* and *RSA\_verify\_ASN1\_OCTET\_STRING()* were added in SSLeay 0.8.

**NAME**

RSA\_size – get RSA modulus size

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/rsa.h>

int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

This function returns the RSA modulus size in bytes. It can be used to determine how much memory must be allocated for an RSA encrypted value.

**rsa**→**n** must not be **NULL**.

**RETURN VALUE**

The size in bytes.

**SEE ALSO**

*rsa*(3)

**HISTORY**

*RSA\_size()* is available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

SHA1, SHA1\_Init, SHA1\_Update, SHA1\_Final – Secure Hash Algorithm

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/sha.h>

unsigned char *SHA1(const unsigned char *d, unsigned long n,
                    unsigned char *md);

void SHA1_Init(SHA_CTX *c);
void SHA1_Update(SHA_CTX *c, const void *data,
                 unsigned long len);
void SHA1_Final(unsigned char *md, SHA_CTX *c);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) is a cryptographic hash function with a 160 bit output.

*SHA1()* computes the SHA-1 message digest of the **n** bytes at **d** and places it in **md** (which must have space for SHA\_DIGEST\_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output). If **md** is NULL, the digest is placed in a static array.

The following functions may be used if the message is not completely stored in memory:

*SHA1\_Init()* initializes a **SHA\_CTX** structure.

*SHA1\_Update()* can be called repeatedly with chunks of the message to be hashed (**len** bytes at **data**).

*SHA1\_Final()* places the message digest in **md**, which must have space for SHA\_DIGEST\_LENGTH == 20 bytes of output, and erases the **SHA\_CTX**.

Applications should use the higher level functions *EVP\_DigestInit*(3) etc. instead of calling the hash functions directly.

The predecessor of SHA-1, SHA, is also implemented, but it should be used only when backward compatibility is required.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SHA1()* returns a pointer to the hash value.

*SHA1\_Init()*, *SHA1\_Update()* and *SHA1\_Final()* do not return values.

**CONFORMING TO**

SHA: US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180 (Secure Hash Standard), SHA-1: US Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS PUB 180-1 (Secure Hash Standard), ANSI X9.30

**SEE ALSO**

*ripemd*(3), *hmac*(3), *EVP\_DigestInit*(3)

**HISTORY**

*SHA1()*, *SHA1\_Init()*, *SHA1\_Update()* and *SHA1\_Final()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

SMIME\_read\_PKCS7 – parse S/MIME message.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
PKCS7 *SMIME_read_PKCS7(BIO *in, BIO **bcont);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SMIME\_read\_PKCS7()* parses a message in S/MIME format.

**in** is a BIO to read the message from.

If cleartext signing is used then the content is saved in a memory bio which is written to **\*bcont**, otherwise **\*bcont** is set to **NULL**.

The parsed PKCS#7 structure is returned or **NULL** if an error occurred.

**NOTES**

If **\*bcont** is not **NULL** then the message is clear text signed. **\*bcont** can then be passed to *PKCS7\_verify()* with the **PKCS7\_DETACHED** flag set.

Otherwise the type of the returned structure can be determined using *PKCS7\_type()*.

To support future functionality if **bcont** is not **NULL** **\*bcont** should be initialized to **NULL**. For example:

```
BIO *cont = NULL;
PKCS7 *p7;

p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &cont);
```

**BUGS**

The MIME parser used by *SMIME\_read\_PKCS7()* is somewhat primitive. While it will handle most S/MIME messages more complex compound formats may not work.

The parser assumes that the PKCS7 structure is always base64 encoded and will not handle the case where it is in binary format or uses quoted printable format.

The use of a memory BIO to hold the signed content limits the size of message which can be processed due to memory restraints: a streaming single pass option should be available.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SMIME\_read\_PKCS7()* returns a valid **PKCS7** structure or **NULL** if an error occurred. The error can be obtained from *ERR\_get\_error(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *PKCS7\_type(3)*, *SMIME\_read\_PKCS7(3)*, *PKCS7\_sign(3)*, *PKCS7\_verify(3)*, *PKCS7\_encrypt(3)*, *PKCS7\_decrypt(3)*

**HISTORY**

*SMIME\_read\_PKCS7()* was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5

**NAME**

SMIME\_write\_PKCS7 – convert PKCS#7 structure to S/MIME format.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SMIME\_write\_PKCS7()* adds the appropriate MIME headers to a PKCS#7 structure to produce an S/MIME message.

**out** is the BIO to write the data to. **p7** is the appropriate **PKCS7** structure. If cleartext signing (**multi-part/signed**) is being used then the signed data must be supplied in the **data** argument. **flags** is an optional set of flags.

**NOTES**

The following flags can be passed in the **flags** parameter.

If **PKCS7\_DETACHED** is set then cleartext signing will be used, this option only makes sense for signedData where **PKCS7\_DETACHED** is also set when *PKCS7\_sign()* is also called.

If the **PKCS7\_TEXT** flag is set MIME headers for type **text/plain** are added to the content, this only makes sense if **PKCS7\_DETACHED** is also set.

If cleartext signing is being used then the data must be read twice: once to compute the signature in *PKCS7\_sign()* and once to output the S/MIME message.

**BUGS**

*SMIME\_write\_PKCS7()* always base64 encodes PKCS#7 structures, there should be an option to disable this.

There should really be a way to produce cleartext signing using only a single pass of the data.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SMIME\_write\_PKCS7()* returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *PKCS7\_sign(3)*, *PKCS7\_verify(3)*, *PKCS7\_encrypt(3)* *PKCS7\_decrypt(3)*

**HISTORY**

*SMIME\_write\_PKCS7()* was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5

**NAME**

SSL\_accept – wait for a TLS/SSL client to initiate a TLS/SSL handshake

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_accept()* waits for a TLS/SSL client to initiate the TLS/SSL handshake. The communication channel must already have been set and assigned to the **ssl** by setting an underlying **BIO**.

**NOTES**

The behaviour of *SSL\_accept()* depends on the underlying **BIO**.

If the underlying **BIO** is **blocking**, *SSL\_accept()* will only return once the handshake has been finished or an error occurred, except for SGC (Server Gated Cryptography). For SGC, *SSL\_accept()* may return with `-1`, but *SSL\_get\_error()* will yield **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ/WRITE** and *SSL\_accept()* should be called again.

If the underlying **BIO** is **non-blocking**, *SSL\_accept()* will also return when the underlying **BIO** could not satisfy the needs of *SSL\_accept()* to continue the handshake, indicating the problem by the return value `-1`. In this case a call to *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value of *SSL\_accept()* will yield **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ** or **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_WRITE**. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of *SSL\_accept()*. The action depends on the underlying **BIO**. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but *select()* can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering **BIO**, like a **BIO** pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the **BIO** before being able to continue.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

- 1 The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been established.
- The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value **ret** to find out the reason.
- <0 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was not clean. It can also occur of action is need to continue the operation for non-blocking **BIO**s. Call *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value **ret** to find out the reason.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_get\_error(3)*, *SSL\_connect(3)*, *SSL\_shutdown(3)*, *ssl(3)*, *bio(3)*, *SSL\_set\_connect\_state(3)*, *SSL\_do\_handshake(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_new(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_alert\_type\_string,                      SSL\_alert\_type\_string\_long,                      SSL\_alert\_desc\_string,  
 SSL\_alert\_desc\_string\_long – get textual description of alert information

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value);
const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value);

const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value);
const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_alert\_type\_string()* returns a one letter string indicating the type of the alert specified by **value**.

*SSL\_alert\_type\_string\_long()* returns a string indicating the type of the alert specified by **value**.

*SSL\_alert\_desc\_string()* returns a two letter string as a short form describing the reason of the alert specified by **value**.

*SSL\_alert\_desc\_string\_long()* returns a string describing the reason of the alert specified by **value**.

**NOTES**

When one side of an SSL/TLS communication wants to inform the peer about a special situation, it sends an alert. The alert is sent as a special message and does not influence the normal data stream (unless its contents results in the communication being canceled).

A warning alert is sent, when a non-fatal error condition occurs. The “close notify” alert is sent as a warning alert. Other examples for non-fatal errors are certificate errors (“certificate expired”, “unsupported certificate”), for which a warning alert may be sent. (The sending party may however decide to send a fatal error.) The receiving side may cancel the connection on reception of a warning alert on its discretion.

Several alert messages must be sent as fatal alert messages as specified by the TLS RFC. A fatal alert always leads to a connection abort.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following strings can occur for *SSL\_alert\_type\_string()* or *SSL\_alert\_type\_string\_long()*:

“W”/“warning”

“F”/“fatal”

“U”/“unknown”

This indicates that no support is available for this alert type. Probably **value** does not contain a correct alert message.

The following strings can occur for *SSL\_alert\_desc\_string()* or *SSL\_alert\_desc\_string\_long()*:

“CN”/“close notify”

The connection shall be closed. This is a warning alert.

“UM”/“unexpected message”

An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations.

“BM”/“bad record mac”

This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect MAC. This message is always fatal.

“DF”/“decompression failure”

The decompression function received improper input (e.g. data that would expand to excessive length). This message is always fatal.

“HF”/“handshake failure”

Reception of a handshake\_failure alert message indicates that the sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security parameters given the options available. This is a fatal error.

“NC”/“no certificate”

A client, that was asked to send a certificate, does not send a certificate (SSLv3 only).

“BC”/“bad certificate”

A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not verify correctly, etc

“UC”/“unsupported certificate”

A certificate was of an unsupported type.

“CR”/“certificate revoked”

A certificate was revoked by its signer.

“CE”/“certificate expired”

A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.

“CU”/“certificate unknown”

Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the certificate, rendering it unacceptable.

“IP”/“illegal parameter”

A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with other fields. This is always fatal.

“DC”/“decryption failed”

A TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it wasn't an even multiple of the block length or its padding values, when checked, weren't correct. This message is always fatal.

“RO”/“record overflow”

A TLSCiphertext record was received which had a length more than  $2^{14}+2048$  bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSCompressed record with more than  $2^{14}+1024$  bytes. This message is always fatal.

“CA”/“unknown CA”

A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This message is always fatal.

“AD”/“access denied”

A valid certificate was received, but when access control was applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation. This message is always fatal.

“DE”/“decode error”

A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. This message is always fatal.

“CY”/“decrypt error”

A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being unable to correctly verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange, or validate a finished message.

“ER”/“export restriction”

A negotiation not in compliance with export restrictions was detected; for example, attempting to transfer a 1024 bit ephemeral RSA key for the RSA\_EXPORT handshake method. This message is always fatal.

“PV”/“protocol version”

The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is recognized, but not supported. (For example, old protocol versions might be avoided for security reasons). This message is always fatal.

“IS”/“insufficient security”

Returned instead of handshake\_failure when a negotiation has failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more secure than those supported by the client. This message is always fatal.

“IE”/“internal error”

An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the protocol makes it impossible to continue (such as a memory allocation failure). This message is always fatal.

“US”/“user canceled”

This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure. If the user cancels an operation after the handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending a close\_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed by a close\_notify. This message is generally a warning.



**“NR”/“no renegotiation”**

Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking. Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when that is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert; at that point, the original requester can decide whether to proceed with the connection. One case where this would be appropriate would be where a server has spawned a process to satisfy a request; the process might receive security parameters (key length, authentication, etc.) at startup and it might be difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that point. This message is always a warning.

**“UK”/“unknown”**

This indicates that no description is available for this alert type. Probably **value** does not contain a correct alert message.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_info\_callback*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_CIPHER\_get\_name, SSL\_CIPHER\_get\_bits, SSL\_CIPHER\_get\_version,  
SSL\_CIPHER\_description – get SSL\_CIPHER properties

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, int *alg_bits);
char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
char *SSL_CIPHER_description(SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int size);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CIPHER\_get\_name()* returns a pointer to the name of **cipher**. If the argument is the NULL pointer, a pointer to the constant value “NONE” is returned.

*SSL\_CIPHER\_get\_bits()* returns the number of secret bits used for **cipher**. If **alg\_bits** is not NULL, it contains the number of bits processed by the chosen algorithm. If **cipher** is NULL, 0 is returned.

*SSL\_CIPHER\_get\_version()* returns the protocol version for **cipher**, currently “SSLv2”, “SSLv3”, or “TLSv1”. If **cipher** is NULL, “(NONE)” is returned.

*SSL\_CIPHER\_description()* returns a textual description of the cipher used into the buffer **buf** of length **len** provided. **len** must be at least 128 bytes, otherwise a pointer to the the string “Buffer too small” is returned. If **buf** is NULL, a buffer of 128 bytes is allocated using *OPENSSL\_malloc()*. If the allocation fails, a pointer to the string “OPENSSL\_malloc Error” is returned.

**NOTES**

The number of bits processed can be different from the secret bits. An export cipher like e.g. EXP-RC4-MD5 has only 40 secret bits. The algorithm does use the full 128 bits (which would be returned for **alg\_bits**), of which however 88bits are fixed. The search space is hence only 40 bits.

The string returned by *SSL\_CIPHER\_description()* in case of success consists of cleartext information separated by one or more blanks in the following sequence:

<ciphername>

Textual representation of the cipher name.

<protocol version>

Protocol version: **SSLv2**, **SSLv3**. The TLSv1 ciphers are flagged with SSLv3.

Kx=<key exchange>

Key exchange method: **RSA** (for export ciphers as **RSA(512)** or **RSA(1024)**), **DH** (for export ciphers as **DH(512)** or **DH(1024)**), **DH/RSA**, **DH/DSS**, **Fortezza**.

Au=<authentication>

Authentication method: **RSA**, **DSS**, **DH**, **None**. None is the representation of anonymous ciphers.

Enc=<symmetric encryption method>

Encryption method with number of secret bits: **DES(40)**, **DES(56)**, **3DES(168)**, **RC4(40)**, **RC4(56)**, **RC4(64)**, **RC4(128)**, **RC2(40)**, **RC2(56)**, **RC2(128)**, **IDEA(128)**, **Fortezza**, **None**.

Mac=<message authentication code>

Message digest: **MD5**, **SHA1**.

<export flag>

If the cipher is flagged exportable with respect to old US crypto regulations, the word “**export**” is printed.

**EXAMPLES**

Some examples for the output of *SSL\_CIPHER\_description()*:

EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA	SSLv3	Kx=DH	Au=RSA	Enc=3DES(168)	Mac=SHA1	
EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA	SSLv3	Kx=DH	Au=DSS	Enc=3DES(168)	Mac=SHA1	
RC4-MD5	SSLv3	Kx=RSA	Au=RSA	Enc=RC4(128)	Mac=MD5	
EXP-RC4-MD5	SSLv3	Kx=RSA(512)	Au=RSA	Enc=RC4(40)	Mac=MD5	export

**BUGS**

If *SSL\_CIPHER\_description()* is called with **cipher** being NULL, the library crashes.

If *SSL\_CIPHER\_description()* cannot handle a built-in cipher, the according description of the cipher property is **unknown**. This case should not occur.

**RETURN VALUES**

See DESCRIPTION

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_get\_current\_cipher*(3), *SSL\_get\_ciphers*(3), *ciphers*(1)

**NAME**

SSL\_clear – reset SSL object to allow another connection

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_clear(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

Reset **ssl** to allow another connection. All settings (method, ciphers, BIOs) are kept.

**NOTES**

SSL\_clear is used to prepare an SSL object for a new connection. While all settings are kept, a side effect is the handling of the current SSL session. If a session is still **open**, it is considered bad and will be removed from the session cache, as required by RFC2246. A session is considered open, if *SSL\_shutdown(3)* was not called for the connection or at least *SSL\_set\_shutdown(3)* was used to set the SSL\_SENT\_SHUTDOWN state.

If a session was closed cleanly, the session object will be kept and all settings corresponding. This explicitly means, that e.g. the special method used during the session will be kept for the next handshake. So if the session was a TLSv1 session, a SSL client object will use a TLSv1 client method for the next handshake and a SSL server object will use a TLSv1 server method, even if SSLv23\_\*\_methods were chosen on startup. This will might lead to connection failures (see *SSL\_new(3)*) for a description of the method's properties.

**WARNINGS**

*SSL\_clear()* resets the SSL object to allow for another connection. The reset operation however keeps several settings of the last sessions (some of these settings were made automatically during the last handshake). It only makes sense when opening a new session (or reusing an old one) with the same peer that shares these settings. *SSL\_clear()* is not a short form for the sequence *SSL\_free(3); SSL\_new(3);*.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

- The *SSL\_clear()* operation could not be performed. Check the error stack to find out the reason.
- 1 The *SSL\_clear()* operation was successful.

*SSL\_new(3)*, *SSL\_free(3)*, *SSL\_shutdown(3)*, *SSL\_set\_shutdown(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_options(3)*, *ssl(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_cert\_cb(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_COMP\_add\_compression\_method – handle SSL/TLS integrated compression methods

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_COMP\_add\_compression\_method()* adds the compression method **cm** with the identifier **id** to the list of available compression methods. This list is globally maintained for all SSL operations within this application. It cannot be set for specific SSL\_CTX or SSL objects.

**NOTES**

The TLS standard (or SSLv3) allows the integration of compression methods into the communication. The TLS RFC does however not specify compression methods or their corresponding identifiers, so there is currently no compatible way to integrate compression with unknown peers. It is therefore currently not recommended to integrate compression into applications. Applications for non-public use may agree on certain compression methods. Using different compression methods with the same identifier will lead to connection failure.

An OpenSSL client speaking a protocol that allows compression (SSLv3, TLSv1) will unconditionally send the list of all compression methods enabled with *SSL\_COMP\_add\_compression\_method()* to the server during the handshake. Unlike the mechanisms to set a cipher list, there is no method available to restrict the list of compression method on a per connection basis.

An OpenSSL server will match the identifiers listed by a client against its own compression methods and will unconditionally activate compression when a matching identifier is found. There is no way to restrict the list of compression methods supported on a per connection basis.

The OpenSSL library has the compression methods *COMP\_rle()* and (when especially enabled during compilation) *COMP\_zlib()* available.

**WARNINGS**

Once the identities of the compression methods for the TLS protocol have been standardized, the compression API will most likely be changed. Using it in the current state is not recommended.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_COMP\_add\_compression\_method()* may return the following values:

- 1    The operation succeeded.
- The operation failed. Check the error queue to find out the reason.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_connect – initiate the TLS/SSL handshake with an TLS/SSL server

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_connect()* initiates the TLS/SSL handshake with a server. The communication channel must already have been set and assigned to the **ssl** by setting an underlying **BIO**.

**NOTES**

The behaviour of *SSL\_connect()* depends on the underlying BIO.

If the underlying BIO is **blocking**, *SSL\_connect()* will only return once the handshake has been finished or an error occurred.

If the underlying BIO is **non-blocking**, *SSL\_connect()* will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of *SSL\_connect()* to continue the handshake, indicating the problem by the return value `-1`. In this case a call to *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value of *SSL\_connect()* will yield **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ** or **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_WRITE**. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of *SSL\_connect()*. The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but *select()* can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

- 1 The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been established.
- The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value **ret** to find out the reason.
- <0 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred either at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was not clean. It can also occur if action is needed to continue the operation for non-blocking BIOs. Call *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value **ret** to find out the reason.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_get\_error(3)*, *SSL\_accept(3)*, *SSL\_shutdown(3)*, *ssl(3)*, *bio(3)*, *SSL\_set\_connect\_state(3)*, *SSL\_do\_handshake(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_new(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_add\_extra\_chain\_cert – add certificate to chain

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX ctx, X509 *x509)
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_add\_extra\_chain\_cert()* adds the certificate **x509** to the certificate chain presented together with the certificate. Several certificates can be added one after the other.

**NOTES**

When constructing the certificate chain, the chain will be formed from these certificates explicitly specified. If no chain is specified, the library will try to complete the chain from the available CA certificates in the trusted CA storage, see *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations*(3).

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_add\_extra\_chain\_cert()* returns 1 on success. Check out the error stack to find out the reason for failure otherwise.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_cert\_cb*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_add\_session, SSL\_add\_session, SSL\_CTX\_remove\_session, SSL\_remove\_session – manipulate session cache

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c);
int SSL_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c);

int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c);
int SSL_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_add\_session()* adds the session **c** to the context **ctx**. The reference count for session **c** is incremented by 1. If a session with the same session id already exists, the old session is removed by calling *SSL\_SESSION\_free*(3).

*SSL\_CTX\_remove\_session()* removes the session **c** from the context **ctx**. *SSL\_SESSION\_free*(3) is called once for **c**.

*SSL\_add\_session()* and *SSL\_remove\_session()* are synonyms for their *SSL\_CTX\_\**() counterparts.

**NOTES**

When adding a new session to the internal session cache, it is examined whether a session with the same session id already exists. In this case it is assumed that both sessions are identical. If the same session is stored in a different *SSL\_SESSION* object, The old session is removed and replaced by the new session. If the session is actually identical (the *SSL\_SESSION* object is identical), *SSL\_CTX\_add\_session()* is a no-op, and the return value is 0.

If a server *SSL\_CTX* is configured with the *SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_NO\_INTERNAL\_STORE* flag then the internal cache will not be populated automatically by new sessions negotiated by the SSL/TLS implementation, even though the internal cache will be searched automatically for session-resume requests (the latter can be suppressed by *SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_NO\_INTERNAL\_LOOKUP*). So the application can use *SSL\_CTX\_add\_session()* directly to have full control over the sessions that can be resumed if desired.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following values are returned by all functions:

- The operation failed. In case of the add operation, it was tried to add the same (identical) session twice. In case of the remove operation, the session was not found in the cache.
- 1 The operation succeeded.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode*(3), *SSL\_SESSION\_free*(3)



**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_ctrl, SSL\_CTX\_callback\_ctrl, SSL\_ctrl, SSL\_callback\_ctrl – internal handling functions for SSL\_CTX and SSL objects

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int cmd, void (*fp)());

long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl, int cmd, long larg, void *parg);
long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int cmd, void (*fp)());
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The `SSL*_ctrl()` family of functions is used to manipulate settings of the `SSL_CTX` and `SSL` objects. Depending on the command **cmd** the arguments **larg**, **parg**, or **fp** are evaluated. These functions should never be called directly. All functionalities needed are made available via other functions or macros.

**RETURN VALUES**

The return values of the `SSL*_ctrl()` functions depend on the command supplied via the **cmd** parameter.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions, SSL\_flush\_sessions – remove expired sessions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm);
void SSL_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long tm);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions()* causes a run through the session cache of **ctx** to remove sessions expired at time **tm**.

*SSL\_flush\_sessions()* is a synonym for *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions()*.

**NOTES**

If enabled, the internal session cache will collect all sessions established up to the specified maximum number (see *SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_cache\_size()*). As sessions will not be reused ones they are expired, they should be removed from the cache to save resources. This can either be done automatically whenever 255 new sessions were established (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode(3)*) or manually by calling *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions()*.

The parameter **tm** specifies the time which should be used for the expiration test, in most cases the actual time given by *time(0)* will be used.

*SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions()* will only check sessions stored in the internal cache. When a session is found and removed, the *remove\_session\_cb* is however called to synchronize with the external cache (see *SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_get\_cb(3)*).

**RETURN VALUES****SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_timeout(3)*,  
*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_get\_cb(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_free – free an allocated SSL\_CTX object

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_free()* decrements the reference count of **ctx**, and removes the SSL\_CTX object pointed to by **ctx** and frees up the allocated memory if the the reference count has reached 0.

It also calls the *free()*ing procedures for indirectly affected items, if applicable: the session cache, the list of ciphers, the list of Client CAs, the certificates and keys.

**WARNINGS**

If a session-remove callback is set (*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_remove\_cb()*), this callback will be called for each session being freed from **ctx**'s session cache. This implies, that all corresponding sessions from an external session cache are removed as well. If this is not desired, the user should explicitly unset the callback by calling *SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_remove\_cb(ctx, NULL)* prior to calling *SSL\_CTX\_free()*.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_free()* does not provide diagnostic information.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_CTX\_new*(3), *ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_get\_cb*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_get\_ex\_new\_index, SSL\_CTX\_set\_ex\_data, SSL\_CTX\_get\_ex\_data – internal application specific data functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
                             CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
                             CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
                             CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);

int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *arg);

void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx);

typedef int new_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
                    int idx, long argl, void *argp);
typedef void free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
                      int idx, long argl, void *argp);
typedef int dup_func(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d,
                    int idx, long argl, void *argp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

Several OpenSSL structures can have application specific data attached to them. These functions are used internally by OpenSSL to manipulate application specific data attached to a specific structure.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_ex\_new\_index()* is used to register a new index for application specific data.

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_ex\_data()* is used to store application data at **arg** for **idx** into the **ctx** object.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_ex\_data()* is used to retrieve the information for **idx** from **ctx**.

A detailed description for the *\*\_get\_ex\_new\_index()* functionality can be found in *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*. The *\*\_get\_ex\_data()* and *\*\_set\_ex\_data()* functionality is described in *CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*, *CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data(3)*

**NAME**

`SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode`, `SSL_get_verify_mode`, `SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth`, `SSL_get_verify_depth`, `SSL_get_verify_callback`, `SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback` – get currently set verification parameters

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx);
int SSL_get_verify_mode(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx);
int SSL_get_verify_depth(SSL *ssl);
int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(SSL *ssl))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

`SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode()` returns the verification mode currently set in **ctx**.

`SSL_get_verify_mode()` returns the verification mode currently set in **ssl**.

`SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth()` returns the verification depth limit currently set in **ctx**. If no limit has been explicitly set, -1 is returned and the default value will be used.

`SSL_get_verify_depth()` returns the verification depth limit currently set in **ssl**. If no limit has been explicitly set, -1 is returned and the default value will be used.

`SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback()` returns a function pointer to the verification callback currently set in **ctx**. If no callback was explicitly set, the NULL pointer is returned and the default callback will be used.

`SSL_get_verify_callback()` returns a function pointer to the verification callback currently set in **ssl**. If no callback was explicitly set, the NULL pointer is returned and the default callback will be used.

**RETURN VALUES**

See DESCRIPTION

**SEE ALSO**

`ssl(3)`, `SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)`

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations – set default locations for trusted CA certificates

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
                                const char *CApath);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations()* specifies the locations for **ctx**, at which CA certificates for verification purposes are located. The certificates available via **CAfile** and **CApath** are trusted.

**NOTES**

If **CAfile** is not NULL, it points to a file of CA certificates in PEM format. The file can contain several CA certificates identified by

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
... (CA certificate in base64 encoding) ...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

sequences. Before, between, and after the certificates text is allowed which can be used e.g. for descriptions of the certificates.

The **CAfile** is processed on execution of the *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations()* function.

If **CApath** is not NULL, it points to a directory containing CA certificates in PEM format. The files each contain one CA certificate. The files are looked up by the CA subject name hash value, which must hence be available. If more than one CA certificate with the same name hash value exist, the extension must be different (e.g. 9d66eef0.0, 9d66eef0.1 etc). The search is performed in the ordering of the extension number, regardless of other properties of the certificates. Use the **c\_rehash** utility to create the necessary links.

The certificates in **CApath** are only looked up when required, e.g. when building the certificate chain or when actually performing the verification of a peer certificate.

When looking up CA certificates, the OpenSSL library will first search the certificates in **CAfile**, then those in **CApath**. Certificate matching is done based on the subject name, the key identifier (if present), and the serial number as taken from the certificate to be verified. If these data do not match, the next certificate will be tried. If a first certificate matching the parameters is found, the verification process will be performed; no other certificates for the same parameters will be searched in case of failure.

In server mode, when requesting a client certificate, the server must send the list of CAs of which it will accept client certificates. This list is not influenced by the contents of **CAfile** or **CApath** and must explicitly be set using the *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list*(3) family of functions.

When building its own certificate chain, an OpenSSL client/server will try to fill in missing certificates from **CAfile/CApath**, if the certificate chain was not explicitly specified (see *SSL\_CTX\_add\_extra\_chain\_cert*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate*(3)).

**WARNINGS**

If several CA certificates matching the name, key identifier, and serial number condition are available, only the first one will be examined. This may lead to unexpected results if the same CA certificate is available with different expiration dates. If a “certificate expired” verification error occurs, no other certificate will be searched. Make sure to not have expired certificates mixed with valid ones.

**EXAMPLES**

Generate a CA certificate file with descriptive text from the CA certificates ca1.pem ca2.pem ca3.pem:

```
#!/bin/sh
rm CAfile.pem
for i in ca1.pem ca2.pem ca3.pem ; do
    openssl x509 -in $i -text >> CAfile.pem
done
```

Prepare the directory /some/where/certs containing several CA certificates for use as **CApath**:

```
cd /some/where/certs
c_rehash .
```

## RETURN VALUES

The following return values can occur:

- The operation failed because **C`file`** and **C`path`** are NULL or the processing at one of the locations specified failed. Check the error stack to find out the reason.
- 1 The operation succeeded.

## SEE ALSO

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list(3)*, *SSL\_get\_client\_CA\_list(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_add\_extra\_chain\_cert(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_store(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_new – create a new SSL\_CTX object as framework for TLS/SSL enabled functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *method);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_new()* creates a new **SSL\_CTX** object as framework to establish TLS/SSL enabled connections.

**NOTES**

The **SSL\_CTX** object uses **method** as connection method. The methods exist in a generic type (for client and server use), a server only type, and a client only type. **method** can be of the following types:

SSLv2\_method(void), SSLv2\_server\_method(void), SSLv2\_client\_method(void)

A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the SSLv2 protocol. A client will send out SSLv2 client hello messages and will also indicate that it only understand SSLv2. A server will only understand SSLv2 client hello messages.

SSLv3\_method(void), SSLv3\_server\_method(void), SSLv3\_client\_method(void)

A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the SSLv3 protocol. A client will send out SSLv3 client hello messages and will indicate that it only understands SSLv3. A server will only understand SSLv3 client hello messages. This especially means, that it will not understand SSLv2 client hello messages which are widely used for compatibility reasons, see *SSLv23\_\*\_method()*.

TLSv1\_method(void), TLSv1\_server\_method(void), TLSv1\_client\_method(void)

A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will only understand the TLSv1 protocol. A client will send out TLSv1 client hello messages and will indicate that it only understands TLSv1. A server will only understand TLSv1 client hello messages. This especially means, that it will not understand SSLv2 client hello messages which are widely used for compatibility reasons, see *SSLv23\_\*\_method()*. It will also not understand SSLv3 client hello messages.

SSLv23\_method(void), SSLv23\_server\_method(void), SSLv23\_client\_method(void)

A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will understand the SSLv2, SSLv3, and TLSv1 protocol. A client will send out SSLv2 client hello messages and will indicate that it also understands SSLv3 and TLSv1. A server will understand SSLv2, SSLv3, and TLSv1 client hello messages. This is the best choice when compatibility is a concern.

The list of protocols available can later be limited using the *SSL\_OP\_NO\_SSLv2*, *SSL\_OP\_NO\_SSLv3*, *SSL\_OP\_NO\_TLSv1* options of the *SSL\_CTX\_set\_options()* or *SSL\_set\_options()* functions. Using these options it is possible to choose e.g. *SSLv23\_server\_method()* and be able to negotiate with all possible clients, but to only allow newer protocols like SSLv3 or TLSv1.

*SSL\_CTX\_new()* initializes the list of ciphers, the session cache setting, the callbacks, the keys and certificates, and the options to its default values.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

NULL

The creation of a new **SSL\_CTX** object failed. Check the error stack to find out the reason.

Pointer to an **SSL\_CTX** object

The return value points to an allocated **SSL\_CTX** object.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_CTX\_free*(3), *SSL\_accept*(3), *ssl*(3), *SSL\_set\_connect\_state*(3)



**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_sess\_number, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_connect, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_connect\_good,  
 SSL\_CTX\_sess\_connect\_renegotiate, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_accept, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_accept\_good,  
 SSL\_CTX\_sess\_accept\_renegotiate, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_hits, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_cb\_hits,  
 SSL\_CTX\_sess\_misses, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_timeouts, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_cache\_full – obtain session cache statistics

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_CTX_sess_number(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_CTX_sess_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_CTX_sess_accept(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_CTX_sess_hits(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_CTX_sess_misses(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(SSL_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_number()* returns the current number of sessions in the internal session cache.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_connect()* returns the number of started SSL/TLS handshakes in client mode.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_connect\_good()* returns the number of successfully established SSL/TLS sessions in client mode.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_connect\_renegotiate()* returns the number of start renegotiations in client mode.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_accept()* returns the number of started SSL/TLS handshakes in server mode.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_accept\_good()* returns the number of successfully established SSL/TLS sessions in server mode.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_accept\_renegotiate()* returns the number of start renegotiations in server mode.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_hits()* returns the number of successfully reused sessions. In client mode a session set with *SSL\_set\_session*(3) successfully reused is counted as a hit. In server mode a session successfully retrieved from internal or external cache is counted as a hit.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_cb\_hits()* returns the number of successfully retrieved sessions from the external session cache in server mode.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_misses()* returns the number of sessions proposed by clients that were not found in the internal session cache in server mode.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_timeouts()* returns the number of sessions proposed by clients and either found in the internal or external session cache in server mode, but that were invalid due to timeout. These sessions are not included in the *SSL\_CTX\_sess\_hits()* count.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_cache\_full()* returns the number of sessions that were removed because the maximum session cache size was exceeded.

**RETURN VALUES**

The functions return the values indicated in the DESCRIPTION section.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_set\_session*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode*(3) *SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_cache\_size*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_cache\_size, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_get\_cache\_size – manipulate session cache size

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t);
long SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(SSL_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_cache\_size()* sets the size of the internal session cache of context **ctx** to **t**.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_get\_cache\_size()* returns the currently valid session cache size.

**NOTES**

The internal session cache size is `SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT`, currently 1024\*20, so that up to 20000 sessions can be held. This size can be modified using the *SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_cache\_size()* call. A special case is the size 0, which is used for unlimited size.

When the maximum number of sessions is reached, no more new sessions are added to the cache. New space may be added by calling *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions*(3) to remove expired sessions.

If the size of the session cache is reduced and more sessions are already in the session cache, old session will be removed at the next time a session shall be added. This removal is not synchronized with the expiration of sessions.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_cache\_size()* returns the previously valid size.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_get\_cache\_size()* returns the currently valid size.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_sess\_number*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_new\_cb, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_remove\_cb, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_get\_cb, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_get\_new\_cb, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_get\_remove\_cb, SSL\_CTX\_sess\_get\_get\_cb – provide callback functions for server side external session caching

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                             int (*new_session_cb)(SSL *, SSL_SESSION *));
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                                void (*remove_session_cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *));
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                             SSL_SESSION (*get_session_cb)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int, int *));

int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess);
SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *, int, int *);

int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess);
void (*remove_session_cb)(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess);
SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data,
                                int len, int *copy);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_new\_cb()* sets the callback function, which is automatically called whenever a new session was negotiated.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_remove\_cb()* sets the callback function, which is automatically called whenever a session is removed by the SSL engine, because it is considered faulty or the session has become obsolete because of exceeding the timeout value.

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_set\_get\_cb()* sets the callback function which is called, whenever a SSL/TLS client proposed to resume a session but the session could not be found in the internal session cache (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode(3)*). (SSL/TLS server only.)

*SSL\_CTX\_sess\_get\_new\_cb()*, *SSL\_CTX\_sess\_get\_remove\_cb()*, and *SSL\_CTX\_sess\_get\_get\_cb()* allow to retrieve the function pointers of the provided callback functions. If a callback function has not been set, the NULL pointer is returned.

**NOTES**

In order to allow external session caching, synchronization with the internal session cache is realized via callback functions. Inside these callback functions, session can be saved to disk or put into a database using the *d2i\_SSL\_SESSION(3)* interface.

The *new\_session\_cb()* is called, whenever a new session has been negotiated and session caching is enabled (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode(3)*). The *new\_session\_cb()* is passed the **ssl** connection and the ssl session **sess**. If the callback returns **0**, the session will be immediately removed again.

The *remove\_session\_cb()* is called, whenever the SSL engine removes a session from the internal cache. This happens when the session is removed because it is expired or when a connection was not shut-down cleanly. It also happens for all sessions in the internal session cache when *SSL\_CTX\_free(3)* is called. The *remove\_session\_cb()* is passed the **ctx** and the ssl session **sess**. It does not provide any feedback.

The *get\_session\_cb()* is only called on SSL/TLS servers with the session id proposed by the client. The *get\_session\_cb()* is always called, also when session caching was disabled. The *get\_session\_cb()* is passed the **ssl** connection, the session id of length **length** at the memory location **data**. With the parameter **copy** the callback can require the SSL engine to increment the reference count of the **SSL\_SESSION** object. Normally the reference count is not incremented and therefore the session must not be explicitly freed with *SSL\_SESSION\_free(3)*.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *d2i\_SSL\_SESSION(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions(3)*, *SSL\_SESSION\_free(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_free(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_sessions – access internal session cache

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_sessions()* returns a pointer to the lhash databases containing the internal session cache for **ctx**.

**NOTES**

The sessions in the internal session cache are kept in an *lhash*(3) type database. It is possible to directly access this database e.g. for searching. In parallel, the sessions form a linked list which is maintained separately from the *lhash*(3) operations, so that the database must not be modified directly but by using the *SSL\_CTX\_add\_session*(3) family of functions.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *lhash*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_add\_session*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_store, SSL\_CTX\_get\_cert\_store – manipulate X509 certificate verification storage

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store);
X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_store()* sets/replaces the certificate verification storage of **ctx** to/with **store**. If another X509\_STORE object is currently set in **ctx**, it will be *X509\_STORE\_free()*ed.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_cert\_store()* returns a pointer to the current certificate verification storage.

**NOTES**

In order to verify the certificates presented by the peer, trusted CA certificates must be accessed. These CA certificates are made available via lookup methods, handled inside the X509\_STORE. From the X509\_STORE the X509\_STORE\_CTX used when verifying certificates is created.

Typically the trusted certificate store is handled indirectly via using *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations*(3). Using the *SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_store()* and *SSL\_CTX\_get\_cert\_store()* functions it is possible to manipulate the X509\_STORE object beyond the *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations*(3) call.

Currently no detailed documentation on how to use the X509\_STORE object is available. Not all members of the X509\_STORE are used when the verification takes place. So will e.g. the *verify\_callback()* be overridden with the *verify\_callback()* set via the *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify*(3) family of functions. This document must therefore be updated when documentation about the X509\_STORE object and its handling becomes available.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_store()* does not return diagnostic output.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_cert\_store()* returns the current setting.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify*(3)

## NAME

SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_verify\_callback – set peer certificate verification procedure

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
```

```
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*callback)(X509_STORE_CTX,
```

## DESCRIPTION

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_verify\_callback()* sets the verification callback function for *ctx*. SSL objects that are created from *ctx* inherit the setting valid at the time when *SSL\_new*(3) is called.

## NOTES

Whenever a certificate is verified during a SSL/TLS handshake, a verification function is called. If the application does not explicitly specify a verification callback function, the built-in verification function is used. If a verification callback *callback* is specified via *SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_verify\_callback()*, the supplied callback function is called instead. By setting *callback* to NULL, the default behaviour is restored.

When the verification must be performed, *callback* will be called with the arguments *callback*(X509\_STORE\_CTX \**x509\_store\_ctx*, void \**arg*). The argument *arg* is specified by the application when setting *callback*.

*callback* should return 1 to indicate verification success and 0 to indicate verification failure. If SSL\_VERIFY\_PEER is set and *callback* returns 0, the handshake will fail. As the verification procedure may allow to continue the connection in case of failure (by always returning 1) the verification result must be set in any case using the **error** member of *x509\_store\_ctx* so that the calling application will be informed about the detailed result of the verification procedure!

Within *x509\_store\_ctx*, *callback* has access to the *verify\_callback* function set using *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify*(3).

## WARNINGS

Do not mix the verification callback described in this function with the **verify\_callback** function called during the verification process. The latter is set using the *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify*(3) family of functions.

Providing a complete verification procedure including certificate purpose settings etc is a complex task. The built-in procedure is quite powerful and in most cases it should be sufficient to modify its behaviour using the **verify\_callback** function.

## BUGS

## RETURN VALUES

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_verify\_callback()* does not provide diagnostic information.

## SEE ALSO

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify*(3), *SSL\_get\_verify\_result*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations*(3)

## HISTORY

Previous to OpenSSL 0.9.7, the *arg* argument to **SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_verify\_callback** was ignored, and *callback* was called simply as

```
int (*callback)(X509_STORE_CTX *)
```

To compile software written for previous versions of OpenSSL, a dummy argument will have to be added to *callback*.

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_cipher\_list, SSL\_set\_cipher\_list – choose list of available SSL\_CIPHERs

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str);
int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, const char *str);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_cipher\_list()* sets the list of available ciphers for **ctx** using the control string **str**. The format of the string is described in *ciphers*(1). The list of ciphers is inherited by all **ssl** objects created from **ctx**.

*SSL\_set\_cipher\_list()* sets the list of ciphers only for **ssl**.

**NOTES**

The control string **str** should be universally usable and not depend on details of the library configuration (ciphers compiled in). Thus no syntax checking takes place. Items that are not recognized, because the corresponding ciphers are not compiled in or because they are mistyped, are simply ignored. Failure is only flagged if no ciphers could be collected at all.

It should be noted, that inclusion of a cipher to be used into the list is a necessary condition. On the client side, the inclusion into the list is also sufficient. On the server side, additional restrictions apply. All ciphers have additional requirements. ADH ciphers don't need a certificate, but DH-parameters must have been set. All other ciphers need a corresponding certificate and key.

A RSA cipher can only be chosen, when a RSA certificate is available. RSA export ciphers with a keylength of 512 bits for the RSA key require a temporary 512 bit RSA key, as typically the supplied key has a length of 1024 bit (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_rsa\_callback*(3)). RSA ciphers using EDH need a certificate and key and additional DH-parameters (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback*(3)).

A DSA cipher can only be chosen, when a DSA certificate is available. DSA ciphers always use DH key exchange and therefore need DH-parameters (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback*(3)).

When these conditions are not met for any cipher in the list (e.g. a client only supports export RSA ciphers with a asymmetric key length of 512 bits and the server is not configured to use temporary RSA keys), the “no shared cipher” (SSL\_R\_NO\_SHARED\_CIPHER) error is generated and the handshake will fail.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_cipher\_list()* and *SSL\_set\_cipher\_list()* return 1 if any cipher could be selected and 0 on complete failure.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_get\_ciphers*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_rsa\_callback*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback*(3), *ciphers*(1)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list, SSL\_set\_client\_CA\_list, SSL\_CTX\_add\_client\_CA, SSL\_add\_client\_CA – set list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list);
void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list);
int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cacert);
int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *cacert);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list()* sets the **list** of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for **ctx**.

*SSL\_set\_client\_CA\_list()* sets the **list** of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for the chosen **ssl**, overriding the setting valid for **ssl**'s SSL\_CTX object.

*SSL\_CTX\_add\_client\_CA()* adds the CA name extracted from **cacert** to the list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for **ctx**.

*SSL\_add\_client\_CA()* adds the CA name extracted from **cacert** to the list of CAs sent to the client when requesting a client certificate for the chosen **ssl**, overriding the setting valid for **ssl**'s SSL\_CTX object.

**NOTES**

When a TLS/SSL server requests a client certificate (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify\_options()*), it sends a list of CAs, for which it will accept certificates, to the client.

This list must explicitly be set using *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list()* for **ctx** and *SSL\_set\_client\_CA\_list()* for the specific **ssl**. The list specified overrides the previous setting. The CAs listed do not become trusted (**list** only contains the names, not the complete certificates); use *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations*(3) to additionally load them for verification.

If the list of acceptable CAs is compiled in a file, the *SSL\_load\_client\_CA\_file*(3) function can be used to help importing the necessary data.

*SSL\_CTX\_add\_client\_CA()* and *SSL\_add\_client\_CA()* can be used to add additional items the list of client CAs. If no list was specified before using *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list()* or *SSL\_set\_client\_CA\_list()*, a new client CA list for **ctx** or **ssl** (as appropriate) is opened.

These functions are only useful for TLS/SSL servers.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list()* and *SSL\_set\_client\_CA\_list()* do not return diagnostic information.

*SSL\_CTX\_add\_client\_CA()* and *SSL\_add\_client\_CA()* have the following return values:

- 1 The operation succeeded.
- A failure while manipulating the STACK\_OF(X509\_NAME) object occurred or the X509\_NAME could not be extracted from **cacert**. Check the error stack to find out the reason.

**EXAMPLES**

Scan all certificates in **CAfile** and list them as acceptable CAs:

```
SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
```

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_get\_client\_CA\_list*(3), *SSL\_load\_client\_CA\_file*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations*(3)



## NAME

SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_cert\_cb, SSL\_CTX\_get\_client\_cert\_cb – handle client certificate callback function

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
```

```
void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509, EVP_PKEY *pkey));
int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_cert\_cb()* sets the *client\_cert\_cb()* callback, that is called when a client certificate is requested by a server and no certificate was yet set for the SSL object.

When *client\_cert\_cb()* is NULL, no callback function is used.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_client\_cert\_cb()* returns a pointer to the currently set callback function.

*client\_cert\_cb()* is the application defined callback. If it wants to set a certificate, a certificate/private key combination must be set using the *x509* and *pkey* arguments and “1” must be returned. The certificate will be installed into *ssl*, see the NOTES and BUGS sections. If no certificate should be set, “0” has to be returned and no certificate will be sent. A negative return value will suspend the handshake and the handshake function will return immediately. *SSL\_get\_error(3)* will return *SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_X509\_LOOKUP* to indicate, that the handshake was suspended. The next call to the handshake function will again lead to the call of *client\_cert\_cb()*. It is the job of the *client\_cert\_cb()* to store information about the state of the last call, if required to continue.

## NOTES

During a handshake (or renegotiation) a server may request a certificate from the client. A client certificate must only be sent, when the server did send the request.

When a certificate was set using the *SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate(3)* family of functions, it will be sent to the server. The TLS standard requires that only a certificate is sent, if it matches the list of acceptable CAs sent by the server. This constraint is violated by the default behavior of the OpenSSL library. Using the callback function it is possible to implement a proper selection routine or to allow a user interaction to choose the certificate to be sent.

If a callback function is defined and no certificate was yet defined for the SSL object, the callback function will be called. If the callback function returns a certificate, the OpenSSL library will try to load the private key and certificate data into the SSL object using the *SSL\_use\_certificate()* and *SSL\_use\_private\_key()* functions. Thus it will permanently install the certificate and key for this SSL object. It will not be reset by calling *SSL\_clear(3)*. If the callback returns no certificate, the OpenSSL library will not send a certificate.

## BUGS

The *client\_cert\_cb()* cannot return a complete certificate chain, it can only return one client certificate. If the chain only has a length of 2, the root CA certificate may be omitted according to the TLS standard and thus a standard conforming answer can be sent to the server. For a longer chain, the client must send the complete chain (with the option to leave out the root CA certificate). This can only be accomplished by either adding the intermediate CA certificates into the trusted certificate store for the SSL\_CTX object (resulting in having to add CA certificates that otherwise maybe would not be trusted), or by adding the chain certificates using the *SSL\_CTX\_add\_extra\_chain\_cert(3)* function, which is only available for the SSL\_CTX object as a whole and that therefore probably can only apply for one client certificate, making the concept of the callback function (to allow the choice from several certificates) questionable.

Once the SSL object has been used in conjunction with the callback function, the certificate will be set for the SSL object and will not be cleared even when *SSL\_clear(3)* is being called. It is therefore mandatory to destroy the SSL object using *SSL\_free(3)* and create a new one to return to the previous state.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_add\_extra\_chain\_cert*(3), *SSL\_get\_client\_CA\_list*(3), *SSL\_clear*(3), *SSL\_free*(3)

**NAME**

`SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb`, `SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata` – set passwd callback for encrypted PEM file handling

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb);
void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u);

int pem_passwd_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

`SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb()` sets the default password callback called when loading/storing a PEM certificate with encryption.

`SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata()` sets a pointer to **userdata** which will be provided to the password callback on invocation.

The `pem_passwd_cb()`, which must be provided by the application, hands back the password to be used during decryption. On invocation a pointer to **userdata** is provided. The `pem_passwd_cb` must write the password into the provided buffer **buf** which is of size **size**. The actual length of the password must be returned to the calling function. **rwflag** indicates whether the callback is used for reading/decryption (`rwflag=0`) or writing/encryption (`rwflag=1`).

**NOTES**

When loading or storing private keys, a password might be supplied to protect the private key. The way this password can be supplied may depend on the application. If only one private key is handled, it can be practical to have `pem_passwd_cb()` handle the password dialog interactively. If several keys have to be handled, it can be practical to ask for the password once, then keep it in memory and use it several times. In the last case, the password could be stored into the **userdata** storage and the `pem_passwd_cb()` only returns the password already stored.

When asking for the password interactively, `pem_passwd_cb()` can use **rwflag** to check, whether an item shall be encrypted (`rwflag=1`). In this case the password dialog may ask for the same password twice for comparison in order to catch typos, that would make decryption impossible.

Other items in PEM formatting (certificates) can also be encrypted, it is however not usual, as certificate information is considered public.

**RETURN VALUES**

`SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb()` and `SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata()` do not provide diagnostic information.

**EXAMPLES**

The following example returns the password provided as **userdata** to the calling function. The password is considered to be a `'\0'` terminated string. If the password does not fit into the buffer, the password is truncated.

```
int pem_passwd_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *password)
{
    strncpy(buf, (char *)password, size);
    buf[size - 1] = '\0';
    return(strlen(buf));
}
```

**SEE ALSO**

`ssl(3)`, `SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)`

**NAME**

`SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id`, `SSL_set_generate_session_id`, `SSL_has_matching_session_id` – manipulate generation of SSL session IDs (server only)

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB)(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
                              unsigned int *id_len);

int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb);
int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB, cb);
int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
                              unsigned int id_len);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

`SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id()` sets the callback function for generating new session ids for SSL/TLS sessions for **ctx** to be **cb**.

`SSL_set_generate_session_id()` sets the callback function for generating new session ids for SSL/TLS sessions for **ssl** to be **cb**.

`SSL_has_matching_session_id()` checks, whether a session with id **id** (of length **id\_len**) is already contained in the internal session cache of the parent context of **ssl**.

**NOTES**

When a new session is established between client and server, the server generates a session id. The session id is an arbitrary sequence of bytes. The length of the session id is 16 bytes for SSLv2 sessions and between 1 and 32 bytes for SSLv3/TLSv1. The session id is not security critical but must be unique for the server. Additionally, the session id is transmitted in the clear when reusing the session so it must not contain sensitive information.

Without a callback being set, an OpenSSL server will generate a unique session id from pseudo random numbers of the maximum possible length. Using the callback function, the session id can be changed to contain additional information like e.g. a host id in order to improve load balancing or external caching techniques.

The callback function receives a pointer to the memory location to put **id** into and a pointer to the maximum allowed length **id\_len**. The buffer at location **id** is only guaranteed to have the size **id\_len**. The callback is only allowed to generate a shorter id and reduce **id\_len**; the callback **must never** increase **id\_len** or write to the location **id** exceeding the given limit.

If a SSLv2 session id is generated and **id\_len** is reduced, it will be restored after the callback has finished and the session id will be padded with 0x00. It is not recommended to change the **id\_len** for SSLv2 sessions. The callback can use the `SSL_get_version(3)` function to check, whether the session is of type SSLv2.

The location **id** is filled with 0x00 before the callback is called, so the callback may only fill part of the possible length and leave **id\_len** untouched while maintaining reproducibility.

Since the sessions must be distinguished, session ids must be unique. Without the callback a random number is used, so that the probability of generating the same session id is extremely small ( $2^{128}$  possible ids for an SSLv2 session,  $2^{256}$  for SSLv3/TLSv1). In order to assure the uniqueness of the generated session id, the callback must call `SSL_has_matching_session_id()` and generate another id if a conflict occurs. If an id conflict is not resolved, the handshake will fail. If the application codes e.g. a unique host id, a unique process number, and a unique sequence number into the session id, uniqueness could easily be achieved without randomness added (it should however be taken care that no confidential information is leaked this way). If the application can not guarantee uniqueness, it is recommended to use the maximum **id\_len** and fill in the bytes not used to code special information with random data to avoid collisions.

`SSL_has_matching_session_id()` will only query the internal session cache, not the external one. Since the session id is generated before the handshake is completed, it is not immediately added to the cache. If another thread is using the same internal session cache, a race condition can occur in that another thread generates the same session id. Collisions can also occur when using an external session cache,

since the external cache is not tested with *SSL\_has\_matching\_session\_id()* and the same race condition applies.

When calling *SSL\_has\_matching\_session\_id()* for an SSLv2 session with reduced **id\_len**, the match operation will be performed using the fixed length required and with a 0x00 padded id.

The callback must return 0 if it cannot generate a session id for whatever reason and return 1 on success.

## EXAMPLES

The callback function listed will generate a session id with the server id given, and will fill the rest with pseudo random bytes:

```
const char session_id_prefix = "www-18";

#define MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
                              unsigned int *id_len)
{
    unsigned int count = 0;
    const char *version;
    version = SSL_get_version(ssl);
    if (!strcmp(version, "SSLv2"))
        /* we must not change id_len */;
    do {
        RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len);
        /* Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our
         * prefix is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects
         * anyway, eg. the server could only possibly create 1 session
         * ID (ie. the prefix!) so all future session negotiations will
         * fail due to conflicts. */
        memcpy(id, session_id_prefix,
               (strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len) ?
               strlen(session_id_prefix) : *id_len);
    }
    while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
          (++count < MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS));
    if(count >= MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS)
        return 0;
    return 1;
}
```

## RETURN VALUES

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_generate\_session\_id()* and *SSL\_set\_generate\_session\_id()* always return 1.

*SSL\_has\_matching\_session\_id()* returns 1 if another session with the same id is already in the cache.

## SEE ALSO

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_get\_version(3)*

## HISTORY

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_generate\_session\_id()*, *SSL\_set\_generate\_session\_id()* and *SSL\_has\_matching\_session\_id()* have been introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_info\_callback, SSL\_CTX\_get\_info\_callback, SSL\_set\_info\_callback,  
SSL\_get\_info\_callback – handle information callback for SSL connections

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*callback)());
void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))();

void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*callback)());
void (*SSL_get_info_callback(SSL *ssl))();
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_info\_callback()* sets the **callback** function, that can be used to obtain state information for SSL objects created from **ctx** during connection setup and use. The setting for **ctx** is overridden from the setting for a specific SSL object, if specified. When **callback** is NULL, no callback function is used.

*SSL\_set\_info\_callback()* sets the **callback** function, that can be used to obtain state information for **ssl** during connection setup and use. When **callback** is NULL, the callback setting currently valid for **ctx** is used.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_info\_callback()* returns a pointer to the currently set information callback function for **ctx**.

*SSL\_get\_info\_callback()* returns a pointer to the currently set information callback function for **ssl**.

**NOTES**

When setting up a connection and during use, it is possible to obtain state information from the SSL/TLS engine. When set, an information callback function is called whenever the state changes, an alert appears, or an error occurs.

The callback function is called as **callback(SSL \*ssl, int where, int ret)**. The **where** argument specifies information about where (in which context) the callback function was called. If **ret** is 0, an error condition occurred. If an alert is handled, SSL\_CB\_ALERT is set and **ret** specifies the alert information.

**where** is a bitmask made up of the following bits:

**SSL\_CB\_LOOP**

Callback has been called to indicate state change inside a loop.

**SSL\_CB\_EXIT**

Callback has been called to indicate error exit of a handshake function. (May be soft error with retry option for non-blocking setups.)

**SSL\_CB\_READ**

Callback has been called during read operation.

**SSL\_CB\_WRITE**

Callback has been called during write operation.

**SSL\_CB\_ALERT**

Callback has been called due to an alert being sent or received.

SSL\_CB\_READ\_ALERT (SSL\_CB\_ALERT|SSL\_CB\_READ)

SSL\_CB\_WRITE\_ALERT (SSL\_CB\_ALERT|SSL\_CB\_WRITE)

SSL\_CB\_ACCEPT\_LOOP (SSL\_ST\_ACCEPT|SSL\_CB\_LOOP)

SSL\_CB\_ACCEPT\_EXIT (SSL\_ST\_ACCEPT|SSL\_CB\_EXIT)

SSL\_CB\_CONNECT\_LOOP (SSL\_ST\_CONNECT|SSL\_CB\_LOOP)

SSL\_CB\_CONNECT\_EXIT (SSL\_ST\_CONNECT|SSL\_CB\_EXIT)

**SSL\_CB\_HANDSHAKE\_START**

Callback has been called because a new handshake is started.

SSL\_CB\_HANDSHAKE\_DONE 0x20

Callback has been called because a handshake is finished.

The current state information can be obtained using the *SSL\_state\_string*(3) family of functions.

The **ret** information can be evaluated using the *SSL\_alert\_type\_string*(3) family of functions.

## RETURN VALUES

*SSL\_set\_info\_callback()* does not provide diagnostic information.

*SSL\_get\_info\_callback()* returns the current setting.

## EXAMPLES

The following example callback function prints state strings, information about alerts being handled and error messages to the **bio\_err** BIO.

```
void apps_ssl_info_callback(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
{
    const char *str;
    int w;

    w=where& ~SSL_ST_MASK;

    if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT) str="SSL_connect";
    else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) str="SSL_accept";
    else str="undefined";

    if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
    {
        BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s:%s\n",str,SSL_state_string_long(s));
    }
    else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT)
    {
        str=(where & SSL_CB_READ)?"read":"write";
        BIO_printf(bio_err,"SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n",
                    str,
                    SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret),
                    SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
    }
    else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT)
    {
        if (ret == 0)
            BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s:failed in %s\n",
                        str,SSL_state_string_long(s));
        else if (ret < 0)
        {
            BIO_printf(bio_err,"%s:error in %s\n",
                        str,SSL_state_string_long(s));
        }
    }
}
```

## SEE ALSO

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_state\_string*(3), *SSL\_alert\_type\_string*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_max\_cert\_list, SSL\_CTX\_get\_max\_cert\_list, SSL\_set\_max\_cert\_list, SSL\_get\_max\_cert\_list, – manipulate allowed for the peer’s certificate chain

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, long size);
long SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(SSL_CTX *ctx);

long SSL_set_max_cert_list(SSL *ssl, long size);
long SSL_get_max_cert_list(SSL *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_max\_cert\_list()* sets the maximum size allowed for the peer’s certificate chain for all SSL objects created from **ctx** to be <size> bytes. The SSL objects inherit the setting valid for **ctx** at the time *SSL\_new*(3) is being called.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_max\_cert\_list()* returns the currently set maximum size for **ctx**.

*SSL\_set\_max\_cert\_list()* sets the maximum size allowed for the peer’s certificate chain for **ssl** to be <size> bytes. This setting stays valid until a new value is set.

*SSL\_get\_max\_cert\_list()* returns the currently set maximum size for **ssl**.

**NOTES**

During the handshake process, the peer may send a certificate chain. The TLS/SSL standard does not give any maximum size of the certificate chain. The OpenSSL library handles incoming data by a dynamically allocated buffer. In order to prevent this buffer from growing without bounds due to data received from a faulty or malicious peer, a maximum size for the certificate chain is set.

The default value for the maximum certificate chain size is 100kB (30kB on the 16bit DOS platform). This should be sufficient for usual certificate chains (OpenSSL’s default maximum chain length is 10, see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify*(3), and certificates without special extensions have a typical size of 1–2kB).

For special applications it can be necessary to extend the maximum certificate chain size allowed to be sent by the peer, see e.g. the work on “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Proxy Certificate Profile” and “TLS Delegation Protocol” at <http://www.ietf.org/> and <http://www.globus.org/>.

Under normal conditions it should never be necessary to set a value smaller than the default, as the buffer is handled dynamically and only uses the memory actually required by the data sent by the peer.

If the maximum certificate chain size allowed is exceeded, the handshake will fail with a *SSL\_R\_EXCESSIVE\_MESSAGE\_SIZE* error.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_max\_cert\_list()* and *SSL\_set\_max\_cert\_list()* return the previously set value.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_max\_cert\_list()* and *SSL\_get\_max\_cert\_list()* return the currently set value.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_new*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify*(3)

**HISTORY**

*SSL\*\_set/get\_max\_cert\_list()* have been introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.7.



**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_mode, SSL\_set\_mode, SSL\_CTX\_get\_mode, SSL\_get\_mode – manipulate SSL engine mode

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, long mode);
long SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, long mode);

long SSL_CTX_get_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_get_mode(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_mode()* adds the mode set via bitmask in **mode** to **ctx**. Options already set before are not cleared.

*SSL\_set\_mode()* adds the mode set via bitmask in **mode** to **ssl**. Options already set before are not cleared.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_mode()* returns the mode set for **ctx**.

*SSL\_get\_mode()* returns the mode set for **ssl**.

**NOTES**

The following mode changes are available:

**SSL\_MODE\_ENABLE\_PARTIAL\_WRITE**

Allow *SSL\_write(..., n)* to return *r* with  $0 < r < n$  (i.e. report success when just a single record has been written). When not set (the default), *SSL\_write()* will only report success once the complete chunk was written. Once *SSL\_write()* returns with *r*, *r* bytes have been successfully written and the next call to *SSL\_write()* must only send the  $n-r$  bytes left, imitating the behaviour of *write()*.

**SSL\_MODE\_ACCEPT\_MOVING\_WRITE\_BUFFER**

Make it possible to retry *SSL\_write()* with changed buffer location (the buffer contents must stay the same). This is not the default to avoid the misconception that non-blocking *SSL\_write()* behaves like non-blocking *write()*.

**SSL\_MODE\_AUTO\_RETRY**

Never bother the application with retries if the transport is blocking. If a renegotiation take place during normal operation, a *SSL\_read(3)* or *SSL\_write(3)* would return with  $-1$  and indicate the need to retry with *SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ*. In a non-blocking environment applications must be prepared to handle incomplete read/write operations. In a blocking environment, applications are not always prepared to deal with read/write operations returning without success report. The flag *SSL\_MODE\_AUTO\_RETRY* will cause read/write operations to only return after the handshake and successful completion.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_mode()* and *SSL\_set\_mode()* return the new mode bitmask after adding **mode**.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_mode()* and *SSL\_get\_mode()* return the current bitmask.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_read(3)*, *SSL\_write(3)*

**HISTORY**

*SSL\_MODE\_AUTO\_RETRY* has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6.

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_msg\_callback, SSL\_CTX\_set\_msg\_callback\_arg, SSL\_set\_msg\_callback, SSL\_get\_msg\_callback\_arg – install callback for observing protocol messages

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version,
void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);

void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int
void SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_msg\_callback()* or *SSL\_set\_msg\_callback()* can be used to define a message callback function *cb* for observing all SSL/TLS protocol messages (such as handshake messages) that are received or sent. *SSL\_CTX\_set\_msg\_callback\_arg()* and *SSL\_set\_msg\_callback\_arg()* can be used to set argument *arg* to the callback function, which is available for arbitrary application use.

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_msg\_callback()* and *SSL\_CTX\_set\_msg\_callback\_arg()* specify default settings that will be copied to new **SSL** objects by *SSL\_new(3)*. *SSL\_set\_msg\_callback()* and *SSL\_set\_msg\_callback\_arg()* modify the actual settings of an **SSL** object. Using a **0** pointer for *cb* disables the message callback.

When *cb* is called by the SSL/TLS library for a protocol message, the function arguments have the following meaning:

*write\_p*

This flag is **0** when a protocol message has been received and **1** when a protocol message has been sent.

*version*

The protocol version according to which the protocol message is interpreted by the library. Currently, this is one of **SSL2\_VERSION**, **SSL3\_VERSION** and **TLS1\_VERSION** (for SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, respectively).

*content\_type*

In the case of SSL 2.0, this is always **0**. In the case of SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0, this is one of the **ContentType** values defined in the protocol specification (**change\_cipher\_spec(20)**, **alert(21)**, **handshake(22)**; but never **application\_data(23)** because the callback will only be called for protocol messages).

*buf, len*

*buf* points to a buffer containing the protocol message, which consists of *len* bytes. The buffer is no longer valid after the callback function has returned.

*ssl* The **SSL** object that received or sent the message.

*arg* The user-defined argument optionally defined by *SSL\_CTX\_set\_msg\_callback\_arg()* or *SSL\_set\_msg\_callback\_arg()*.

**NOTES**

Protocol messages are passed to the callback function after decryption and fragment collection where applicable. (Thus record boundaries are not visible.)

If processing a received protocol message results in an error, the callback function may not be called. For example, the callback function will never see messages that are considered too large to be processed.

Due to automatic protocol version negotiation, *version* is not necessarily the protocol version used by the sender of the message: If a TLS 1.0 ClientHello message is received by an SSL 3.0-only server, *version* will be **SSL3\_VERSION**.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_new(3)*

**HISTORY**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_msg\_callback()*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_msg\_callback\_arg()*, *SSL\_set\_msg\_callback()* and *SSL\_get\_msg\_callback\_arg()* were added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_options, SSL\_set\_options, SSL\_CTX\_get\_options, SSL\_get\_options – manipulate SSL engine options

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options);
long SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, long options);

long SSL_CTX_get_options(SSL_CTX *ctx);
long SSL_get_options(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_options()* adds the options set via bitmask in **options** to **ctx**. Options already set before are not cleared!

*SSL\_set\_options()* adds the options set via bitmask in **options** to **ssl**. Options already set before are not cleared!

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_options()* returns the options set for **ctx**.

*SSL\_get\_options()* returns the options set for **ssl**.

**NOTES**

The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several options. The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a logical **or** operation (**|**). Options can only be added but can never be reset.

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_options()* and *SSL\_set\_options()* affect the (external) protocol behaviour of the SSL library. The (internal) behaviour of the API can be changed by using the similar *SSL\_CTX\_set\_mode*(3) and *SSL\_set\_mode()* functions.

During a handshake, the option settings of the SSL object are used. When a new SSL object is created from a context using *SSL\_new()*, the current option setting is copied. Changes to **ctx** do not affect already created SSL objects. *SSL\_clear()* does not affect the settings.

The following **bug workaround** options are available:

**SSL\_OP\_MICROSOFT\_SESS\_ID\_BUG**

www.microsoft.com – when talking SSLv2, if session-id reuse is performed, the session-id passed back in the server-finished message is different from the one decided upon.

**SSL\_OP\_NETSCAPE\_CHALLENGE\_BUG**

Netscape-Commerce/1.12, when talking SSLv2, accepts a 32 byte challenge but then appears to only use 16 bytes when generating the encryption keys. Using 16 bytes is ok but it should be ok to use 32. According to the SSLv3 spec, one should use 32 bytes for the challenge when operating in SSLv2/v3 compatibility mode, but as mentioned above, this breaks this server so 16 bytes is the way to go.

**SSL\_OP\_NETSCAPE\_REUSE\_CIPHER\_CHANGE\_BUG**

ssl3.netscape.com:443, first a connection is established with RC4-MD5. If it is then resumed, we end up using DES-CBC3-SHA. It should be RC4-MD5 according to 7.6.1.3, 'cipher\_suite'.

Netscape-Enterprise/2.01 (<https://merchant.netscape.com>) has this bug. It only really shows up when connecting via SSLv2/v3 then reconnecting via SSLv3. The cipher list changes....

NEW INFORMATION. Try connecting with a cipher list of just DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-MD5. For some weird reason, each new connection uses RC4-MD5, but a re-connect tries to use DES-CBC-SHA. So netscape, when doing a re-connect, always takes the first cipher in the cipher list.

**SSL\_OP\_SSLREF2\_REUSE\_CERT\_TYPE\_BUG**

...

**SSL\_OP\_MICROSOFT\_BIG\_SSLV3\_BUFFER**

...

SSL\_OP\_MSIE\_SSLV2\_RSA\_PADDING

...

SSL\_OP\_SSLEAY\_080\_CLIENT\_DH\_BUG

...

SSL\_OP\_TLS\_D5\_BUG

...

SSL\_OP\_TLS\_BLOCK\_PADDING\_BUG

...

SSL\_OP\_DONT\_INSERT\_EMPTY\_FRAGMENTS

Disables a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers, which cannot be handled by some broken SSL implementations. This option has no effect for connections using other ciphers.

SSL\_OP\_ALL

All of the above bug workarounds.

It is usually safe to use **SSL\_OP\_ALL** to enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken implementations is desired.

The following **modifying** options are available:

SSL\_OP\_TLS\_ROLLBACK\_BUG

Disable version rollback attack detection.

During the client key exchange, the client must send the same information about acceptable SSL/TLS protocol levels as during the first hello. Some clients violate this rule by adapting to the server's answer. (Example: the client sends a SSLv2 hello and accepts up to SSLv3.1=TLSv1, the server only understands up to SSLv3. In this case the client must still use the same SSLv3.1=TLSv1 announcement. Some clients step down to SSLv3 with respect to the server's answer and violate the version rollback protection.)

SSL\_OP\_SINGLE\_DH\_USE

Always create a new key when using temporary/ephemeral DH parameters (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback*(3)). This option must be used to prevent small subgroup attacks, when the DH parameters were not generated using “strong” primes (e.g. when using DSA-parameters, see *dhparam*(1)). If “strong” primes were used, it is not strictly necessary to generate a new DH key during each handshake but it is also recommended. **SSL\_OP\_SINGLE\_DH\_USE** should therefore be enabled whenever temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are used.

SSL\_OP\_EPHEMERAL\_RSA

Always use ephemeral (temporary) RSA key when doing RSA operations (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_rsa\_callback*(3)). According to the specifications this is only done, when a RSA key can only be used for signature operations (namely under export ciphers with restricted RSA keylength). By setting this option, ephemeral RSA keys are always used. This option breaks compatibility with the SSL/TLS specifications and may lead to interoperability problems with clients and should therefore never be used. Ciphers with EDH (ephemeral Diffie–Hellman) key exchange should be used instead.

SSL\_OP\_CIPHER\_SERVER\_PREFERENCE

When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of the client preferences. When not set, the SSL server will always follow the clients preferences. When set, the SSLv3/TLSv1 server will choose following its own preferences. Because of the different protocol, for SSLv2 the server will send his list of preferences to the client and the client chooses.

SSL\_OP\_PKCS1\_CHECK\_1

...

SSL\_OP\_PKCS1\_CHECK\_2

...

SSL\_OP\_NETSCAPE\_CA\_DN\_BUG

If we accept a netscape connection, demand a client cert, have a non-self-signed CA which does not have its CA in netscape, and the browser has a cert, it will crash/hang. Works for 3.x and 4.xbeta

SSL\_OP\_NETSCAPE\_DEMO\_CIPHER\_CHANGE\_BUG

...

SSL\_OP\_NO\_SSLv2

Do not use the SSLv2 protocol.

SSL\_OP\_NO\_SSLv3

Do not use the SSLv3 protocol.

SSL\_OP\_NO\_TLSv1

Do not use the TLSv1 protocol.

SSL\_OP\_NO\_SESSION\_RESUMPTION\_ON\_RENEGOTIATION

When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session (i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial handshake). This option is not needed for clients.

## RETURN VALUES

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_options()* and *SSL\_set\_options()* return the new options bitmask after adding **options**.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_options()* and *SSL\_get\_options()* return the current bitmask.

## SEE ALSO

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_new*(3), *SSL\_clear*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_rsa\_callback*(3), *dhparam*(1)

## HISTORY

**SSL\_OP\_CIPHER\_SERVER\_PREFERENCE** and **SSL\_OP\_NO\_SESSION\_RESUMPTION\_ON\_RENEGOTIATION** have been added in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

**SSL\_OP\_TLS\_ROLLBACK\_BUG** has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6 and was automatically enabled with **SSL\_OP\_ALL**. As of 0.9.7, it is no longer included in **SSL\_OP\_ALL** and must be explicitly set.

**SSL\_OP\_DONT\_INSERT\_EMPTY\_FRAGMENTS** has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6e. Versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6c do not include the countermeasure that can be disabled with this option (in OpenSSL 0.9.6d, it was always enabled).

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_quiet\_shutdown, SSL\_CTX\_get\_quiet\_shutdown, SSL\_set\_quiet\_shutdown, SSL\_get\_quiet\_shutdown – manipulate shutdown behaviour

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode);
int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx);

void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode);
int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_quiet\_shutdown()* sets the “quiet shutdown” flag for **ctx** to be **mode**. SSL objects created from **ctx** inherit the **mode** valid at the time *SSL\_new*(3) is called. **mode** may be 0 or 1.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_quiet\_shutdown()* returns the “quiet shutdown” setting of **ctx**.

*SSL\_set\_quiet\_shutdown()* sets the “quiet shutdown” flag for **ssl** to be **mode**. The setting stays valid until **ssl** is removed with *SSL\_free*(3) or *SSL\_set\_quiet\_shutdown()* is called again. It is not changed when *SSL\_clear*(3) is called. **mode** may be 0 or 1.

*SSL\_get\_quiet\_shutdown()* returns the “quiet shutdown” setting of **ssl**.

**NOTES**

Normally when a SSL connection is finished, the parties must send out “close notify” alert messages using *SSL\_shutdown*(3) for a clean shutdown.

When setting the “quiet shutdown” flag to 1, *SSL\_shutdown*(3) will set the internal flags to SSL\_SENT\_SHUTDOWN|SSL\_RECEIVED\_SHUTDOWN. (*SSL\_shutdown*(3) then behaves like *SSL\_set\_shutdown*(3) called with SSL\_SENT\_SHUTDOWN|SSL\_RECEIVED\_SHUTDOWN.) The session is thus considered to be shutdown, but no “close notify” alert is sent to the peer. This behaviour violates the TLS standard.

The default is normal shutdown behaviour as described by the TLS standard.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_quiet\_shutdown()* and *SSL\_set\_quiet\_shutdown()* do not return diagnostic information.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_quiet\_shutdown()* and *SSL\_get\_quiet\_shutdown* return the current setting.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_shutdown*(3), *SSL\_set\_shutdown*(3), *SSL\_new*(3), *SSL\_clear*(3), *SSL\_free*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode, SSL\_CTX\_get\_session\_cache\_mode – enable/disable session caching

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX ctx, long mode);
long SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(SSL_CTX ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode()* enables/disables session caching by setting the operational mode for **ctx** to <mode>.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_session\_cache\_mode()* returns the currently used cache mode.

**NOTES**

The OpenSSL library can store/retrieve SSL/TLS sessions for later reuse. The sessions can be held in memory for each **ctx**, if more than one SSL\_CTX object is being maintained, the sessions are unique for each SSL\_CTX object.

In order to reuse a session, a client must send the session's id to the server. It can only send exactly one id. The server then either agrees to reuse the session or it starts a full handshake (to create a new session).

A server will lookup up the session in its internal session storage. If the session is not found in internal storage or lookups for the internal storage have been deactivated (SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_NO\_INTERNAL\_LOOKUP), the server will try the external storage if available.

Since a client may try to reuse a session intended for use in a different context, the session id context must be set by the server (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_id\_context(3)*).

The following session cache modes and modifiers are available:

**SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_OFF**

No session caching for client or server takes place.

**SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_CLIENT**

Client sessions are added to the session cache. As there is no reliable way for the OpenSSL library to know whether a session should be reused or which session to choose (due to the abstract BIO layer the SSL engine does not have details about the connection), the application must select the session to be reused by using the *SSL\_set\_session(3)* function. This option is not activated by default.

**SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_SERVER**

Server sessions are added to the session cache. When a client proposes a session to be reused, the server looks for the corresponding session in (first) the internal session cache (unless SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_NO\_INTERNAL\_LOOKUP is set), then (second) in the external cache if available. If the session is found, the server will try to reuse the session. This is the default.

**SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_BOTH**

Enable both SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_CLIENT and SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_SERVER at the same time.

**SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_NO\_AUTO\_CLEAR**

Normally the session cache is checked for expired sessions every 255 connections using the *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions(3)* function. Since this may lead to a delay which cannot be controlled, the automatic flushing may be disabled and *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions(3)* can be called explicitly by the application.

**SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_NO\_INTERNAL\_LOOKUP**

By setting this flag, session-resume operations in an SSL/TLS server will not automatically look up sessions in the internal cache, even if sessions are automatically stored there. If external session caching callbacks are in use, this flag guarantees that all lookups are directed to the external cache. As automatic lookup only applies for SSL/TLS servers, the flag has no effect on clients.



**SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_NO\_INTERNAL\_STORE**

Depending on the presence of `SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT` and/or `SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER`, sessions negotiated in an SSL/TLS handshake may be cached for possible reuse. Normally a new session is added to the internal cache as well as any external session caching (callback) that is configured for the `SSL_CTX`. This flag will prevent sessions being stored in the internal cache (though the application can add them manually using `SSL_CTX_add_session(3)`). Note: in any SSL/TLS servers where external caching is configured, any successful session lookups in the external cache (ie. for session-resume requests) would normally be copied into the local cache before processing continues – this flag prevents these additions to the internal cache as well.

**SSL\_SESS\_CACHE\_NO\_INTERNAL**

Enable both `SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP` and `SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE` at the same time.

The default mode is `SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER`.

**RETURN VALUES**

`SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode()` returns the previously set cache mode.

`SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode()` returns the currently set cache mode.

**SEE ALSO**

`ssl(3)`, `SSL_set_session(3)`, `SSL_session_reused(3)`, `SSL_CTX_add_session(3)`, `SSL_CTX_sess_number(3)`, `SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(3)`, `SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(3)`, `SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(3)`, `SSL_CTX_set_timeout(3)`, `SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(3)`

**HISTORY**

`SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE` and `SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL` were introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.6h.

**NAME**

`SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context`, `SSL_set_session_id_context` – set context within which session can be reused (server side only)

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
                                   unsigned int sid_ctx_len);

int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
                               unsigned int sid_ctx_len);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

`SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context()` sets the context **sid\_ctx** of length **sid\_ctx\_len** within which a session can be reused for the **ctx** object.

`SSL_set_session_id_context()` sets the context **sid\_ctx** of length **sid\_ctx\_len** within which a session can be reused for the **ssl** object.

**NOTES**

Sessions are generated within a certain context. When exporting/importing sessions with **i2d\_SSL\_SESSION/d2i\_SSL\_SESSION** it would be possible, to re-import a session generated from another context (e.g. another application), which might lead to malfunctions. Therefore each application must set its own session id context **sid\_ctx** which is used to distinguish the contexts and is stored in exported sessions. The **sid\_ctx** can be any kind of binary data with a given length, it is therefore possible to use e.g. the name of the application and/or the hostname and/or service name ...

The session id context becomes part of the session. The session id context is set by the SSL/TLS server. The `SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context()` and `SSL_set_session_id_context()` functions are therefore only useful on the server side.

OpenSSL clients will check the session id context returned by the server when reusing a session.

The maximum length of the **sid\_ctx** is limited to **SSL\_MAX\_SSL\_SESSION\_ID\_LENGTH**.

**WARNINGS**

If the session id context is not set on an SSL/TLS server, stored sessions will not be reused but a fatal error will be flagged and the handshake will fail.

If a server returns a different session id context to an OpenSSL client when reusing a session, an error will be flagged and the handshake will fail. OpenSSL servers will always return the correct session id context, as an OpenSSL server checks the session id context itself before reusing a session as described above.

**RETURN VALUES**

`SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context()` and `SSL_set_session_id_context()` return the following values:

- The length **sid\_ctx\_len** of the session id context **sid\_ctx** exceeded the maximum allowed length of **SSL\_MAX\_SSL\_SESSION\_ID\_LENGTH**. The error is logged to the error stack.
- 1 The operation succeeded.

**SEE ALSO**

`ssl(3)`

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_ssl\_version, SSL\_set\_ssl\_method, SSL\_get\_ssl\_method – choose a new TLS/SSL method

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_METHOD *method);
int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, SSL_METHOD *method);
SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_ssl\_version()* sets a new default TLS/SSL **method** for SSL objects newly created from this **ctx**. SSL objects already created with *SSL\_new*(3) are not affected, except when *SSL\_clear*(3) is being called.

*SSL\_set\_ssl\_method()* sets a new TLS/SSL **method** for a particular **ssl** object. It may be reset, when *SSL\_clear*() is called.

*SSL\_get\_ssl\_method()* returns a function pointer to the TLS/SSL method set in **ssl**.

**NOTES**

The available **method** choices are described in *SSL\_CTX\_new*(3).

When *SSL\_clear*(3) is called and no session is connected to an SSL object, the method of the SSL object is reset to the method currently set in the corresponding SSL\_CTX object.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur for *SSL\_CTX\_set\_ssl\_version()* and *SSL\_set\_ssl\_method()*:

- The new choice failed, check the error stack to find out the reason.
- 1 The operation succeeded.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_CTX\_new*(3), *SSL\_new*(3), *SSL\_clear*(3), *ssl*(3), *SSL\_set\_connect\_state*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_timeout, SSL\_CTX\_get\_timeout – manipulate timeout values for session caching

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long t);
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_timeout()* sets the timeout for newly created sessions for **ctx** to **t**. The timeout value **t** must be given in seconds.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_timeout()* returns the currently set timeout value for **ctx**.

**NOTES**

Whenever a new session is created, it is assigned a maximum lifetime. This lifetime is specified by storing the creation time of the session and the timeout value valid at this time. If the actual time is later than creation time plus timeout, the session is not reused.

Due to this realization, all sessions behave according to the timeout value valid at the time of the session negotiation. Changes of the timeout value do not affect already established sessions.

The expiration time of a single session can be modified using the *SSL\_SESSION\_get\_time*(3) family of functions.

Expired sessions are removed from the internal session cache, whenever *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions*(3) is called, either directly by the application or automatically (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode*(3))

The default value for session timeout is decided on a per protocol basis, see *SSL\_get\_default\_timeout*(3). All currently supported protocols have the same default timeout value of 300 seconds.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_timeout()* returns the previously set timeout value.

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_timeout()* returns the currently set timeout value.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode*(3), *SSL\_SESSION\_get\_time*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions*(3), *SSL\_get\_default\_timeout*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback, SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh, SSL\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback,  
SSL\_set\_tmp\_dh – handle DH keys for ephemeral key exchange

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                                DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
long SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *dh);

void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                             DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
long SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, DH *dh)

DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback()* sets the callback function for **ctx** to be used when a DH parameters are required to **tmp\_dh\_callback**. The callback is inherited by all **ssl** objects created from **ctx**.

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh()* sets DH parameters to be used to be **dh**. The key is inherited by all **ssl** objects created from **ctx**.

*SSL\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback()* sets the callback only for **ssl**.

*SSL\_set\_tmp\_dh()* sets the parameters only for **ssl**.

These functions apply to SSL/TLS servers only.

**NOTES**

When using a cipher with RSA authentication, an ephemeral DH key exchange can take place. Ciphers with DSA keys always use ephemeral DH keys as well. In these cases, the session data are negotiated using the ephemeral/temporary DH key and the key supplied and certified by the certificate chain is only used for signing. Anonymous ciphers (without a permanent server key) also use ephemeral DH keys.

Using ephemeral DH key exchange yields forward secrecy, as the connection can only be decrypted, when the DH key is known. By generating a temporary DH key inside the server application that is lost when the application is left, it becomes impossible for an attacker to decrypt past sessions, even if he gets hold of the normal (certified) key, as this key was only used for signing.

In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group (DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation, when the DH parameters are supplied via callback and/or when the `SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE` option of *SSL\_CTX\_set\_options*(3) is set. It will immediately create a DH key, when DH parameters are supplied via *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh()* and `SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE` is not set. In this case, it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later being needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the negotiation is being saved.

If “strong” primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward secrecy. If it is not assured, that “strong” primes were used (see especially the section about DSA parameters below), `SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE` must be used in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using `SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE` has an impact on the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable this option.

As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters. DH parameters can be reused, as the actual key is newly generated during the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the *openssl dhparam*(1) application. In order to reduce the computer time needed for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters instead (see *dhparam*(1)), but in this case `SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE` is mandatory.

Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files *dh512.pem*, *dh1024.pem*, *dh2048.pem*, and

dh4096 in the 'apps' directory of current version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters, which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly. These files can be converted into C code using the `-C` option of the *dhparam*(1) application. Authors may also generate their own set of parameters using *dhparam*(1), but a user may not be sure how the parameters were generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore recommended.

An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH parameters for different key lengths.

The **tmp\_dh\_callback** is called with the **keylength** needed and the **is\_export** information. The **is\_export** flag is set, when the ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher.

## EXAMPLES

Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling partly left out.)

```
...
/* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */
DH *dh_512 = NULL;
DH *dh_1024 = NULL;
FILE *paramfile;

...
/* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */
paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r");
if (paramfile) {
    dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
    fclose(paramfile);
}
/* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */
paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r");
if (paramfile) {
    dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
    fclose(paramfile);
}
...
/* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */
DH *get_dh512() { ... }
DH *get_dh1024() { ... }

DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
{
    DH *dh_tmp=NULL;
    switch (keylength) {
    case 512:
        if (!dh_512)
            dh_512 = get_dh512();
        dh_tmp = dh_512;
        break;
    case 1024:
        if (!dh_1024)
            dh_1024 = get_dh1024();
        dh_tmp = dh_1024;
        break;
    default:
        /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */
        setup_dh_parameters_like_above();
    }
    return(dh_tmp);
}
```

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback()* and *SSL\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback()* do not return diagnostic output.

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh()* and *SSL\_set\_tmp\_dh()* do return 1 on success and 0 on failure. Check the error queue to find out the reason of failure.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_cipher\_list*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_rsa\_callback*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_options*(3), *ciphers*(1), *dhparam*(1)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_rsa\_callback, SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_rsa, SSL\_CTX\_need\_tmp\_rsa, SSL\_set\_tmp\_rsa\_callback, SSL\_set\_tmp\_rsa, SSL\_need\_tmp\_rsa – handle RSA keys for ephemeral key exchange

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
    RSA *(*tmp_rsa_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
long SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa);
long SSL_CTX_need_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx);

void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,
    RSA *(*tmp_rsa_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
long SSL_set_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa);
long SSL_need_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl);

RSA *(*tmp_rsa_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_rsa\_callback()* sets the callback function for **ctx** to be used when a temporary/ephemeral RSA key is required to **tmp\_rsa\_callback**. The callback is inherited by all SSL objects newly created from **ctx** with `<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>`. Already created SSL objects are not affected.

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_rsa()* sets the temporary/ephemeral RSA key to be used to be **rsa**. The key is inherited by all SSL objects newly created from **ctx** with `<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>`. Already created SSL objects are not affected.

*SSL\_CTX\_need\_tmp\_rsa()* returns 1, if a temporary/ephemeral RSA key is needed for RSA-based strength-limited 'exportable' ciphersuites because a RSA key with a keysize larger than 512 bits is installed.

*SSL\_set\_tmp\_rsa\_callback()* sets the callback only for **ssl**.

*SSL\_set\_tmp\_rsa()* sets the key only for **ssl**.

*SSL\_need\_tmp\_rsa()* returns 1, if a temporary/ephemeral RSA key is needed, for RSA-based strength-limited 'exportable' ciphersuites because a RSA key with a keysize larger than 512 bits is installed.

These functions apply to SSL/TLS servers only.

**NOTES**

When using a cipher with RSA authentication, an ephemeral RSA key exchange can take place. In this case the session data are negotiated using the ephemeral/temporary RSA key and the RSA key supplied and certified by the certificate chain is only used for signing.

Under previous export restrictions, ciphers with RSA keys shorter (512 bits) than the usual key length of 1024 bits were created. To use these ciphers with RSA keys of usual length, an ephemeral key exchange must be performed, as the normal (certified) key cannot be directly used.

Using ephemeral RSA key exchange yields forward secrecy, as the connection can only be decrypted, when the RSA key is known. By generating a temporary RSA key inside the server application that is lost when the application is left, it becomes impossible for an attacker to decrypt past sessions, even if he gets hold of the normal (certified) RSA key, as this key was used for signing only. The downside is that creating a RSA key is computationally expensive.

Additionally, the use of ephemeral RSA key exchange is only allowed in the TLS standard, when the RSA key can be used for signing only, that is for export ciphers. Using ephemeral RSA key exchange for other purposes violates the standard and can break interoperability with clients. It is therefore strongly recommended to not use ephemeral RSA key exchange and use EDH (Ephemeral Diffie–Hellman) key exchange instead in order to achieve forward secrecy (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback(3)*).

On OpenSSL servers ephemeral RSA key exchange is therefore disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled using the `SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA` option of *SSL\_CTX\_set\_options(3)*, violating the



TLS/SSL standard. When ephemeral RSA key exchange is required for export ciphers, it will automatically be used without this option!

An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via a callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the callback may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the generation of a RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant delay in the handshake procedure. Another advantage of the callback function is that it can supply keys of different size (e.g. for SSL\_OP\_EPHEMERAL\_RSA usage) while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for key size of 512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give away key length if a longer key would be allowed.

The **tmp\_rsa\_callback** is called with the **keylength** needed and the **is\_export** information. The **is\_export** flag is set, when the ephemeral RSA key exchange is performed with an export cipher.

## EXAMPLES

Generate temporary RSA keys to prepare ephemeral RSA key exchange. As the generation of a RSA key costs a lot of computer time, they saved for later reuse. For demonstration purposes, two keys for 512 bits and 1024 bits respectively are generated.

```
...
/* Set up ephemeral RSA stuff */
RSA *rsa_512 = NULL;
RSA *rsa_1024 = NULL;

rsa_512 = RSA_generate_key(512,RSA_F4,NULL,NULL);
if (rsa_512 == NULL)
    evaluate_error_queue();

rsa_1024 = RSA_generate_key(1024,RSA_F4,NULL,NULL);
if (rsa_1024 == NULL)
    evaluate_error_queue();

...

RSA *tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
{
    RSA *rsa_tmp=NULL;

    switch (keylength) {
    case 512:
        if (rsa_512)
            rsa_tmp = rsa_512;
        else { /* generate on the fly, should not happen in this example */
            rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(keylength,RSA_F4,NULL,NULL);
            rsa_512 = rsa_tmp; /* Remember for later reuse */
        }
        break;
    case 1024:
        if (rsa_1024)
            rsa_tmp=rsa_1024;
        else
            should_not_happen_in_this_example();
        break;
    default:
        /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */
        if (rsa_1024)
            rsa_tmp=rsa_1024;
        else
            rsa_tmp=rsa_512; /* Use at least a shorter key */
    }
    return(rsa_tmp);
}
```

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_rsa\_callback()* and *SSL\_set\_tmp\_rsa\_callback()* do not return diagnostic output.

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_rsa()* and *SSL\_set\_tmp\_rsa()* do return 1 on success and 0 on failure. Check the error queue to find out the reason of failure.

*SSL\_CTX\_need\_tmp\_rsa()* and *SSL\_need\_tmp\_rsa()* return 1 if a temporary RSA key is needed and 0 otherwise.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_cipher\_list*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_options*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_tmp\_dh\_callback*(3), *SSL\_new*(3), *ciphers*(1)

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify, SSL\_set\_verify, SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify\_depth, SSL\_set\_verify\_depth – set peer certificate verification parameters

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
                        int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
                    int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth);
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth);

int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify()* sets the verification flags for **ctx** to be **mode** and specifies the **verify\_callback** function to be used. If no callback function shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for **verify\_callback**.

*SSL\_set\_verify()* sets the verification flags for **ssl** to be **mode** and specifies the **verify\_callback** function to be used. If no callback function shall be specified, the NULL pointer can be used for **verify\_callback**. In this case last **verify\_callback** set specifically for this **ssl** remains. If no special **callback** was set before, the default callback for the underlying **ctx** is used, that was valid at the the time **ssl** was created with *SSL\_new*(3).

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify\_depth()* sets the maximum **depth** for the certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for **ctx**. (See the BUGS section.)

*SSL\_set\_verify\_depth()* sets the maximum **depth** for the certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for **ssl**. (See the BUGS section.)

**NOTES**

The verification of certificates can be controlled by a set of logically or'ed **mode** flags:

**SSL\_VERIFY\_NONE**

**Server mode:** the server will not send a client certificate request to the client, so the client will not send a certificate.

**Client mode:** if not using an anonymous cipher (by default disabled), the server will send a certificate which will be checked. The result of the certificate verification process can be checked after the TLS/SSL handshake using the *SSL\_get\_verify\_result*(3) function. The handshake will be continued regardless of the verification result.

**SSL\_VERIFY\_PEER**

**Server mode:** the server sends a client certificate request to the client. The certificate returned (if any) is checked. If the verification process fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for the verification failure. The behaviour can be controlled by the additional **SSL\_VERIFY\_FAIL\_IF\_NO\_PEER\_CERT** and **SSL\_VERIFY\_CLIENT\_ONCE** flags.

**Client mode:** the server certificate is verified. If the verification process fails, the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with an alert message containing the reason for the verification failure. If no server certificate is sent, because an anonymous cipher is used, **SSL\_VERIFY\_PEER** is ignored.

**SSL\_VERIFY\_FAIL\_IF\_NO\_PEER\_CERT**

**Server mode:** if the client did not return a certificate, the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately terminated with a “handshake failure” alert. This flag must be used together with **SSL\_VERIFY\_PEER**.

**Client mode:** ignored

**SSL\_VERIFY\_CLIENT\_ONCE**

**Server mode:** only request a client certificate on the initial TLS/SSL handshake. Do not ask for a client certificate again in case of a renegotiation. This flag must be used together with `SSL_VERIFY_PEER`.

**Client mode:** ignored

Exactly one of the **mode** flags `SSL_VERIFY_NONE` and `SSL_VERIFY_PEER` must be set at any time.

The actual verification procedure is performed either using the built-in verification procedure or using another application provided verification function set with `SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(3)`. The following descriptions apply in the case of the built-in procedure. An application provided procedure also has access to the verify depth information and the `verify_callback()` function, but the way this information is used may be different.

`SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth()` and `SSL_set_verify_depth()` set the limit up to which depth certificates in a chain are used during the verification procedure. If the certificate chain is longer than allowed, the certificates above the limit are ignored. Error messages are generated as if these certificates would not be present, most likely a `X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY` will be issued. The depth count is “level 0: peer certificate”, “level 1: CA certificate”, “level 2: higher level CA certificate”, and so on. Setting the maximum depth to 2 allows the levels 0, 1, and 2. The default depth limit is 9, allowing for the peer certificate and additional 9 CA certificates.

The **verify\_callback** function is used to control the behaviour when the `SSL_VERIFY_PEER` flag is set. It must be supplied by the application and receives two arguments: **preverify\_ok** indicates, whether the verification of the certificate in question was passed (`preverify_ok=1`) or not (`preverify_ok=0`). **x509\_ctx** is a pointer to the complete context used for the certificate chain verification.

The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest nesting level (the root CA certificate) and worked upward to the peer’s certificate. At each level signatures and issuer attributes are checked. Whenever a verification error is found, the error number is stored in **x509\_ctx** and **verify\_callback** is called with **preverify\_ok=0**. By applying `X509_CTX_store *` functions **verify\_callback** can locate the certificate in question and perform additional steps (see `EXAMPLES`). If no error is found for a certificate, **verify\_callback** is called with **preverify\_ok=1** before advancing to the next level.

The return value of **verify\_callback** controls the strategy of the further verification process. If **verify\_callback** returns 0, the verification process is immediately stopped with “verification failed” state. If `SSL_VERIFY_PEER` is set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and the TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If **verify\_callback** returns 1, the verification process is continued. If **verify\_callback** always returns 1, the TLS/SSL handshake will not be terminated with respect to verification failures and the connection will be established. The calling process can however retrieve the error code of the last verification error using `SSL_get_verify_result(3)` or by maintaining its own error storage managed by **verify\_callback**.

If no **verify\_callback** is specified, the default callback will be used. Its return value is identical to **preverify\_ok**, so that any verification failure will lead to a termination of the TLS/SSL handshake with an alert message, if `SSL_VERIFY_PEER` is set.

**BUGS**

In client mode, it is not checked whether the `SSL_VERIFY_PEER` flag is set, but whether `SSL_VERIFY_NONE` is not set. This can lead to unexpected behaviour, if the `SSL_VERIFY_PEER` and `SSL_VERIFY_NONE` are not used as required (exactly one must be set at any time).

The certificate verification depth set with `SSL[_CTX]_verify_depth()` stops the verification at a certain depth. The error message produced will be that of an incomplete certificate chain and not `X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG` as may be expected.

**RETURN VALUES**

The `SSL*_set_verify*()` functions do not provide diagnostic information.

**EXAMPLES**

The following code sequence realizes an example **verify\_callback** function that will always continue the TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification failure, if wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit with more informational output.

All verification errors are printed, informations about the certificate chain are printed on request. The

example is realized for a server that does allow but not require client certificates.

The example makes use of the `ex_data` technique to store application data into/retrieve application data from the SSL structure (see `SSL_get_ex_new_index(3)`, `SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)`).

```
...
typedef struct {
    int verbose_mode;
    int verify_depth;
    int always_continue;
} mydata_t;
int mydata_index;
...
static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
    char    buf[256];
    X509    *err_cert;
    int     err, depth;
    SSL     *ssl;
    mydata_t *mydata;

    err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
    err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
    depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);

    /*
     * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
     * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
     */
    ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
    mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index);

    X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);

    /*
     * Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using
     * SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so
     * that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we
     * have violated the limit and want to log this error condition.
     * We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not
     * be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the
     * additional certificates would be logged.
     */
    if (depth > mydata->verify_depth) {
        preverify_ok = 0;
        err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
        X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
    }
    if (!preverify_ok) {
        printf("verify error:num=%d:s:depth=%d:s\n", err,
            X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf);
    }
    else if (mydata->verbose_mode)
    {
        printf("depth=%d:s\n", depth, buf);
    }
}
```

```

/*
 * At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use
 * it for something special
 */
if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT))
{
    X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, 256);
    printf("issuer= %s\n", buf);
}

if (mydata->always_continue)
    return 1;
else
    return preverify_ok;
}
...
mydata_t mydata;

...
mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL);

...
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
                    verify_callback);

/*
 * Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get
 * an appropriate error in the logfile.
 */
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1);

/*
 * Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into the SSL
 * structure.
 */
mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ...
SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata);

...
SSL_accept(ssl);          /* check of success left out for clarity */
if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl))
{
    if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK)
    {
        /* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */
    }
}
}

```

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_new(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_get\_verify\_mode(3)*, *SSL\_get\_verify\_result(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations(3)*, *SSL\_get\_peer\_certificate(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_cert\_verify\_callback(3)*, *SSL\_get\_ex\_data\_X509\_STORE\_CTX\_idx(3)*, *SSL\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate, SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate\_ASN1, SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate\_file, SSL\_use\_certificate, SSL\_use\_certificate\_ASN1, SSL\_use\_certificate\_file, SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate\_chain\_file, SSL\_CTX\_use\_PrivateKey, SSL\_CTX\_use\_PrivateKey\_ASN1, SSL\_CTX\_use\_PrivateKey\_file, SSL\_CTX\_use\_RSAPrivateKey, SSL\_CTX\_use\_RSAPrivateKey\_ASN1, SSL\_CTX\_use\_RSAPrivateKey\_file, SSL\_use\_PrivateKey\_file, SSL\_use\_PrivateKey\_ASN1, SSL\_use\_PrivateKey, SSL\_use\_RSAPrivateKey, SSL\_use\_RSAPrivateKey\_ASN1, SSL\_use\_RSAPrivateKey\_file, SSL\_CTX\_check\_private\_key, SSL\_check\_private\_key – load certificate and key data

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, unsigned char *d);
int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x);
int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, int len);
int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);

int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file);

int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d,
                                long len);

int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa);
int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *d, long len);
int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type);
int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk, SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len);
int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);
int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa);
int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len);
int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type);

int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(SSL_CTX *ctx);
int SSL_check_private_key(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions load the certificates and private keys into the SSL\_CTX or SSL object, respectively.

The SSL\_CTX\_\* class of functions loads the certificates and keys into the SSL\_CTX object **ctx**. The information is passed to SSL objects **ssl** created from **ctx** with *SSL\_new*(3) by copying, so that changes applied to **ctx** do not propagate to already existing SSL objects.

The SSL\_\* class of functions only loads certificates and keys into a specific SSL object. The specific information is kept, when *SSL\_clear*(3) is called for this SSL object.

*SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate()* loads the certificate **x** into **ctx**, *SSL\_use\_certificate()* loads **x** into **ssl**. The rest of the certificates needed to form the complete certificate chain can be specified using the *SSL\_CTX\_add\_extra\_chain\_cert*(3) function.

*SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate\_ASN1()* loads the ASN1 encoded certificate from the memory location **d** (with length **len**) into **ctx**, *SSL\_use\_certificate\_ASN1()* loads the ASN1 encoded certificate into **ssl**.

*SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate\_file()* loads the first certificate stored in **file** into **ctx**. The formatting **type** of the certificate must be specified from the known types SSL\_FILETYPE\_PEM, SSL\_FILETYPE\_ASN1. *SSL\_use\_certificate\_file()* loads the certificate from **file** into **ssl**. See the NOTES section on why *SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate\_chain\_file()* should be preferred.

*SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate\_chain\_file()* loads a certificate chain from **file** into **ctx**. The certificates must be in PEM format and must be sorted starting with the subject's certificate (actual client or server certificate), followed by intermediate CA certificates if applicable, and ending at the highest level (root) CA. There is no corresponding function working on a single SSL object.

*SSL\_CTX\_use\_PrivateKey()* adds **pkey** as private key to **ctx**. *SSL\_CTX\_use\_RSAPrivateKey()* adds the private key **rsa** of type RSA to **ctx**. *SSL\_use\_PrivateKey()* adds **pkey** as private key to **ssl**; *SSL\_use\_RSAPrivateKey()* adds **rsa** as private key of type RSA to **ssl**.

*SSL\_CTX\_use\_PrivateKey\_ASN1()* adds the private key of type **pk** stored at memory location **d** (length **len**) to **ctx**. *SSL\_CTX\_use\_RSAPrivateKey\_ASN1()* adds the private key of type RSA stored at memory location **d** (length **len**) to **ctx**. *SSL\_use\_PrivateKey\_ASN1()* and *SSL\_use\_RSAPrivateKey\_ASN1()* add the private key to **ssl**.

*SSL\_CTX\_use\_PrivateKey\_file()* adds the first private key found in **file** to **ctx**. The formatting **type** of the certificate must be specified from the known types `SSL_FILETYPE_PEM`, `SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1`. *SSL\_CTX\_use\_RSAPrivateKey\_file()* adds the first private RSA key found in **file** to **ctx**. *SSL\_use\_PrivateKey\_file()* adds the first private key found in **file** to **ssl**; *SSL\_use\_RSAPrivateKey\_file()* adds the first private RSA key found to **ssl**.

*SSL\_CTX\_check\_private\_key()* checks the consistency of a private key with the corresponding certificate loaded into **ctx**. If more than one key/certificate pair (RSA/DSA) is installed, the last item installed will be checked. If e.g. the last item was a RSA certificate or key, the RSA key/certificate pair will be checked. *SSL\_check\_private\_key()* performs the same check for **ssl**. If no key/certificate was explicitly added for this **ssl**, the last item added into **ctx** will be checked.

## NOTES

The internal certificate store of OpenSSL can hold two private key/certificate pairs at a time: one key/certificate of type RSA and one key/certificate of type DSA. The certificate used depends on the cipher select, see also *SSL\_CTX\_set\_cipher\_list*(3).

When reading certificates and private keys from file, files of type `SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1` (also known as **DER**, binary encoding) can only contain one certificate or private key, consequently *SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate\_chain\_file()* is only applicable to PEM formatting. Files of type `SSL_FILETYPE_PEM` can contain more than one item.

*SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate\_chain\_file()* adds the first certificate found in the file to the certificate store. The other certificates are added to the store of chain certificates using *SSL\_CTX\_add\_extra\_chain\_cert*(3). There exists only one extra chain store, so that the same chain is appended to both types of certificates, RSA and DSA! If it is not intended to use both type of certificate at the same time, it is recommended to use the *SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate\_chain\_file()* instead of the *SSL\_CTX\_use\_certificate\_file()* function in order to allow the use of complete certificate chains even when no trusted CA storage is used or when the CA issuing the certificate shall not be added to the trusted CA storage.

If additional certificates are needed to complete the chain during the TLS negotiation, CA certificates are additionally looked up in the locations of trusted CA certificates, see *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations*(3).

The private keys loaded from file can be encrypted. In order to successfully load encrypted keys, a function returning the passphrase must have been supplied, see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_default\_passwd\_cb*(3). (Certificate files might be encrypted as well from the technical point of view, it however does not make sense as the data in the certificate is considered public anyway.)

## RETURN VALUES

On success, the functions return 1. Otherwise check out the error stack to find out the reason.

## SEE ALSO

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_new*(3), *SSL\_clear*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_load\_verify\_locations*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_default\_passwd\_cb*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_cipher\_list*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_cert\_cb*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_add\_extra\_chain\_cert*(3)



**NAME**

SSL\_do\_handshake – perform a TLS/SSL handshake

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_do\_handshake()* will wait for a SSL/TLS handshake to take place. If the connection is in client mode, the handshake will be started. The handshake routines may have to be explicitly set in advance using either *SSL\_set\_connect\_state*(3) or *SSL\_set\_accept\_state*(3).

**NOTES**

The behaviour of *SSL\_do\_handshake()* depends on the underlying BIO.

If the underlying BIO is **blocking**, *SSL\_do\_handshake()* will only return once the handshake has been finished or an error occurred, except for SGC (Server Gated Cryptography). For SGC, *SSL\_do\_handshake()* may return with `-1`, but *SSL\_get\_error()* will yield **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ/WRITE** and *SSL\_do\_handshake()* should be called again.

If the underlying BIO is **non-blocking**, *SSL\_do\_handshake()* will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of *SSL\_do\_handshake()* to continue the handshake. In this case a call to *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value of *SSL\_do\_handshake()* will yield **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ** or **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_WRITE**. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of *SSL\_do\_handshake()*. The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but *select()* can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

- 1 The TLS/SSL handshake was successfully completed, a TLS/SSL connection has been established.
- The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful but was shut down controlled and by the specifications of the TLS/SSL protocol. Call *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value **ret** to find out the reason.
- <0 The TLS/SSL handshake was not successful because a fatal error occurred either at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. The shutdown was not clean. It can also occur if action is needed to continue the operation for non-blocking BIOs. Call *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value **ret** to find out the reason.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_get\_error*(3), *SSL\_connect*(3), *SSL\_accept*(3), *ssl*(3), *bio*(3), *SSL\_set\_connect\_state*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_free – free an allocated SSL structure

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_free(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_free()* decrements the reference count of **ssl**, and removes the SSL structure pointed to by **ssl** and frees up the allocated memory if the the reference count has reached 0.

**NOTES**

*SSL\_free()* also calls the *free()*ing procedures for indirectly affected items, if applicable: the buffering BIO, the read and write BIOs, cipher lists specially created for this **ssl**, the **SSL\_SESSION**. Do not explicitly free these indirectly freed up items before or after calling *SSL\_free()*, as trying to free things twice may lead to program failure.

The ssl session has reference counts from two users: the SSL object, for which the reference count is removed by *SSL\_free()* and the internal session cache. If the session is considered bad, because *SSL\_shutdown(3)* was not called for the connection and *SSL\_set\_shutdown(3)* was not used to set the **SSL\_SENT\_SHUTDOWN** state, the session will also be removed from the session cache as required by RFC2246.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_free()* does not provide diagnostic information.

*SSL\_new(3)*, *SSL\_clear(3)*, *SSL\_shutdown(3)*, *SSL\_set\_shutdown(3)*, *ssl(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_ciphers, SSL\_get\_cipher\_list – get list of available SSL\_CIPHERs

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(SSL *ssl);
const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, int priority);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_ciphers()* returns the stack of available SSL\_CIPHERs for **ssl**, sorted by preference. If **ssl** is NULL or no ciphers are available, NULL is returned.

*SSL\_get\_cipher\_list()* returns a pointer to the name of the SSL\_CIPHER listed for **ssl** with **priority**. If **ssl** is NULL, no ciphers are available, or there are less ciphers than **priority** available, NULL is returned.

**NOTES**

The details of the ciphers obtained by *SSL\_get\_ciphers()* can be obtained using the *SSL\_CIPHER\_get\_name(3)* family of functions.

Call *SSL\_get\_cipher\_list()* with **priority** starting from 0 to obtain the sorted list of available ciphers, until NULL is returned.

**RETURN VALUES**

See DESCRIPTION

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_cipher\_list(3)*, *SSL\_CIPHER\_get\_name(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_client\_CA\_list, SSL\_CTX\_get\_client\_CA\_list – get list of client CAs

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(SSL *s);
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_CTX\_get\_client\_CA\_list()* returns the list of client CAs explicitly set for **ctx** using *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list(3)*.

*SSL\_get\_client\_CA\_list()* returns the list of client CAs explicitly set for **ssl** using *SSL\_set\_client\_CA\_list()* or **ssl**'s *SSL\_CTX* object with *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list(3)*, when in server mode. In client mode, *SSL\_get\_client\_CA\_list* returns the list of client CAs sent from the server, if any.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list()* and *SSL\_set\_client\_CA\_list()* do not return diagnostic information.

*SSL\_CTX\_add\_client\_CA()* and *SSL\_add\_client\_CA()* have the following return values:

STACK\_OF(X509\_NAMES)

List of CA names explicitly set (for **ctx** or in server mode) or send by the server (client mode).

NULL

No client CA list was explicitly set (for **ctx** or in server mode) or the server did not send a list of CAs (client mode).

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_cert\_cb(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_current\_cipher, SSL\_get\_cipher, SSL\_get\_cipher\_name, SSL\_get\_cipher\_bits,  
SSL\_get\_cipher\_version – get SSL\_CIPHER of a connection

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(SSL *ssl);
#define SSL_get_cipher(s) \
    SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
#define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \
    SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
#define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \
    SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np)
#define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \
    SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s))
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_current\_cipher()* returns a pointer to an SSL\_CIPHER object containing the description of the actually used cipher of a connection established with the **ssl** object.

*SSL\_get\_cipher()* and *SSL\_get\_cipher\_name()* are identical macros to obtain the name of the currently used cipher. *SSL\_get\_cipher\_bits()* is a macro to obtain the number of secret/algorithm bits used and *SSL\_get\_cipher\_version()* returns the protocol name. See *SSL\_CIPHER\_get\_name(3)* for more details.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_get\_current\_cipher()* returns the cipher actually used or NULL, when no session has been established.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_CIPHER\_get\_name(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_default\_timeout – get default session timeout value

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_get_default_timeout(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_default\_timeout()* returns the default timeout value assigned to SSL\_SESSION objects negotiated for the protocol valid for **ssl**.

**NOTES**

Whenever a new session is negotiated, it is assigned a timeout value, after which it will not be accepted for session reuse. If the timeout value was not explicitly set using *SSL\_CTX\_set\_timeout(3)*, the hardcoded default timeout for the protocol will be used.

*SSL\_get\_default\_timeout()* return this hardcoded value, which is 300 seconds for all currently supported protocols (SSLv2, SSLv3, and TLSv1).

**RETURN VALUES**

See description.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode(3)*, *SSL\_SESSION\_get\_time(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions(3)*, *SSL\_get\_default\_timeout(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_error – obtain result code for TLS/SSL I/O operation

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_get_error(SSL *ssl, int ret);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_error()* returns a result code (suitable for the C “switch” statement) for a preceding call to *SSL\_connect()*, *SSL\_accept()*, *SSL\_do\_handshake()*, *SSL\_read()*, *SSL\_peek()*, or *SSL\_write()* on *ssl*. The value returned by that TLS/SSL I/O function must be passed to *SSL\_get\_error()* in parameter *ret*.

In addition to *ssl* and *ret*, *SSL\_get\_error()* inspects the current thread’s OpenSSL error queue. Thus, *SSL\_get\_error()* must be used in the same thread that performed the TLS/SSL I/O operation, and no other OpenSSL function calls should appear in between. The current thread’s error queue must be empty before the TLS/SSL I/O operation is attempted, or *SSL\_get\_error()* will not work reliably.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can currently occur:

**SSL\_ERROR\_NONE**

The TLS/SSL I/O operation completed. This result code is returned if and only if *ret* > 0.

**SSL\_ERROR\_ZERO\_RETURN**

The TLS/SSL connection has been closed. If the protocol version is SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0, this result code is returned only if a closure alert has occurred in the protocol, i.e. if the connection has been closed cleanly. Note that in this case **SSL\_ERROR\_ZERO\_RETURN** does not necessarily indicate that the underlying transport has been closed.

**SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ**, **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_WRITE**

The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function should be called again later. If, by then, the underlying **BIO** has data available for reading (if the result code is **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ**) or allows writing data (**SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_WRITE**), then some TLS/SSL protocol progress will take place, i.e. at least part of an TLS/SSL record will be read or written. Note that the retry may again lead to a **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ** or **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_WRITE** condition. There is no fixed upper limit for the number of iterations that may be necessary until progress becomes visible at application protocol level.

For socket **BIOs** (e.g. when *SSL\_set\_fd()* was used), *select()* or *poll()* on the underlying socket can be used to find out when the TLS/SSL I/O function should be retried.

Caveat: Any TLS/SSL I/O function can lead to either of **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ** and **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_WRITE**. In particular, *SSL\_read()* or *SSL\_peek()* may want to write data and *SSL\_write()* may want to read data. This is mainly because TLS/SSL handshakes may occur at any time during the protocol (initiated by either the client or the server); *SSL\_read()*, *SSL\_peek()*, and *SSL\_write()* will handle any pending handshakes.

**SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_CONNECT**, **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_ACCEPT**

The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function should be called again later. The underlying **BIO** was not connected yet to the peer and the call would block in *connect()/accept()*. The SSL function should be called again when the connection is established. These messages can only appear with a *BIO\_s\_connect()* or *BIO\_s\_accept()* **BIO**, respectively. In order to find out, when the connection has been successfully established, on many platforms *select()* or *poll()* for writing on the socket file descriptor can be used.

**SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_X509\_LOOKUP**

The operation did not complete because an application callback set by *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_cert\_cb()* has asked to be called again. The TLS/SSL I/O function should be called again later. Details depend on the application.

**SSL\_ERROR\_SYSCALL**

Some I/O error occurred. The OpenSSL error queue may contain more information on the error. If the error queue is empty (i.e. *ERR\_get\_error()* returns 0), *ret* can be used to find out more about the error: If *ret* == 0, an EOF was observed that violates the protocol. If *ret* == -1, the underlying

**BIO** reported an I/O error (for socket I/O on Unix systems, consult **errno** for details).

#### SSL\_ERROR\_SSL

A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error. The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error.

#### SEE ALSO

*ssl*(3), *err*(3)

#### HISTORY

*SSL\_get\_error()* was added in SSLeay 0.8.



**NAME**

`SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx` – get ex\_data index to access SSL structure from X509\_STORE\_CTX

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

`SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()` returns the index number under which the pointer to the SSL object is stored into the X509\_STORE\_CTX object.

**NOTES**

Whenever a X509\_STORE\_CTX object is created for the verification of the peers certificate during a handshake, a pointer to the SSL object is stored into the X509\_STORE\_CTX object to identify the connection affected. To retrieve this pointer the `X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data()` function can be used with the correct index. This index is globally the same for all X509\_STORE\_CTX objects and can be retrieved using `SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()`. The index value is set when `SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()` is first called either by the application program directly or indirectly during other SSL setup functions or during the handshake.

The value depends on other index values defined for X509\_STORE\_CTX objects before the SSL index is created.

**RETURN VALUES**

`>=0`

The index value to access the pointer.

`<0` An error occurred, check the error stack for a detailed error message.

**EXAMPLES**

The index returned from `SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()` allows to access the SSL object for the connection to be accessed during the `verify_callback()` when checking the peers certificate. Please check the example in `SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)`,

**SEE ALSO**

`ssl(3)`, `SSL_CTX_set_verify(3)`, `CRYPTO_set_ex_data(3)`

## NAME

SSL\_get\_ex\_new\_index, SSL\_set\_ex\_data, SSL\_get\_ex\_data – internal application specific data functions

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
                        CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
                        CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
                        CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);

int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx, void *arg);

void *SSL_get_ex_data(SSL *ssl, int idx);

typedef int new_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
                    int idx, long argl, void *argp);
typedef void free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
                      int idx, long argl, void *argp);
typedef int dup_func(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d,
                    int idx, long argl, void *argp);
```

## DESCRIPTION

Several OpenSSL structures can have application specific data attached to them. These functions are used internally by OpenSSL to manipulate application specific data attached to a specific structure.

*SSL\_get\_ex\_new\_index()* is used to register a new index for application specific data.

*SSL\_set\_ex\_data()* is used to store application data at **arg** for **idx** into the **ssl** object.

*SSL\_get\_ex\_data()* is used to retrieve the information for **idx** from **ssl**.

A detailed description for the *\*\_get\_ex\_new\_index()* functionality can be found in *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*. The *\*\_get\_ex\_data()* and *\*\_set\_ex\_data()* functionality is described in *CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data(3)*.

## EXAMPLES

An example on how to use the functionality is included in the example *verify\_callback()* in *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify(3)*.

## SEE ALSO

*ssl(3)*, *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*, *CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_fd – get file descriptor linked to an SSL object

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_get_fd(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_get_rfd(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_get_wfd(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_fd()* returns the file descriptor which is linked to **ssl**. *SSL\_get\_rfd()* and *SSL\_get\_wfd()* return the file descriptors for the read or the write channel, which can be different. If the read and the write channel are different, *SSL\_get\_fd()* will return the file descriptor of the read channel.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

- 1 The operation failed, because the underlying BIO is not of the correct type (suitable for file descriptors).

>=0

The file descriptor linked to **ssl**.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_set\_fd(3)*, *ssl(3)*, *bio(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_peer\_cert\_chain – get the X509 certificate chain of the peer

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_peer\_cert\_chain()* returns a pointer to STACK\_OF(X509) certificates forming the certificate chain of the peer. If called on the client side, the stack also contains the peer's certificate; if called on the server side, the peer's certificate must be obtained separately using *SSL\_get\_peer\_certificate(3)*. If the peer did not present a certificate, NULL is returned.

**NOTES**

The peer certificate chain is not necessarily available after reusing a session, in which case a NULL pointer is returned.

The reference count of the STACK\_OF(X509) object is not incremented. If the corresponding session is freed, the pointer must not be used any longer.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

NULL

No certificate was presented by the peer or no connection was established or the certificate chain is no longer available when a session is reused.

Pointer to a STACK\_OF(X509)

The return value points to the certificate chain presented by the peer.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_get\_peer\_certificate(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_peer\_certificate – get the X509 certificate of the peer

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_peer\_certificate()* returns a pointer to the X509 certificate the peer presented. If the peer did not present a certificate, NULL is returned.

**NOTES**

Due to the protocol definition, a TLS/SSL server will always send a certificate, if present. A client will only send a certificate when explicitly requested to do so by the server (see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify*(3)). If an anonymous cipher is used, no certificates are sent.

That a certificate is returned does not indicate information about the verification state, use *SSL\_get\_verify\_result*(3) to check the verification state.

The reference count of the X509 object is incremented by one, so that it will not be destroyed when the session containing the peer certificate is freed. The X509 object must be explicitly freed using *X509\_free*().

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

NULL

No certificate was presented by the peer or no connection was established.

Pointer to an X509 certificate

The return value points to the certificate presented by the peer.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_get\_verify\_result*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_verify*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_rbio – get BIO linked to an SSL object

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

BIO *SSL_get_rbio(SSL *ssl);
BIO *SSL_get_wbio(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_rbio()* and *SSL\_get\_wbio()* return pointers to the BIOs for the read or the write channel, which can be different. The reference count of the BIO is not incremented.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

NULL

No BIO was connected to the SSL object

Any other pointer

The BIO linked to **ssl**.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_set\_bio(3)*, *ssl(3)*, *bio(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_session – retrieve TLS/SSL session data

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *ssl);
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get0_session(SSL *ssl);
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_session()* returns a pointer to the **SSL\_SESSION** actually used in **ssl**. The reference count of the **SSL\_SESSION** is not incremented, so that the pointer can become invalid by other operations.

*SSL\_get0\_session()* is the same as *SSL\_get\_session()*.

*SSL\_get1\_session()* is the same as *SSL\_get\_session()*, but the reference count of the **SSL\_SESSION** is incremented by one.

**NOTES**

The ssl session contains all information required to re-establish the connection without a new handshake.

*SSL\_get0\_session()* returns a pointer to the actual session. As the reference counter is not incremented, the pointer is only valid while the connection is in use. If *SSL\_clear*(3) or *SSL\_free*(3) is called, the session may be removed completely (if considered bad), and the pointer obtained will become invalid. Even if the session is valid, it can be removed at any time due to timeout during *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions*(3).

If the data is to be kept, *SSL\_get1\_session()* will increment the reference count, so that the session will not be implicitly removed by other operations but stays in memory. In order to remove the session *SSL\_SESSION\_free*(3) must be explicitly called once to decrement the reference count again.

SSL\_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache list, when being inserted into one SSL\_CTX object's session cache. One SSL\_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore only be used with one SSL\_CTX object (and the SSL objects created from this SSL\_CTX object).

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

NULL

There is no session available in **ssl**.

Pointer to an SSL

The return value points to the data of an SSL session.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_free*(3), *SSL\_clear*(3), *SSL\_SESSION\_free*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_SSL\_CTX – get the SSL\_CTX from which an SSL is created

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_SSL\_CTX()* returns a pointer to the SSL\_CTX object, from which **ssl** was created with *SSL\_new(3)*.

**RETURN VALUES**

The pointer to the SSL\_CTX object is returned.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_new(3)*



**NAME**

SSL\_get\_verify\_result – get result of peer certificate verification

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_get_verify_result(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_verify\_result()* returns the result of the verification of the X509 certificate presented by the peer, if any.

**NOTES**

*SSL\_get\_verify\_result()* can only return one error code while the verification of a certificate can fail because of many reasons at the same time. Only the last verification error that occurred during the processing is available from *SSL\_get\_verify\_result()*.

The verification result is part of the established session and is restored when a session is reused.

**BUGS**

If no peer certificate was presented, the returned result code is X509\_V\_OK. This is because no verification error occurred, it does however not indicate success. *SSL\_get\_verify\_result()* is only useful in connection with *SSL\_get\_peer\_certificate*(3).

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can currently occur:

X509\_V\_OK

The verification succeeded or no peer certificate was presented.

Any other value

Documented in *verify*(1).

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_set\_verify\_result*(3), *SSL\_get\_peer\_certificate*(3), *verify*(1)

**NAME**

SSL\_get\_version – get the protocol version of a connection.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

const char *SSL_get_version(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_get\_cipher\_version()* returns the name of the protocol used for the connection **ssl**.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following strings can occur:

SSLv2

The connection uses the SSLv2 protocol.

SSLv3

The connection uses the SSLv3 protocol.

TLSv1

The connection uses the TLSv1 protocol.

unknown

This indicates that no version has been set (no connection established).

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3)

**NAME**

*SSL\_library\_init*, *OpenSSL\_add\_ssl\_algorithms*, *SSLey\_add\_ssl\_algorithms* – initialize SSL library by registering algorithms

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_library_init(void);
#define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms()    SSL_library_init()
#define SSLey_add_ssl_algorithms()     SSL_library_init()
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_library\_init()* registers the available ciphers and digests.

*OpenSSL\_add\_ssl\_algorithms()* and *SSLey\_add\_ssl\_algorithms()* are synonyms for *SSL\_library\_init()*.

**NOTES**

*SSL\_library\_init()* must be called before any other action takes place.

**WARNING**

*SSL\_library\_init()* only registers ciphers. Another important initialization is the seeding of the PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generator), which has to be performed separately.

**EXAMPLES**

A typical TLS/SSL application will start with the library initialization, will provide readable error messages and will seed the PRNG.

```
SSL_load_error_strings();           /* readable error messages */
SSL_library_init();                 /* initialize library */
actions_to_seed_PRNG();
```

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_library\_init()* always returns “1”, so it is safe to discard the return value.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_load\_error\_strings(3)*, *RAND\_add(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_load\_client\_CA\_file – load certificate names from file

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_load\_client\_CA\_file()* reads certificates from **file** and returns a `STACK_OF(X509_NAME)` with the subject names found.

**NOTES**

*SSL\_load\_client\_CA\_file()* reads a file of PEM formatted certificates and extracts the `X509_NAMES` of the certificates found. While the name suggests the specific usage as support function for *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list*(3), it is not limited to CA certificates.

**EXAMPLES**

Load names of CAs from file and use it as a client CA list:

```
SSL_CTX *ctx;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cert_names;

...
cert_names = SSL_load_client_CA_file("/path/to/CAfile.pem");
if (cert_names != NULL)
    SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, cert_names);
else
    error_handling();
...
```

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

NULL

The operation failed, check out the error stack for the reason.

Pointer to `STACK_OF(X509_NAME)`

Pointer to the subject names of the successfully read certificates.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_CA\_list*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_new – create a new SSL structure for a connection

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_new()* creates a new **SSL** structure which is needed to hold the data for a TLS/SSL connection. The new structure inherits the settings of the underlying context **ctx**: connection method (SSLv2/v3/TLSv1), options, verification settings, timeout settings.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

NULL

The creation of a new SSL structure failed. Check the error stack to find out the reason.

Pointer to an SSL structure

The return value points to an allocated SSL structure.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_free*(3), *SSL\_clear*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_options*(3), *SSL\_get\_SSL\_CTX*(3), *ssl*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_pending – obtain number of readable bytes buffered in an SSL object

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_pending(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_pending()* returns the number of bytes which are available inside **ssl** for immediate read.

**NOTES**

Data are received in blocks from the peer. Therefore data can be buffered inside **ssl** and are ready for immediate retrieval with *SSL\_read(3)*.

**RETURN VALUES**

The number of bytes pending is returned.

**BUGS**

*SSL\_pending()* takes into account only bytes from the TLS/SSL record that is currently being processed (if any). If the **SSL** object's *read\_ahead* flag is set, additional protocol bytes may have been read containing more TLS/SSL records; these are ignored by *SSL\_pending()*.

Up to OpenSSL 0.9.6, *SSL\_pending()* does not check if the record type of pending data is application data.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_read(3)*, *ssl(3)*

## NAME

`SSL_read` – read bytes from a TLS/SSL connection.

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_read(SSL *ssl, void *buf, int num);
```

## DESCRIPTION

`SSL_read()` tries to read **num** bytes from the specified **ssl** into the buffer **buf**.

## NOTES

If necessary, `SSL_read()` will negotiate a TLS/SSL session, if not already explicitly performed by `SSL_connect(3)` or `SSL_accept(3)`. If the peer requests a re-negotiation, it will be performed transparently during the `SSL_read()` operation. The behaviour of `SSL_read()` depends on the underlying BIO.

For the transparent negotiation to succeed, the **ssl** must have been initialized to client or server mode. This is being done by calling `SSL_set_connect_state(3)` or `SSL_set_accept_state()` before the first call to an `SSL_read()` or `SSL_write(3)` function.

`SSL_read()` works based on the SSL/TLS records. The data are received in records (with a maximum record size of 16kB for SSLv3/TLSv1). Only when a record has been completely received, it can be processed (decryption and check of integrity). Therefore data that was not retrieved at the last call of `SSL_read()` can still be buffered inside the SSL layer and will be retrieved on the next call to `SSL_read()`. If **num** is higher than the number of bytes buffered, `SSL_read()` will return with the bytes buffered. If no more bytes are in the buffer, `SSL_read()` will trigger the processing of the next record. Only when the record has been received and processed completely, `SSL_read()` will return reporting success. At most the contents of the record will be returned. As the size of an SSL/TLS record may exceed the maximum packet size of the underlying transport (e.g. TCP), it may be necessary to read several packets from the transport layer before the record is complete and `SSL_read()` can succeed.

If the underlying BIO is **blocking**, `SSL_read()` will only return, once the read operation has been finished or an error occurred, except when a renegotiation take place, in which case a `SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ` may occur. This behaviour can be controlled with the `SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY` flag of the `SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)` call.

If the underlying BIO is **non-blocking**, `SSL_read()` will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of `SSL_read()` to continue the operation. In this case a call to `SSL_get_error(3)` with the return value of `SSL_read()` will yield `SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ` or `SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE`. As at any time a re-negotiation is possible, a call to `SSL_read()` can also cause write operations! The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of `SSL_read()`. The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but `select()` can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.

## WARNING

When an `SSL_read()` operation has to be repeated because of `SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ` or `SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE`, it must be repeated with the same arguments.

## RETURN VALUES

The following return values can occur:

- >0 The read operation was successful; the return value is the number of bytes actually read from the TLS/SSL connection.
- The read operation was not successful. The reason may either be a clean shutdown due to a “close notify” alert sent by the peer (in which case the `SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN` flag in the `ssl` shutdown state is set (see `SSL_shutdown(3)`, `SSL_set_shutdown(3)`). It is also possible, that the peer simply shut down the underlying transport and the shutdown is incomplete. Call `SSL_get_error()` with the return value **ret** to find out, whether an error occurred or the connection was shut down cleanly (`SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN`).

SSLv2 (deprecated) does not support a shutdown alert protocol, so it can only be detected, whether the underlying connection was closed. It cannot be checked, whether the closure was initiated by the peer or by something else.

<0 The read operation was not successful, because either an error occurred or action must be taken by the calling process. Call *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value **ret** to find out the reason.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_get\_error(3)*, *SSL\_write(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_mode(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_new(3)*, *SSL\_connect(3)*,  
*SSL\_accept(3)* *SSL\_set\_connect\_state(3)*, *SSL\_shutdown(3)*, *SSL\_set\_shutdown(3)*, *ssl(3)*, *bio(3)*



**NAME**

*SSL\_rstate\_string*, *SSL\_rstate\_string\_long* – get textual description of state of an SSL object during read operation

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

const char *SSL_rstate_string(SSL *ssl);
const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_rstate\_string()* returns a 2 letter string indicating the current read state of the SSL object *ssl*.

*SSL\_rstate\_string\_long()* returns a string indicating the current read state of the SSL object *ssl*.

**NOTES**

When performing a read operation, the SSL/TLS engine must parse the record, consisting of header and body. When working in a blocking environment, *SSL\_rstate\_string[\_long]()* should always return “RD”/“read done”.

This function should only seldom be needed in applications.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_rstate\_string()* and *SSL\_rstate\_string\_long()* can return the following values:

“RH”/“read header”

The header of the record is being evaluated.

“RB”/“read body”

The body of the record is being evaluated.

“RD”/“read done”

The record has been completely processed.

“unknown”/“unknown”

The read state is unknown. This should never happen.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_SESSION\_free – free an allocated SSL\_SESSION structure

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_SESSION\_free()* decrements the reference count of **session** and removes the **SSL\_SESSION** structure pointed to by **session** and frees up the allocated memory, if the the reference count has reached 0.

**NOTES**

SSL\_SESSION objects are allocated, when a TLS/SSL handshake operation is successfully completed. Depending on the settings, see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode*(3), the SSL\_SESSION objects are internally referenced by the SSL\_CTX and linked into its session cache. SSL objects may be using the SSL\_SESSION object; as a session may be reused, several SSL objects may be using one SSL\_SESSION object at the same time. It is therefore crucial to keep the reference count (usage information) correct and not delete a SSL\_SESSION object that is still used, as this may lead to program failures due to dangling pointers. These failures may also appear delayed, e.g. when an SSL\_SESSION object was completely freed as the reference count incorrectly became 0, but it is still referenced in the internal session cache and the cache list is processed during a *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions*(3) operation.

*SSL\_SESSION\_free()* must only be called for SSL\_SESSION objects, for which the reference count was explicitly incremented (e.g. by calling *SSL\_get1\_session()*, see *SSL\_get\_session*(3)) or when the SSL\_SESSION object was generated outside a TLS handshake operation, e.g. by using *d2i\_SSL\_SESSION*(3). It must not be called on other SSL\_SESSION objects, as this would cause incorrect reference counts and therefore program failures.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_SESSION\_free()* does not provide diagnostic information.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_get\_session*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_flush\_sessions*(3), *d2i\_SSL\_SESSION*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_SESSION\_get\_ex\_new\_index, SSL\_SESSION\_set\_ex\_data, SSL\_SESSION\_get\_ex\_data – internal application specific data functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
                                CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
                                CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
                                CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);

int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *session, int idx, void *arg);
void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *session, int idx);

typedef int new_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
                    int idx, long argl, void *argp);
typedef void free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
                      int idx, long argl, void *argp);
typedef int dup_func(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from, void *from_d,
                    int idx, long argl, void *argp);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

Several OpenSSL structures can have application specific data attached to them. These functions are used internally by OpenSSL to manipulate application specific data attached to a specific structure.

*SSL\_SESSION\_get\_ex\_new\_index()* is used to register a new index for application specific data.

*SSL\_SESSION\_set\_ex\_data()* is used to store application data at **arg** for **idx** into the **session** object.

*SSL\_SESSION\_get\_ex\_data()* is used to retrieve the information for **idx** from **session**.

A detailed description for the *\*\_get\_ex\_new\_index()* functionality can be found in *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*. The *\*\_get\_ex\_data()* and *\*\_set\_ex\_data()* functionality is described in *CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data(3)*.

**WARNINGS**

The application data is only maintained for sessions held in memory. The application data is not included when dumping the session with *i2d\_SSL\_SESSION()* (and all functions indirectly calling the dump functions like *PEM\_write\_SSL\_SESSION()* and *PEM\_write\_bio\_SSL\_SESSION()*) and can therefore not be restored.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *RSA\_get\_ex\_new\_index(3)*, *CRYPTO\_set\_ex\_data(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_SESSION\_get\_time, SSL\_SESSION\_set\_time, SSL\_SESSION\_get\_timeout, SSL\_SESSION\_set\_timeout – retrieve and manipulate session time and timeout settings

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

long SSL_SESSION_get_time(SSL_SESSION *s);
long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm);
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s);
long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm);

long SSL_get_time(SSL_SESSION *s);
long SSL_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm);
long SSL_get_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s);
long SSL_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long tm);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_SESSION\_get\_time()* returns the time at which the session *s* was established. The time is given in seconds since the Epoch and therefore compatible to the time delivered by the *time()* call.

*SSL\_SESSION\_set\_time()* replaces the creation time of the session *s* with the chosen value *tm*.

*SSL\_SESSION\_get\_timeout()* returns the timeout value set for session *s* in seconds.

*SSL\_SESSION\_set\_timeout()* sets the timeout value for session *s* in seconds to *tm*.

The *SSL\_get\_time()*, *SSL\_set\_time()*, *SSL\_get\_timeout()*, and *SSL\_set\_timeout()* functions are synonyms for the *SSL\_SESSION\_\**() counterparts.

**NOTES**

Sessions are expired by examining the creation time and the timeout value. Both are set at creation time of the session to the actual time and the default timeout value at creation, respectively, as set by *SSL\_CTX\_set\_timeout*(3). Using these functions it is possible to extend or shorten the lifetime of the session.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_SESSION\_get\_time()* and *SSL\_SESSION\_get\_timeout()* return the currently valid values.

*SSL\_SESSION\_set\_time()* and *SSL\_SESSION\_set\_timeout()* return 1 on success.

If any of the function is passed the NULL pointer for the session *s*, 0 is returned.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_timeout*(3), *SSL\_get\_default\_timeout*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_session\_reused – query whether a reused session was negotiated during handshake

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_session_reused(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

Query, whether a reused session was negotiated during the handshake.

**NOTES**

During the negotiation, a client can propose to reuse a session. The server then looks up the session in its cache. If both client and server agree on the session, it will be reused and a flag is being set that can be queried by the application.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

- A new session was negotiated.
- 1 A session was reused.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_set\_session(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_set\_bio – connect the SSL object with a BIO

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_set_bio(SSL *ssl, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_set\_bio()* connects the BIOs **rbio** and **wbio** for the read and write operations of the TLS/SSL (encrypted) side of **ssl**.

The SSL engine inherits the behaviour of **rbio** and **wbio**, respectively. If a BIO is non-blocking, the **ssl** will also have non-blocking behaviour.

If there was already a BIO connected to **ssl**, *BIO\_free()* will be called (for both the reading and writing side, if different).

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_set\_bio()* cannot fail.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_get\_rbio(3)*, *SSL\_connect(3)*, *SSL\_accept(3)*, *SSL\_shutdown(3)*, *ssl(3)*, *bio(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_set\_connect\_state, SSL\_get\_accept\_state – prepare SSL object to work in client or server mode

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *ssl);

void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_set\_connect\_state()* sets **ssl** to work in client mode.

*SSL\_set\_accept\_state()* sets **ssl** to work in server mode.

**NOTES**

When the SSL\_CTX object was created with *SSL\_CTX\_new*(3), it was either assigned a dedicated client method, a dedicated server method, or a generic method, that can be used for both client and server connections. (The method might have been changed with *SSL\_CTX\_set\_ssl\_version*(3) or *SSL\_set\_ssl\_method*().)

When beginning a new handshake, the SSL engine must know whether it must call the connect (client) or accept (server) routines. Even though it may be clear from the method chosen, whether client or server mode was requested, the handshake routines must be explicitly set.

When using the *SSL\_connect*(3) or *SSL\_accept*(3) routines, the correct handshake routines are automatically set. When performing a transparent negotiation using *SSL\_write*(3) or *SSL\_read*(3), the handshake routines must be explicitly set in advance using either *SSL\_set\_connect\_state*() or *SSL\_set\_accept\_state*().

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_set\_connect\_state()* and *SSL\_set\_accept\_state()* do not return diagnostic information.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_new*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_new*(3), *SSL\_connect*(3), *SSL\_accept*(3), *SSL\_write*(3), *SSL\_read*(3), *SSL\_do\_handshake*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_ssl\_version*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_set\_fd – connect the SSL object with a file descriptor

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd);
int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd);
int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_set\_fd()* sets the file descriptor **fd** as the input/output facility for the TLS/SSL (encrypted) side of **ssl**. **fd** will typically be the socket file descriptor of a network connection.

When performing the operation, a **socket BIO** is automatically created to interface between the **ssl** and **fd**. The BIO and hence the SSL engine inherit the behaviour of **fd**. If **fd** is non-blocking, the **ssl** will also have non-blocking behaviour.

If there was already a BIO connected to **ssl**, *BIO\_free()* will be called (for both the reading and writing side, if different).

*SSL\_set\_rfd()* and *SSL\_set\_wfd()* perform the respective action, but only for the read channel or the write channel, which can be set independently.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

- The operation failed. Check the error stack to find out why.
- 1 The operation succeeded.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_get\_fd(3)*, *SSL\_set\_bio(3)*, *SSL\_connect(3)*, *SSL\_accept(3)*, *SSL\_shutdown(3)*, *ssl(3)*, *bio(3)*



**NAME**

SSL\_set\_session – set a TLS/SSL session to be used during TLS/SSL connect

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_set\_session()* sets **session** to be used when the TLS/SSL connection is to be established. *SSL\_set\_session()* is only useful for TLS/SSL clients. When the session is set, the reference count of **session** is incremented by 1. If the session is not reused, the reference count is decremented again during *SSL\_connect()*. Whether the session was reused can be queried with the *SSL\_session\_reused(3)* call.

If there is already a session set inside **ssl** (because it was set with *SSL\_set\_session()* before or because the same **ssl** was already used for a connection), *SSL\_SESSION\_free()* will be called for that session.

**NOTES**

SSL\_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache list, when being inserted into one SSL\_CTX object's session cache. One SSL\_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore only be used with one SSL\_CTX object (and the SSL objects created from this SSL\_CTX object).

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

- The operation failed; check the error stack to find out the reason.
- 1 The operation succeeded.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_SESSION\_free(3)*, *SSL\_get\_session(3)*, *SSL\_session\_reused(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_session\_cache\_mode(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_set\_shutdown, SSL\_get\_shutdown – manipulate shutdown state of an SSL connection

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl, int mode);

int SSL_get_shutdown(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_set\_shutdown()* sets the shutdown state of **ssl** to **mode**.

*SSL\_get\_shutdown()* returns the shutdown mode of **ssl**.

**NOTES**

The shutdown state of an ssl connection is a bitmask of:

- No shutdown setting, yet.

**SSL\_SENT\_SHUTDOWN**

A “close notify” shutdown alert was sent to the peer, the connection is being considered closed and the session is closed and correct.

**SSL\_RECEIVED\_SHUTDOWN**

A shutdown alert was received from the peer, either a normal “close notify” or a fatal error.

SSL\_SENT\_SHUTDOWN and SSL\_RECEIVED\_SHUTDOWN can be set at the same time.

The shutdown state of the connection is used to determine the state of the ssl session. If the session is still open, when *SSL\_clear*(3) or *SSL\_free*(3) is called, it is considered bad and removed according to RFC2246. The actual condition for a correctly closed session is SSL\_SENT\_SHUTDOWN (according to the TLS RFC, it is acceptable to only send the “close notify” alert but to not wait for the peer’s answer, when the underlying connection is closed). *SSL\_set\_shutdown()* can be used to set this state without sending a close alert to the peer (see *SSL\_shutdown*(3)).

If a “close notify” was received, SSL\_RECEIVED\_SHUTDOWN will be set, for setting SSL\_SENT\_SHUTDOWN the application must however still call *SSL\_shutdown*(3) or *SSL\_set\_shutdown()* itself.

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_set\_shutdown()* does not return diagnostic information.

*SSL\_get\_shutdown()* returns the current setting.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_shutdown*(3), *SSL\_CTX\_set\_quiet\_shutdown*(3), *SSL\_clear*(3), *SSL\_free*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_set\_verify\_result – override result of peer certificate verification

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long verify_result);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_set\_verify\_result()* sets **verify\_result** of the object **ssl** to be the result of the verification of the X509 certificate presented by the peer, if any.

**NOTES**

*SSL\_set\_verify\_result()* overrides the verification result. It only changes the verification result of the **ssl** object. It does not become part of the established session, so if the session is to be reused later, the original value will reappear.

The valid codes for **verify\_result** are documented in *verify*(1).

**RETURN VALUES**

*SSL\_set\_verify\_result()* does not provide a return value.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *SSL\_get\_verify\_result*(3), *SSL\_get\_peer\_certificate*(3), *verify*(1)

## NAME

SSL\_shutdown – shut down a TLS/SSL connection

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_shutdown(SSL *ssl);
```

## DESCRIPTION

*SSL\_shutdown()* shuts down an active TLS/SSL connection. It sends the “close notify” shutdown alert to the peer.

## NOTES

*SSL\_shutdown()* tries to send the “close notify” shutdown alert to the peer. Whether the operation succeeds or not, the `SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN` flag is set and a currently open session is considered closed and good and will be kept in the session cache for further reuse.

The shutdown procedure consists of 2 steps: the sending of the “close notify” shutdown alert and the reception of the peer’s “close notify” shutdown alert. According to the TLS standard, it is acceptable for an application to only send its shutdown alert and then close the underlying connection without waiting for the peer’s response (this way resources can be saved, as the process can already terminate or serve another connection). When the underlying connection shall be used for more communications, the complete shutdown procedure (bidirectional “close notify” alerts) must be performed, so that the peers stay synchronized.

*SSL\_shutdown()* supports both uni- and bidirectional shutdown by its 2 step behaviour.

When the application is the first party to send the “close notify” alert, *SSL\_shutdown()* will only send the alert and then set the `SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN` flag (so that the session is considered good and will be kept in cache). *SSL\_shutdown()* will then return with 0. If a unidirectional shutdown is enough (the underlying connection shall be closed anyway), this first call to *SSL\_shutdown()* is sufficient. In order to complete the bidirectional shutdown handshake, *SSL\_shutdown()* must be called again. The second call will make *SSL\_shutdown()* wait for the peer’s “close notify” shutdown alert. On success, the second call to *SSL\_shutdown()* will return with 1.

If the peer already sent the “close notify” alert **and** it was already processed implicitly inside another function (*SSL\_read*(3)), the `SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN` flag is set. *SSL\_shutdown()* will send the “close notify” alert, set the `SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN` flag and will immediately return with 1. Whether `SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN` is already set can be checked using the *SSL\_get\_shutdown()* (see also *SSL\_set\_shutdown*(3) call.

It is therefore recommended, to check the return value of *SSL\_shutdown()* and call *SSL\_shutdown()* again, if the bidirectional shutdown is not yet complete (return value of the first call is 0). As the shutdown is not specially handled in the SSLv2 protocol, *SSL\_shutdown()* will succeed on the first call.

The behaviour of *SSL\_shutdown()* additionally depends on the underlying BIO.

If the underlying BIO is **blocking**, *SSL\_shutdown()* will only return once the handshake step has been finished or an error occurred.

If the underlying BIO is **non-blocking**, *SSL\_shutdown()* will also return when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of *SSL\_shutdown()* to continue the handshake. In this case a call to *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value of *SSL\_shutdown()* will yield `SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ` or `SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE`. The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of *SSL\_shutdown()*. The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but *select()* can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.

*SSL\_shutdown()* can be modified to only set the connection to “shutdown” state but not actually send the “close notify” alert messages, see *SSL\_CTX\_set\_quiet\_shutdown*(3). When “quiet shutdown” is enabled, *SSL\_shutdown()* will always succeed and return 1.

## RETURN VALUES

The following return values can occur:

- 1 The shutdown was successfully completed. The “close notify” alert was sent and the peer’s “close notify” alert was received.
- The shutdown is not yet finished. Call *SSL\_shutdown()* for a second time, if a bidirectional shutdown shall be performed. The output of *SSL\_get\_error(3)* may be misleading, as an erroneous *SSL\_ERROR\_SYSCALL* may be flagged even though no error occurred.
- 1 The shutdown was not successful because a fatal error occurred either at the protocol level or a connection failure occurred. It can also occur if action is need to continue the operation for non-blocking BIOs. Call *SSL\_get\_error(3)* with the return value **ret** to find out the reason.

**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_get\_error(3)*, *SSL\_connect(3)*, *SSL\_accept(3)*, *SSL\_set\_shutdown(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_quiet\_shutdown(3)*, *SSL\_clear(3)*, *SSL\_free(3)*, *ssl(3)*, *bio(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_state\_string, SSL\_state\_string\_long – get textual description of state of an SSL object

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

const char *SSL_state_string(SSL *ssl);
const char *SSL_state_string_long(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_state\_string()* returns a 6 letter string indicating the current state of the SSL object **ssl**.

*SSL\_state\_string\_long()* returns a string indicating the current state of the SSL object **ssl**.

**NOTES**

During its use, an SSL objects passes several states. The state is internally maintained. Querying the state information is not very informative before or when a connection has been established. It however can be of significant interest during the handshake.

When using non-blocking sockets, the function call performing the handshake may return with `SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ` or `SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE` condition, so that `SSL_state_string[_long]()` may be called.

For both blocking or non-blocking sockets, the details state information can be used within the `info_callback` function set with the *SSL\_set\_info\_callback()* call.

**RETURN VALUES**

Detailed description of possible states to be included later.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_info\_callback(3)*

**NAME**

SSL\_want, SSL\_want\_nothing, SSL\_want\_read, SSL\_want\_write, SSL\_want\_x509\_lookup – obtain state information TLS/SSL I/O operation

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_want(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_want_nothing(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_want_read(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_want_write(SSL *ssl);
int SSL_want_x509_lookup(SSL *ssl);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_want()* returns state information for the SSL object *ssl*.

The other *SSL\_want\_\**() calls are shortcuts for the possible states returned by *SSL\_want()*.

**NOTES**

*SSL\_want()* examines the internal state information of the SSL object. Its return values are similar to that of *SSL\_get\_error*(3). Unlike *SSL\_get\_error*(3), which also evaluates the error queue, the results are obtained by examining an internal state flag only. The information must therefore only be used for normal operation under non-blocking I/O. Error conditions are not handled and must be treated using *SSL\_get\_error*(3).

The result returned by *SSL\_want()* should always be consistent with the result of *SSL\_get\_error*(3).

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can currently occur for *SSL\_want()*:

**SSL\_NOTHING**

There is no data to be written or to be read.

**SSL\_WRITING**

There are data in the SSL buffer that must be written to the underlying **BIO** layer in order to complete the actual *SSL\_\**() operation. A call to *SSL\_get\_error*(3) should return *SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_WRITE*.

**SSL\_READING**

More data must be read from the underlying **BIO** layer in order to complete the actual *SSL\_\**() operation. A call to *SSL\_get\_error*(3) should return *SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ*.

**SSL\_X509\_LOOKUP**

The operation did not complete because an application callback set by *SSL\_CTX\_set\_client\_cert\_cb()* has asked to be called again. A call to *SSL\_get\_error*(3) should return *SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_X509\_LOOKUP*.

*SSL\_want\_nothing()*, *SSL\_want\_read()*, *SSL\_want\_write()*, *SSL\_want\_x509\_lookup()* return 1, when the corresponding condition is true or 0 otherwise.

**SEE ALSO**

*ssl*(3), *err*(3), *SSL\_get\_error*(3)

**NAME**

SSL\_write – write bytes to a TLS/SSL connection.

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

int SSL_write(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int num);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*SSL\_write()* writes **num** bytes from the buffer **buf** into the specified **ssl** connection.

**NOTES**

If necessary, *SSL\_write()* will negotiate a TLS/SSL session, if not already explicitly performed by *SSL\_connect(3)* or *SSL\_accept(3)*. If the peer requests a re-negotiation, it will be performed transparently during the *SSL\_write()* operation. The behaviour of *SSL\_write()* depends on the underlying BIO.

For the transparent negotiation to succeed, the **ssl** must have been initialized to client or server mode. This is being done by calling *SSL\_set\_connect\_state(3)* or *SSL\_set\_accept\_state()* before the first call to an *SSL\_read(3)* or *SSL\_write()* function.

If the underlying BIO is **blocking**, *SSL\_write()* will only return, once the write operation has been finished or an error occurred, except when a renegotiation take place, in which case a **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ** may occur. This behaviour can be controlled with the **SSL\_MODE\_AUTO\_RETRY** flag of the *SSL\_CTX\_set\_mode(3)* call.

If the underlying BIO is **non-blocking**, *SSL\_write()* will also return, when the underlying BIO could not satisfy the needs of *SSL\_write()* to continue the operation. In this case a call to *SSL\_get\_error(3)* with the return value of *SSL\_write()* will yield **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ** or **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_WRITE**. As at any time a re-negotiation is possible, a call to *SSL\_write()* can also cause read operations! The calling process then must repeat the call after taking appropriate action to satisfy the needs of *SSL\_write()*. The action depends on the underlying BIO. When using a non-blocking socket, nothing is to be done, but *select()* can be used to check for the required condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.

*SSL\_write()* will only return with success, when the complete contents of **buf** of length **num** has been written. This default behaviour can be changed with the **SSL\_MODE\_ENABLE\_PARTIAL\_WRITE** option of *SSL\_CTX\_set\_mode(3)*. When this flag is set, *SSL\_write()* will also return with success, when a partial write has been successfully completed. In this case the *SSL\_write()* operation is considered completed. The bytes are sent and a new *SSL\_write()* operation with a new buffer (with the already sent bytes removed) must be started. A partial write is performed with the size of a message block, which is 16kB for SSLv3/TLSv1.

**WARNING**

When an *SSL\_write()* operation has to be repeated because of **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_READ** or **SSL\_ERROR\_WANT\_WRITE**, it must be repeated with the same arguments.

When calling *SSL\_write()* with num=0 bytes to be sent the behaviour is undefined.

**RETURN VALUES**

The following return values can occur:

- >0 The write operation was successful, the return value is the number of bytes actually written to the TLS/SSL connection.
- The write operation was not successful. Probably the underlying connection was closed. Call *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value **ret** to find out, whether an error occurred or the connection was shut down cleanly (**SSL\_ERROR\_ZERO\_RETURN**).
 

SSLv2 (deprecated) does not support a shutdown alert protocol, so it can only be detected, whether the underlying connection was closed. It cannot be checked, why the closure happened.
- <0 The write operation was not successful, because either an error occurred or action must be taken by the calling process. Call *SSL\_get\_error()* with the return value **ret** to find out the reason.



**SEE ALSO**

*SSL\_get\_error(3)*, *SSL\_read(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_set\_mode(3)*, *SSL\_CTX\_new(3)*, *SSL\_connect(3)*,  
*SSL\_accept(3)* *SSL\_set\_connect\_state(3)*, *ssl(3)*, *bio(3)*

**NAME**

CRYPTO\_set\_locking\_callback, CRYPTO\_set\_id\_callback, CRYPTO\_num\_locks, CRYPTO\_set\_dynlock\_create\_callback, CRYPTO\_set\_dynlock\_lock\_callback, CRYPTO\_set\_dynlock\_destroy\_callback, CRYPTO\_get\_new\_dynlockid, CRYPTO\_destroy\_dynlockid, CRYPTO\_lock – OpenSSL thread support

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/crypto.h>

void CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(void (*locking_function)(int mode,
    int n, const char *file, int line));

void CRYPTO_set_id_callback(unsigned long (*id_function)(void));

int CRYPTO_num_locks(void);

/* struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value needs to be defined by the user */
struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value;

void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *
    (*dyn_create_function)(char *file, int line));
void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(void (*dyn_lock_function)
    (int mode, struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l,
    const char *file, int line));
void CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(void (*dyn_destroy_function)
    (struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *l, const char *file, int line));

int CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid(void);

void CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid(int i);

void CRYPTO_lock(int mode, int n, const char *file, int line);

#define CRYPTO_w_lock(type) \
    CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK|CRYPTO_WRITE,type, __FILE__, __LINE__)
#define CRYPTO_w_unlock(type) \
    CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_UNLOCK|CRYPTO_WRITE,type, __FILE__, __LINE__)
#define CRYPTO_r_lock(type) \
    CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK|CRYPTO_READ,type, __FILE__, __LINE__)
#define CRYPTO_r_unlock(type) \
    CRYPTO_lock(CRYPTO_UNLOCK|CRYPTO_READ,type, __FILE__, __LINE__)
#define CRYPTO_add(addr,amount,type) \
    CRYPTO_add_lock(addr,amount,type, __FILE__, __LINE__)
```

**DESCRIPTION**

OpenSSL can safely be used in multi-threaded applications provided that at least two callback functions are set.

*locking\_function*(int mode, int n, const char \*file, int line) is needed to perform locking on shared data structures. (Note that OpenSSL uses a number of global data structures that will be implicitly shared whenever multiple threads use OpenSSL.) Multi-threaded applications will crash at random if it is not set.

*locking\_function*() must be able to handle up to *CRYPTO\_num\_locks*() different mutex locks. It sets the *n*-th lock if **mode & CRYPTO\_LOCK**, and releases it otherwise.

**file** and **line** are the file number of the function setting the lock. They can be useful for debugging.

*id\_function*(void) is a function that returns a thread ID. It is not needed on Windows nor on platforms where *getpid*() returns a different ID for each thread (most notably Linux).

Additionally, OpenSSL supports dynamic locks, and sometimes, some parts of OpenSSL need it for better performance. To enable this, the following is required:

- Three additional callback function, *dyn\_create\_function*, *dyn\_lock\_function* and *dyn\_destroy\_function*.

- A structure defined with the data that each lock needs to handle.

struct `CRYPTO_dynlock_value` has to be defined to contain whatever structure is needed to handle locks.

`dyn_create_function(const char *file, int line)` is needed to create a lock. Multi-threaded applications might crash at random if it is not set.

`dyn_lock_function(int mode, CRYPTO_dynlock *l, const char *file, int line)` is needed to perform locking off dynamic lock numbered `n`. Multi-threaded applications might crash at random if it is not set.

`dyn_destroy_function(CRYPTO_dynlock *l, const char *file, int line)` is needed to destroy the lock `l`. Multi-threaded applications might crash at random if it is not set.

`CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid()` is used to create locks. It will call `dyn_create_function` for the actual creation.

`CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid()` is used to destroy locks. It will call `dyn_destroy_function` for the actual destruction.

`CRYPTO_lock()` is used to lock and unlock the locks. `mode` is a bitfield describing what should be done with the lock. `n` is the number of the lock as returned from `CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid()`. `mode` can be combined from the following values. These values are pairwise exclusive, with undefined behaviour if misused (for example, `CRYPTO_READ` and `CRYPTO_WRITE` should not be used together):

<code>CRYPTO_LOCK</code>	<code>0x01</code>
<code>CRYPTO_UNLOCK</code>	<code>0x02</code>
<code>CRYPTO_READ</code>	<code>0x04</code>
<code>CRYPTO_WRITE</code>	<code>0x08</code>

## RETURN VALUES

`CRYPTO_num_locks()` returns the required number of locks.

`CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid()` returns the index to the newly created lock.

The other functions return no values.

## NOTE

You can find out if OpenSSL was configured with thread support:

```
#define OPENSLL_THREAD_DEFINES
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#if defined(THREADS)
    // thread support enabled
#else
    // no thread support
#endif
```

Also, dynamic locks are currently not used internally by OpenSSL, but may do so in the future.

## EXAMPLES

`crypto/threads/mttest.c` shows examples of the callback functions on Solaris, Irix and Win32.

## HISTORY

`CRYPTO_set_locking_callback()` and `CRYPTO_set_id_callback()` are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL. `CRYPTO_num_locks()` was added in OpenSSL 0.9.4. All functions dealing with dynamic locks were added in OpenSSL 0.9.5b-dev.

## SEE ALSO

`crypto(3)`

**NAME**

UI\_new, UI\_new\_method, UI\_free, UI\_add\_input\_string, UI\_dup\_input\_string, UI\_add\_verify\_string, UI\_dup\_verify\_string, UI\_add\_input\_boolean, UI\_dup\_input\_boolean, UI\_add\_info\_string, UI\_dup\_info\_string, UI\_add\_error\_string, UI\_dup\_error\_string, UI\_construct\_prompt, UI\_add\_user\_data, UI\_get0\_user\_data, UI\_get0\_result, UI\_process, UI\_ctrl, UI\_set\_default\_method, UI\_get\_default\_method, UI\_get\_method, UI\_set\_method, UI\_OpenSSL, ERR\_load\_UI\_strings – New User Interface

**SYNOPSIS**

```
#include <openssl/ui.h>

typedef struct ui_st UI;
typedef struct ui_method_st UI_METHOD;

UI *UI_new(void);
UI *UI_new_method(const UI_METHOD *method);
void UI_free(UI *ui);

int UI_add_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
    char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize);
int UI_dup_input_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
    char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize);
int UI_add_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
    char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf);
int UI_dup_verify_string(UI *ui, const char *prompt, int flags,
    char *result_buf, int minsize, int maxsize, const char *test_buf);
int UI_add_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc,
    const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars,
    int flags, char *result_buf);
int UI_dup_input_boolean(UI *ui, const char *prompt, const char *action_desc,
    const char *ok_chars, const char *cancel_chars,
    int flags, char *result_buf);
int UI_add_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text);
int UI_dup_info_string(UI *ui, const char *text);
int UI_add_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text);
int UI_dup_error_string(UI *ui, const char *text);

/* These are the possible flags. They can be or'ed together. */
#define UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO          0x01
#define UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD  0x02

char *UI_construct_prompt(UI *ui_method,
    const char *object_desc, const char *object_name);

void *UI_add_user_data(UI *ui, void *user_data);
void *UI_get0_user_data(UI *ui);

const char *UI_get0_result(UI *ui, int i);

int UI_process(UI *ui);

int UI_ctrl(UI *ui, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
#define UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS        1
#define UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE        2

void UI_set_default_method(const UI_METHOD *meth);
const UI_METHOD *UI_get_default_method(void);
const UI_METHOD *UI_get_method(UI *ui);
const UI_METHOD *UI_set_method(UI *ui, const UI_METHOD *meth);

UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

UI stands for User Interface, and is general purpose set of routines to prompt the user for text-based information. Through user-written methods (see *ui\_create(3)*), prompting can be done in any way

imaginable, be it plain text prompting, through dialog boxes or from a cell phone.

All the functions work through a context of the type `UI`. This context contains all the information needed to prompt correctly as well as a reference to a `UI_METHOD`, which is an ordered vector of functions that carry out the actual prompting.

The first thing to do is to create a UI with `UI_new()` or `UI_new_method()`, then add information to it with the `UI_add` or `UI_dup` functions. Also, user-defined random data can be passed down to the underlying method through calls to `UI_add_user_data`. The default UI method doesn't care about these data, but other methods might. Finally, use `UI_process()` to actually perform the prompting and `UI_get0_result()` to find the result to the prompt.

A UI can contain more than one prompt, which are performed in the given sequence. Each prompt gets an index number which is returned by the `UI_add` and `UI_dup` functions, and has to be used to get the corresponding result with `UI_get0_result()`.

The functions are as follows:

`UI_new()` creates a new UI using the default UI method. When done with this UI, it should be freed using `UI_free()`.

`UI_new_method()` creates a new UI using the given UI method. When done with this UI, it should be freed using `UI_free()`.

`UI_OpenSSL()` returns the built-in UI method (note: not the default one, since the default can be changed. See further on). This method is the most machine/OS dependent part of OpenSSL and normally generates the most problems when porting.

`UI_free()` removes a UI from memory, along with all other pieces of memory that's connected to it, like duplicated input strings, results and others.

`UI_add_input_string()` and `UI_add_verify_string()` add a prompt to the UI, as well as flags and a result buffer and the desired minimum and maximum sizes of the result. The given information is used to prompt for information, for example a password, and to verify a password (i.e. having the user enter it twice and check that the same string was entered twice). `UI_add_verify_string()` takes an extra argument that should be a pointer to the result buffer of the input string that it's supposed to verify, or verification will fail.

`UI_add_input_boolean()` adds a prompt to the UI that's supposed to be answered in a boolean way, with a single character for yes and a different character for no. A set of characters that can be used to cancel the prompt is given as well. The prompt itself is really divided in two, one part being the descriptive text (given through the *prompt* argument) and one describing the possible answers (given through the *action\_desc* argument).

`UI_add_info_string()` and `UI_add_error_string()` add strings that are shown at the same time as the prompt for extra information or to show an error string. The difference between the two is only conceptual. With the builtin method, there's no technical difference between them. Other methods may make a difference between them, however.

The flags currently supported are `UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO`, which is relevant for `UI_add_input_string()` and will have the users response be echoed (when prompting for a password, this flag should obviously not be used, and `UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD`, which means that a default password of some sort will be used (completely depending on the application and the UI method).

`UI_dup_input_string()`, `UI_dup_verify_string()`, `UI_dup_input_boolean()`, `UI_dup_info_string()` and `UI_dup_error_string()` are basically the same as their `UI_add` counterparts, except that they make their own copies of all strings.

`UI_construct_prompt()` is a helper function that can be used to create a prompt from two pieces of information: an description and a name. The default constructor (if there is none provided by the method used) creates a string "Enter *description* for *name*:". With the description "pass phrase" and the file name "foo.key", that becomes "Enter pass phrase for foo.key:". Other methods may create whatever string and may include encodings that will be processed by the other method functions.

`UI_add_user_data()` adds a piece of memory for the method to use at any time. The builtin UI method doesn't care about this info. Note that several calls to this function doesn't add data, it replaces the previous blob with the one given as argument.

*UI\_get0\_user\_data()* retrieves the data that has last been given to the UI with *UI\_add\_user\_data()*.

*UI\_get0\_result()* returns a pointer to the result buffer associated with the information indexed by *i*.

*UI\_process()* goes through the information given so far, does all the printing and prompting and returns.

*UI\_ctrl()* adds extra control for the application author. For now, it understands two commands: *UI\_CTRL\_PRINT\_ERRORS*, which makes *UI\_process()* print the OpenSSL error stack as part of processing the UI, and *UI\_CTRL\_IS\_REDOABLE*, which returns a flag saying if the used UI can be used again or not.

*UI\_set\_default\_method()* changes the default UI method to the one given.

*UI\_get\_default\_method()* returns a pointer to the current default UI method.

*UI\_get\_method()* returns the UI method associated with a given UI.

*UI\_set\_method()* changes the UI method associated with a given UI.

## SEE ALSO

*ui\_create(3)*, *ui\_compat(3)*

## HISTORY

The UI section was first introduced in OpenSSL 0.9.7.

## AUTHOR

Richard Levitte (richard@levitte.org) for the OpenSSL project (<http://www.openssl.org>).

**NAME**

`des_read_password`, `des_read_2passwords`, `des_read_pw_string`, `des_read_pw` – Compatibility user interface functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
int des_read_password(DES_cblock *key, const char *prompt, int verify);
int des_read_2passwords(DES_cblock *key1, DES_cblock *key2,
    const char *prompt, int verify);

int des_read_pw_string(char *buf, int length, const char *prompt, int verify);
int des_read_pw(char *buf, char *buff, int size, const char *prompt, int verify);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The DES library contained a few routines to prompt for passwords. These aren't necessarily dependent on DES, and have therefore become part of the UI compatibility library.

`des_read_pw()` writes the string specified by *prompt* to standard output, turns echo off and reads an input string from the terminal. The string is returned in *buf*, which must have space for at least *size* bytes. If *verify* is set, the user is asked for the password twice and unless the two copies match, an error is returned. The second password is stored in *buff*, which must therefore also be at least *size* bytes. A return code of -1 indicates a system error, 1 failure due to user interaction, and 0 is success. All other functions described here use `des_read_pw()` to do the work.

`des_read_pw_string()` is a variant of `des_read_pw()` that provides a buffer for you if *verify* is set.

`des_read_password()` calls `des_read_pw()` and converts the password to a DES key by calling `DES_string_to_key()`; `des_read_2password()` operates in the same way as `des_read_password()` except that it generates two keys by using the `DES_string_to_2key()` function.

**NOTES**

`des_read_pw_string()` is available in the MIT Kerberos library as well, and is also available under the name `EVP_read_pw_string()`.

**SEE ALSO**

`ui(3)`, `ui_create(3)`

**AUTHOR**

Richard Levitte ([richard@levitte.org](mailto:richard@levitte.org)) for the OpenSSL project (<http://www.openssl.org>).

**NAME**

X509\_NAME\_add\_entry\_by\_txt, X509\_NAME\_add\_entry\_by\_OBJ,  
 X509\_NAME\_add\_entry\_by\_NID, X509\_NAME\_add\_entry, X509\_NAME\_delete\_entry –  
 X509\_NAME modification functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(X509_NAME *name, char *field, int type, unsigned char *bytes,
int len, int loc, int set); int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, ASN1_OBJECT
*obj, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); int
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int
len, int loc, int set); int X509_NAME_add_entry(X509_NAME *name, X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int
loc, int set); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*X509\_NAME\_add\_entry\_by\_txt()*, *X509\_NAME\_add\_entry\_by\_OBJ()* and *X509\_NAME\_add\_entry\_by\_NID()* add a field whose name is defined by a string **field**, an object **obj** or a NID **nid** respectively. The field value to be added is in **bytes** of length **len**. If **len** is -1 then the field length is calculated internally using `strlen(bytes)`.

The type of field is determined by **type** which can either be a definition of the type of **bytes** (such as **MBSTRING\_ASC**) or a standard ASN1 type (such as **V\_ASN1\_IA5STRING**). The new entry is added to a position determined by **loc** and **set**.

*X509\_NAME\_add\_entry()* adds a copy of **X509\_NAME\_ENTRY** structure **ne** to **name**. The new entry is added to a position determined by **loc** and **set**. Since a copy of **ne** is added **ne** must be freed up after the call.

*X509\_NAME\_delete\_entry()* deletes an entry from **name** at position **loc**. The deleted entry is returned and must be freed up.

**NOTES**

The use of string types such as **MBSTRING\_ASC** or **MBSTRING\_UTF8** is strongly recommended for the **type** parameter. This allows the internal code to correctly determine the type of the field and to apply length checks according to the relevant standards. This is done using *ASN1\_STRING\_set\_by\_NID()*.

If instead an ASN1 type is used no checks are performed and the supplied data in **bytes** is used directly.

In *X509\_NAME\_add\_entry\_by\_txt()* the **field** string represents the field name using `OBJ_txt2obj(field, 0)`.

The **loc** and **set** parameters determine where a new entry should be added. For almost all applications **loc** can be set to -1 and **set** to 0. This adds a new entry to the end of **name** as a single valued RelativeDistinguishedName (RDN).

**loc** actually determines the index where the new entry is inserted: if it is -1 it is appended.

**set** determines how the new type is added. If it is zero a new RDN is created.

If **set** is -1 or 1 it is added to the previous or next RDN structure respectively. This will then be a multi-valued RDN: since multivalued RDNs are very seldom used **set** is almost always set to zero.

**EXAMPLES**

Create an **X509\_NAME** structure:

“C=UK, O=Disorganized Organization, CN=Joe Bloggs”



```

X509_NAME *nm;
nm = X509_NAME_new();
if (nm == NULL)
    /* Some error */
if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
                                "C", "UK", -1, -1, 0))
    /* Error */
if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
                                "O", "Disorganized Organization", -1, -1, 0))
    /* Error */
if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
                                "CN", "Joe Bloggs", -1, -1, 0))
    /* Error */

```

## RETURN VALUES

*X509\_NAME\_add\_entry\_by\_txt()*, *X509\_NAME\_add\_entry\_by\_OBJ()*, *X509\_NAME\_add\_entry\_by\_NID()* and *X509\_NAME\_add\_entry()* return 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred.

*X509\_NAME\_delete\_entry()* returns either the deleted **X509\_NAME\_ENTRY** structure or **NULL** if an error occurred.

## BUGS

**type** can still be set to **V\_ASN1\_APP\_CHOOSE** to use a different algorithm to determine field types. Since this form does not understand multicharacter types, performs no length checks and can result in invalid field types its use is strongly discouraged.

## SEE ALSO

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *d2i\_X509\_NAME(3)*

## HISTORY

**NAME**

X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_get\_object, X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_get\_data,  
 X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_set\_object, X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_set\_data, X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_txt,  
 X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_NID, X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_OBJ –  
 X509\_NAME\_ENTRY utility functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
ASN1_OBJECT * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); ASN1_STRING *
X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);

int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int
X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len);

X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, char
*field, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, int nid, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len);
X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne,
ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

*X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_get\_object()* retrieves the field name of **ne** in and **ASN1\_OBJECT** structure.

*X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_get\_data()* retrieves the field value of **ne** in and **ASN1\_STRING** structure.

*X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_set\_object()* sets the field name of **ne** to **obj**.

*X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_set\_data()* sets the field value of **ne** to string type **type** and value determined by **bytes** and **len**.

*X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_txt()*, *X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_NID()* and  
*X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_OBJ()* create and return an **X509\_NAME\_ENTRY** structure.

**NOTES**

*X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_get\_object()* and *X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_get\_data()* can be used to examine an **X509\_NAME\_ENTRY** function as returned by *X509\_NAME\_get\_entry()* for example.

*X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_txt()*, *X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_NID()*, and  
*X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_OBJ()* create and return an

*X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_txt()*, *X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_OBJ()*,  
*X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_create\_by\_NID()* and *X509\_NAME\_ENTRY\_set\_data()* are seldom used in practice because **X509\_NAME\_ENTRY** structures are almost always part of **X509\_NAME** structures and the corresponding **X509\_NAME** functions are typically used to create and add new entries in a single operation.

The arguments of these functions support similar options to the similarly named ones of the corresponding **X509\_NAME** functions such as *X509\_NAME\_add\_entry\_by\_txt()*. So for example **type** can be set to **MBSTRING\_ASC** but in the case of *X509\_set\_data()* the field name must be set first so the relevant field information can be looked up internally.

**RETURN VALUES****SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *d2i\_X509\_NAME(3)*, *OBJ\_nid2obj(3)*, *OBJ\_nid2obj(3)*

**HISTORY**

TBA

**NAME**

X509\_NAME\_get\_index\_by\_NID, X509\_NAME\_get\_index\_by\_OBJ, X509\_NAME\_get\_entry, X509\_NAME\_entry\_count, X509\_NAME\_get\_text\_by\_NID, X509\_NAME\_get\_text\_by\_OBJ – X509\_NAME lookup and enumeration functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name,int nid,int lastpos); int
X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name,ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);

int X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_NAME *name); X509_NAME_ENTRY
*X509_NAME_get_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc);

int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf,int len); int
X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf,int len);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

These functions allow an **X509\_NAME** structure to be examined. The **X509\_NAME** structure is the same as the **Name** type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used for example in certificate subject and issuer names.

*X509\_NAME\_get\_index\_by\_NID()* and *X509\_NAME\_get\_index\_by\_OBJ()* retrieve the next index matching **nid** or **obj** after **lastpos**. **lastpos** should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned.

*X509\_NAME\_entry\_count()* returns the total number of entries in **name**.

*X509\_NAME\_get\_entry()* retrieves the **X509\_NAME\_ENTRY** from **name** corresponding to index **loc**. Acceptable values for **loc** run from 0 to (X509\_NAME\_entry\_count(name) - 1). The value returned is an internal pointer which must not be freed.

*X509\_NAME\_get\_text\_by\_NID()*, *X509\_NAME\_get\_text\_by\_OBJ()* retrieve the “text” from the first entry in **name** which matches **nid** or **obj**, if no such entry exists -1 is returned. At most **len** bytes will be written and the text written to **buf** will be null terminated. The length of the output string written is returned excluding the terminating null. If **buf** is <NULL> then the amount of space needed in **buf** (excluding the final null) is returned.

**NOTES**

*X509\_NAME\_get\_text\_by\_NID()* and *X509\_NAME\_get\_text\_by\_OBJ()* are legacy functions which have various limitations which make them of minimal use in practice. They can only find the first matching entry and will copy the contents of the field verbatim: this can be highly confusing if the target is a muticharacter string type like a BMPString or a UTF8String.

For a more general solution *X509\_NAME\_get\_index\_by\_NID()* or *X509\_NAME\_get\_index\_by\_OBJ()* should be used followed by *X509\_NAME\_get\_entry()* on any matching indices and then the various **X509\_NAME\_ENTRY** utility functions on the result.

**EXAMPLES**

Process all entries:

```
int i;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;

for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(nm); i++)
{
    e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
    /* Do something with e */
}
```

Process all commonName entries:

```
int loc;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
```

```
loc = -1;
for (;;)
{
    lastpos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, lastpos);
    if (lastpos == -1)
        break;
    e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, lastpos);
    /* Do something with e */
}
```

**RETURN VALUES**

*X509\_NAME\_get\_index\_by\_NID()* and *X509\_NAME\_get\_index\_by\_OBJ()* return the index of the next matching entry or `-1` if not found.

*X509\_NAME\_entry\_count()* returns the total number of entries.

*X509\_NAME\_get\_entry()* returns an **X509\_NAME** pointer to the requested entry or **NULL** if the index is invalid.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *d2i\_X509\_NAME(3)*

**HISTORY**

TBA

## NAME

`X509_NAME_print_ex`, `X509_NAME_print_ex_fp`, `X509_NAME_print`, `X509_NAME_oneline` – `X509_NAME` printing routines.

## SYNOPSIS

```
#include <openssl/x509.h>

int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags)
int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags)
char * X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, int size);
int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, X509_NAME *name, int obase);
```

## DESCRIPTION

`X509_NAME_print_ex()` prints a human readable version of **nm** to BIO **out**. Each line (for multiline formats) is indented by **indent** spaces. The output format can be extensively customised by use of the **flags** parameter.

`X509_NAME_print_ex_fp()` is identical to `X509_NAME_print_ex()` except the output is written to FILE pointer **fp**.

`X509_NAME_oneline()` prints an ASCII version of **a** to **buf**. At most **size** bytes will be written. If **buf** is **NULL** then a buffer is dynamically allocated and returned, otherwise **buf** is returned.

`X509_NAME_print()` prints out **name** to **bp** indenting each line by **obase** characters. Multiple lines are used if the output (including indent) exceeds 80 characters.

## NOTES

The functions `X509_NAME_oneline()` and `X509_NAME_print()` are legacy functions which produce a non standard output form, they don't handle multi character fields and have various quirks and inconsistencies. Their use is strongly discouraged in new applications.

Although there are a large number of possible flags for most purposes **XN\_FLAG\_ONELINE**, **XN\_FLAG\_MULTILINE** or **XN\_FLAG\_RFC2253** will suffice. As noted on the `ASN1_STRING_print_ex(3)` manual page for UTF8 terminals the **ASN1\_STRFLAGS\_ESC\_MSB** should be unset: so for example **XN\_FLAG\_ONELINE & ~ASN1\_STRFLAGS\_ESC\_MSB** would be used.

The complete set of the flags supported by `X509_NAME_print_ex()` is listed below.

Several options can be ored together.

The options **XN\_FLAG\_SEP\_COMMA\_PLUS**, **XN\_FLAG\_SEP\_CPLUS\_SPC**, **XN\_FLAG\_SEP\_SPLUS\_SPC** and **XN\_FLAG\_SEP\_MULTILINE** determine the field separators to use. Two distinct separators are used between distinct RelativeDistinguishedName components and separate values in the same RDN for a multi-valued RDN. Multi-valued RDNs are currently very rare so the second separator will hardly ever be used.

**XN\_FLAG\_SEP\_COMMA\_PLUS** uses comma and plus as separators. **XN\_FLAG\_SEP\_CPLUS\_SPC** uses comma and plus with spaces: this is more readable than plain comma and plus. **XN\_FLAG\_SEP\_SPLUS\_SPC** uses spaced semicolon and plus. **XN\_FLAG\_SEP\_MULTILINE** uses spaced newline and plus respectively.

If **XN\_FLAG\_DN\_REV** is set the whole DN is printed in reversed order.

The fields **XN\_FLAG\_FN\_SN**, **XN\_FLAG\_FN\_LN**, **XN\_FLAG\_FN\_OID**, **XN\_FLAG\_FN\_NONE** determine how a field name is displayed. It will use the short name (e.g. CN) the long name (e.g. common-Name) always use OID numerical form (normally OIDs are only used if the field name is not recognised) and no field name respectively.

If **XN\_FLAG\_SPC\_EQ** is set then spaces will be placed around the '=' character separating field names and values.

If **XN\_FLAG\_DUMP\_UNKNOWN\_FIELDS** is set then the encoding of unknown fields is printed instead of the values.

If **XN\_FLAG\_FN\_ALIGN** is set then field names are padded to 20 characters: this is only of use for multiline format.

Additionally all the options supported by `ASN1_STRING_print_ex()` can be used to control how each

field value is displayed.

In addition a number options can be set for commonly used formats.

**XN\_FLAG\_RFC2253** sets options which produce an output compatible with RFC2253 it is equivalent to:  
**ASN1\_STRFLGS\_RFC2253** | **XN\_FLAG\_SEP\_COMMA\_PLUS** | **XN\_FLAG\_DN\_REV** |  
**XN\_FLAG\_FN\_SN** | **XN\_FLAG\_DUMP\_UNKNOWN\_FIELDS**

**XN\_FLAG\_ONELINE** is a more readable one line format it is the same as:

**ASN1\_STRFLGS\_RFC2253** | **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_ESC\_QUOTE** | **XN\_FLAG\_SEP\_CPLUS\_SPC** |  
**XN\_FLAG\_SPC\_EQ** | **XN\_FLAG\_FN\_SN**

**XN\_FLAG\_MULTILINE** is a multiline format is is the same as:

**ASN1\_STRFLGS\_ESC\_CTRL** | **ASN1\_STRFLGS\_ESC\_MSB** | **XN\_FLAG\_SEP\_MULTILINE** |  
**XN\_FLAG\_SPC\_EQ** | **XN\_FLAG\_FN\_LN** | **XN\_FLAG\_FN\_ALIGN**

**XN\_FLAG\_COMPAT** uses a format identical to *X509\_NAME\_print()*: in fact it calls *X509\_NAME\_print()* internally.

## SEE ALSO

*ASN1\_STRING\_print\_ex(3)*

## HISTORY

TBA

**NAME**

*X509\_new*, *X509\_free* – X509 certificate ASN1 allocation functions

**SYNOPSIS**

```
X509 *X509_new(void);  
void X509_free(X509 *a);
```

**DESCRIPTION**

The X509 ASN1 allocation routines, allocate and free an X509 structure, which represents an X509 certificate.

*X509\_new()* allocates and initializes a X509 structure.

*X509\_free()* frees up the **X509** structure **a**.

**RETURN VALUES**

If the allocation fails, *X509\_new()* returns **NULL** and sets an error code that can be obtained by *ERR\_get\_error(3)*. Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.

*X509\_free()* returns no value.

**SEE ALSO**

*ERR\_get\_error(3)*, *d2i\_X509(3)*

**HISTORY**

*X509\_new()* and *X509\_free()* are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.

**NAME**

config – OpenSSL CONF library configuration files

**DESCRIPTION**

The OpenSSL CONF library can be used to read configuration files. It is used for the OpenSSL master configuration file **openssl.cnf** and in a few other places like **SPKAC** files and certificate extension files for the **x509** utility.

A configuration file is divided into a number of sections. Each section starts with a line [ **section\_name** ] and ends when a new section is started or end of file is reached. A section name can consist of alphanumeric characters and underscores.

The first section of a configuration file is special and is referred to as the **default** section this is usually unnamed and is from the start of file until the first named section. When a name is being looked up it is first looked up in a named section (if any) and then the default section.

The environment is mapped onto a section called **ENV**.

Comments can be included by preceding them with the **#** character

Each section in a configuration file consists of a number of name and value pairs of the form **name=value**

The **name** string can contain any alphanumeric characters as well as a few punctuation symbols such as **.**, **;** and **\_**.

The **value** string consists of the string following the **=** character until end of line with any leading and trailing white space removed.

The value string undergoes variable expansion. This can be done by including the form **\$var** or **\${var}**: this will substitute the value of the named variable in the current section. It is also possible to substitute a value from another section using the syntax **\$section::name** or **\${section::name}**. By using the form **\$ENV::name** environment variables can be substituted. It is also possible to assign values to environment variables by using the name **ENV::name**, this will work if the program looks up environment variables using the **CONF** library instead of calling *getenv()* directly.

It is possible to escape certain characters by using any kind of quote or the **\** character. By making the last character of a line a **\** a **value** string can be spread across multiple lines. In addition the sequences **\n**, **\r**, **\b** and **\t** are recognized.

**NOTES**

If a configuration file attempts to expand a variable that doesn't exist then an error is flagged and the file will not load. This can happen if an attempt is made to expand an environment variable that doesn't exist. For example the default OpenSSL master configuration file used the value of **HOME** which may not be defined on non Unix systems.

This can be worked around by including a **default** section to provide a default value: then if the environment lookup fails the default value will be used instead. For this to work properly the default value must be defined earlier in the configuration file than the expansion. See the **EXAMPLES** section for an example of how to do this.

If the same variable exists in the same section then all but the last value will be silently ignored. In certain circumstances such as with DNs the same field may occur multiple times. This is usually worked around by ignoring any characters before an initial **.** e.g.

```
1.OU="My first OU"
2.OU="My Second OU"
```

**EXAMPLES**

Here is a sample configuration file using some of the features mentioned above.

```
# This is the default section.

HOME=/temp
RANDFILE= ${ENV::HOME}/.rnd
configdir=$ENV::HOME/config
```



```
[ section_one ]
# We are now in section one.
# Quotes permit leading and trailing whitespace
any = " any variable name "
other = A string that can \
cover several lines \
by including \\ characters
message = Hello World\n
[ section_two ]
greeting = ${section_one::message}
```

This next example shows how to expand environment variables safely.

Suppose you want a variable called **tmpfile** to refer to a temporary filename. The directory it is placed in can be determined by the **TEMP** or **TMP** environment variables but they may not be set to any value at all. If you just include the environment variable names and the variable doesn't exist then this will cause an error when an attempt is made to load the configuration file. By making use of the default section both values can be looked up with **TEMP** taking priority and **/tmp** used if neither is defined:

```
TMP=/tmp
# The above value is used if TMP isn't in the environment
TEMP=${ENV::TMP}
# The above value is used if TEMP isn't in the environment
tmpfile=${ENV::TEMP}/tmp.filename
```

## BUGS

Currently there is no way to include characters using the octal **\nnn** form. Strings are all null terminated so nulls cannot form part of the value.

The escaping isn't quite right: if you want to use sequences like **\n** you can't use any quote escaping on the same line.

Files are loaded in a single pass. This means that a variable expansion will only work if the variables referenced are defined earlier in the file.

## SEE ALSO

*x509(1)*, *req(1)*, *ca(1)*

**NAME**

Modes of DES – the variants of DES and other crypto algorithms of OpenSSL

**DESCRIPTION**

Several crypto algorithms for OpenSSL can be used in a number of modes. Those are used for using block ciphers in a way similar to stream ciphers, among other things.

**OVERVIEW****Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB)**

Normally, this is found as the function *algorithm\_ecb\_encrypt()*.

- 64 bits are enciphered at a time.
- The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection.
- The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block (for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'.
- An error will only affect one ciphertext block.

**Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)**

Normally, this is found as the function *algorithm\_cbc\_encrypt()*. Be aware that *des\_cbc\_encrypt()* is not really DES CBC (it does not update the IV); use *des\_ncbc\_encrypt()* instead.

- a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time.
- The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable.
- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not be rearranged.
- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext.
- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks.

**Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB)**

Normally, this is found as the function *algorithm\_cfb\_encrypt()*.

- a number of bits (*j*)  $\leq 64$  are enciphered at a time.
- The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable.
- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the current and all preceding variables and therefore *j*-bit variables are chained together and can not be rearranged.
- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext.
- The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of *k* (maximal if *j* == *k*). In my implementation this is always the case.
- Selection of a small value for *j* will require more cycles through the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause greater processing overheads.
- Only multiples of *j* bits can be enciphered.
- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables.

**Output Feedback Mode (OFB)**

Normally, this is found as the function *algorithm\_ofb\_encrypt()*.

- a number of bits (*j*)  $\leq 64$  are enciphered at a time.
- The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key.

- The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks.
- The use of different start variables values prevents the same plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different key streams.
- Selection of a small value for *j* will require more cycles through the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause greater processing overheads.
- Only multiples of *j* bits can be enciphered.
- OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext.
- OFB mode is not self-synchronizing. If the two operation of encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs to be re-initialized.
- Each re-initialization should use a value of the start variable different from the start variable values used before with the same key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be produced each time from the same parameters. This would be susceptible to a 'known plaintext' attack.

### Triple ECB Mode

Normally, this is found as the function *algorithm\_ecb3\_encrypt()*.

- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again.
- As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits. There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2<sup>56</sup> blocks of memory, not very likely, even for the NSA.
- If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with just one key.
- If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits. There are attacks that could reduce the effective key strength to only slightly more than 56 bits, but these require a lot of memory.
- If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal ecb mode.

### Triple CBC Mode

Normally, this is found as the function *algorithm\_ede3\_cbc\_encrypt()*.

- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3.
- As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode.

## NOTES

This text has been written in large parts by Eric Young in his original documentation for SSLeay, the predecessor of OpenSSL. In turn, he attributed it to:

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AS 2805.5.2
Australian Standard
Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces,
Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm
Appendix A
```

## SEE ALSO

*blowfish*(3), *des*(3), *idea*(3), *rc2*(3)